What else can be asked of Bush?
By Aluf Benn (Tel Aviv) and Shmuel Rosner (Washington)
A well-worn joke about former secretary of state Colin Powell's mission to Ramallah and Jerusalem in 2002 that began with an attempt to achieve a cease-fire and ended in a loud squabble with Yasser Arafat was resuscitated this week in a corridor conversation between a visiting Israeli and a Washingtonian friend. "Powell's mission was somewhat of a success. He came back alive," quoted the visitor. The context: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to the Middle East this week. She too came back alive, "If you can call that alive," commented the Israeli visitor.
Rice went to the Middle East with no expectations and returned with no achievements. The Mecca agreement has a golden share in this unsurprising failure. Leaked citations from her conversation with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) reveal that it was difficult and bitter. "You are retreating on previous commitments," Rice said to him angrily. Abu Mazen replied that his first priority was to prevent a Palestinian civil war, and considered canceling the summit in protest, at least according to Palestinian sources.
As far as Rice's failure goes, a place of honor is also reserved for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In recent months Olmert has been criticized from every direction and in every possible area. But one thing cannot be taken from him: There is no one more adept at power games and sparring with political rivals than he is. This week he demonstrated this again, in the moves that preceded the tripartite summit in Jerusalem. Rice did not manage to do much to stop him.
Olmert cannot be accused of backpedaling. After all, h e was never enthusiastic about the initiatives of the secretary of state and her Israeli counterpart, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, to weave a "political horizon" for the Palestinians and begin to fashion a future Palestinian state. Perhaps he feared a loss of control over the process, perhaps he worried about the political price of diplomacy, perhaps he realized that a success would be credited to Livni and a failure to him.
In her talks in Israel, Rice took an interest in Olmert and his government's chances of survival. She did not divulge her intentions, and one of her interlocutors wondered whether she wants Olmert to remain in his position as a leader acceptable to Washington, or would prefer him to fall. "She would prefer Livni as prime minister," smiled one American correspondent.
Olmert knows that there are those in President George W. Bush's camp who are also baffled by Rice's diplomatic activism. Statements that she made in interviews last week reminded some of them of former president Bill Clinton's months of delusions leading up to Camp David. On Friday, when Rice was en route to the region, Olmert and Bush spoke on the phone. It is not clear who called whom, and what exactly was said, but Olmert announced after the conversation that Bush is in line with him about insisting on "the Quartet's conditions" for the Palestinian government: recognize Israel, renounce terror and honor previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements. Rice's aides quickly took note of the message. Their Israeli interlocutors had gotten the impression that they sounded more committed and determined than before to enforce the Quartet's conditions and to boycott the Palestinian unity government.
Phone conversations between the prime minister and the president are not an everyday occurrence. During the Lebanon War the two kept their distance until the end of the fighting, so as to prevent rumors of either encouragement or pressure. If Bush decided to talk this time, it is not by chance. The conversation between Olmert and Bush set the boundaries of the framework for the summit and channeled it into a playing field suitable to Olmert. It also denied Rice the ability to pressure Olmert, who had already clinched the matter with her boss.
American journalists who flew in with Rice noticed that the White House did not harbinger her visit with the routine statement that Bush "is sending the secretary of state" to make peace. The silence was interpreted as displeasure and keeping a distance from the failure. This impression was only reinforced when Rice told reporters that before she took off she had a long conversation with Bush, at the end of which she decided to make the trip despite the Mecca agreement. She did not say whether Bush tried to persuade her to stay home. Israeli sources who were involved in the organizing said, until the very last minute, that it was not certain a summit would take place.
By Aluf Benn (Tel Aviv) and Shmuel Rosner (Washington)
A well-worn joke about former secretary of state Colin Powell's mission to Ramallah and Jerusalem in 2002 that began with an attempt to achieve a cease-fire and ended in a loud squabble with Yasser Arafat was resuscitated this week in a corridor conversation between a visiting Israeli and a Washingtonian friend. "Powell's mission was somewhat of a success. He came back alive," quoted the visitor. The context: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to the Middle East this week. She too came back alive, "If you can call that alive," commented the Israeli visitor.
Rice went to the Middle East with no expectations and returned with no achievements. The Mecca agreement has a golden share in this unsurprising failure. Leaked citations from her conversation with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) reveal that it was difficult and bitter. "You are retreating on previous commitments," Rice said to him angrily. Abu Mazen replied that his first priority was to prevent a Palestinian civil war, and considered canceling the summit in protest, at least according to Palestinian sources.
As far as Rice's failure goes, a place of honor is also reserved for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In recent months Olmert has been criticized from every direction and in every possible area. But one thing cannot be taken from him: There is no one more adept at power games and sparring with political rivals than he is. This week he demonstrated this again, in the moves that preceded the tripartite summit in Jerusalem. Rice did not manage to do much to stop him.
Olmert cannot be accused of backpedaling. After all, h e was never enthusiastic about the initiatives of the secretary of state and her Israeli counterpart, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, to weave a "political horizon" for the Palestinians and begin to fashion a future Palestinian state. Perhaps he feared a loss of control over the process, perhaps he worried about the political price of diplomacy, perhaps he realized that a success would be credited to Livni and a failure to him.
In her talks in Israel, Rice took an interest in Olmert and his government's chances of survival. She did not divulge her intentions, and one of her interlocutors wondered whether she wants Olmert to remain in his position as a leader acceptable to Washington, or would prefer him to fall. "She would prefer Livni as prime minister," smiled one American correspondent.
Olmert knows that there are those in President George W. Bush's camp who are also baffled by Rice's diplomatic activism. Statements that she made in interviews last week reminded some of them of former president Bill Clinton's months of delusions leading up to Camp David. On Friday, when Rice was en route to the region, Olmert and Bush spoke on the phone. It is not clear who called whom, and what exactly was said, but Olmert announced after the conversation that Bush is in line with him about insisting on "the Quartet's conditions" for the Palestinian government: recognize Israel, renounce terror and honor previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements. Rice's aides quickly took note of the message. Their Israeli interlocutors had gotten the impression that they sounded more committed and determined than before to enforce the Quartet's conditions and to boycott the Palestinian unity government.
Phone conversations between the prime minister and the president are not an everyday occurrence. During the Lebanon War the two kept their distance until the end of the fighting, so as to prevent rumors of either encouragement or pressure. If Bush decided to talk this time, it is not by chance. The conversation between Olmert and Bush set the boundaries of the framework for the summit and channeled it into a playing field suitable to Olmert. It also denied Rice the ability to pressure Olmert, who had already clinched the matter with her boss.
American journalists who flew in with Rice noticed that the White House did not harbinger her visit with the routine statement that Bush "is sending the secretary of state" to make peace. The silence was interpreted as displeasure and keeping a distance from the failure. This impression was only reinforced when Rice told reporters that before she took off she had a long conversation with Bush, at the end of which she decided to make the trip despite the Mecca agreement. She did not say whether Bush tried to persuade her to stay home. Israeli sources who were involved in the organizing said, until the very last minute, that it was not certain a summit would take place.



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