John Limbert

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

FA: Who was the prince he refers to in his book? Did he ever talk to you about him; it seems he was fascinated by this man and they had a special connection, why?

JL: He was aBakhtiyari prince. His name was Yahya Khan. They had met in Isfahan and had bonded. He later mentions him in more detail in another article. He never talked to me directly about him but I think they had much in common.

FA: Tells us about the hostage crisis. What did you feel as a hostage yourself and what kind of repercussions do you think this has had on Iran- US relations?

JL: With the hostage crisis, came a different picture. I couldn’t accept the degree of nastiness that existed which came with the revolution. They were not the same people you knew and remembered. They were harsh now. There was a sense of resentment and grudge. It was class warfare between the educated elite and ordinary Iranians.

From Aug – Nov 1979 in Tehran was the best Foreign Service assignment I ever had, it was challenging. And the next 14 months was the worst time in my memory.

There were open debates, discussions all over the country. Suppression had leveled off. It was an exciting time, what we remember as the spring of freedom. It could have become behesht (heaven) instead of what it did become. Ambassador Sullivan had already left Iran in early 1979. The chargé d’affaires was Ambassador Bruce Laingen, who came in April- May of that year. There were problems; I had never seen this. But Iran under the Shah was different, the reality was something else. We weren’t sure what was on the horizon.

The actual day the students took over the embassy was the 1st day of work on November 4. On October 22nd, the Shah had been admitted to the US. It was a humanitarian gesture but it was also a stupid move. No Iranian in his right mind believed it was humanitarian, not given the history of US Iran relations. We sent a message to the Department of State; the message was “we have no protection here.” We told them, the Provisional government has no power to protect us. The message that was sent back was “too bad!” besuz o besaz (live with it); “We don’t care what you say; we’re going to do it anyway.”

Jimmy Carter was alone and his advisors told him to let the shah enter the US. Cyrus Vance had been against it, but he changed his opinion. It was Oct 20th. Carter found himself isolated against his own advisors. Strategically it was a too dangerous move for the US. As they say, Siyasat pedar o madar nadareh. (Politics is a dirty business). We were hung out to dry. We were told in so many words, have a nice day! I thought we were all going to die. Some of my colleagues thought the same. You are expandable. But nothing happened until the 4th of November.

At that time, Henry Precht, State Department’s director of Iranian affairs was in Tehran. He went to see Ayatollah Montazeri, and I went as escort/interpreter. Montazeri never said a word about the Shah. He invited us to come to the Friday Prayers at the University. He was the Imam Jom’eh. There were no unfriendly words towards the US in the Friday sermons, except once I heard Marg bar Carter (death to Carter) but the usual slogan around town was Marg bar Amrika (death to America). But no mention of the Shah was made. I was thinking that maybe, I was wrong, no big deal. On Nov. 4th I found out I was wrong. But it wasn’t about the Shah; it was all about destroying the Bazargan government.

FA: What do you think the motives were behind this action?

JL: There were three motives:

Do something against the US-show strength
Use it against the domestic enemies- nationalists, seculars and leftists
Meet young girls and have fun!
I don’t think there were any plans beyond that. They told themselves: What do we do now? Berim sefara- ra begirim ba`d chi? Yek karesh mikonim, ba`d chi misheh? (Let’s go take over the embassy. What about afterwards? Well we’ll do something.) It was a very Iranian thing!

It was all a political gesture, showing off that we are strong too and we mean business, we are mighty as they are.

The response hit a nerve. A huge crowd came to their support. The students were in their early twenties. Some were bearded; some were engineering students who seemed to be the ketab khun (bookish) type.

Most had no knowledge of the world. The majority pretended to be praying. They were from second rank provincial towns, Like Neishapur and Kazerun. They were mostly middle to lower middle class.

We were kept there for 14 months. They would tell us, don’t get mad you should appreciate us. I would say, don’t pretend you are doing us a favor, Menat saremun nagozarin! (Don’t think you are doing us a favor). What you are doing is so disgraceful. I am like your teacher; don’t talk to me this way. They interrogated us a couple of times, they couldn’t figure me out. I knew more about their country and history than they did. They never introduced themselves. But I know one of them was Abbas Abdi. (See photo) He would come with five others. I told them it was a media show. What is the program? When talking to us, there was a lot of anger and personal resentment.

I said, Kar e zeshti bud. (It was a wrong thing to do). What are they doing to their country? Now, the same people who took over the embassy talk of civil society and the rule of law. It reminds me of Mush o gorbeh. Abed o zahed o Mosalmanha. [From a book by Obayd-e Zakani, a 14h- century satirical poet, called Mush-o-Ghorbeh (Mouse and Cat) - a humorous political fable from the time of Hafez. It is the story of a false, hypocritical conversion. The catdecides to repent and starts praying, but he turns out to be worse than before, for he starts eating mice, not one but five at a time!] They were not interested in us, the Shah or the US. It was part of a larger power struggle in Iran against other forces- nationalists, intellectuals and secularists. They used the documents to find and reinforce their own position. One of them told me, “This is not just about you; we are going to find things about what the US has been doing in Iran.” I told them, that this is what most embassies do: Read, report and send communiqués to the authorities in their respective countries.

FA: Who were the others?

JL: One was Hussein Sheikohleslam. He was a gavkosh (Islamic butcher) in California. He reportedly had a halal meat place in Berkeley. He later became a member of parliament.

They told me, “Name all the Iranians you know.” I gave them 500 names. There was no physical harm to me but a few others told me they were beaten. They went to my apartment and took all my belongings, jewelry, a collection of musical tapes, books, etc. They said it would be kept safely and that they would be returned to me one day. They never returned anything. One day I saw that someone was wearing my coat. I told them, why do you steal? Your prayer and fast are batel (invalid)

I think at the end, the real losers were the Iranians. Bazargan’s government had a responsibility to protect us. But he was powerless himself and they couldn’t or didn’t do anything.

Khomeini originally told Yazdi to go ahead kick them [the students] out of the embassy. Khominei was not happy. But he had no choice. He was a Moj savar (lead from behind). Popular opinion was important to them; he and others re-directed the revolution. It was a chance to get rid of their political enemies. In my opinion, it was class warfare. The story is that sometime in August 1980 Khomeini told his advisors, Yek juri tamumesh kon (Finish it somehow). They used Ahmad Khomeini and [his brother-in-law] Sadegh Tabatabai . In September, the German ambassador got involved. They said, we are ready to talk with conditions. Then [Secretary of State] Ed Muskie went to Carter to get his OK. There had been false hopes before. Let us make sure. Warren Christopher and the Germans were involved. They confirmed to us that this time it was serious but we must have Khomeini’s signature on it.

Right before we left Iran they told us, “Some of you will be released but you must go on IRTV for an interview.” Massumeh (Ebtekar) see photo, who became a member of Khatami’s government, had changed her name. Her real name was Nilufar. She was one of the few women captors. They also called her Mary. She had lived and attended school in the US with her parents so she spoke English fluently. She said you have to talk, go on TV; otherwise you would not be let out. I said, “I will not go. I will not be part of this charade.” (In a recent interview with Press TV, she has said that they were not trained for this type of work, they were just intellectuals.)

I said what a shame. You had something good going. Enghelabe khubi dashtin. Ama kharabesh kardin (You had a good revolution but you destroyed it). They were playing games. This was while a new administration was taking office in the US.

It was the night before, 19th January.

We were given medical exams. I had lost 25 pounds. It was a reaction to stress. There were times when I thought they might kill us. They wanted to interview with us before releasing us. The Algerian delegation was involved. We knew that, now that diplomats were involved, it was serious. Jimmy carter had lost the November elections.

Would you be inclined to talk to any of your captors? As you know many have now become reformists, like Abdi*, like Seyyed Musavi Khoeeneha, and they sort of tobeh kardand? (They have repented.)

Voice of America has requested many interviews but I am not interested to talk to them in a public setting, maybe privately. We have had a class action law suit now for 7-8 years against the government of Iran, but it hasn’t gone anywhere. Our own government allied with the Islamic Republic. During the Clinton–Albright era, there was lots of talk about negotiation but with conditions from both sides.