Eye On Iran

[Rasputin]

An often overlooked question about the Iranian threat is why are they so vehemently opposed to the existence of Israel, and what can that teach us about how to best deal with them?

Iran, unlike other bellicose regimes that have surrounded Israel since its incarnation, is non-Arab and Shi'ite. Iran has never had a modern claim to any land that Israel has ever occupied, and do not house any Palestinian refugees. Except for the recent funding of Hizbullah, Iran had never before gone to war with Israel, not even in 1948.

So why now? First, Israel was a chief supporter, along with the US, of Mohammed Reza Shah, the despised dictator overthrown during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Because Israel was pro-Shah and works so closely with the US, anti-Shah and anti-US sentiment were naturally combined into anti-Israeli sentiment. A major point of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's speeches was the embarrassingly close relations with Israel (in the eyes of Iran's neighbors), which only made Iran more of an outcast in the Arab Middle East.

This leads us to the main reason for Iran's hatred of Israel: acceptance into the Arab world. If one subscribes to Sam Huntington's viewpoint, Iran is isolated culturally, racially, and historically. Reza Shah tried to imitate Ataturk and force Iran into a European mold, backed by the synthesis of Aryan racial theories, which failed.

Mohammed Reza Shah tried to identify with America and continue to suppress Iran's Islamic heritage by stressing its connection to the pagan Persian Empire, which also failed. Khomenei's revolution has now tried to identify Iran with the Islamic World. The experience of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism is that the only matter that Arab States have been able to agree on his hatred of Israel, which is why Ahmednijad's has chosen this platform to promote Islamic Unity.

What are the implications of this? First, the fissures in the jihadist alliance of Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria, and Iran need to be exposed. Sunni Syrians and Palestinians are at best skeptical of an alliance with Shi'ite Iran and Hizbullah. Syria is secular, and Hizbullah operates in a country with a liberal culture that is wary of burkas and sharia. The problems of Arab Unity were ultimately exposed by war (the disunity of Arab armies in 1967), and ended by diplomacy (Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties).

The best way to deal with the current situation is diplomacy with the secular Syrians (spearheaded by the US, who is forcing Syria into the corner of outcasts by refusing to talk to them), diplomacy with Hamas, who is still a greater and more urgent problem than Hizbullah, and action against Iran. If real sanctions are implemented against Iran, and soon, this is the preferred way of testing Iran's mettle. With a desire for acceptance being its only motivation, Iran will be forced to come around, provided that the US will in turn reopen diplomatic relations.

Unfortunately, Russia and China seem bent on preventing real sanctions in order to protect their economic interests. Aside from real sanctions, war is the only option, unless we want to set an example for how rogue nations can gain power and nukes while spurning world order.

[Rasputin]

Given Tehran's opinion on the future inclusion of the state of Israel in school atlases together with the growing concerns over Iran's potential to develop nuclear weapons, it is understandable that many Israelis are feeling increasingly threatened these days.

At the same time, however, it would also be useful to understand the position of an ordinary citizen of Iran. In the light of the bellicose rhetoric used by some Israeli politicians, if I were an Iranian, I would be feeling rather uneasy at the moment.

The knowledge that Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and that influential people there are openly discussing preemptive military strikes would not serve to ease my nerves. Furthermore, my disquiet would certainly have been heightened when viewing the aftermath of the Israeli Defense
Force's recent excursions into Lebanese and Palestinian territories.

I would also, no doubt, duly note that these countries' respective administrations were too weak, politically and militarily, to either defend their citizens or to disarm the militant agitators whose actions Israel claimed justified their incursions. In short, I should be most anxious that Iranians would not suffer the same fate, or worse, as that of the Lebanese and Palestinians.

Most Israelis support their government in doing whatever they believe is necessary to defend their country, regardless of the subsequent reaction from the likes of the UN or the EU. It should not, therefore, be difficult to perceive why ordinary Iranians would not similarly support their own government's (suspected) attempt to develop a nuclear deterrent and treat the ensuing international criticism with equal disregard.

One side, and militant Arab states on the other, ratchet up the tensions a point whereby their
respective differences become permanently irreconcilable.

Israel's present government is mistaken if it believes that provocative military adventures supplemented with vows and The real danger comes when Israel and the US, on threats are being helpful in securing peace in the region. This can only be achieved by engendering the goodwill of Israel's neighbours, primarily through affording Muslims in Israel and Palestine the same rights and opportunities that the citizens of other faiths enjoy.

This way, Israel can rightly expect to gain acceptance and support from the Arab world, in particular, and from the wider Muslim population in general.

Without this backing, however, the national security of Israel will always be threatened.

[Rasputin]

Ahmadinejad fancies himself a prophet and surrounds himself with followers and threatens America - the only country to have used the bomb. We need to review the rules of war and engagement in light of terrorism.

If we are attacked, we first attempt to address the damage, agree on the response and then attempt to get a consensus. I would suggest that we forget about the consensus part and just
respond accordingly.

Israel has respect for how they address issues and responds in a way that only the middle east can understand. They hate Israel and therefore Israel can take appropriate measures without concern how they may be viewed by others within the region. I honestly feel the United States would worry about how we would be viewed by our own peer group before we would respond. I feel we need to reevaluate our strategic goals and update our nuclear arsenal.

In the new millennium we need to reassess scenarios that were thought to be wholly unacceptable in the sixties. I'm sorry to say, but give us 100-dollar-a-barrel oil, a very cold winter and a hotter than usual summer and stir gently - throw in an attack by Iran and "walla!".... consensus.

In closing, I would also recommend that we make it known to everyone that if we are attacked, we will do whatever it takes to take the country that supports the offenders and all their resources to be used in any way we see fit; like stabilizing oil supplies with cheaper oil to all countries - a lot cheaper oil.

[Rasputin]

My two cents :

The Iranians have no reason to feel uneasy for several reasons. Israel has no conflict with Iran. In fact, Israel and Iran have a history of cooperation that was interrupted by the fundamentalist regime ruling Teheran these days. Israel has never threatened to destroy Iran. It is only as a legitimate reaction to Iran's beliquose retoric combined with its plans for nuclear arms that some Israeli have made statements that can be qualified at threatening. There is a simple way to put to rest any concerns about Israel: stop threatening its existence.

[Rasputin]

Iran knows how to use 'soft' power

The losers in the war in Lebanon, at least in terms of global opinion, are Israel and those governments seen to have implicitly or otherwise supported the Jewish state's action. Lebanon is a major loser in terms of infrastructure, economy and the further undermining of its previously already slight territorial and political control.

The damage to Hizbullah is difficult to ascertain - politically emboldened, no doubt, but militarily severely wounded in spite of the tactical successes it unexpectedly enjoyed especially against Israeli armor.

The real winner in the war in Lebanon is Iran. But the extent of its victory is not yet public or clear. In the battle of public perceptions its victory was assured in the Islamic world, and even further afield, the moment Israel launched what many saw as a disproportionate military response to the abduction of its soldiers.

But Teheran's real victory will come in the aftermath of battle, during the reconstruction stage. While the international community spends a fortune on inserting a massive peacekeeping force, Iran will fund the rebuilding of Hizbullah communities, dishing out aid, captivating communities and ensuring religious patronage.

While the Iranians reportedly assisted in arming Hizbullah with advanced wire- and laser-guided anti-tank weaponry and large numbers of relatively crude ground-to-ground missiles, their real advantage will come after the sound of gunfire through the use of soft power.

Where the West would have elaborate procedures to ensure that its aid money was being properly spent, the Iranians will resort to much blunter but likely more effective, and certainly faster tactics. While the West speaks of "effects-based operations" in post-conflict societies, in reality it conducts value-based operations - focusing on the delivery of assistance in a manner that adheres to Western liberal governance norms and standards of transparency and accountability.

The term "soft power," as opposed to military "hard power," is American, created by those who wanted the US to better exploit its advantages of economic and cultural power in winning the global contest for hearts and minds. But while the phrase may be American it is others, notably the Iranians, who are showing mastery at putting it into practice, and not just in places like Lebanon.

NEITHER ARE the Iranians alone in using soft power to win over communities. Elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Muslim Brotherhood has been doing it for years in Egypt. Where communities lack medical care, for example, the Brotherhood uses doctors to offer a number of free consultations as a condition of their membership.

These opportunities are doled out within disadvantaged communities, strengthening lines of patronage and support for the Brotherhood's aims. It uses the lack of delivery of the government to its own advantage. Exploiting the government's failings and meeting, if only in part, social needs explains why the Brotherhood is such a feared and powerful political force in Egypt today.

By comparison, aid delivery in a country like Afghanistan is a tortuous affair. Bureaucratic procedures and the delivery of security ensures that the ratio of expenditure (on security forces, consultants, administration and other forms of bureaucracy) versus aid delivered is both very much lower, and also very much slower.

Because the West delivers according to its own rules, local actors are seldom able to use the money to their own advantage and in the manner in which their system operates and understands, as patronage and for political power as much as the goal of socioeconomic development.

[Rasputin]

This is not, however, because all local politicians are venal and corrupt: It's the way the system works, and without it there would be a much greater likelihood of systemic instability.

ANOTHER feature of so much Western aid is very often how little credit its donors receive from the recipients for what, whatever the problems, is genuinely massive assistance. The link between the new school or mini-power station and the white aid workers in their white four-wheel drives is rarely made, while many in the aid community regard aid as something that is essentially neutral. This is not how Hizbullah and their backers see it; they want and make sure they receive every drop of political credit going.

Such effective use of soft power is also hard to object to, let alone counter. Arguing against the supply of guns to terrorist organizations is one thing, but, whatever their motives, if the Iranians also seek to influence societies by funding reconstruction, how can we protest?

In the global contest for hearts and minds, policy-makers may be over-focusing on their opponents' guns rather than their butter.

How Iran will use its victory remains to be seen. It is unlikely, however, to be encouraged to seek compromise with the West over its nuclear issues. It probably now fears less the military advantage enjoyed by Israel, the US and others. Whatever tactical damage they can mete out will pale by comparison to the public diplomatic advantage Iran would gain as a result - a David and Goliath contest, with the weak exploiting the enemy's strength.
But the reality is that Teheran is not weak at all, just very astutely playing the game to its own rules.

[Rasputin]

In Tehran, This Guys' Night Out Is About Getting Down to the Hard Line

TEHRAN The weekly gathering of those who still believe most in the Islamic Revolution was to start promptly at 5 p.m. The time was right there in the lower left-hand corner of Ya Lesarat al-Hussein, the hard-line weekly newspaper that sponsors the Sunday gathering.

The paper's name, which translates as "Those Who Want to Avenge the Blood of Hussein," suggests the militant flavor the gathering is intended to nurse, 27 years after the revolution that brought the clerics to power in Iran. A couple of dozen of the faithful are already in the evenly lit basement of the capital headquarters of Ansar al-Hezbollah, or Friends of the Party of God, a paramilitary group whose members were called on many a time in the previous decade to break the ranks, if not the skulls, of student protesters.

Leaving their shoes in the racks at the top of the stairs, they pad past posters trumpeting the pan-Islamic goals -- "One Day the Land of Palestine Will Be Returned to the World of Islam" -- articulated by the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose virtues the guest speaker will extol when he shows up. Meanwhile, they fold their legs under themselves and read.

A slender young man moves through the silence, newsprint hung over his forearm like a waiter's towel. He hands out Partosokhan, or "In the Light of Discourse." A balding man opens to an article on the lamentable state of Iranian textiles; the world's only Islamic theocracy is importing chadors, the enveloping black robes whose name literally translates as "tent."

Another problem: Many young women aren't even wearing them, preferring fashionable scarves and snug jackets that stretch the definition of hijab , or head covering. A second young man circulates handbills announcing a march against such immodesty, on the coming Friday, after prayers. (No one will show up.)

"Mourning songs?" asks another man, handing out CDs from a stack. His white beard is neatly trimmed and he wears a pinstriped double-breasted suit. The room he moves through has the feel of a weeknight function in a church basement, except everyone's sitting on the carpet.

The last gaps are disappearing -- elbows drawn in to make room, shoulders touched in greeting -- when Mehdi Koochakzadeh strides in on long legs. Slender, bearded, strings on his glasses, he takes the only seat in the room and commences on the advertised topic: the thoughts and character of Khomeini. He waves a thick stack of quotations by the cleric whose charisma and religious authority held the Islamic Republic together through its first decade, until his death in 1989. Since then, there's been a certain amount of improvisation.

"We have no such thing as majority rule in Islam," Koochakzadeh proclaims. "If the majority says, 'We don't want an Islamic regime,' they have no right."

If it seems a strange statement from an elected member of parliament, this goes unremarked. But when, at 6:40, Koochakzadeh announces that "someone is picking me up at 7:15," a young man in the back pipes up: "Well, that's as usual. Officials are always coming to talk to us. They never listen. They never ask our opinion."

The speaker waves another quotation. Khomeini said: "What we should have in mind is the satisfaction of God, not the satisfaction of the people." The legislator adds: "They know nothing. They have no right to make a decision."

He has an eye on the clock. It's after 7. But the crowd is restless, and before Koochakzadeh can leave, someone sets a stack of papers on the desk -- written questions from the audience.

"There are several ladies in the place where I work who are not observing hijab and who make fun of me for being a Hezbolli. What should I do?"

[Rasputin]

In Tehran, This Guys' Night Out Is About Getting Down to the Hard Line II

Koochakzadeh looks up. To maintain public peace, Iran's conservatives have given youth a measure of freedom that somehow disempowers the men seated on the floor. "I understand your suffering," he says, counseling patience and the services of his office if circumstances grow intolerable. As he recites his phone number, every man in the audience appears to jot it down.

"For 27 years, you and yours have been running this country. Why is there still so much corruption?"

The reply, which runs for several paragraphs, ends with: "Most of the trouble we have has been plotted by the United States and our enemies. And part of it is you voted for people you shouldn't have." He mentions a "stupid" presidential candidate who offered every Iranian $60 a month.

From the back, a man shoots back: "This person you're talking about was much closer to Imam Khomeini than many people in high positions."

Another man calls out: "There were others who promised to put oil money on the tablecloth!" The reference is to the candidate who won, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The speaker spreads his arms wide. It's 7:20. He's late.

"See how democratic we are? When a person wants to go and make a speech, he can go to an Ansar meeting!"

In the second row, a young man in a blue blazer stands. "I was beaten up by Ansar, myself." He smiles. "They broke a tooth."

[Rasputin]

A Different Face of Iran

As a journalist, I've spent considerable time over the years in places where America was not always popular. In the bad old days, that meant Russia, China and Vietnam; more recently I've reported from such human-rights black holes as Uzbekistan and North Korea. Then there were the destinations with elements of danger: Israel, the southern Philippines, Northern Ireland. None of those ever gave me pause.

But I wouldn't be truthful if I didn't admit being slightly uneasy about going to Iran -- now in the United States' cross hairs because of its developing nuclear technology -- when a U.N. contact invited me to join a group of international reporters on a trip in May.

The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran haven't had diplomatic relations in 26 years, since students in Tehran seized 66 American hostages inside the U.S. Embassy and held some of them for as long as 14 months. Neither nation has an embassy in the other's capital, and the U.S. State Department has a travel warning on Iran. Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council is pressuring Iran to stop its uranium enrichment, and the Bush administration is talking sanctions.

I applied for my visa in a room on the second floor of a nondescript building in upper Georgetown marked "Iranian Interests Section." This facility is technically part of the Pakistani Embassy (which handles Iran's affairs in the United States), but Pakistan's embassy is actually two miles away. What I saw here didn't ease my mind. Inside were a dozen Iranian Americans waiting for their own visas. As they waited, they gazed at videos on a large plasma television. On the screen was the classic image that most Americans have of Iran: a bearded, red-faced mullah wagging a bony finger at a stadium of young people. For what, I didn't know.

Four days later, visa in hand, I boarded an Air France flight from Dulles to Tehran. There I met my colleagues arriving from various points; they were German, British, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Korean. I was the only Yank.

What took place over the next fortnight astonished me. Everywhere I went -- from the traffic-choked streets of Tehran in the north to the dusty desert town of Yazd in central Iran, to the elegant cultural centers of Isfahan and Shiraz -- I was overwhelmed by the warmth and, dare I say it, pro-Americanism of the people I met.

Ponder the irony of that last statement for a moment. While much of the rest of the world seems to be holding their collective noses at us Americans, in Iran people were literally crossing the road to shake an American's hand and say hello. Who knew?

Initially, when Iranians asked me where I was from, I'd suggest they guess. But this game quickly proved too time-consuming -- no one ever guessed correctly. So instead I would simply mumble "American." And then their faces would light up. For better or worse, Iranians are avid fans of America: its culture, films, food, music, its open, free-wheeling society.

In a small stall at the bazaar in Isfahan, for example, I was nonchalantly eyeing a carpet while the young rug merchant looked on sleepily. But when I responded to his casual question about where I was from, he became as energetic as an 8-year-old near an ice cream truck. Straight away, he launched into a virtual love sonnet to all things Hollywood.

"Do you agree," he pressed, "that Marlon Brando was the greatest actor in the world?"

Indeed he was, I granted, slowly edging toward the exit. But he beckoned me back. Reaching under his desk, he pulled out a large paperback, which turned out to be a well-thumbed Brando biography . . . in Persian.

He turned the pages with gentle reverence, gesturing at specific photos of the Great Man. Then, holding his hand up in a "don't go" gesture, he broke into an impersonation of Brando doing Don Corleone. "Ya come to meee on desse de day of ma daughter's wadding . . . " It was the worst Brando impersonation I've ever heard, but surely the most heartfelt.

[Rasputin]

During my visit, I could not pause on a street corner for more than 30 seconds without someone coming up and shyly asking if they could help. Discovering that they had an American in their midst, they would often insist on walking me to my destination. Some told me of their friends and relatives living in the United States. (Precise figures are impossible to come by, but Iranian immigrant groups believe that between 1.5 and 2 million Iranians and Iranian Americans live in the United States.)

According to Iranian government officials, about 70 percent of Iran's 69 million people are under 30. They have no memory of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran's last monarch; the taking of U.S. hostages; or the accidental shooting down of an Iranian airliner by a U.S. Navy ship in 1988. And to me, few young Iranians seemed happy with their own government. I seriously doubt that if Iran had opinion polls, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's popularity ratings would be any higher than George W. Bush's. Another irony.

Many people I spoke with did voice fears of what President Bush might do to Iran. Some were frightened of being attacked. But others were concerned about what effects U.S. economic sanctions would have on an economy that is already appallingly managed by mullahs. Yet I never sensed any personal hatred toward Bush.

Iranians seem readily able to separate in their minds the difference between the American people and America as a nation, with a U.S. government whose policies they strongly oppose.

Everywhere I went, however, Iranians -- from high school students to middle-aged taxi drivers -- repeatedly asked me: "Why does America call us Evil Axis?" Then they would indignantly add: "We are good people -- we are Persians! Iran is a good country, some are bad, but most people here are good." They seemed genuinely wounded by the political rhetoric of the White House.

When told I was a reporter, college kids asked me to tell Americans: "Please know this: We are not Saudi Arabia. We are not Iraq. We are not Yemen. Please tell them we are not the same as these places!" In fact, Islam came late to the Persia party. The Persian empire boasted a rich civilization several centuries before Arab invaders swept in from the west. During my visit, I got the distinct impression that Iranians admire Islam's sense of discipline and are grateful for the art and architecture that were its gifts. But younger Iranians have little interest in its rigid dogma and social intolerance. After all, it was Omar Khayyam, the Persian poet, who wrote the famous line celebrating life's earthy essentials: "A loaf of bread . . . a flask of wine, a book of verse -- and thou."

What astonished me the most about Iran were its women. I met and spoke with scores of them from all parts of the country. And everywhere they were wonderful: vivid, bold, articulate in several languages, politically astute and audaciously outward-looking. While some men demurred, the women weren't afraid to voice opinions about anything under the sun.

In fact, women in Iran can work and drive and vote, own property or businesses, run for political office and seek a divorce. The majority of Iran's university graduates are women.

But socially, Iran's women still live under Islamic edicts: They must wear the hijab when leaving the house, and they cannot normally associate with any male who is not their father, brother or son, or shake hands with a man. Despite these restrictions, they manage to remain utterly feminine. They are keen on bright lipsticks, nail polish and eye shadow. And they have a passion for imported handbags and shoes.

It's the women who give me the most hope that this once noble nation will one day return to its tolerant roots. Most of the young people I spoke with insist that change is coming.

On my last night in Iran, as I waited to board my flight to Paris, a little boy named Ali queued up behind me with his father and his elderly grandmother who had come to see them off. The old woman, dressed in black, was distressed at the boy's departure and was smothering him with hugs and kisses.

I handed them sticks of cinnamon gum and snapped their picture. At this, the old woman pulled Ali close and whispered in his ear. The little boy's face lit up. He walked up to me and introduced himself in halting English, shook my hand and said: "We can be friends, yes?"

[Rasputin]

Blogs from Iran
A Journalist from Iran - A journalist and student discusses the difficulties and politics of being a single woman living in Iran.

Adventures of Mr. Behi - 28-year-old Iranian man tries to shed light on his society

ddmmyyyy - Brit with Iranian roots moves to Iran to explore his heritage

Hadi Mirror - 23-year-old Teheran-based blogger shares concerns about Iran while reflecting on life

Human First, Then a Proud Iranian - An Iranian's liberal veiw on peace and humanity

Iranian Teacher XP - A teacher in Iran blogs about the difficulties and hypocrisies inherent in local politics and society

Masoud Behnoud - Prominent Iranian journalist and writer comments on current events and offers suggestions

Mohammad Ali Abtahi - Iranian politician uses personal blog to advocate democracy while retaining tradition

My Lucid Dreams - Iranian 20-something intertwines tales of life and political commentary

Planet Rodmania - Unconcerned Iranian blogs about living life and consuming technology

Under Underground - Azad University student waxes on about the government and enjoying life

View from Iran - American in Iran talks about life and politics


Blogs from outside Iran
A Glinting Glimpse from Above the Wall - Iranian woman in India reflects on life and her homeland, especially from a feminist viewpoint

Editor: Myself - An Iranian transplant to Toronto blogs about Iran, technology and pop culture

Free Thoughts on Iran - An Iranian living away from home reflecting on perceptions on Iran and its politics

Hanif of Yazd - Texan-Iranian in US university shares thoughts and quotes

Nik's Kicks - Quotes, comments and cartoons on Iran from Canadian-Iranian

The Spirit of Man - Canada-based, pro-America Iranian seeks democratic regime change in Iran

To Write or Not to Write - Iranian student in France comments on his life, reflects on his homeland

Webgardian - Blogging from Belgium on Iranian blogs, politics, art, media daily life

White Balloon - Iranian-American student still adjusting to life in the US while maintaining cultural ties

[Rasputin]

Iranians taste freedoms on own terms

Emad Baghi is a human rights activist who spent three years in prison for his writings. Shadi Vatanparast is a promoter of underground Iranian rock bands who, in the semi-privacy of her office, throws off her government-mandated headscarf. And Fazel Mehbadi is a mullah who preaches a message that's dangerously dissident in the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion should be separate from government.

These Iranians, in large ways and small, want more democracy and pluralism in their country, and they have taken risks to change their society. They are the kind of people whom US officials say they want to support. Yet they all agree that the last thing they need is help from the United States.

``The best thing the Americans can do for democracy in Iran is not to support it," Baghi, the activist, said recently in his office, next to a stack of his politically risky published books -- ``The Tragedy of Democracy in Iran," ``Clerics and Power," and a study that criticizes the government on its own terms, using Islamic teachings to indict Iran's justice system and its arbitrary arrests and executions.

Receiving US aid -- whether cash or simply public statements of support -- could destroy democracy advocates' chances of building grass-roots credibility at home, say Baghi and many other Iranians critical of their government. They prefer to steer their own course, pushing for gradual change and navigating a middle ground between accommodation and conflict with the Muslim clerics who rule Iran.

Their goals vary, though none would sound out of place on an American wish list: Baghi pushes for the rule of law; Mehbadi, the cleric, wants more power for elected officials; and Vatanparast, the music promoter, wants to midwife young Iranians' yearning for social and cultural freedom, a force that has already pushed the government to accept, tacitly, a looser dress code for women.

Watch it here : http://www.boston.com/news/world/mid..._on_own_terms/

[jjbb]

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اين هم از آن نشانه هاست ، شده گاهی هی فکری توی سرت دور بزند و بعد همه اتفاقها يکجوری باز مربوط شوند به همان فکر ؟ از هفته پيش که بايد برای يکی از کلاسها يک مستند ده ساعته از جنگهای داخلی امريکا را می ديديم و تحليل می کرديم و آن حالی که داشتم و در موردش در وبلاگ ديگرم نوشته ام ، تا بازخوانی قصه ای که خيلی قديمها نوشته بودم و منتظر فرصتی بوده ام و هستم تا با قالب آن طرحی بريزم درباره بازماندگان جنگ - و حتی حرفها و شعرها و موسيقی هايی که بايد با هر جمله همراه شود هی توی سرم می چرخد - تا همين امروز که باز از فراموش شدگان نوشتم و از شهادت و ايوئولوژی ای که آنها را به پيش راند و مرا عجيب به ياد ايدئولوژی پروتستان می اندازد و ايده رستگاری ، هی با فکر جنگ زندگی کردم . هی آمد و هی رفت و هی چرخيد . امروز اما با اشتياق جشنواره فيلمهای ايرانی در موزه هنرهای بوستون ، رفتم به تماشای گيلانه ، با دوست يونانی ام - اوليا . بازی وصف نشدنی معتمد آريا از خود بی خودم کرد . توی گيلانه ، همه آن صداها و نواها حضور داشتند ، صدای آژير قرمز ، مارش اغلام عملياتها از تلويزيون ، صدای ضدهوايی ، صدای بمبها ،همه بودند . همه بودند و همه برگشتند باز به فضای خاطرم و با خودم گفتم عجب تقارنی ست گاهی بين اتفاقها . اوليا می گويد صدای اين آژير تورا يک طور ديگری کرد ، و من نمی توانم برايش بگويم از اين صدا که برای هميشه در کنجی از پستوهای ذهنم خانه کرده ، و از آن دويدنها به سمت زيرزمين و از آن خاموشی ها و از آن صداها که در خاطره قومی ما ضبط شده اند ، و تازه من و ما کمترين تاثير را از جنگ گرفته ايم شايد . اوليا کلی از جنگ می پرسد و من روايت قصه ای که تا به حال مال خودمان بوده را با او تمرين می کنم ، اما باز يک چيزی کم است . واقعيت کم است . باز ياد فراموش شدگان افتادم ، و اسماعيل ها ، و آن جمله کليشه ای و دردناک ِ سهميه دانشگاه که سمبلی شده از معادله معاملات که شامل همه نمی شد ، سمبلی که هم واقعيت داشت و هم اشتباه بود از آن رو که آغاز قضاوت گری ما شد و آغاز خصومت ، و اصلا ما کِی از قضاوت و برچسب زدن بر همديگر مصون بوده ايم ؟ جنگ اما ، ويژگی های منحصر به فرد خودش را دارد . شروع که بشود ، تمامی ندارد . مگر نمی شد بعد از آزادسازی خرمشهر تمام شود ؟ منتظر کدام پيروزی بوديم که هرگز نرسيد ؟ به دور و برم نگاه می کنم ، چيزی که زياد است جنگ ، زنده و حی و حاضر . با جنگ حرص می آيد ، و با حرص دنيايی از معادلات هزارمجهولی . هزار بار ديگر همه اين فکرها می آيد توی سرم و باز يادداشتهای پارسالم را می خوانم :

يادم هست هنوز که چطوراز کرخه تا راين مرا تکان داد ، روايتی بود هوشمندانه و به دور از گزافه گويی . واقع بينانه و تلخ . وا می داشتت تا از هر مرام و مسلکی که هستی ، بتوانی از زاويه نگاه سعيد به زندگی نگاه کنی و همه چيز را درک کنی . وا می داشتت تا خشمی عميق را تجربه کنی ، و دردی همگانی را دور از شعارهای کليشه ای حس کنی .. اين موزيک مرا می برد به سال آخری که توی آن مدرسه داشتم ، و رويارويی با دنيای بيرون که بعد از کنکور منتظرمان بود . می بَردم به شعرها و يادداشتهايی که آن روزها می نوشتم . می بَردم به روزهايی که فهميدم چه بهای سنگينی بابت آن جنگ پرداخته ايم . جنگ اصلا هميشه مغلوبه است، چه فتح کنی چه فتح شوی ، باخته ای و خودت نمی دانی . کرور کرور دست و پا و چشم و نخاع فدای هوسبازی آنهايی می شود که يک شبه حمله می کنند به تکه ای از خاک سرزمينت ، با يک عالم سرو صدا. بعد اما که سرو صداها خوابيد ، هيچکس حال پسر نه ساله ناظم ما را نپرسيد که تنها يادگارش از پدر مفقودالاثرش يک کيسه بود با چند تکه استخوان و لباس و يک پلاک فلزی. هيچکس اهميتی نداد که پای مصنوعی مجيد هنوز هم که هنوز است اندازه اش نيست . هيچکس يک لحظه هم فکر نکرد که سهميه دانشگاه برای فاميل اويی که رفته ، کاری ست که جای او را نمی گيرد ، که نتيجه اش هم می شود نگاه خصمانه بقيه ای که هيچ سهميه ای نداشتند برای کنکور . هيچکدام از ما شجاعت يکی از آن جوانها را نداشتيم که آن يک تکه خاک را پس گرفتند تا ما امروز بتوانيم همان نقشه جغرافيا را به ديوارها نصب کنيم . آنهايی که به خاطر جانبازی و آزادگی تقدير شدند ، فقط کسر کوچکی بودند ، مثل يک کوه يخی که فقط نوکش از آب بيرون است . کافی ست بروی حرف بزنی با بقيه شان . با آنهايی که کليد بهشت را انداختند گردنشان برای عمليات فردا صبح ، و امروز روی ويلچر با خاطرات هم رزمانشان زنده اند جهنم را از بهشت نمی شناسند . کافی ست نگاه کنی به پسرهای و دخترهايی که طبق ادبيات رايج آن روز ، شاهد بودند اما آنقدر خوش شانس نبودند تا از پس شهريه مدرسه شاهد بربيايند . چه چيزی جبران اين واقعيت است که پدرشان را از دست داده اند، يا به همه اعتقادات پدرشان بی اعتقاد شده اند ؟ حتی برای من و تو هم اهميتی نداشت ، داشت ؟ ما فقط سهميه کنکور را می ديديم ، همين . امروز بيست و اندی سال دارند شايد ، دربدر دنبال راهی برای رفتن ... حالا هی بنويسيم چرا اينهمه اعتياد ، اينهمه افسردگی ، اينهمه بيکاری ، اينهمه فساد ، اينهمه فرار ، اينهمه بی هويتی ، اينهمه بی اعتقادی به همه چيز ...

ما باختيم، ما هزارها جوان و هزارها دل شاد را باختيم . توی هر جنگی باختنی هست که گاهی باور کردنش سالها طول می کشد ... و اين موزيک مرا می برد به روزی که فهميدم نه فقط آن خانواده ها ، بلکه همه ما باخته ايم ، همه ما .

[Rasputin]

In early 1906, disgusted by the incompetent and corrupt behavior of their shah, Muzaffar ad-Din, Persian merchants and religious leaders began agitating for the drastic curtailment of his authority. Though unsurprisingly reluctant to legislate his own demise, within months the shah had been obliged by the sheer weight of protests and strikes to assent to what amounted to a constitutional revolution. An elected assembly was allowed to convene that fall, it drew up a mandate for an elected and representative parliament, and the shah signed the whole package into law on December 30. He died, marginalized by his own forced hand, just a few days afterwards.

A hundred years later, the Bush administration is aiming for a repeat performance, against a far more sophisticated oppressor. Even as it passes domestic legislation designed to isolate Iran, and tries to push the United Nations toward toughening sanctions, the US has also moved to allocate funds for a process of democratization there. Tens of millions of dollars are to be spent on improved satellite TV broadcasts into the country, student outreach initiatives, educational and cultural programs and the like. Although the aim of such spending is not specifically stated, it is entirely plain: to encourage the kind of internal dissent that put paid to Muzaffar ad-Din a century ago and that, ideally sooner rather than later, will lead today's opposition groups in Iran to overthrow the ayatollahs.

Some analysts, in the US and beyond, claim that dissident groups are poised to hit the streets, ready to put their lives on the line in the kinds of mass numbers that would overwhelm the regime, and that only the absence of a clearer green light from the United States is holding them back. There is talk of progress toward an unprecedented unifying of Iranian opposition groups - monarchists, communists et al, possibly around Reza Pahlavi, son of the late, last shah - ahead of a planned large-scale campaign of civil disobedience this summer.
Others, more skeptical, assert that opponents of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Islamist government are weak, afraid and disunited, and that, 27 years after the revolution that brought it to power, the Iranian leadership is eminently capable of thwarting whatever protests can be mustered.

In Washington a few days ago, I met with a longtime Iranian-born opposition activist who, among other efforts, is a member of the National Union for Democracy in Iran, a three-year-old, US-based opposition group which seeks, it says, "to promote a strategy of nonviolent political defiance to the rule of the dictatorial theocracy in Iran, and set the conditions for a transparent national referendum," under which Iranians would "determine their future form of government in a free, fair and democratic manner." The group has good ideas but, he readily acknowledged, next to no resources, a common affliction among such organizations.

The activist, who asked that key parts of our conversation be presented anonymously and who therefore I will not name, left Iran shortly before the revolution to study and has been in the US ever since. He is thoroughly familiar with the variety of opposition groups seeking the ouster of the mullahs - including the oft-touted effort by Pahlavi to unite many such factions and galvanize the kind of concerted protests that disunity and infighting have hitherto prevented.

He painted a complex picture of an Iranian populace at once overwhelmingly resentful of the regime and deeply dispirited over the prospects of removing it. He argued that it could take as few as 10,000 protesters, holding firm for just a few hours, to open the floodgates and bring the masses out onto the streets, but he also detailed the relative ease with which the regime has quelled nascent such protests.

[Rasputin]

Where he was categorical and unequivocal was in expounding the depth of the Iranian government's anti-Western mind-set, the absurdity of the delusion that it contained any genuine reformist elements within its ranks and the scope of the danger it poses should it go unchecked. If the Western policymakers grappling with Iran, its aims and its nuclear drive are sleeping at night, he said simply, "then they are fools."

There are those who argue that the only way to tackle Ahmadinejad and the regime is from within - via regime change born of popular dissent. Is that your sense, and is there an opposition movement capable of doing this?

If you compare the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, it gets ever more complex. Afghanistan was a simple military takeover. Iraq needs a mixture of military action and politics. Iran is mostly politics. We need to formulate a political solution for Iran that is mostly organized from the outside because it is impossible to organize inside Iran. You have cells inside Iran which can give information, but the message should be articulated from outside to inside - to create a revolution inside Iran.

But before we get too far into this, I need to give you some history.

In 1906, there was a constitutional revolution to modernize Iran. People wanted progress. Reza Pahlavi's grandfather, [the first shah,] created a solid central government, with enough authority to have one uniform nation. His father, Mohammad, the last shah, implemented economic reform. But the social and political reform, which was the most complicated, was not carried out. The 1979 Islamic revolution was a reaction against modernity, against the West, a retreat backwards hundreds of years. The Islamic regime is a way of thinking that opposes the West, modernity, individual liberty and freedom. It aims to defeat the West and make the entire world Muslim. This goal is contained in the Iranian constitution [which speaks of the army's "ideological mission of jihad… to extend the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world"].

At first, the people of Iran supported the revolution because they were afraid of modernity; it created an identity crisis. Five minutes after the regime was in power, they realized their mistake, realized that religion is not an answer for politics. The people are now, for the most part, completely opposed to the regime. And the regime needs crisis after crisis - whether it is taking American diplomats hostage, war with Saddam, Salman Rushdie - to distract attention from its inability to deliver.

The Islamic regime is very sophisticated. They have a lot of money. And they are ruthless. You have a lot of political prisoners. They have rewritten history. They lie to people. They have turned the nuclear issue into a national right, but give no voice to the individual rights of the people of Iran.

But the people voted for Ahmadinejad last summer, no?

The people have totally lost faith in the regime. They don't participate in elections. They know it is meaningless.

They did not choose Ahmadinejad. The election was a total fraud. The turnout was far, far lower than claimed. Some of those from poor neighborhoods, south of Teheran, did vote for Ahmadinejad - but not in nearly as high numbers as the regime claimed. Ahmadinejad was also supported by the Revolutionary Guards. These are the same thugs who fought to keep the regime in power.

But you have to realize, in any case, that they're all the same - Ahmadinejad, Khatami [the president from 1997-2005], Rafsanjani [the defeated candidate and president from 1989-97], whoever. The regime should be viewed as one team. There may be individual rivalries, but they all unite against outside threats. The Karine A [Gaza-bound shipment of Iranian arms] sailed during the rule of the supposedly reformist Khatami. His time marked the worst killings of writers and intellectuals, the greatest number of prisoners. Khatami was Ahmadinejad with a smiling face, pursuing the same policies. He also called for the destruction of Israel.