In memory of IranAir Flight 655 hit by Amercian cruiser USS Vincennes

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Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai. On July 3, 1988, the airplane flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 38 non-Iranians and 66 children.

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by captain Mohsen Rezaian, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time of 9:50 am. It would have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

At that same time, the Vincennes, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Vincennes had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by Iranian forces. Iran had purchased Silkworm missiles from China, and an AEGIS cruiser was the only type of vessel that could counter the threat. Roberts had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.

On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.

According to U.S. government accounts, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airplane as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the A300B2 as being similar to that of an Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force F-14A Tomcat during an attack run.(*) According to the same reports the Vincennes tried more than once to contact Flight 655, but there was no acknowledgement.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2ER Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the Vincennes' crew realised that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalised in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988.[1] Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988, part II in 1993), a fact criticised by many observers.

The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty did not accurately show the location of the USS Vincennes some 2 NM (4 km) inside Iranian territorial waters.

(*) An Airbus A300B2 is 177 feet long (54.08 m), nearly three times as long as an F-14, which is 61 ft 9 in long (18.6 m). Analysis of the radar return's strength can tell them apart, but this is not done in a busy environment because of the time it requires

Newsweek reporters John Barry and Roger Charles wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care. Their report accused the U.S. government of a cover-up.[2] An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire.[3] On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice concluded that the U.S. Navy's actions in the Persian Gulf at the time had been unlawful.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles.[4] This contradicted earlier Navy claims.

Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed nearby the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago" - referring to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He's climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. The Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air 655, seven on military frequencies, three on commercial frequencies and addressed to a non-existent "Iranian F-14".

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The ship's crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules because they were not sure to which time zone they referred.
An Iranian P-3 was in the area a while before the attack, providing an unlikely potential explanation for the lack of target acquisition radar interrogation[5]
It was first claimed that Flight 655 deviated from the centre of its air corridor, an unusual occurrence with commercial flights - namely that it was 3.35 NM off the 10 NM-wide corridor at the time of shoot-down. It is further claimed that this deviation had it bearing straight at the Vincennes. It is unclear how much of this deviation was true, and how much was claimed to obscure the Vincennes' position within Iranian territorial waters.
It is claimed that a Mode II IFF squawk of 21100 was mistakenly attributed to the Airbus track, identifying it as an Iranian military aircraft (commercial aircraft respond with Mode III squawks). However this was not the case: according to the official military report the flight was in fact using the correct squawk mode. The Vincennes simply either heard it wrong or believed it was a military plane using Mode III 36760 to deceive them. It has since been assumed that the tracking device used to identify IFF squawks was left in the original postition of Flight 655 when first sighted, which had subsequently moved, confusing the Flight 655 squawk with that of an Iranian F-14 fighter within the area. The Bandar Abbas airport was shared between commercial and military aircraft at that time.
The crew of the Vincennes' Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus' original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides' track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.
This incident took place just over a year after the USS Stark was attacked in the Persian Gulf by an Iraqi Mirage F-1, costing 37 lives.
The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboats (*) might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes' engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.
Software development expert Steve McConnell claimed:

Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down by the USS Vincennes' Aegis system in 1988, killing 290 people. The error was initially attributed to operator error, but later some experts attributed the incident to the poor design of the Aegis user interface. (Professional Software Development, page 166)

(*) There are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogary in "Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992". Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by Helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around

While issuing notes of regret over the loss of human life, the U.S. government has, to date, neither admitted any wrong-doing or responsibility in this tragedy, nor apologised, but continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Commander Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, even won the navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" having enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure."[2] According to a 23 April 1990 article in The Washington Post, the Legion of Merit was presented to Captain Rogers and Lieutenant Commander Lustig on 3 July 1988. The citations did not mention the downing of the Iran Air flight at all. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

The incident continued to overshadow U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655.[7] The cause of the crash was later determined to be a bomb associated with the Libyan intelligence service, though an Iranian group had claimed responsibility for it.[citation needed]

The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to that of Korean Air Flight 007 interception by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

The Vice-President George H. W. Bush declared a month later, "I will never apologise for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what it has done. I don't care what the facts are."

On February 22, 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$ 61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner) for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown. This was an agreed settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice.[12] The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for the incident.

The United States has not compensated Iran for the airplane itself, to date. The aircraft was worth more than $30 million.

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رئيس كميسيون امنيت ملي و سياست خارجي مجلس با تاكيد بر اينكه حمله آمريكا به هواپيماي مسافربري جمهوري اسلامي ايران از صفحات سياه كارنامه آمريكا در زمينه نقض حقوق بشر است، گفت:آمريكا براي فشار به ايران صدها انسان بي*گناه را كشت.


علاء الدين بروجردي با اشاره به حادثه 12 تير سال 66 و اقدام جنايات بار آمريكا در حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري ايران بر فراز خليج فارس اظهار داشت: آمريكايي*ها هيچ*گونه حريم و حرمتي براي مقررات بين المللي در زمينه*هاي مختلف از جمله مسئله تروريسم دولتي قائل نيستند و اين اقدام نيز هيچ*گونه قبحي براي آنها ندارد.
وي حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري جمهوري اسلامي ايران را از صفحات سياه كارنامه آمريكا در زمينه نقض حقوق بشر عنوان كرد و تصريح كرد: اين جنايت براي فشار به جمهوري اسلامي ايران به قيمت جان صدها انسان بي*گناه صورت گرفت است.
رئيس كميسيون امنيت ملي مجلس با تاكيد بر عمدي بودن اين جنايت توسط آمريكايي*ها گفت: با توجه به اينكه آمريكايي*ها ازمشخصات دقيق پروازها مطلع بودند، لذا يك چنين حمله*اي به يك هواپيماي عادي و مسافربري علاوه بر اينكه هيچ نمودي از قدرت نيست، بلكه قطعاً از مظاهر بارز نقض حقوق انسان*ها كه در تاريخ منطقه به ثبت رسيده است.
بروجردي اظهار داشت: آمريكايي*ها با در اختيار داشتن ابزار دقيقي چون شبكه راداري و مشخصات پروازي هواپيماها احتمال اينكه هواپيماي مسافربري را با يك هواپيماي نظامي كه مشخصات خاص خود را دارد، اشتباه گرفته باشند، صفر است.
وي تشويق فرمانده ناو وينسنس توسط آمريكا را دليل ديگري بر آگاهانه بدون اين اقدام توسط آمريكا خواند و افزود: از طرف ديگر در همان مقطع اعلام شد فرمانده آن ناو مورد تشويق قرار گرفت، لذا اگر يك چنين اقدامي به صورت اشتباه صورت گرفته بود، بايد عكس قضيه اتفاق مي*افتاد.
بروجردي با اشاره به سياست دوگانه آمريكا در زمينه نقض حقوق بشر گفت: سياست دوگانه آمريكا در جهان امروز به گونه*اي مشهود است كه نمونه*هاي متعددي در اين زمينه وجود دارد.
وي حمايت از رژيم صهيونستي، قضاوت*هاي ظالمانه در مورد وضعيت حقوق بشر در ايران و حوادث تاسف بار شكنجه در زندان*هاي گوانتانامو و ابوغريب و حوادث حديثه عراق را نمونه*هاي ديگري از تناقض گفتار و رفتار آمريكا در عرصه حقوق بشر عنوان كرد و افزود: امروز همه كشورهاي جهان چه در سطح دولت*ها و ملت*ها به خوبي از اين اقدامات متناقض آمريكا آگاه هستند.
رئيس كميسيون امنيت ملي وسياست خارجي مجلس تصريح كرد: توجيه آمريكايي*ها در دفاع از ترورسيم همان توجيهي است كه انسان*هاي بي*گناه را شكنجه كرده و مي*كشند و مردم عادي را روزانه در فلسطين به خاك و خون مي*كشند.
وي گفت: عمليات نظامي آمريكا هيچ گونه خط قرمزي ندارد و اين جنايت از ديد آمريكايي*ها در چارچوب جنايت هايي كه در افغانستان و عراق و بمبارانهاي متعدد رخ داده است، قابل توجيه است.
بروجردي به اقدام اخير رژيم صهيونيستي مبني بر ربودن ده*ها نماينده مجلس و تعدادي از وزراي دولت حماس اشاره كرد و افزود: ربايش اين افراد نيز يكي از مصاديق بارز تروريسم توسط يك مدعي دولتي است.
وي اقدام آمريكا در خنثي سازي هرگونه اقدامي توسط شوراي امنيت سازمان ملل را نشان دهنده حمايت جدي آمريكا از مصاديق بارز نقض حقوق بشر و تروريسم دولتي عنوان كرد و گفت: اين كاري است كه به كررات توسط آمريكا انجام شده است.

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عضو فراكسيون اكثريت مجلس با اشاره به سرنگوني هواپيماي مسافربري ايران توسط آمريكا در سال 1367 گفت: اين اقدام تروريستي آمريكا نشانه اوج ذلت و شكست آمريكا عليه دولت و ملت ايران بود.


سيد كاظم دلخوش با اشاره به سرنگوني هواپيماي مسافربري ايران در 12 تير سال 1367توسط ناو جنگي وينسنس آمريكا گفت:آمريكا بعد از پيروزي انقلاب اسلامي ايران منافع خود را از دست رفته مي*ديد و جمهوري اسلامي ايران را يك خطر براي خود در منطقه مي*دانست،به همين دليل مواضع خصمانه*اي عليه جمهوري اسلامي ايران اتخاذ كرد،تا اين كه حتي به هواپيماي مسافربري ايران حمله كرد.
وي حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري ايران و به شهادت رساندن ده*ها كودك، مردم و زن بي*دفاع را نشانه اوج خصومت آمريكا عليه دولت و ملت ايران دانست و خاطرنشان كرد:اين اقدام تروريستي آمريكا ثابت كرد كه اين كشور با دشمن آن روز ايران يعني صدام همراه است.
رئيس مجمع نمايندگان استان گيلان در مجلس شوراي اسلامي اضافه كرد:جاي بسي تاسف است كه كشوري كه مدعي تمدن و فرهنگ است،آن گونه مردم بي*دفاع را به خاك و خون *كشاند.
دلخوش با بيان اين كه سرنگوني هواپيماي مسافربري جمهوري اسلامي ايران عمدي بود،تصريح كرد:با توجه به تجهيزات پيشرفته آمريكا در بخش نظامي به هيچ وجه پذيرفته نيست كه اين اقدام را سهوي بدانيم،همچنين با توجه به حضور آمريكا در خليج فارس كه متعلق به ايران و كشورهاي همسايه است، پرتاب موشك به سمت هواپيما با علم و اطلاع از مسافربري بودن آن بوده است.
در 12 تير 1367 آمريكا در آبهاي نيلگون خليج فارس ناو وينسنس آمريكا با حمله به يك هواپيماي مسافربري ايران 290 نفر را به شهادت رساند.

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عضو كميسيون امنيت ملي و سياست خارجي مجلس گفت:هدف قرار دادن هواپيماي مسافربري ايران توسط نيروهاي نظامي آمريكا،نشان دهنده چهره واقعي جنايتكارانه آمريكا در پشت نقاب دموكراسي و حقوق بشر است.


جواد جهانگيرزاده نماينده مردم اروميه در خصوص حادثه 12 تيرماه سال 67 و به خاك وخون كشيده* شدن سرنشينان هواپيماي مسافربري ايران توسط ناو وينسنس امريكا،اظهار داشت:كشتار بي رحمانه مردم مظلوم و بي دفاعي كه در هواپيما نشسته*اند سند ديگري بر جنايات دولتي و سازمان يافته آمريكا و همراهان آن است كه هيچ وقت از اذهان مردم ايران پاك نخواهد شد.
وي تصريح كرد:در اين كشتار بي*رحمانه جان بسياري از زنها و كودكان گرفته شد،اما هيچ سازمان و نهاد بين*المللي و حقوق بشر عكس**العملي نشان نداد و سكوت اختيار كرد،در حالي كه جان صدها نفر گرفته شد.
عضو كميسيون امنيت ملي و سياست خارجي مجلس گفت: اين اقدام نمونه بارز تروريسم دولتي و حمايت شده از سوي امريكا است كه چهره واقعي اين جنايتكاران را به مردم دنيا روشن كرده است.
وي بيان داشت: غربي*ها فقط شعار دموكراسي مي دهند و اين واژه*ها ابزاري براي اهداف شوم آنها مي باشد، چرا كه به راحتي جان صدها انسان بي گناه را مي*گيرند و حتي به كساني كه اين جنايات را آن انجام داده نشان شجاعت مي*دهند.
عضو كميسيون امنيت ملي و سياست خارجي مجلس با تاكيد بر اين كه آمريكاي*ها انسانها را درجه*بندي كرده*اند و براي جان آنها ارزشي قايل نيستند، گفت: اين طرز تفكر لكه ننگي در تاريخ بشريت و دنياي امروز به شمار مي*آيد و نشان پوچي شعار دموكراسي و آزادي دروغين هستند.
جهانگيرزاده، بيان داشت: واژه مبارزه با تروريسم و حقوق بشر فقط بازي با كلمات در قرن جديد است و در حالي كه آنها به راحتي صدها نفر را مي*كشند،شعار حمايت از جان مردم هم سر مي*دهند.

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معاون فرهنگي و تبليغات دفاعي ستاد كل نيروهاي مسلح تصريح كرد:ناو جنگي آمريكا در خليج فارس براي حفظ امنيت منطقه بود،ولي هواپيماي مسافربري ايراني قرباني ادعاي تأمين امنيت در خليج فارس شد.


سردار عليرضا افشار معاون فرهنگي و تبليغات دفاعي ستاد كل نيروهاي مسلح با اشاره به اين كه اقدام تروريستي دولت آمريكا در به شهادت رساندن 290 شهروند ايراني از منظر جامعه جهاني به هيچ وجه قابل بخشش و گذشت نيست، تصريح كرد: به دليل پيشرفته بودن ناو وينسنس كه از مجهزترين و پيشرفته ترين ناوهاي جنگي ايالات متحده آمريكاست غيرعمدي بودن حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري ايران كه در يك شرايط كاملا عادي در حال پرواز بود، پذيرفتني نيست و اين اقدام آمريكا با اين هدف انجام شد تا به مسئولان جمهوري اسلامي بفهماند كه براي جلوگيري از سقوط صدام به هر كاري دست مي زند.
وي گفت: حادثه حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري ايران بعد از عملياتت والفجر10 صورت گرفت كه در ان عمليات رزمندگان ما در بخشي از شمال عراق به موفقيت هاي بزرگي دست يافتند و رژيم بعث هم براي انتقام از مردم حلبچه با حمله شيميايي، مردم اين منطقه را به خاك و خون كشيد.
معاونت فرهنگي و تبليغات دفاعي ستاد كل نيروهاي مسلح با تأكيد بر اين كه عدول از مباني انساني توسط آمريكا بارها و بارها در تاريخ تكرار شده است، گفت: آمريكا پيش از حمله به هواپيماي مسافربري ما نيز با حضور نظامي در منطقه خليج فارس تمام تلاش خود را براي جلوگيري از سقوط صدام به كار گرفت و حتي به پايگاه هاي نفتي ما نيز حمله كرد و تهديدات خود را با سقوط هواپيماي ايرباس ايراني عملي ساخت.
وي گفت:* اين حركت آمريكا نشان مي دهدكه اين قدرت براي رسيدن به اهداف توسعه طلبانه خود از هيچ اقدامي فروگذار نمي كند و شعار دموكراسي خواهي به هنگام تامين منافع آمريكا تا سر حد اقدام تروريستي تنزل مي يابد.
سردار افشار افزود: جمهوري اسلامي ايران به خاطر پايبندي به مباني ارزشي و اسلامي دست به اقدام متقابل و سرنگوني هواپيماهاي مسافربري آمريكا نزد وگرنه سرنگوني پروازهاي مسافربري آمريكا در هر نقطه اي از جهان در توان جمهوري اسلامي ايران بود.
وي با اشاره به پيام امام به مناسبت سقوط هواپيماي مسافربري ايران تصريح كرد:امام راحل در آن پيام خود اشاره كردند كه انفجار هواپيماي مسافربري زنگ خطري براي تمامي مسافرت هاي هوايي است و بايد باتمام وجود تلاش كنيم تا چنين صحنه دردناكي پيش نيايد.
سردار افشار به درايت امام خميني مبني بر جلوگيري از تغيير رويكرد جنگ به عرصه*هاي ديگر اشاره كرد و افزود: به نظر مي*رسد شايد پذيرش آتش بس هم به دليل جلوگيري از تغيير جريان جنگ به سوي ديگر و احتمال وقوع جنايات انساني در جامعه جهاني توسط امريكا از سوي امام خميني صورت گرفت و ايشان با قبول آتش بس اجازه ندادند اين روند تداوم يابد.
معاون فرهنگي و تبليغات دفاعي ستاد كل نيروهاي مسلح در خصوص تناقض گفتار و رفتار آمريكا گفت:اين كه آمريكا در شعارها و سياست*هاي خود دفاع از آزادي، دموكراسي و حقوق بشر را تبليغ مي*كند و به بهانه آن به اقصي نقاط جهان لشكركشي مي*كند و امنيت جهاني را به مخاطره مي اندازد،استراتژي ديرينه*اي است كه در همان سقوط هواپيماي مسافربري ايران نيز آشكار است،چرا كه حضور ناو جنگي آمريكا در خليج فارس براي حفظ امنيت منطقه بود،ولي هواپيماي مسافربري ايراني قرباني ادعاي تأمين امنيت در خليج فارس شد.
وي گفت: اينك هم آمريكا مبارزه با تروريست را بهانه اي براي توسعه طلبي خود قرار داده تا از اين طريق ملت هاي آزاده و استقلال طلب دنيا را زير فشار قرار دهد.
سردار افشار تأكيد كرد:آمريكا با حضور نظامي در خليج فارس بيش از پيش به نا امني و تروريست دامن زد و در سال*هاي اخير هم با ايجاد طالبان و حمايت از رژيم صهيونيستي بار ديگر خوي وحشي*گري خود را آشكار مي*كند.
وي گفت:در حال حاضر هم آمريكا به دنبال ايجاد حوادثي از اين دست مي باشد تا بهانه اي براي حضور آمريكا در منطقه باشد ولي اگر روزي اين كشور دست از اين خوي توسعه طلبي خود بردارد.امنيت بيش از پيش در جهان برقرار خواهد شد،چرا كه هركجا آمريكا دخالت كرده نا امني و ترور توسعه يافته است.

[donsaeid]

On the morning of 3rd of July 1988, an Iran Air airbus passenger plane, flight number 655, took off from the port city of Bandar Abbas for a routine thrice a week flight to Dubai across the Persian Gulf with 290 passengers on board including 160 men, 73 women and 57 children. It was cruising unsuspecting of the dangers that lurked below. While it was still in Iranian airspace, unknown to it, an American warship had stealthily entered Iranian coastal waters. At 10.22 AM, exactly five minutes after flight’s departure from Bandar Abbas, the Commander of USS Vincennes, Captain Will Rogers ordered the firing of two missiles at the Iranian passenger. The plane immediately exploded in mid air, splintered and crashed into the waters of the Persian Gulf. There were no survivors. All 290 passengers went to a watery grave. Among the victims of the American crime against humanity, 37 passengers were non-Iranians and were nationals of Italy, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, India and some Persian Gulf Arab states. This sorrowful incident shocked millions of freeborn people all over the world and plunged the Islamic Iran into mourning. It was a grave tragedy. The US navy’s measure was a blatant crime, more so, since Washington had directly entered the imposed war against the Islamic Republic on behalf of its surrogate, Saddam Hussein of the Ba’th minority regime of Iraq in order to try to save him from impending defeat.

The US downing of the Iranian Airbus is considered a crime by any law and criteria and its perpetrators should be tried and punished. But the then US officials led by President Ronald Reagan who recently, not only did not punish the perpetrators of this heinous crime but they awarded the commander of the US warship, Will Rogers, with a medal of honour for his dastardly deed. It was proof that the whole administration in the White House was nothing more than a bunch of criminals. During wars, many civilians die and many passenger planes have been attacked, but the aircraft that were attacked had either deviated from their course or violated enemy airspace. However, the Iranian passenger had done neither of this and was targeted deliberately by the USS Vincennes with missiles while in Iranian airspace and still in ascending towards its commercial air corridor

In its first reaction towards the crime committed by its warship, the US claimed that it targeted a F-14 plane. But when it was confirmed that the plane downed was a passenger aircraft as clarified by TVs all over the world with shocking photos of the bodies of women, men and children torn apart and floating on the Persian Gulf waters, the lies of the US officials began to be revealed to a shocked world. But instead of admitting their crime, the US officials started telling more lies to cover up their crime. The Americans next claimed that the Iranian passenger plane had deviated from its air corridor and had ignored warnings by the USS Vincennes. This was a pack of lies. The wreckage of the aircraft and mangled bodies scattered in Iran’s coastal waters, belied Washington’s story and confirmed beyond a doubt that it was shot in Iranian waters. The documents and evidence which were released by Iran as well as independent and impartial sources proved that the Vincennes commander knew that he was firing at a passenger plan in the act of climbing in the air. He did not give any warning as he claimed and on the contrary Will Rogers entered Iranian waters, on orders from the Pentagon, to target the Iranian aircraft. Captain David Carlson who was also an officer on the Vincennes, sometime after the incident divulged the truth and admitted that Captain Rogers had received from Pentagon the order to attack the Iranian passenger plane and for this criminal act the Vincennes had entered Iranian territorial waters in order to be positioned right under the regular three times a week scheduled flight.

The downing of the Iranian passenger plane and the killing of its 290 passengers on board earned Will Rogers and his crew a medal of bravery from President Ronald Reagan, a leader with the image of a lame duck, who was called “imbecile” by Imam Khomeini and who died recently after having lost whatever mind and memory he had. The crime will forever remain a blot on Reagan, the US officials and their military. After the probe committee of the US House of Representatives revealed part of the facts related to the intentional attack on the Iranian Airbus, the US government in order to prevent the disclosure of all facts, handed the case over to the CIA, which termed the probe confidential and practically put it in a classified file. But world opinion and world people could never forget the cowardly US crime, although at government level, especially in European countries there was no reaction other than empty words of regret and sympathy, and that too belatedly, because almost all these countries wanted their blue-eyed boy, Saddam to be saved from defeat in the Imposed War. Without the least doubt the downing of the Iranian passenger was and will remain a firm proof of US state terrorism. If only, a decisive reaction had been shown at the international level, the US would have thought twice before repeating its crimes and terrorist acts in the next 16 years, and the world would have been spared of the slaughters in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the horrible Abu Ghuraib scandal.

Actually, what the current US president George W. Bush is doing senselessly, makes him the right successor to Ronald Reagan. The US soldiers indulging in all sorts of cowardly and criminal acts in Iraq and Afghanistan are the students of the William Rogers school.

[donsaeid]

We hear about this (‘Lockerbie’: Pan Am 103, Dec. 21 1988, 270 victims):

“Lawyers representing the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing struck a deal with Libyan officials last year involving a $10 million payment to each victim’s family. An initial $4 million would be paid once U.N. sanctions have been formally lifted. An additional $4 million would be paid once the United States lifts its sanctions. The final $2 million would be delivered if Libya is removed from the State Department’s list of states allegedly sponsoring terrorism.”

Colum Lynch, “Deal Reached With Libya on Pan Am Bombing,” Washington Post, August 12 2003.

But we don’t hear about this, less than 6 months earlier (‘the other Lockerbie’: Iran Air 655, July 3 1988, 290 victims):

“The survivors of each victim of the Iran Air shootdown will be paid $300,000 (for wage-earning victims) or $150,000 (for non-wage-earning victims).”

Bill Clinton, U.S. President (Jan. 20 1993-2001 Jan. 19), “Developments Concerning the National Emergency with Respect to Iran” (May 16 1996).

British and American news editors rarely report that one Anglo/American is worth 33 “rag-heads”.

An American child or student or housewife or elder are each worth 66 of their Muslim, Hindu, and other lesser counterparts.

Or, 10,000 Afghanis, at $1000 each. (It’s cheaper to kill them all than to bother with them).

Adolph Hitler had a forthright label for such people.

And you can be certain, that nearly every Arab, every Muslim, and the rest of the world’s Untermenchen know these ratios and understand their significance.

Why do people hate America?

On July 3 1988, a Sunday morning, an Iranian airliner took-off from Tehran on a round-trip flight to Dubai, with a stopover at Bandar Abbas, on Iran’s Gulf coast, where it landed normally at 8:40 a.m local time (05:10 UTC). This was a regular passenger service, on a published schedule, which Iran Air had operated twice a week for 20 years, on Sundays and Tuesdays.

Iran Air Flight 655 was scheduled to depart Bandar Abbas at 9:50 a.m. (06:20 UTC) and arrive Dubai at 11:15 Dubai time (07:15 UTC), gate to gate. It was a short hop across the Strait of Hormuz, only 130 nautical-miles, requiring only 28 minutes in the air. A passenger’s immigration problem at the gate delayed the flight 15 minutes, and the pilot requested engine-start at 10:05 a.m. (06:35 UTC).

No other aircraft had taken-off from Bandar Abbas airport that morning. Iran Air Flight 655 was the only airliner from Bandar Abbas scheduled to depart that morning and the only one scheduled to cross the Gulf that day.

The IR655 flight plan, filed with the region’s Air Traffic Control authorities 8 hours 40 minutes earlier, requested a cruising altitude of 16,000 feet (“pressure altitude,” flight level 160). But the pilot changed his request to 14,000 feet, in his initial radio contact (flight level 140), perhaps thinking to pick-up lost time that way. The winds aloft were the same at both altitudes: a 15-knot tail wind for his course (205°) (14,000 feet: 090°/18 kt, 18,000 feet: 080°/25 kt, at 0700/10:30 a.m.). ICAO Report, ¶ 1.7.3, p.4.

And, he likely took account of the low air pressure that day (QNH 998 hPa), his density altitude calculations, and the high temperature (35°C) and humidity (65%) on his engine performance. His actual altitude that day would be roughly 500 feet higher than his flight-level pressure altitude (QNE 1013.25 hPa), i.e. he would be at roughly 14,500 feet at flight level 140.

The pilot was Mohsen Rezaian, a 38 year old veteran with 7000 hours, including 2057 in an AirBus A-300. He had flown this route for the previous two years. ICAO, ¶ 1.5, pp.2-3.

When its door closed at Bandar Abbas airport that morning, at 10:05 a.m. (06:35 UTC), Iran Air Flight 655 had 290 people on board from 6 countries, 274 passengers and 16 crew: 254 were nationals of Iran, 13 of the United Arab Emirates, 10 of India, 6 of Pakistan, 6 of Yugoslavia, and 1 of Italy. 57 were children and 8 were infants. It was an AirBus A300B2-203, tail number EP-IBU. (Sister photo). ICAO, ¶ 1.2.1, p.2, ¶ 1.1.1, p.1; p.D-14, D-15.

All of the pilot’s conversations on the radio, and all of the responses he received, were in the English language, as required by ICAO on international flights, except for a few incidental exchanges. These broadcasts were all on the worldwide standard, published, civil aviation frequencies (VHF: 116.000-139.975 MHz).

Anyone in the area who tuned-in heard this:

Time
UTC Local Talker Transcript
Bandar Abbas Tower (BND TWR) 118.1 MHz

06:34:50 10:04:50 IR655 Tower, IranAir 655

06:34:56 10:04:56 BND TWR IranAir 655, Tower; go ahead

06:34:59 10:04:59 IR655 * Request start up clearance

06:35:06 10:05:06 BND TWR 655, say again please

06:35:08 10:05:08 IR655 Start up clearance

06:35:10 10:05:10 BND TWR Roger; standby; confirm 160 Dubai

06:35:15 10:05:15 IR655 Flight level 140 if possible

06:35:16 10:05:16 BND TWR 140

06:35:17 10:05:17 IR655 Okay

06:38:00 10:08:00 IR655 * Tower, 655

06:38:05 10:08:05 BND TWR * 655, go ahead

06:38:06 10:08:06 IR655 * Request start up for taxi

06:38:10 10:08:10 BND TWR Cleared to start, temperature 35 {Celsius}

06:38:14 10:08:14 IR655 655; thank you

06:40:21 10:10:21 IR655 Tower, 655; request taxi

06:40:26 10:10:26 BND TWR IranAir 655, taxi to holding point, runway 21, via Tango 05; wind calm; QNH 998 {barometric pressure in millibars}; time is 0640 {UTC}

06:40:37 10:10:37 IR655 IranAir 655 cleared taxi for runway 21, taxiway 5; 998

06:41:17 10:11:17 IR655 * Confirm taxiway 5 is open

06:41:20 10:11:20 BND TWR * Yes, it is open

06:41:22 10:11:22 IR655 (Microphone click)

06:41:44 10:11:44 BND TWR * 655, caution; construction work in progress at the entrance of taxiway 5

06:41:50 10:11:50 IR655 (Microphone click)

06:41:59 10:11:59 IR655 * Tower, can we use taxiway 7

06:42:08 10:12:08 BND TWR * Continue taxi via parking area to taxiway 7. Caution construction work on both sides

06:42:20 10:12:20 IR655 (Microphone click)

06:43:19 10:13:19 BND TWR IranAir 655, copy your ATC clearance

06:43:24 10:13:24 IR 655 Go ahead

06:43:25 10:13:25 BND TWR IranAir 655 is cleared to destination Dubai via flight plan route 1 ; climb and maintain flight level 140 {14,000 feet, pressure altitude}; after take off follow simulated MOBET 1 BRAVO departure 2 {a straight ahead climb}, squawking ALPHA 6760 {transponder ID code}

06:43:41 10:13:41 IR 655 IranAir 655 cleared destination flight planned route; flight level 140; simulated MOBET 1 BRAVO; and squawk 6760

06:43:53 10:13:53 BND TWR Squawk 6760, IranAir 655; that is correct; call when ready for departure

06:43:59 10:13:59 IR 655 Call you for departure

06:45:30 10:15:30 IR 655 Tower, IranAir 655 ready for take off

06:45:34 10:15:34 BND TWR IranAir 655 cleared for take off runway 21; wind calm; after departure contact approach 124.2; have a nice flight

06:45:43 10:15:43 IR 655 655 cleared for take off 21; after take off, with approach; thank you very much; good day
Bandar Abbas Approach Control (BND APP) 124.2 MHz

06:49:18 10:19:18 IR 655 Good morning; IranAir 655 airborne out of 3550 {feet, actual**}

06:49:24 10:19:24 BND APP IranAir 655, good morning to you; continue as cleared; next report at MOBET {30 n.miles from the VORTAC navigation radio, at the center of the airport} * and standing by for your estimate

06:49:33 10:19:33 BND APP Roger; estimate MOBET time 52 {10:22 local time}, FIR 58 {10:28}, destination 0715 {11:15 Dubai time} {FIR refers to DARAX, 69 n.miles from the center of the airport, the next waypoint after MOBET, and the Flight Information Region boundary between Tehran ACC (Area Control Centre) and Emirates ACC}

06:49:43 10:19:43 BND APP IranAir 655, roger
Iran Air Company frequency 131.8 MHz
06:50:00? 10:20:00? IR 655 {No transcript}: “On reaching 1000 ft altitude the flight would have commenced flap retraction and transition from initial climb to enroute climb followed by the after take-off checks. During this time the call was made to the Iran Air office at Bandar Abbas with a departure message.” ICAO, ¶ 2.10.9, p.16
Tehran Area Control Centre (THR ACC) 133.4 MHz

06:50:54 10:20:54 IR 655 ...(unreadable)...

06:50:59 10:20:59 THR ACC Station calling Tehran

06:51:04 10:21:04 IR 655 IranAir 655 from Bandar Abbas to Dubai; out of level 70 {7,525 feet actual**} for 140; estimating FIR 58, Dubai 0715

06:51:20 10:21:20 THR ACC Roger; report maintaining 140 and passing DARAX

06:51:26 10:21:26 IR 655 Roger

06:51:28 10:21:28 THR ACC Confirm you are squawking 6760

06:51:30 10:21:30 IR 655 Affirmative
Bandar Abbas Approach Control (BND APP) 124.2 MHz

06:54:00 10:24:00 IR 655 655, position MOBET, out of 120 {12,525 feet, actual**}

06:54:07 10:24:07 BND APP IranAir 655, roger; contact Tehran Control 133.4; have a nice flight

06:54:11 10:24:11 IR 655 Thank you; good day

[donsaeid]

Just as Mohsen Rezaian, the Iran Air pilot, reported reaching MOBET and 12,500 feet (flight level 120) (06:54:05) — more than 12 miles inside Iran’s own territory — William C. Rogers III, Commander of the USS Vincennes, 12 miles away, in the center of the airway (A59W), and also inside Iran’s territory, turned his firing key (06:54:05). DoD Report, ¶ (8)(a), p.37; Crowe Endorsement, ¶ d, p.5.

14 seconds later, following a confirmation and a faulty effort by one crew member to press the right buttons, the Missile System Supervisor (MSS) pressed the “Firing Authorize” button (06:54:19). 3 seconds later the first missile launched (06:54:22), and 1 second later the second, at a speed of Mach-2.5 (1,650 knots, 1,900 mph). DoD, p.38, ¶ (n); Senate Hearing, p.12; House Hearings, p.94; ICAO, p.18, ¶ 2.11.5.

32 seconds after Rezaian’s final “good day,” as Iran Air 655 reached 13,500 feet and still climbing, 1,000 feet below his assigned flight-level 140, two surface-to-air SM-2 missiles — each with passive homing (radar echo), a proximity fuse, and a high-explosive warhead wrapped in 6,000 steel ball-bearings — exploded (06:54:43, 44) (ICAO, p.1, ¶ 1.1.5 (time); DoD, p.39, ¶ (bb)), 21 seconds after launch — shredding the bodies of those on board and blowing off the tail and the left wing. More than 2-1/2 miles high, and still climbing at 380 knots, Iran Air 655 plunged 82 seconds, into the sea (06:56:05). ICAO, p.22 (time). “Few of the bodies recovered were complete”:

“1.12.3. One of the large pieces of engine cowling showed external damage, some 15-20 penetrations, 1-10 cm in size and in a horizontal direction in a 45 degree angle from behind. The cowling originated from the aft left side of one of the engines. The penetrations were consistent with missile detonation beneath the aircraft, between the wing and the tail.”

“1.13.1. The bodies of the flight crew had not been recovered by 1 October 1988. By early August 1988 the remains of some 192 victims had been recovered. Few of the bodies recovered were complete. Some 180 victims were identified, many based on circumstantial evidence.”

U.S. Military Officers did what they always do when they get caught, doing something wrong.

They lied.

This, on the principle well articulated by George H.W. Bush’s Press Secretary, that lies, at the time the news breaks, will reach tens or hundreds of millions of people, and mold their opinions and their memories.

And years later, when some nobody journalist patiently dissects their deceit, it’s history, not “news”. And, if any news editor does bother to report it, on a slow news-day, s/he’ll put it at the bottom of page-32 of some newspaper and “So what. Maybe 200 people read it, or 2,000 or 20,000.”

The national myth remains intact. Mission accomplished.

For many hours, the Commander of the Vincennes huddled with his fellow commanders and his fleet commander and, presumably, by phone with higher commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the States. And finally — after 9-1/2 hours — he made his agreed Operation Report of the incident (July 3 1988, 16:30 Zulu/UTC/GMT, 12:30 p.m. EDT), which the DoD report concealed, but summarized:

“Vincennes OPREP-3 031630Z Jul 88 was readdressed by the CJTFME {Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East} under the same DTG {dating} providing a timeline for both surface and air engagement and reconfirming altitude as 7800 feet and descending, speed 455 kts, Mode II, 1100 {military transponder squawk-code}, ID as F-14, and that the aircraft had ignored MAD {Military Air Distress} and IAD {International Air Distress} warnings. Additionally: TN 4131 {Track Number, the computer-assigned display label}, Bearing/Range 005T/9NM; Mode III, 6675 {civilian transponder squawk-code}, course 185T, and CBDR {Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range} amplifying data was supplied.”

DoD, ¶ (2)(e), p.42.

This report asserts, as unassailable fact, information which, in 9-1/2 hours, the author of the report, William C. Rogers III, Commander of the USS Vincennes (CG-49), had ample opportunity — and the duty — to discover was erroneous. And equally, his commander at Fifth Fleet headquarters, Bahrain, Anthony A. Less (CJTFME), who endorsed this false report by submitting it to the Pentagon.

During this 9-1/2 hours, David R. Carlson, the Commander of the USS Sides (FFG-14) — only 18 n.miles away, nearer the airport (but outside the airway), in real-time data-link with the Vincennes (Link-11) — who tracked the whole incident on his radar, was certainly consulted and reported what he and his officers saw, which bore no resemblance to this false report. DoD, ¶ 2, p.8; ¶ i, p.28; ¶ i, p.33; ¶ c-e, p.36; ¶ m, p.37. Even as John James Kearley, Commander of the USS Elmer Montgomery (DE-1082), was also consulted — the third member of the 3-ship squadron and an eye-witness to the explosion and descent of the aircraft into the sea (DoD, ¶ cc, p.39), but without his aircraft radar switched on at the time (DoD, ¶ i, p.31). Additionally, during this 9-1/2 hours, the Commander of the Vincennes had ample opportunity to rerun his computer tapes of the incident which recorded nothing resembling his false report. This he apparently did, judging from the DoD summary of his concealed report, because he provided a time-line, “and CBDR amplifying data was supplied”.

The U.S. criminal law requires United States Officers to file truthful reports. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. If, in addition to the actual facts of the incident, the officers wish to also include their erroneous view, in the heat of the moment, of the actual facts, then their erroneous view is also a suitable topic to report, provided what they claim to believe is a truthful account of what they actually believed.

But it’s a criminal lie to conceal the actual facts, and to conceal conflicting views of the actual facts, and, instead, to assert as unassailable fact their erroneous view of the actual facts. And this is what the Commander of the Vincennes apparently did and his commander as well (CJTFME), who surely was not so incompetent, and derelict of his duty, as to omit to confer with his Commander of the USS Sides and to order the Vincennes tapes to be reviewed prior to the report.

On the basis of this (concealed) false report, William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held a press conference later the same day, at the Pentagon, about 10-1/2 hours after the ambush

[donsaeid]

[B]Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jetliner

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 4, 1988

A U.S. warship fighting gunboats in the Persian Gulf yesterday mistook an Iranian civilian jetliner for an attacking Iranian F14 fighter plane and blew it out of the hazy sky with a heat-seeking missile, the Pentagon announced. Iran said 290 persons were aboard the European-made A300 Airbus and that all had perished.

“The U.S. government deeply regrets this incident,” Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference.

The disaster occurred at mid-morning over the Strait of Hormuz, when the airliner, Iran Air Flight 655, on what Iran described as a routine 140-mile flight from its coastal city of Bandar Abbas southwest to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, apparently strayed too close to two U.S. Navy warships that were engaged in a battle with Iranian gunboats.

The USS Vincennes, a cruiser equipped with the most sophisticated radar and electronic battle gear in the Navy’s surface arsenal, tracked the oncoming plane electronically, warned it to keep away and, when it did not, fired two Standard surface-to-air missiles.

Navy officials said the Vincennes’ combat teams believed the airliner to be an Iranian F14 jet fighter. No visual contact was made with the aircraft until it was struck and blew up about six miles from the Vincennes; the plane’s wreckage fell in Iranian territorial waters, Navy officials said.

Iranian vessels and helicopters searched for survivors, but there was no indication last night that anyone survived what apparently is the sixth worst aviation disaster. Iranian television broadcast scenes of bodies floating amid scattered debris.

It was the first time any U.S. military unit had shot down a civilian airliner. It occurred almost five years after a Soviet fighter pilot shot down an off-course Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing 269 people.

Iran accused the United States of a “barbaric massacre” and vowed to “avenge the blood of our martyrs.”

President Reagan in a statement {1:30 p.m. EDT, 17:30 UTC} said he was “saddened to report” that the Vincennes “in a proper defensive action” had shot down the jetliner. “This is a terrible human tragedy. Our sympathy and condolences go out to the passengers, crew, and their families ... We deeply regret any loss of life.”

Reagan, who was spending the Fourth of July holiday at Camp David, said the Iranian aircraft “was headed directly for the Vincennes” and had “failed to heed repeated warnings.” The cruiser, he said, fired “to protect itself against possible attack.”

News of the downing of the plane began with sharply conflicting accounts from Iran and from the Defense Department of what had transpired in the Persian Gulf. Early yesterday, Tehran broadcast accusations that the United States had downed an unarmed airliner.

The Pentagon at first denied the Iranian claims, declaring that information from the fleet indicated that the Vincennes, equipped with the Aegis electronic battle management system, had shot down an attacking Iranian F14 jet fighter. But after sifting through more detailed reports and electronic intelligence, Reagan directed the Pentagon to confirm there had been a tragic case of mistaken identity in the war-torn gulf.

Crowe, in his hastily called news conference at the Pentagon, also backed up the skipper of the Vincennes and faulted the Iranian airline pilot. Crowe said the Airbus had flown four miles west of the usual commercial airline route from Bandar Abbas to Dubai and that the pilot ignored repeated radioed warnings from the Vincennes to change course.

Why and how the Vincennes mistook the bulky, wide-bodied Airbus A300 for a sleek, supersonic F14 fighter plane barely a third the transport’s size will be the subject of “a full investigation,” Reagan promised. A military team under the command of Rear Adm. William N. Fogarty of the U.S. Central Command will leave this week to begin that investigation, Defense Department officials said.

The shootdown of the Airbus represents the biggest loss of life on the strategic waterway since the U.S. warships began escorting Kuwaiti tankers in and out of the Persian Gulf last July. Pentagon officials then said the increased U.S. naval presence would have from a “low to moderate risk” of provoking confrontations with Iran.

But in the past year, although the United States and Iran are not in a formal state of war, there have been a series of brief but fierce sea battles in the gulf between the two countries’ military forces. Vigilance and readiness among U.S. forces intensified after the near-sinking of the patrol frigate USS Stark by an Iraqi fighter-bomber on May 17, 1987, in a missile attack that killed 37 sailors.

Yesterday started out as another sea battle, and ended with what the Vincennes Commanders misinterpreted as a “Stark profile” attack on the high-tech cruiser. Crowe in his briefing and other Navy and Defense Department officials offered a detailed version of how the shoot-down occurred.

At 2:10 a.m. EDT, the Pentagon said, three Iranian Boghammar gunboats fired on a helicopter that had flown off the Vincennes on a reconnaissance mission. The helicopter flew back to the cruiser unscathed. The Vincennes and a smaller warship, the frigate USS Elmer Montgomery, a half-hour later closed on the gunboats and put them under fire with 5-inch guns, sinking two and damaging the third.

At 2:47 a.m. EDT, the Iranian Airbus with almost a full load of passengers took off from Bandar Abbas, a big Iranian naval base on the northern coastal elbow of the Strait of Hormuz. The field at the base is used by civilian and military aircraft and recently had become the center for Iran’s dwindling force of F14s, a twin-engine, two-place fighter that the United States sold to Iran during the rule of the shah.

Two minutes after the Airbus took off, the far-reaching radars of the Vincennes Aegis cruiser saw the plane was coming its way. The skipper of the ship, operating under liberalized rules of engagement that call for U.S. captains in the Persian Gulf to fire before being fired upon to avoid another Stark disaster, warned the approaching aircraft to change course, according to the Pentagon.

The Vincennes and most airliners are equipped with identification of friend or foe (IFF) electronic boxes that query each other across the sky to establish identities. The Vincennes’ IFF questioned the Airbus IFF via telemetry, but received no response. A response would come in radio pulses that would be deciphered and displayed as an identifying number on the ship’s combat information center consoles.

Failing to raise the Airbus by IFF, the Pentagon said, the Vincennes broadcast its warnings by voice radio, using the emergency UHF and VHF channels that aircraft crews would hear if they followed standard practice of monitoring those frequencies. Crowe said three warnings were sent over the civilian emergency channel and four over the military one, called “Guard.” The Pentagon said the Vincennes could have issued the warning over the Air Traffic Control channel but did not.

“The suspect aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor,” Crowe told reporters. Defense Department officials said later that the Airbus was four miles west of commercial air corridor. “More importantly,” Crowe continued, “the aircraft headed directly for Vincennes on a constant bearing at high speed, approximately 450 knots.”

Without becoming specific, Crowe said there were “electronic indications on Vincennes” that led the U.S. crew to conclude the approaching airliner was an F14. “Given the threatening flight profile and decreasing range, the aircraft was declared ‘hostile’” at 2:51 a.m. EDT. The airliner at that crucial moment was on a course of almost due south, 185 degrees, and descending toward the Vincennes from an altitude of 7,800 feet, according to Crowe. Visibility was no more than five miles, Crowe said.

Three minutes later, at 2:54 a.m. EDT, the Vincennes launched two Standard surface-to-air missiles from its deck. The missiles whooshed toward the twin-jet airliner, which was nine miles away and not visible to the naked eye because of the haze hanging over the gulf. The Standard missiles homed in on the heat of the quarry’s engines and at least one of them exploded when it pulled abreast of the Airbus. Such a missile hit usually slices an aircraft apart and turns it into a fireball of burning fuel.

[donsaeid]

“At least one hit at an approximate range of six miles,” Crowe said. “We do have some eyewitness reports {USS Elmer Montgomery} that saw the vague shape of the aircraft when the missile hit, and it looked like it disintegrated.”

Asked if the Vincennes’ skipper had been prudent or impetuous by firing at a plane he could not see, Crowe replied: “The commanding officer conducted himself with circumspection and, considering the information that was available to him, followed his authorities and acted with good judgment at a very trying period and under very trying circumstances ... Not only was he following this aircraft and concerned about it,” but he also “was engaged on the surface with Iranian units.”

Crowe said it was “logical” for the skipper to assume an aircraft that was coming down from the sky at high speed and would not respond to radio warnings was putting the Vincennes “in jeopardy.”

At another point in the news conference Crowe broadened his defense of the Vincennes skipper, declaring “the No. 1 obligation of the commanding officer of a ship or units are the protection of his own people. We deeply regret the loss of life here, but that commanding officer had a very heavy obligation to protect his ships, his people. We’ve made that clear throughout the Persian Gulf mission ...”

Crowe, who used a chart of the Strait of Hormuz that displayed the approximate positions of the vessels and the route of the airliner, said he did not have enough data to explain fully why the multiple kinds of detection gear aboard the Vincennes mistook a wide-bodied jetliner for a fighter.

But he noted that the Vincennes’ radar was focused on a plane coming at it head-on, reflecting a smaller dot on the console screens than would be the case from a side view. Also, he said, no Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or Navy Hawkeye sentry planes were aloft over the Strait of Hormuz to provide additional identification data to the Vincennes at the time of the shootdown.

Navy leaders said Iranian commercial aircraft had flown over U.S. warships in a threatening manner at least eight times before the Stark was hit by two French Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi jet. Ever since the Stark attack, skippers in the gulf have been less tolerant of such apparent threats.

Asked if the skipper of the Vincennes would have held his fire under the interpretation of the rules of engagement followed before the Stark was attacked, Crowe replied: “I don’t know. Certainly the rules of engagement would not have been as specific as the authorities granted him.” He said another review of the rules of engagement would be part of the general investigation of the shootdown.

Crowe said there were “fundamental differences” between the actions of United States in this incident and the Soviet Union in the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which strayed into Soviet airspace on the night of Sept. 1, 1983, during a flight from Alaska to Japan. The Soviet airspace was not a war zone like the Persian Gulf, Crowe said, “and there was not combat in progress” as was the case yesterday. “It was at very high altitude” and no Soviet warnings were issued.

“In the Persian Gulf,” Crowe said, there is very little time or maneuver room when ships are put at risk. “We’re fighting in a lake.”

[donsaeid]

This Sunday afternoon press briefing, broadcast on TV and radio, gripped a worldwide audience of hundreds of millions of people, live and in later news broadcasts.

It was the day of the 1988 Wimbledon men’s tennis final. Interrupted by rain, with news reports of the ambush filling some of that time. Concluded the next day, a U.S. national holiday, and a day of more such news, and rebroadcasts of this press briefing.

SSR/IFF: Transponder squawk-code

Crowe stated the aircraft did not broadcast a civilian transponder squawk-code:

“Question: Was the airliner squawking, as it should be, with its IFF? ...

Admiral Crowe: ... You’re asking me about IFF. We did have some electronic emanations, but I really can’t say any more than that.

Question: He didn’t identify himself as a commercial?

Admiral Crowe: No, he did not.

Question: He was squawking something but not the recognizable “I am an airliner?”

Admiral Crowe: Well, it led us to believe that it was a military aircraft.

Question: How come?” {unanswered}

William J. Crowe Jr. (Admiral, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Press Briefing, July 3 1988.

This was a bold, powerful, persuasive lie. A lie of Crowe’s own personal fabrication, independent of events thousands of miles away.

Persuasive, because the absence of a civilian SSR/IFF transponder squawk code is very fishy. Every airliner broadcasts a squawk-code (as required by binding international Air Traffic Control regulations), to identify its digital data-block, and its pressure altitude (flight level), displayed on radar screens equipped to decode Air Traffic Control data — like the ones on board the USS Vincennes, in its Combat Information Center, the Commander’s cockpit.

Bold, because other U.S. Officers had also seen what Crowe had, in his possession, and knew, for a fact, that Crowe was lying:– The Operation Report from the Vincennes Commander which, though false in most respects, nevertheless disclosed receipt of the aircraft’s IFF civilian transponder squawk-code. But, senior U.S. Military Officers well know that lying is part of their duty, and they can be certain that if they don’t keep quiet when their colleagues lie, and themselves lie on orders, their career prospects are doomed. At this Press Briefing, Crowe was modeling for all senior U.S. Military Officers, and their junior aspirants, what it takes to reach the top of the pile in this powerful United States Government institution, operating in secret and largely outside the rule of law, an essential character quality for leadership:– bold deceit.

A lie, because Crowe also had, in his possession, an account of what the Commander of the USS Elmer Montgomery saw. And, if he had that, then he certainly also had a account — later disclosed in the DoD report — of what the officers of USS Sides saw (the third member of the 3-ship squadron). The Sides officers absolutely refuted the Vincennes Commander’s false report, and themselves saw the aircraft’s IFF civilian transponder squawk-code, and no other IFF signal of any sort, with no equivocation.

A lie, because Crowe surely also had, in his possession, the very same “electronic intelligence” the President had, and later mentioned in the DoD report (¶ 2, p.8; ¶ j, p.28), doubtless reporting the aircraft’s civilian transponder broadcasts — squawk-code (mode A) and pressure-altitude (mode C). And, convincingly, a tape recording and transcript of the radio broadcasts between the pilot and Air Traffic Control, and the supposed “warnings” broadcast by U.S. warships. And an account of the radar flight-profile (high and climbing, in the middle of the airway).

These redacted intelligence sources were, presumably, Naval/NSA signals intelligence officers onboard the Vincennes itself at the time with the Naval Security Group Command (NSGC) in charge of the Ship’s Signals Exploitation Space (SSES); the NSA/DIA on-shore listening/radar station in Oman, on the Musandam Peninsula (at 2,000 feet elevation, with line-of-sight to Bandar Abbas airport, 45 n.miles north); the Hawkeye crew aloft nearby at the time above the Northern Gulf of Oman; the AWACs crew aloft at the time above the Northern Persian Gulf; British Intelligence; British/Italian warships; etc. (several of these).

“Surely,” because that would be the first thing any competent officer in Crowe’s position would ask for. He had many hours to get it. And, naturally, the President apparently also wanted it. And got it.

CBDR: Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range

Crowe listed among his reasons — that the Vincennes Commander “acted with good judgment” in deciding to attack — that Iran Air 655 was “headed directly for the Vincennes,” “coming its way,” “headed directly for Vincennes on a constant bearing,” “coming at it head-on”.

Duh! is the expression which now leaps to mind – an exasperated: “So what”.

But it did not leap to the minds of the hundreds of millions of TV viewers of his press briefing, because Crowe concealed the whereabouts of the Vincennes — dead-center in the airway — one of those material omissions referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which denominate a “materially false statement” (a prima facie “lie”). And, he elaborated his deceit by asserting that the Vincennes was “outside” the airway, claiming the “suspect aircraft” (which was headed directly for the Vincennes) was four miles “outside the prescribed commercial air corridor”. Very, very fishy.

Like his transponder lie, this too was a deceit of Crowe’s own personal fabrication (in conspiracy with his complicit staff), independent of events thousands of miles away.

Crowe had, in his possession, the Operation Report from the Vincennes Commander. And, his staff had been on the phone for many hours investigating this incident. Certainly, this report, and those investigations, specified the geographical coordinates of the Vincennes at the time of the attack, a normal part of an Operation Report, a preoccupation of all naval officers dealing with charts, a direct read-out from the display of the warship’s laser-gyro inertial navigation system, recorded continuously and time-stamped as the log of the warship’s movements, and no doubt broadcast automatically every minute or so via satellite to the Pentagon, charting in real-time the position of all U.S. warships at sea. Crowe produced a chart at his Press Briefing showing the (supposed) position of the Vincennes.

And, Crowe certainly had a published chart of the public airway — which itself is defined by geographical coordinates 1 — showing its 20-mile width. Yet, that airway chart would have provoked questions at the press briefing and exposed his deceit. So, he concealed that as well:

“Admiral Crowe: This is sort of a simplistic chart, we’re trying to keep it simple.”

William J. Crowe Jr. (Admiral, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Press Briefing, July 3 1988.