About CIA

[Rasputin]

[donsaeid]

[donsaeid]

[donsaeid]

[donsaeid]

نويسنده: آرتور هالنيك


جاسوسى نو


در پى پيشرفت قابل توجه تكنولوژى، عرصه جاسوسى تا حد زيادى خصوصى شده است. امروز جمع آورى اطلاعات از طريق تكنولوژى پيشرفته و استفاده از ماهواره ها و وسايل الكترونيكى تا حد زيادى جاى شيوه هاى قديمى جاسوسى را كه آژانس هايى مثل سيا دنبال مى كردند گرفته است.


اطلاعات و جاسوسى بخش خصوصى در حال تبديل شدن به بخش مهمى از نظم نوين اطلاعات جهانى است
( رئيس سابق واحد هماهنگ كننده امور آكادميك سيا)
وقتى از اطلاعات و جاسوسى بحث مى شود، معمولا سازمان هاى دولتى مانند سيا، سرويس اطلاعات و جاسوسى انگليس(SIS) و وزارت امنيت ملى چين در ذهن تداعى مى شود. اين استنباط عمومى وجود دارد كه اين سازمان هاى دولتى هستند كه فعاليت جاسوسى، تجزيه و تحليل اطلاعات و برخى ماموريت هاى مختلف را انجام مى دهند. اكثر كشورهاى جهان علاوه بر آژانس هاى اطلاعاتى، آژانس هاى ضد اطلاعاتى نيز دارند كه وظيفه آنها جلوگيرى از فعاليت جاسوسان و حفاظت از امنيت ملى است. در پى حوادث يازده سپتامبر توجه ويژه اى به اطلاعات و نقشى كه در امنيت ملى مى تواند داشته باشد، معطوف شده است. با وجود اين نسبت به جاسوسى در بخش خصوصى همچنان غفلت مى شود. اين در حالى است كه اطلاعات جمع آورى شده توسط بخش خصوصى نيز مى تواند به اندازه اطلاعات آژانس هاى دولتى در امنيت ملى اهميت داشته باشد.
در حقيقت در پى پيشرفت قابل توجه تكنولوژى، عرصه جاسوسى تا حد زيادى خصوصى شده است. امروز جمع آورى اطلاعات از طريق تكنولوژى پيشرفته و استفاده از ماهواره ها و وسايل الكترونيكى تا حد زيادى جاى شيوه هاى قديمى جاسوسى را كه آژانس هايى مثل سيا دنبال مى كردند گرفته است. زمانى تصويربردارى ماهواره اى يكى از تكنولوژى هاى مخفى كشورهاى قدرتمند، براى جاسوسى بود ولى امروز تهيه تصاوير ماهواره اى از هر نقطه اى از جهان، توسط بسيارى از شركت هاى خصوصى صورت مى گيرد و اين تصاوير بدون مشكل به فروش مى رسند. بسيارى از اين تصاوير از طريق پايگاه هاى اينترنتى به فروش مى رسند؛ يعنى اين كه فروشنده اين تصاوير حساس حتى خريدار و اهداف آن را نمى شناسد. اين پيشرفت هاى تكنولوژيكى باعث شده آژانس هاى جاسوسى كه در گذشته امكان پرتاب ماهواره به فضا را نداشتند، اكنون اين اطلاعات را از بخش خصوصى بخرند. امروز جاسوسى از طريق تكنولوژى پيشرفته در بخش خصوصى، كمتر از شيوه هاى قديمى جاسوسى، مانند اعزام جاسوس به خاك يك كشور، خصمانه به نظر مى رسد. اين در حالى است كه تكنولوژى هاى ضد اطلاعاتى مانند دستگاه هاى رمزبندى مكاتبات و مكالمات تلفنى و يا سيستم هاى Firewall مورد استفاده بيشترى قرار مى گيرد.
اطلاعات و جاسوسى بخش خصوصى در حال تبديل شدن به بخش مهمى از نظم نوين اطلاعات جهانى است.

تفاوت بخش دولتى و بخش خصوصى در زمينه جاسوسى
اما تفاوت هاى اطلاعات بخش خصوصى و بخش دولتى چيست؟ هدف اطلاعات و جاسوسى دولتى حفاظت از كشور است، در حالى كه هدف اصلى اطلاعات و جاسوسى بخش خصوصى عمدتاً كسب سود اقتصادى بيشتر است. در زمينه ضداطلاعاتى نيز قوانين متفاوتى بر دو بخش دولتى و خصوصى حاكم است. اقدامات دولت ها براى مقابله با فعاليت جاسوسى كشورهاى ديگر شامل سعى در نفوذ در سازمان هاى جاسوسى خارجى از طريق كاركنان آنها، تلاش براى جذب همكارى عناصر جاسوسى بيگانه و يا بهره بردارى از تكنيك هاى دفاعى مانند سيستم هاى نظارتى است تا امكان رخنه عناصر خارجى به حداقل برسد. در بخش خصوصى بسيارى از اين تكنيك ها يا از لحاظ قانونى ممنوع هستند و يا در واقعيت نمى توانند در بخش خصوصى كارايى داشته باشند. بنابراين بخش خصوصى ناچار است روش هاى ملايم ترى را براى مقابله با جاسوسان ابداع كند؛ چرا كه ابزار بخش خصوصى محدودتر است. همان طور كه گفته شد، هدف از جاسوسى در بخش خصوصى كسب سود اقتصادى از طريق فروش اطلاعات حساس به مشتريان است. عمده اين مشتريان خود شركت هايى هستند كه از طريق دستيابى به اين اطلاعات سعى در كسب سود اقتصادى بيشتر دارند. بنابراين به جاسوسى بخش خصوصى، جاسوسى صنعتى نيز گفته مى شود.
در امريكا در سال 1996 قانون جاسوسى اقتصادى به تصويب رسيد. هدف از اين اقدام مبارزه جدى تر با جاسوسان خارجى بود كه در زمينه گردآورى اطلاعات صنعتى فعاليت مى كردند. با وجود اين مشخص شد تصويب چنين قانون هايى نمى تواند به طور كارايى مانع فعاليت جاسوسى صنعتى شود و فقط فعاليت جاسوسى را پرهزينه تر مى كند. محدوديت هاى حقوقى و اخلاقى در جاسوسى بخش خصوصى به سهولت نقض مى شوند. مثل بيشتر آژانس هاى اطلاعات دولتى، اطلاعات بخش خصوصى نيز از منابع باز تهيه مى شود. منابع باز، منابعى مانند رسانه هاى چاپى و الكترونيكى و اينترنت هستند كه تقريباً به طور رايگان و به راحتى در دسترس هستند. تهيه و توليد بانك هاى اطلاعاتى اينترنت ـ محور ميزان منابع باز را به حدى افزايش داده است كه برخى تحليل گران معتقدند ديگر نيازى به شيوه هاى سنتى گردآورى اطلاعات نيست. اين منابع باز، جاسوسى را كاربردى تر كرده است چرا كه اطلاعات جمع آورى شده مى تواند كامل كننده اطلاعات جمع آورى شده از طريق جاسوسى كه معمولاً مبهم و ناكامل هستند باشد.
با وجودى كه قرار نيست عاملان اطلاعاتى بخش خصوصى به جاسوسى بپردازند، دسترسى به تكنولوژى هاى پيشرفته اى دارند كه فراهم كننده بسيارى از نيازهاى يك عمليات جاسوسى است. يكى از روش هاى مبتنى بر تكنولوژى پيشرفته كه به طور گسترده در بخش خصوصى رشد كرده است، كاوش ديتا است. تكنيك هاى كاوش ديتا، تكنيك هاى پيدا كردن اطلاعات در بانك هاى اطلاعات رايانه اى است. يكى ديگر از تكنولوژى هاى حساسى كه اكنون در دسترس بخش خصوصى است، تكنولوژى ماهواره اى است.
يكى ديگر از تفاوت هاى اطلاعات بخش خصوصى و دولتى در اين است كه سازمان هاى اطلاعاتى دولتى، بخشى مستقل هستند و قسمتى از زيرساختار دولت محسوب مى شوند. اما فعاليت اطلاعاتى بخش خصوصى به صورت مستقل دنبال نمى شود؛ يعنى يك شركت صرفاً تحت عنوان شركت اطلاعات و جاسوسى فعاليت نمى كند. فعاليت اطلاعاتى در بخش خصوصى از طريق يكى از معاونت هاى شركت خصوصى دنبال مى شود و برخى شركت ها، تحت عنوان شركت هاى مشاوره فعاليت مى كنند ولى در حقيقت بخش عمده اى از فعاليت خود را به جاسوسى اختصاص داده اند.
شركت هاى اطلاعاتى بخش خصوصى ممكن است در زمينه گردآورى و تجزيه و تحليل اطلاعات در مورد رقباى موجود در بازار، ريسك هاى سرمايه گذارى خارجى و يا ابعاد مختلف امنيتى، تخصص داشته باشند.

تفاوت اقدامات امنيتى و اقدامات اطلاعاتى
مقامات تجارى امريكا تمايلى ندارند كه واحدى تحت عنوان واحد اطلاعات در شركت خود داشته باشند؛ چرا كه معتقدند وجود چنين بخشى در شركت مى تواند حاكى از اين باشد كه شركت در زمينه جاسوسى صنعتى و يا حداقل يك كار غيرقانونى ديگر فعاليت دارد. مديران به خوبى نمى توانند درك كنند اطلاعات تا چه حد مى تواند در وضعيت شركت نقش داشته باشد؛ چرا كه نتايج كارهاى اطلاعاتى اغلب قابل اندازه گيرى نيستند. با وجود اين همين رهبران تجارى به اين اطلاعات نياز دارند. اطلاعات مى تواند مانع شگفت زدگى، باعث برنامه ريزى استراتژيك، نظارت بر تحولات و كمك در شكست دادن رقبا شود. در حقيقت هزينه براى فعاليت اطلاعاتى در بخش خصوصى با هدف كسب موفقيت و فرصت هاى اقتصادى بيشتر صورت مى گيرد.
اما در مورد مسايل امنيتى اين رويكردها چندان وجود ندارد. هزينه براى اقدامات امنيتى با هدف جلوگيرى از ضرر صورت مى گيرد و برخلاف مسايل و فعاليت هاى اطلاعاتى، هزينه اقدامات امنيتى تا حد زيادى قابل برآورد و تخمين است. به علاوه مديران مشكلى با واژه فعاليت امنيتى ندارند. در امريكا اين الگو ايجاد شد كه شركت ها امور اطلاعاتى خود را به شركت هاى ديگر مى سپارند ولى فعاليت هاى امنيتى را از طريق يكى از معاونت هاى خود انجام مى دهند. بسيارى از شركت هاى تازه تاسيس حتى نسبت به اصول و اقدامات امنيتى نيز بى تفاوت هستند و فقط زمانى متوجه اهميت اين اقدامات مى شوند كه به نوعى صدمه ببينند و يا ضرر كنند.
در امريكا هر كسى كه بخواهد مى تواند يك مأمور اطلاعاتى بخش خصوصى شود و كافى است فقط يك كارت چاپ كند و در جست وجوى شغلى متناسب با آن باشد. هيچ نوع گواهينامه براى چنين افرادى ضرورى نيست و هيچ آزمايش استاندارد شده اى از آنها گرفته نمى شود. اكثر اين اطلاعات هيچ فعاليت در بخش اطلاعاتى دولتى ندارند. اما در امريكا شرايط لازم براى يك مأمور امنيتى بودن سفت و سخت تر است. تمام افرادى كه در حيطه امنيتى فعاليت مى كنند بايد مدرك پرسنل حفاظتى مجاز باشند. اين مدرك از سوى جامعه امنيت صنعتى امريكا (ASIS) اعطا مى شود.
تمام افرادى كه مدتى در يك سازمان اطلاعاتى مشغول به كار بوده اند، يك مدل نظرى عنوان چرخه اطلاعاتى را فرا مى گيرند. چرخه اطلاعاتى زمانى آغاز مى شود كه سياست گذاران از مديران اطلاعاتى برخى اطلاعات لازم و ضرورى را درخواست مى كنند. اين اعلام نياز، آغازگر مرحله دوم چرخه اطلاعاتى، يعنى گردآورى اطلاعات است. سپس تحليل گران اين اطلاعات را تجزيه و تحليل مى كنند. اين نتيجه گيرى ها به سياست گذارانى كه اطلاعات را خواسته بودند ارسال مى شود و سياست گذاران تصميم لازم براساس اين اطلاعات اتخاذ مى كنند. با وجودى كه اين مدل در بخش اطلاعات دولتى خيلى دقيق پيگيرى نمى شود، در بخش اطلاعات خصوصى به طور نسبتا دقيقى پى گيرى و اجرا مى شود.
در بخش خصوصى، مديران و سياست گذاران، پروسه اطلاعاتى را مستقيم تر از بخش دولتى هدايت مى كنند. در بخش خصوصى ارتباط نزديك ترى بين كارفرما و عناصر اطلاعاتى وجود دارد. چرا كه تامين كنندگان اطلاعات سعى دارند محصولى را ارائه كنند كه مطمئن هستند مورد پسند و استفاده سفارش دهنده قرار مى گيرد. اما آيا اطلاعات مبناى تصميم گيرى ها در بخش خصوصى است؟ پاسخ به اين سؤال مشكل است ولى شواهد حاكى از اين است كه اهميت اطلاعات در تصميم گيرى هاى بخش خصوصى بيشتر از تصميم گيرى هاى دولتى است. در بخش دولتى، تحليلگران اطلاعاتى سياستگذار نيستند و حتى دخالتى در تصميم گيرى ها ندارند. اما در بخش خصوصى، معمولاً مديران و سياستگذاران از گردآورندگان اطلاعات مشورت مى خواهند چرا كه به آنها حقوق پرداخت مى كنند.

[donsaeid]

رقابت و برنامه ريزى
پروسه جمع آورى و تجزيه و تحليل اطلاعات در دو ناحيه بخش خصوصى اهميت ويژه اى دارد. اولى، اطلاعات بازار و يا اطلاعات رقابتى است. اطلاعات بازار در طول دهه گذشته مورد توجه جدى قرار گرفته است و اين به دليل افزايش آگاهى شركت ها، در مورد اهميت اطلاعات در مورد اوضاع و احوال بازار و رقبا است. در صورتى كه مانند برخى نظريه پردازان معتقد باشيم كه بازار ميدان جنگ بين رقباى تجارى است، بنابراين اطلاعات در مورد اوضاع بازار براى شركت ها به اندازه اطلاعات در مورد ميدان جنگ ارزشمند است. به كمك اين اطلاعات است كه مى توان رقبا و خصوصيات آنها را شناخت و اقدامات لازم را براى شكست دادن آنها انجام داد.
ناحيه دوم كه در آن جمع آورى و تجزيه و تحليل نقش ويژه اى دارد، برنامه ريزى استراتژيك است. اطلاعات در برنامه ريزى استراتژيك در تجارت بين المللى نقش مهم ترى ايفا مى كند؛ اما اين امر كمتر مورد توجه دانشگاهيان و رسانه ها بوده است. شبكه پيچيده اى از حرفه اى هاى جمع آورى اطلاعات با هدف برنامه ريزى استراتژيك وجود دارد. بسيارى از اين افراد از مقامات دولتى سابق هستند و تمايلى ندارند در كانون توجه رسانه ها قرار گيرند. اين افراد معمولاً مشغول آناليز ريسك هاى سياسى و ارائه نتايج اين آناليزها به سرمايه گذاران خارجى هستند. اين اطلاعات در سرمايه گذارى هاى خارجى بسيار ارزشمند است. اين اطلاعات در مورد سرمايه گذاى در كشورهاى در حال توسعه اهميت بيشترى پيدا مى كند، چرا كه سرمايه گذارى در اين كشورها معمولاً ريسك هاى بيشترى دارد.
امريكا در مورد اطلاعات بخش خصوصى دو موضع متمايز دارد. در مورد اطلاعات بازار، دولت امريكا همواره تاكيد كرده كه از سرويس هاى اطلاعاتى اش براى جمع آورى اطلاعات مربوط به شركت هاى خارجى به منظور تقويت شركت هاى داخلى استفاده نخواهد كرد. اين موضع در تضاد با موضع كشورى مانند فرانسه است كه تأييد كرده اند از شركت هاى خارجى به نفع شركت هاى داخلى جاسوسى مى كند. از بين ساير دولت ها كه اقدام به جاسوسى صنعتى مى كنند مى توان به كشورهاى ژاپن، كره جنوبى، چين و اسراييل اشاره كرد.
در زمينه آناليز ريسك، يعنى استفاده از اطلاعات براى برنامه ريزى استراتژيك، دولت امريكا رويكرد متفاوتى دارد. وزارت خارجه و وزارت بازرگانى امريكا، هر دو مشوق سرمايه گذارى خارجى شركت ها هستند و از طريق ارائه اطلاعات و حتى بيمه سعى دارند ريسك اين سرمايه گذارى را به حداقل برسانند. با اين حال اين رويكرد نتوانسته از تجارت و سرمايه گذارى خارجى ريسك زدايى كند و بسيارى از شركت ها نسبت به اين اطلاعات دولتى بى اعتماد هستند و تمايلى ندارند دولت از برنامه هاى آنها مطلع شود. بنابراين، شركت ها ترجيح مى دهند بدون و سروصدا، نياز اطلاعاتى با هدف برنامه ريزى استراتژيك را نيز از طريق شركت هاى اطلاعاتى خصوصى تأمين كنند.
با وجودى كه دولت امريكا متعهد شده است از سرويس هاى اطلاعاتى اش براى حفاظت از صنايع داخلى استفاده نكند، اعلام كرده از منابع اطلاعاتى و جاسوسى اش به عنوان ابزارى دفاعى در تشخيص انعقاد غيرمنصفانه قراردادهاى بين المللى و يا جاسوسى صنعتى ساير كشورها استفاده خواهد كرد. عوامل اطلاعاتى دولت امريكا معتقدند، صنايع خصوصى امريكا، توان مقابله با جاسوسى صنعتى بسيارى از آژانس هاى اطلاعاتى خارجى را ندارند؛ چرا كه اين آژانس ها بسيار هوشمندانه و پيچيده برخورد مى كنند و تجهيزات پيشرفته اى در اختيار دارند.
يكى ديگر از نمونه هاى جاسوسى در بخش خصوصى از طريق جاسوسى يك فرد در يك شركت به نفع شركتى ديگر است. اين موارد از جاسوسى در حال افزايش است. براى مثال چند سال پيش مدير اجرايى شركت خودروسازى جنرال موتورز امريكا، اين شركت را ترك كرد و به شركت خودروسازى فولكس واگن آلمان پيوست و بدين ترتيب تمام اطلاعات حساس اين شركت را به شركت فولكس واگن منتقل كرد.

ماموريت هاى سرى
يكى از مسايل و ابعاد فعاليت هاى اطلاعاتى و جاسوسى كه كمتر مورد توجه قرارگرفته، مأموريت هاى سرى است. در بخش دولتى، مأموريت سرى به مفهوم عمليات مخفيانه، نه با هدف جمع آورى اطلاعات، بلكه با هدف اجراى سياست هاى دولت است؛ طورى كه بتوان در آينده چنين اقدامى را انكار كرد. مأموريت هاى سرى شامل برخى اقدامات سياسى و اقتصادى در خارج از كشور با هدف كمك به دوستان در خارج ازكشور است. اين اقدامات از طريق مأموران مخفى اجرا و شامل فريب دادن و گمراه كردن رقيب و يا حريف مى شود. يكى ديگر از اين اقدامات سياه پراكنى يعنى پراكندن اخبار كذب و تهمت ها در مورد رقيب است.
با اين اوصاف ممكن است چنين به نظر رسد كه مأموريت هاى سرى جايى در شركت هاى خصوصى ندارد. با وجود اين، حقيقت اين است كه شركت هاى خصوصى نيز از اين اقدام براى تضعيف رقباى خود استفاده مى كنند. يكى از اين اقدامات كه توسط شركت هاى خصوصى دنبال مى شود، انتشار اخبار كذب است. ممكن است يك شركت به طور دروغين اعلام كند در آينده خيلى نزديك محصول جديدى عرضه خواهدكرد تا از اين طريق رقيب خود را وادارد زمان و هزينه زيادى را صرف ساخت محصولى مشابه كند. يكى ديگر از اقدامات مخفى كه ممكن است شركت هاى خصوصى براى از پاى درآوردن رقبا انجام دهند، ايجاد اغتشاش است. اين اقدام در بين شركت هاى هواپيمايى بيشتر رايج است. چند سال پيش شركت هواپيمايى British Airways از طريق سازماندهى اعتصاب و شورش در شركت هواپيمايى Virgin AHantic اين شركت را تا آستانه ورشكستگى پيش برد.
پيش از حوادث يازده سپتامبر، مديران تجارى شايد بر اهميت اطلاعات و امنيت واقف بودند و تاحدى تدابير امنيتى را در نظر نمى گرفتند. ولى نسبت به اهميت اطلاعات تا حد زيادى بى توجه بودند. حوادث يازده سپتامبر زنگ خطرى براى بخش خصوصى بود. هشدارهاى مبهم و غيرمتمركز دولت در مورد احتمال حملات تروريستى به بانك ها و مراكز خريد كمك چندانى به بخش خصوصى نمى كرد و باعث سردرگمى آنها شده بود. شركت هاى خصوصى براى موفقيت در بازار و برنامه ريزى هاى استراتژيك، نياز به اطلاعات كاربردى و دقيق داشتند.
اكنون تجارت جهانى باعث وابستگى بيشتر شركت هاى جهان به يكديگر شده است و فعاليت در چنين شرايطى نياز به امنيت و اطلاعات دارد و شركت هاى امريكايى مى دانند كه دولت نمى تواند به خوبى تأمين كننده اين امنيت و اطلاعات باشد و به همين دليل اين شركت هادرصدد تقويت واحدهاى اطلاعاتى خود هستند.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

White House brushes off CIA report on Iran: report

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The White House dismissed a classified CIA draft assessment that found no conclusive evidence of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program, the New Yorker reported.

The article by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh said the CIA's analysis was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites and on other evidence like measurements of the radioactivity of water samples.

"The CIA found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency," according to the article.

"A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the CIA analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it," it said.

The United States has accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian energy program.

The article, in the current issue of the magazine, discussed how Vice President Dick Cheney believed the Bush administration would deal with Iran if the Republicans lost control of Congress as they did in the November 7 election.

"If the Democrats won on November 7th, the vice president said, that victory would not stop the administration from pursuing a military option with Iran," Hersh wrote, citing an unidentified source familiar with the discussion.

[Rasputin]

Ex-Russian spy dies in hospital

Former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko has died in hospital three weeks after apparently being poisoned in London.
University College Hospital, London, said Mr Litvinenko had died at 2121 GMT on Thursday and the cause of his condition was still being investigated.

Friends have said the 43-year-old was poisoned because of his criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin - Russia has denied any involvement.

Scotland Yard said they were now investigating "an unexplained death".

Defector

A hospital spokesman said: "Every avenue was explored to establish the cause of [Mr Litvinenko's] condition and the matter is now an ongoing investigation being dealt with by detectives from New Scotland Yard.

"Because of this we will not be commenting any further on this matter. Our thoughts are with Mr Litvinenko's family."

Mr Litvinenko, who defected to the UK in 2000 and was later granted asylum and citizenship, was apparently poisoned on November 1.

Thallium theory

He was admitted to University College Hospital on 17 November. His condition deteriorated after he suffered a heart attack overnight on Wednesday.

Initial reports from the hospital said Mr Litvinenko had been poisoned with the heavy metal thallium, but later it was suggested that some form of radioactive material may have been used.

Head of critical care at the hospital, Dr Geoff Bellingan, has subsequently dismissed both of these explanations.

Reports of three objects found on X-rays of the patient were "misleading" and were almost certainly shadows caused by Prussian Blue, used to treat thallium or caesium poisoning, he said.

Asylum

Before Mr Litvinenko's death, police said they suspected "deliberate poisoning".

Investigations are examining two meetings, one at a London hotel with a former KGB agent and another man, and a later rendezvous with Italian security consultant Mario Scaramella at a sushi restaurant in London's West End.

Mr Litvinenko fled to the UK in 2000, claiming persecution in Russia, and was granted asylum. He is understood to have taken British citizenship this year.

He had been investigating the murder of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

Both the Kremlin and Russia's foreign intelligence service, the SVR, have denied any part in poisoning Mr Litvinenko, who is a former security agent with Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).

[Rasputin]

Seeking Iran Intelligence, U.S. Tries Google

When the State Department recently asked the CIA for names of Iranians who could be sanctioned for their involvement in a clandestine nuclear weapons program, the agency refused, citing a large workload and a desire to protect its sources and tradecraft.

Frustrated, the State Department assigned a junior Foreign Service officer to find the names another way -- by using Google. Those with the most hits under search terms such as "Iran and nuclear," three officials said, became targets for international rebuke Friday when a sanctions resolution circulated at the United Nations.

Policymakers and intelligence officials have always struggled when it comes to deciding how and when to disclose secret information, such as names of Iranians with suspected ties to nuclear weapons. In some internal debates, policymakers win out and intelligence is made public to further political or diplomatic goals. In other cases, such as this one, the intelligence community successfully argues that protecting information outweighs the desires of some to share it with the world.

But that argument can also put the U.S. government in the awkward position of relying, in part, on an Internet search to select targets for international sanctions.

None of the 12 Iranians that the State Department eventually singled out for potential bans on international travel and business dealings is believed by the CIA to be directly connected to Iran's most suspicious nuclear activities.

"There is nothing that proves involvement in a clandestine weapons program, and there is very little out there at all that even connects people to a clandestine weapons program," said one official familiar with the intelligence on Iran. Like others interviewed for this story, the official insisted on anonymity when discussing the use of intelligence.

What little information there is has been guarded at CIA headquarters. The agency declined to discuss the case in detail, but a senior intelligence official said: "There were several factors that made it a complicated and time-consuming request, not the least of which were well-founded concerns" about revealing the way the CIA gathers intelligence on Iran.

That may be why the junior State Department officer, who has been with the nonproliferation bureau for only a few months, was put in front of a computer.

An initial Internet search yielded over 100 names, including dozens of Iranian diplomats who have publicly defended their country's efforts as intended to produce energy, not bombs, the sources said. The list also included names of Iranians who have spoken with U.N. inspectors or have traveled to Vienna to attend International Atomic Energy Agency meetings about Iran.

It was submitted to the CIA for approval but the agency refused to look up such a large number of people, according to three government sources. Too time-consuming, the intelligence community said, for the CIA's Iran desk staff of 140 people. The list would need to be pared down. So the State Department cut the list in half and resubmitted the names.

In the end, the CIA approved a handful of individuals, though none is believed connected to Project 1-11 -- Iran's secret military effort to design a weapons system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The names of Project 1-11 staff members have never been released by any government and doing so may have raised questions that the CIA was not willing or fully able to answer. But the agency had no qualms about approving names already publicly available on the Internet.

"Using a piece of intel on project 1-11, which we couldn't justify in open-source reporting, or with whatever the Russians had, would have put us in a difficult position," an intelligence official said. "Inevitably, someone would have asked, 'Why this guy?' and then we would have been back to the old problem of justifying intelligence."

A senior administration official acknowledged that the back-and-forth with the CIA had been difficult, especially given the administration's desire to isolate Iran and avoid a repeat of flawed intelligence that preceded the Iraq war.

"In this instance, we were the requesters and the CIA was the clearer," the official said. "It's the process we go through on a lot of these things. Both sides don't know a lot of reasons for why either side is requesting or denying things. Sources and methods became their stated rationale and that is what they do. But for policymaking, it can be quite frustrating."

Washington's credibility in the U.N. Security Council on weapons intelligence was sharply eroded by the collapse of prewar claims about Iraq. A senior intelligence official said the intelligence community is determined to avoid mistakes of the past when dealing with Iran and other issues. "Once you push intelligence out there, you can't take it back," the official said.

U.S., French and British officials came to agree that it was better to stay away from names that would have to be justified with sensitive information from intelligence programs, and instead put forward names of Iranians whose jobs were publicly connected to the country's nuclear energy and missile programs. European officials said their governments did not rely on Google searches but came up with nearly identical lists to the one U.S. officials offered.

"We do have concerns about Iranian activities that are overt, and uranium enrichment is a case in point," said a senior administration official who agreed to discuss the process on the condition of anonymity. "We are concerned about what it means for the program, but also because enrichment is in violation of a U.N. Security Council resolution."

The U.S.-backed draft resolution, formally offered by Britain and France, would impose a travel ban and freeze the assets of 11 institutions and 12 individuals, including the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the directors of Iran's chief nuclear energy facilities, and several people involved in the missile program. It would prohibit the sale of nuclear technologies to Iran and urges states to "prevent specialised teaching or training" of Iranian nationals in disciplines that could further Tehran's understanding of banned nuclear activities.

The text says the council will be prepared to lift the sanctions if Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA's director general, concludes within 60 days that Iran has suspended its enrichment and reprocessing of uranium and has halted efforts to produce a heavy-water nuclear energy reactor.

Many Security Council members are uneasy about the sanctions. The Russians and the Chinese -- whose support is essential for the resolution to be approved -- have told the United States, Britain and France they will not support the travel-ban element of the resolution, according to three officials involved in the negotiations. Russia is building a light-water nuclear reactor in Iran and some people on the sanctions list are connected to the project.

"The Russians have already told us it would be demeaning for people to ask the Security Council for permission to travel to Russia to discuss an ongoing project," a European diplomat said yesterday.

U.S. and European officials said there is room for negotiation with Russia on the names and organizations, but they also said it is possible that by the time the Security Council approves the resolution, the entire list could be removed.

"The real scope of debate will be on the number of sanctions," one diplomat said. "Companies and individuals could go off the list or go on."

[Rasputin]

Censored ex-CIA analyst on options towards Tehran

18 December 2006

SPEAKER: FLYNT LEVERETT, DIRECTOR, GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY INITIATIVE, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION

(JOINED IN PROGRESS) LEVERETT: ... not to publish it because the White House intervened in the CIA's prepublication review process and has threatened me with criminal prosecution if I publish this op-ed based on the Century Foundation paper because in the White House's view that op-ed contains classified information.

That claim is false. Indeed, I would say that claim is fraudulent. The people making that claim know it is not true.

The White House is using the rubric and of protecting classified information, not to protect classified information, but to limit the dissemination of the views of someone who is very critical of their approach to Iran policy.

The White House intervened in the clearance process to excise whole paragraphs from the draft op-ed, paragraphs that deal with things like the fact that after the 9/11 attacks we had a dialogue with Iran over Afghanistan. This was -- it was cleared for me to write about this in the Century Foundation paper. I have mentioned U.S.-Iranian cooperation over Afghanistan in two op-eds I've published previously in the New York Times, both of which were cleared.

The fact that we had a dialogue with Afghanistan has been talked about in public by Secretary Rice, by Secretary Powell when he was in office, by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage when he was in office, and it's been extensively reported in the media.

There is no way that our having a dialogue with Iran over Afghanistan can be considered classified information that is not already in the public domain, but I am being threatened with criminal prosecution if I publish this in a New York Times op-ed right now at a time when the White House is under maximum political pressure over its mishandling of American policy in the Middle East.

LEVERETT: Similarly, the White House intervened in the clearance process to excise whole paragraphs from the draft op-ed that deal with the fact that in the spring of 2003, the Iranians offered to negotiate a comprehensive grand bargain of the sort that I just described. They offered to negotiate that with the United States. And this administration rejected that offer.

Now, this, too, has been talked about by Secretary Rice in public. It has been extensively reported in the media. Enterprising journalists have managed to obtain copies of the document that the Iranians sent in to us, proposing these negotiations.

But for me to write about this and the way that the administration blew this opportunity in 2003, for me to write about that now, at this critical moment, on the op-ed pages of the New York Times, for that, the White House threatens me with criminal prosecution for disclosing classified information.

Again, the claim is not just false -- it is fraudulent. It is fraudulent. It is an abuse of the pre-publication review process to silence an established critic of their policies at a time when they are under maximum political pressure to change those disastrous policies.

In terms of the politicization of the process, it is interesting to me, not just the timing of this White House intervention in the CIA's clearance process and not just that they are out to silence a critic, but it's also interesting to me the way in which they will also use the clearance process to promote the views of those who write in support of their policies.

LEVERETT: A former colleague at the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack, like me a former CIA analyst, former NSC official, who used his experience and background in the intelligence community and at the NSC to write a best-selling book that made a deeply flawed and flat-out wrong case regarding the WMD threat in Iraq, to argue that going to war in Iraq was the, quote/unquote, "conservative option," he's not threatened with criminal prosecution for making that argument.

After the war was fought and Saddam was overthrown, and David Kay and the inspectors were in Iraq, and they weren't finding any WMD, Ken writes an op-ed in the New York Times in which he uses his intelligence experience, his experience at the NSC to detail, blow-by- blow, how if we just stay the course on the ground in Iraq, we're going to find the WMD.

The White House doesn't threaten him with criminal prosecution for that.

Now he's doing it on Iran. On December 8th, Ken Pollack published in the op-ed pages of the New York Times as op-ed that essentially supports the Bush administration's resistance to engaging Iran over Iraq.

LEVERETT: He talked in that op-ed about how Iran provided the United States with intelligence, logistical support, on-the-ground help with Afghan politics in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks -- the same stuff that I've written about and that I wanted to write about in my New York Times op-ed, but because he uses this to support the administration's policies, they don't threaten him with criminal prosecution.

It is an abuse of the pre-publication review process for the White House to intervene in this way and for it to have politicized the process in order to silence critics and promote the views of cheerleaders for their disastrous policies. But that is precisely what the White House is doing in this case.

I also have to say it is very disappointing to me that former colleagues at the CIA have proven so spineless in the face of this kind of tawdry political pressure from the White House. Officials of the CIA's Publication Review Board told me that in their view, on their own, my draft op-ed, the draft op-ed that I wanted to publish as a co-authored piece with my wife, did not contain classified information, but they had to bow to the wishes of the White House.

Intelligence officers are supposed to behave better than that.

LEVERETT: And it is sad to me that this is yet one more instance where people in the intelligence community who know better are not prepared to speak truth to power, which is the whole point of having a separate intelligence agency like the CIA.

But that is the state of the intelligence community in our country six years into the Bush administration.

So with that, once again, thank you all for coming. I look forward to your questions and the discussion.

MODERATOR: Thanks very much, Flynt. I'm sure that there will be a lot of questions, and I promised him the first, but I'm going to go first with mine. And I know he's probably going to ask you -- I anticipate you'll ask about the White House bits, so I'll ask to go back to Iran.

(CROSSTALK)

MODERATOR: But let me just open up, as people think about their questions -- when you do pose your questions, please identify yourself. And, apparently, we don't need microphones to run around the room. Just speak loudly in case there's some technical malfunction out there that I don't know.

The first question is -- I just got back from the Middle East. And there is no doubt, particularly among the Gulf state region, that there is a sense that Iran is an ascendant power and not being challenged compellingly. And there is a great worry about the perception of American decline in the region and the sense that, if America withdraws -- as some have suggested -- in Iraq, that states in the region will have to redefine their loyalties as being either vassals of some sort of Talibanized Al Qaida network or of Tehran.

And it occurred to me that Tehran is, of course, growing. It does see an opportunity. Of course, we knocked out their chief rival.

MODERATOR: But one doesn't need to be an ascendant power quite as noisily as Iran is doing, if they wanted to ascend. And Ahmadinejad, the president of Iran, is committed to a nuclear program, which he says for peaceful purposes, and then hosts Holocaust denial conferences.

In other words, I'm interested in how you deal with your formulation with Iran and dealing with a president of Iran who seems to be saber rattling in wild ways that seem unnecessary and counterproductive if Iran wanted to signal to the regions that: We are a great ascendant power in the region and you shouldn't all be worried about that.

But I get the sense that Iran wants to send shockwaves through its neighbors, and I wondering what reaction you have.

LEVERETT: I think that, first of all, to some degree, you need to disaggregate the President Ahmadinejad from the leadership structure as a whole. He is obviously an influential and important player in the Islamic Republic, but he is not the sole or even necessarily the most important voice, particularly on foreign policy issues.

Secondly, I think it is a gross misreading to view Ahmadinejad as some kind of -- should we say -- dangerous flake. I think that this guy has shown himself to be an extremely adroit and astute populist politician. He does sometimes, I think, make tactical misjudgments.

The results of the Assembly of Experts elections, as they have come in, in the last 24 hours, would suggest that his political position is certainly not unassailable.

LEVERETT: But still, if you look at how he came to be the president of Iran and how he has functioned since he's been president, I think you would have to say this is an extremely smart and tactically competent politician.

[Rasputin]

Now, he obviously has an agenda that, in many ways, we find problematic. And he uses rhetoric about parts of that agenda that many in the United States and in other places find -- quite understandably -- find offensive.

That being said, I think it is a serious mistake to use Ahmadinejad's presence as an excuse for not trying to engage Iran in a manner that, in the end, would serve American interests and would solve the security problems that we see coming from Iran.

QUESTION: Actually, it was about Iran. There's been a lot written on this grand bargain offer.

LEVERETT: Yes.

QUESTION: Did you meet this guy from the Interior Ministry? And did you go with anybody else? And what was your understanding of the meeting at the time? Can you kind of walk us through the details of that?

LEVERETT: To the best of my knowledge, I've never met with any official from Iran's Interior Ministry.

QUESTION: OK. So you talked with him. Who offered this? You had a meeting with someone who said they wanted a grand bargain. When did you meet? Who were you with from the U.S.? And was the assessment at this time that this was a serious offer?

LEVERETT: I think you're confusing a couple of different stories. First of all, there is a written offer to negotiate a grand bargain that comes in through Swiss intermediaries. It comes from Tehran through Swiss intermediaries to the State Department here in Washington. That is a written document presented to us.

LEVERETT: It was presented to the Swiss diplomats who passed the paper by a senior official of the Iranian foreign ministry. And according to those diplomats, it was presented as having the blessing of all of the major power centers in Iran, including, at the time, President Khatami and the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Within a few weeks after I had left government, I did, indeed, have a meeting with a very senior Iranian official. I was not a government official at the time, and I made clear to the Iranians in the room that I was not a government official and was not representing anyone other than myself.

But with those disclaimers on the table, I did have an extremely interesting conversation in which it did -- I was persuaded that the offer which had come in through the Swiss channel was serious.

I've had, since then, over the last three years, other opportunities to talk with senior Iranian officials about the offer, and I -- in all of those conversations, I have become ever more persuaded that the offer was serious.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up? There are clearly people who at the time thought the fax from the Swiss was nonsense. Can you describe -- did you argue at the time? Can you describe -- you know, I mean, there wasn't a consensus, obviously, in the administration. And wouldn't they have already had the channel through Khalilzad or somebody else to have said we'd like to make a grand bargain?

LEVERETT: You have to recall the paper from the Swiss came in almost literally as I was leaving government. So other than seeing the paper, I really was not in a position to argue with anyone about how it should be handled -- and I'm not really in a position to comment on that.

MODERATOR: I can comment that people from the Department of State who have spoken at New America Foundation have said that they perceived it to be a serious offer, which has been public. I can fill you in later on those.

QUESTION: I agree with you that the U.S. (OFF-MIKE) Iran and will ultimately have to engage with Iran (OFF-MIKE) engagement would (OFF-MIKE).

Now, a part of this package would be basically to recognize Iran's role as a major regional player and to allow it to actually pursue its interests in the region.

This is something that is obviously bothering the traditional allies of the U.S. in the region, whether it's the gulf, or if you go beyond that, Egypt, Jordan, other such countries, who are now actually pushing against such an engagement.

What would you suggest to allay the fears of these players and to actually get them on board such a process and not to oppose such a process?

LEVERETT: I mean, first of all, I don't think -- I would say, first of all, I don't think that the views of the gulf states on this issue are monolithic. Yes, you certainly -- I was just in Abu Dhabi and Bahrain within the last couple of weeks, and, yes, it's certainly not hard to get people to convey these kinds of concerns to you.

But I would also note that earlier this year the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, gave a speech in London. And it was timed to coincide when the P-5 foreign ministers were meeting to discuss how to move the Iranian nuclear issue in the Security Council, and Prince Saud gave a speech in London in which he departed from literally years of standard Saudi rhetoric on creating a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which the traditional position was it had to be for the whole region, meaning it had to cover Israel, which meant that it was a nonstarter as far as the United States was concerned.

LEVERETT: And Saud modified that position to say that while ultimately, yes, you'd want a nuclear weapons free zone to cover the whole region, why couldn't we start with a nuclear weapons free zone in the Gulf?

And I thought that was sufficiently important public statement that I actually wrote an op-ed in the New York Times about it. And I guess, you know, Elliott Abrams and others in the White House didn't get word of it in time to try and kill it.

But in any event, I argued that this was actually an important opening and that one way that we could try and square this circle between needing to engage Iran on a broad range of regional issues while also standing by our traditional allies in the Gulf would be by creating a regional security framework, a kind of OSCE mechanism for the Gulf and perhaps, you know, wider in the Middle East that would provide some very important rules of the road; provide some forums for making sure that conflicts didn't get out of hand, that states had a place where even though their interests were conflicting and there was considerable distrust, there was still a common forum where they could try and deal with regional issues of importance to everyone.

And this is also something that I argued in the Century Foundation and argued lay out how as part of a strategy for engaging Iran on a comprehensive basis, I think it would also be useful for the United States to push for the establishment of a regional security mechanism in the Gulf.

QUESTION: Granted that the Iranians were interested in May 2003, when the U.S. had just gone into Iraq (OFF-MIKE) what makes you so sure that they still are when it seems to me they are in (OFF-MIKE) and all they have to do is to sit back and watch the U.S. (OFF-MIKE)?

LEVERETT: I think that's a very important question.

LEVERETT: And I think it is undoubtedly the case that it has become harder to do this now than it might have been three years ago, that the price we're going to have to pay in terms of what we accept from the Iranians has gone up and the leadership picture on the Iranian side has become more challenging to manage on these issues. All of that is true.

And certainly, you're right, I think you're right, that the Iranians see themselves on a roll in the region, see things as going in their direction. This is part of why I say they're not going to repeat in Iraq what they did in Afghanistan, unless we are prepared explicitly to put it on the table as part of a broader process in which they're going to get a fundamentally different relationship with us, and from that fundamentally different relationship, they're going to get things from us that I think they still want, like what they would call acceptance of the Islamic republic.

I think if we are willing to put that on the table, there is still an appreciable chance that we could get Iran into a serious process. If we're not prepared to put that on the table, there's no way we get Iran into serious process.

And it demonstrates, in a way, the cost of delay. If we had pursued this Iranian offer three years ago when it came in, you know, the Iranians weren't spinning centrifuges, they weren't enriching uranium, Khatami was the president of Iran, not Ahmadinejad.

You know, the region was looking a lot better from our standpoint than it is now. The relative position of the two players, the United States and Iran, was much more favorable to us than it is now.

[Rasputin]

LEVERETT: The relative position of the two players, the United States and Iran, was much more favorable to us than it is now. And there is a real cost to delay.

It is not just: Well, if we don't want to do it now, we can do it three years from now or four years from now or five years from now. No. The longer you wait, the harder this gets, the less certain the outcome, and the higher the cost that the United States is going to have to pay.

This is why I've said in some settings that I think the administration's handling of Iran policy has been the strategic equivalent of medical malpractice. It is not just they're not doing something that would be useful; it's by not doing it they are contributing to further erosion, further damage to the American strategic position in the region.

QUESTION: Are you risking criminal prosecution by saying in public what you can't write in the New York Times op-ed? And can you say a bit more about who it is in the White House -- who in the White House is trying to silence you?

LEVERETT: I am not saying -- in what I've said here today, I am not saying anything that I have not already written in pieces that have been cleared by the CIA and for which I have pieces of paper that say: We've reviewed this and it does not contain classified information, go ahead and publish it.

I am not saying anything that has not already been publicly reported on in the media and publicly discussed by U.S. officials.

Now, because of the secrecy agreement that I signed, I am not going to publish the op-ed in the New York Times unless and until I have another piece of paper from the CIA telling me that I'm cleared to publish it.

I have an obligation to respect that process. And I will not publish the op-ed, even though, as I'm saying, the White House is intervening in the process not to protect classified information, but to limit the dissemination of critical views.

LEVERETT: But I took on a binding lifelong legal obligation when I signed the paper that I would not publish something which the government is saying I can't publish. And so I won't publish that. Because then I would be subject to criminal prosecution if I were to publish the op-ed.

But in terms of what I've said here today, I am not saying anything that I've not already had cleared multiple times by the CIA and that is extensively covered in the media and extensively documented by statements from senior U.S. officials.

QUESTION: I'm sure the White House is watching, and we'll soon hear whether they agree with your comment.

(CROSSTALK)

QUESTION: Is the White House normally involved in this kind of vetting process for such a piece?

And if the answer to that is no, how did they see it in the first place?

LEVERETT: My understanding is that this is the first time that the White House has intervened in the CIA pre-publication review process regarding one of my drafts. If they've done this with other people, I don't know about it.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that they've intervened in a pre-publication review process for one of my drafts.

My understanding is the White House has complained to the CIA that I've been writing pieces, publishing pieces in which the White House -- the phrase that is used with me by the publication review board is that: "The White House has equities here." Not that there's classified information, but, "The White House has equities here," and, you know, we've been told we have to let them review this.

QUESTION: You mentioned in your observations that he shared on his blog that Meghan O'Sullivan and Elliott Abrams were specifically involved in the decision to excise paragraphs from your draft, and someone working for them.

Can you talk more about who that might be and why that...

LEVERETT: Yes. Yes. My understanding, and it is consistent with my own experience when I worked at the NSC, is that the people who are actually doing the dirty work at the White House of going through my draft and blacking out whole paragraphs about stuff that Deputy Secretary Armitage has talked about in public and testified about in front of Congress, the people who are doing that are director-level people, not the most senior staff people.

But they work in the shops in the directorates that are run by Michael Duran, the senior director for Middle East affairs, and by Meghan O'Sullivan and Elliott Abrams, both of whom are politically appointed deputy national security advisers, deputies to the national security adviser, Stephen Hadley.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on her question and to ask very specifically: What should the U.S. be seeking to gain from Iran, from any sort of engagement with Iran that Iran might actually, at this point of time, be willing to give us?

LEVERETT: The question about what should we want from Iran and why would they be willing to give it to us -- the part about why they would be willing to give it to us is contingent on what we are willing to put on the table in return.

LEVERETT: You know, I think there are things of significance that Iran would be prepared to reach agreement with us on as part of a package that resolves some very, very important national security and -- national security problems and foreign policy problems for them. But it's all going to be part of a package.

What I think we would want out of that package is, first of all, a resolution to the nuclear issue, basically an understanding with Iran about limits on their nuclear activities, such that we and others in the international community were confident or comfortable with the level of proliferation risks associated with those activities.

We would want cessation of Iranian support for what we consider terrorist activities by groups like Hezbollah, Hamas. We would want cooperation in stabilizing a post-Saddam political order in Iraq and on other regional issues.

And in return for that, what I think we would be offering would be what I have described as a security guarantee bolstered by the prospect of normalization of relations with Iran and a lifting of U.S. sanctions. That's the package.

And Iran isn't going to do those things unless our part of the package is also on the table.

QUESTION: Without getting too deep into the legalese, what exactly does your vetting agreement with the CIA prevent you from doing? Is it case by case? Does it involve public speaking as well as publication in a newspaper?

MODERATOR: So the question is -- just for others; make sure they can hear it -- is: What does the vetting agreement involve?

Can you go into any cases in the past in which you have been told to modify your statements?

LEVERETT: Up until this point, up until last week with regard to this particular op-ed at this particular time, the CIA, their Publications Review Board, they have cleared on order of 30 drafts that I have sent them in three and a half years out of government and up until last week they never asked to change a word.

LEVERETT: Up until this point, up until last week with regard to this particular op-ed at this particular time, the CIA, their publications, review board, they have cleared on order of 30 drafts that I have sent them in 3.5 years out of government. And, up until last week, they never asked to change a word.

MODERATOR: So this looks like a new change.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, you mentioned that the paragraphs they wanted excised involved cooperation on Afghanistan and also this...

LEVERETT: The 2003 offer.

QUESTION: Were there any other paragraphs they asked to have excised?

LEVERETT: Not whole paragraphs. They had some individual sentences which they wanted excised, but the big chunks were whole paragraphs that dealt with the topics that I indicated.

In a second round of edits, they also came back, it's interesting to note, they came back with, at one point we basically paraphrased a public statement by Secretary Rice, and they came back insisting on an edit to the way that we characterized her public statements.

[Rasputin]

QUESTION: The way you used that information, was there anything different from what was in here?

LEVERETT: No.

QUESTION: There was the exact same information presented...

LEVERETT: Yes. With regard to the cooperation in Afghanistan and the 2003 offer.

MODERATOR: It would be kind of cool. You won't be able to see the classified parts, or these so-called classified parts, but maybe I could convince you later to let me put a photostat of the returned item on the blogs.

LEVERETT: I'm very much looking forward to...

MODERATOR: The washingtonnote.com (ph). It will be an exclusive in about half-an-hour. QUESTION: You said you're just back from the Gulf. Could you talk about the concern among U.S. allies there and perhaps in the wider Middle East, the failure, so far, for the White House to lay out its new way forward in Iraq?

QUESTION: And what is the response to various ideas that are floating around, not just from the White House, but the Iraq Study Group, McCain, the idea of a sort of a faster U.S. withdrawal?

LEVERETT: I think that you're quite correct, that not only are our allies in the Gulf concerned about what they see as rising Iranian influence and power in the region, but they are also concerned about what they see as a drift -- incompetence in the way this administration is dealing with the Iran problem and with other aspects of Middle East policy.

I would say that is universal, across the board, in the Gulf. People are just completely dismayed at the way this administration has bungled so many important parts of its Middle East policy.

And I think, as much as they are worried about Iran, they are at least as worried about what this administration is going to do now.

I think, across the board, I certainly had the sense that people in the Gulf believe that an American military strike on Iran would be disastrous -- would be disastrous for them, for U.S. interests and the U.S. position in the region. But they are worried the administration will, over the next year or so, opt to go down that road.

They are very concerned about what we're going to do in Iraq. They are certainly worried about what they would see as an overly precipitous withdrawal.

In that regard, I love the line of now former Saudi ambassador, Prince Turki, who says the United States entered Iraq uninvited; it should not leave Iraq uninvited.

They are worried about an overly precipitous withdrawal, but they're also deeply worried that we will stay without any serious plan for how to make things better.

And they think that our effective abandonment of Palestinian issue just compounds the negative political and strategic consequences of our mishandling of Iran and Iraq.

QUESTION: Many of these policies you described as disastrous were authored or originated or heavily influenced by Elliot Abrams himself. To what extent do you suspect his fingerprints on this and is it a sign of desperation from the administration, or an indictment of him personally, and do you see that that is why he is in fact acting?

LEVERETT: It is very hard for me to imagine that some director at the NSC is going to take it upon himself or herself to intervene in the CIA's pre-publication review process in what, at least in my experience, is a completely unprecedented way, that a person at that level would do that on their own without the support, encouragement of superiors.

And the relevant superiors at the NSC would be the people that I identified: Elliott, Michael Duran and Meghan O'Sullivan.

MODERATOR: No one in the Vice President's Office?

LEVERETT: The vice president's staff is extremely influential and extremely interventionist with regard to the workings of the NSC staff. It would not surprise me at all if people from the Vice President's Office had been those who kind of adopted the "we have to stop Leverett from publishing again" position, which apparently is what prompted the CIA to send this op-ed draft to the NSC in the first place. But I have no direct knowledge that people in the Vice President's Office are involved.

QUESTION: I'm just curious: What was the public statement of Condi Rice that you were accused of misrepresenting?

LEVERETT: It was the one in which she described why we rejected the offer from the Iranians in the spring of 2003. She only recently acknowledged that that offer had come in and that we had rejected it.

LEVERETT: And in an interview...

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) to NPR, coming back...

LEVERETT: I believe it was. Thank you. It was an NPR interview and her argument was, essentially, that: Well, that would have been one-on-one negotiations and we're much better off, you know, working together with our European and P-5 allies.

And the way that we paraphrased this statement in the draft op-ed was considered unacceptable.

QUESTION: My question is to ask whether -- I'm wondering: Is there a possible parallel with the legal case that rocked the nation 35 years ago; namely, the Pentagon Papers?

Let me say what I mean and ask a specific question. I am working in the presidential campaign of former United States Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska.

It was Gravel who, 35 years ago, joined with Dan Ellsberg in fighting the Nixon administration attempt to use prior restraint. We all know the particulars of that case.

Gravel was actually criminally prosecuted by the Justice Department; won his right at the Supreme Court level to publish what is known as the "Mike Gravel Edition" of the Pentagon Papers that Beacon Press published.

My question is this -- you're not going to fight the attempt to squash your views, you say. That is, you're not going to tell the New York Times to go ahead and publish. But have you contemplated filing a lawsuit and trying to bring the case into a jurisprudence?

LEVERETT: You're right. And, first of all, I hope you didn't just describe my future. I really hope.

(LAUGHTER)

(CROSSTALK)

LEVERETT: Second of all, I really don't mean for this to be an analogy to the Pentagon Papers case, because, as I said, I am going to play by the rules of the pre-publication review process -- which means, as long as the CIA is sending me letters that say, you know, because we've consulted with other agencies and they object to these various parts of your op-ed, we have concluded it contains classified information and you can't publish it, I won't publish it.

[Rasputin]

QUESTION: Question with respect to what you said early on about the 20-year history of the U.S. seeking limited engagement with the Iranians; the Iranians coming back for a more comprehensive engagement; and then, if I quote you correctly, you said that this all foundered, always, on domestic political considerations and other foreign policy interests.

Could you spell that out a little bit?

LEVERETT: Yes, I can give a few specifics on that. Well, here we go -- Elliot Abrams again. You know, the Reagan administration obviously tried to engage Iran to get Iranian assistance with the release of American hostages being held in Lebanon.

That came to grief, not because of anything that the Iranians did, but because Elliott and his cohorts in the Reagan administration decided also to use this as a channel for subverting congressionally mandated limits on funding the Contras.

LEVERETT: And you have the Iran-Contra scandal. So, you know, the effort to engage Iran there fell apart because Elliott and his cohorts don't take the Constitution very seriously.

In the case of the first Bush administration, you had renewed contacts with Iran to secure the release of the last American hostages in Lebanon. That was successful. But then the Bush administration made a calculated decision not to push for further rapproachment with Iran until after President Bush won re-election in 1992. It didn't quite work out.

The Clinton administration, you know, acquiesced to Iranian supply of weapons to Bosnian Muslims starting in 1994. But then, when that leaked to the press in 1996, then the presumptive Republican presidential nominee for that year, Bob Dole, began to criticize the administration for dealing with Iran. The Clinton administration then backed off.

And then, you know, we know the saga of this Bush administration in cooperation with Iran over Afghanistan.

MODERATOR: I'll give the floor to Hillary Mann for a moment. You had -- did you...

LEVERETT: Yes, my co-author.

MODERATOR: The censored co-author, Hillary Mann.

QUESTION: Thank you.

Flynt, two questions. First on this point in terms of the history: Was the piece censored at all to excise any of the context of the history of any of the negotiations that the Clinton administration did or that the first Bush administration did or that the Reagan administration did?

LEVERETT: No, not a word of that was...

QUESTION: Or were the deletions only about what this administration this time?

LEVERETT: Oh yes, absolutely -- only about what this administration has done.

QUESTION: The second question is -- two years ago you wrote an op-ed about Libya where you similarly had a case where most Americans perceived Moammar Gadhafi to be a madman bent on the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and engaged in supporting terrorist groups worldwide.

QUESTION: You wrote in that piece a blow-by-blow of the negotiations that this administration did to get Libya out of the terrorism business and off the WMD path.

What is the difference between what you wrote then about the blow-by-blow of negotiations involving Libya with what you're presenting today on Iran?

LEVERETT: I guess the big difference is that in that op-ed you're referring to -- which I published in January of 2004 -- once again, cleared without changing a word by the CIA -- in this op-ed, as you say, I went through the blow-by-blow of the dealings with Libya and essentially said that the administration had done the right thing; that it had applied a conditional engagement, carrots-and-sticks model, aimed at basically a grand bargain with Libya; and that this policy had worked.

We got Libya out of the terrorism business. We got them out of the WMD business. And this was a good thing.

Now, then I went ahead and criticized the administration for not applying that model to other cases like Iran and for attributing their success in Libya to something that I considered basically extraneous to the outcome with Libya, namely the Iraq war.

But, essentially, to some degree, I was giving the administration credit for having done something that I thought was constructive and for having an approach that I thought was strategically sound.

And the White House didn't seem to have an objection to that one.

MODERATOR: You must have known the answers to those questions.

(LAUGHTER)

QUESTION: Over the last few days, we've been reading in the press that the White House is considering a plan -- considering to substantially increase the number of troops in Iraq along the lines of a plan released by the American Enterprise Institute last Thursday.

If you put that together with the resistance -- White House resistance to changing the policy on Iran, which you've noted, and the suppression of your op-ed, what does all of that tell you about the mental state inside the White House?

LEVERETT: Well, it tells me something that I've been arguing for a while, which is that reports of the return of realism and rationality to this administration are greatly exaggerated.

You know, I don't think this administration is going to change course in any fundamental way. They have embarked on a disastrous course for U.S. interests in this region. Iraq is part of it. Their mishandling of Iran is part of it. There are other components to it.

LEVERETT: But, you know, Baker-Hamilton, the victory of the Democrats in the congressional elections, you know, plunging polls for the president -- that doesn't matter. They're not going to change. They are not going to alter course in a fundamental way on these issues.

MODERATOR: It's always strange when I feel more optimistic than Flynt Leverett.

QUESTION: First, I want to thank you for what you're doing in terms of bringing these issues to the forefront of public.

Secondly, I remember that Colonel Wilkerson, who was chief of staff to Secretary Powell, publicly has said that this offer did come through in 2003, that the State Department really thought it was serious. They passed it on to the White House. And it was the vice president himself who said no. He has publicly said this.

So I don't know what the big secret is on this.

And since none of these characters have changed -- and I think in your last answer to the last question, you already answered mine, how you get them to listen? What do you do to sort of shake them out of this stupor that they're in about what is in the best interest of America and the way we should go ahead in the Middle East?

LEVERETT: I have to tell you, frankly, I don't have an answer to that.

Look, I was the senior director for Middle East Affairs at the National Security Council. You know, I had many opportunities -- opportunities which I consistently took -- to argue for different kinds of policies, different sorts of strategic approaches, all of that. And basically I reached a point in the spring of 2003 where I thought there were just so many mistakes being made and so many wrong directions been taken that I couldn't stay.

Obviously, I've tried to write and speak about these issues since I've been out of government. But I don't have any real optimism that the administration is going to change course.

My role, at least as far as I see it, is to try and inform public discussion and debate.

I don't think the an administration is censoring my op-ed in the New York Times so that they can actually adopt it as the basis for their new diplomatic strategy toward Iran, you know. I don't see that.

MODERATOR: There is someone who is very senior in these circles who told me -- I asked before -- I didn't know whether Flynt Leverett was overreacting to something that happened. I had to go get a benchmark.

I'm just joking, really, here. I know you don't overreact.

(LAUGHTER)

But I wanted to go find out. And this person I spoke to, whom I can't identify, said one of two things has happened in his view.

MODERATOR: Either Vice President Cheney's Office has decided that they've had enough of you and thus engineered a time to basically rein you in, with putting the pressure on -- it was his identification of Cheney in the process, because it would reflect risks too higher even for Elliott and others as they sought to play that role; but in his view -- or that there was, and this is a more positive story, a piece of fragile diplomacy that was at hand.

And I don't know fragile diplomacy toward what, but I would be interested in what you think about that. Is there, in your scope of things, a kind of fragile diplomacy out there that you could imagine might be going on that your writing could disrupt?