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Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai. On July 3, 1988, the airplane flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 38 non-Iranians and 66 children.
The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by captain Mohsen Rezaian, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 9:50 am. It would have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.
At that same time, the Vincennes, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Vincennes had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by Iranian forces. Iran had purchased Silkworm missiles from China, and an AEGIS cruiser was the only type of vessel that could counter the threat. Roberts had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.
On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.
According to U.S. government accounts, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airplane as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the A300B2 as being similar to that of an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force F-14A Tomcat during an attack run.(*) According to the same reports the Vincennes tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement.
At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2ER Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the Vincennes' crew realised that the plane had been a civilian airliner.
This version was finalised in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988.[1] Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988, part II in 1993), a fact criticised by many observers.
The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty did not accurately show the location of the USS Vincennes some 2 NM (4 km) inside Iranian territorial waters.
(*) An Airbus A300B2 is 177 feet long (54.08 m), nearly three times as long as an F-14, which is 61 ft 9 in long (18.6 m). Analysis of the radar return's strength can tell them apart, but this is not done in a busy environment because of the time it requires
Newsweek reporters John Barry and Roger Charles wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.[2] An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire.[3] On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice concluded that the U.S. Navy's actions in the Persian Gulf at the time had been unlawful.
Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.[4] This contradicted earlier Navy claims.
Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed nearby the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago" - referring to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.
Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. The Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.
The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air 655, seven on military frequencies, three on commercial frequencies and addressed to a non-existent "Iranian F-14".
The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by captain Mohsen Rezaian, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 9:50 am. It would have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.
At that same time, the Vincennes, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.
The Vincennes had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by Iranian forces. Iran had purchased Silkworm missiles from China, and an AEGIS cruiser was the only type of vessel that could counter the threat. Roberts had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.
On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.
According to U.S. government accounts, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airplane as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the A300B2 as being similar to that of an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force F-14A Tomcat during an attack run.(*) According to the same reports the Vincennes tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement.
At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2ER Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the Vincennes' crew realised that the plane had been a civilian airliner.
This version was finalised in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988.[1] Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988, part II in 1993), a fact criticised by many observers.
The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty did not accurately show the location of the USS Vincennes some 2 NM (4 km) inside Iranian territorial waters.
(*) An Airbus A300B2 is 177 feet long (54.08 m), nearly three times as long as an F-14, which is 61 ft 9 in long (18.6 m). Analysis of the radar return's strength can tell them apart, but this is not done in a busy environment because of the time it requires
Newsweek reporters John Barry and Roger Charles wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.[2] An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire.[3] On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice concluded that the U.S. Navy's actions in the Persian Gulf at the time had been unlawful.
Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.[4] This contradicted earlier Navy claims.
Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed nearby the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago" - referring to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.
Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. The Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.
The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air 655, seven on military frequencies, three on commercial frequencies and addressed to a non-existent "Iranian F-14".
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