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Part II
A nuclear Iran would also affect the subcontinent. The Iranians are very close to India, which is just 300 km away. It will have a domino effect on the precarious Indian-Pakistani nuclear balance. Pakistan, which borders Iran, will have to adjust its nuclear posture to a nuclear Iran. Whatever it does will influence India. This is the basic security dilemma we teach in international relations courses. So we may see a negative influence on the India-Pakistan nuclear balance, which could reverberate even to China, and we shouldn't forget that India and Pakistan were close to a nuclear exchange during the Kargil war.
A nuclear Iran may not hesitate to transfer nuclear technology to other bad guys in the region. It's not likely, but we may even see the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists or radical states. The danger of nuclear bombs falling in the hands of extremists if chaos comes to Iran is obviously something we have to think about.
The most important repercussion of a nuclear Iran is that it would heighten threat perception in the Middle East. In contrast to other parts of the world, in the Middle East, threat perceptions are very high. It's not only the Israelis who are concerned about security, Jordanians are afraid of the Syrians and Iraqis, the Syrians are afraid of the Turks and Israelis, and the Saudis are afraid of everybody. A nuclear Iran will only heighten those threat perceptions and bring about nuclear proliferation in this region. We see already the first steps of many countries trying to gain some nuclear technology. Turkey has renewed its civilian nuclear program, which uses the same technology as nuclear weapons. Egypt is doing the same. We cannot be sure that the Pakistanis will not supply weapons to the Saudis, who have subsidized part of their nuclear program.
Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is a nightmare, because a nuclear Middle East cannot be stable. It is very dangerous to believe that the type of nuclear stability that existed between the Soviet Union and United States can be easily emulated in the Middle East. Americans like Kenneth Waltz produce theories that the more weapons, the better, that spreading nuclear weapons is bringing about stability because leaders are afraid of conflicts escalating. I doubt this. If the countries in the Middle East have nuclear weapons, there's a greater chance than ever before they will use them.
Of course, there is no extended deterrence. I don't think the Arabs believe that an American nuclear umbrella is effective, for the same reason the French didn't believe that a US umbrella would be effective - namely that Americans would not risk Washington to save Paris. The same type of rationale would be adopted by the Middle East elite, who have seen Ottomans coming and going, French, British, and I think they also see Americans coming and going and don't know exactly how the Americans would play out the Iraqi scenario. But many people in the Middle East believe the Americans have already decided on an exit strategy and are just groping for how to do it. So I don't think that an American promise to the Arab countries to defend them in the case of a nuclear attack will be trusted. And also there is no defense against nuclear weapons at this stage. Israel's Arrow system, which is attuned to intercept such ballistic missiles, can intercept only 80-90 percent, but if it comes to missiles armed with nuclear warheads, 90 percent is not good enough.
Therefore, there is a regional consensus that Iran must be stopped. There is wide agreement across the Middle East that a nuclear Iran is very bad news. So what can be done? Diplomacy has just about run its course. Actually, everyone in the world is on a different page. The world has already decided to go for sanctions. So far the sanctions were rather vegetarian, and diplomacy without sharper teeth will be ineffective.
Furthermore, I don't think economic sanctions alone would be effective, because Iranians are willing to pay a heavy price to get the bomb. The record is not encouraging. Cuba is still under sanctions, Saddam Hussein was under sanctions and he did not care whether the children in the streets of Baghdad or Basra had enough medicine, he just blamed it on the Americans. The same is true in Iran. If they had no refined oil and gas, the ayatollahs would reconcile to seeing their people ride donkeys rather than in cars.
As to regime change, don't hold your breath. We are talking about a police state. It's true that this type of state does not last forever, but the Iranian police state has been successful so far at staying in power even though it's not very well liked. There don't seem too many courageous Iranians fighting the regime within Iran. I see opposition here and in Los Angeles, but to be in opposition in Iran is a different story.
That leaves us with two options. One is a credible threat to act militarily, which I hoped could be effective in supporting the diplomacy, but since the NIE report I think the only thing we really have left is military action. A credible threat means someone that Iranians are afraid of. To great extent Bush served this purpose before the NIE because he was viewed in the Middle East as a cowboy, ready to draw his gun. He has acted militarily in Afghanistan, in Iraq, why not Iran? An ultimatum by Bush could have been useful in freezing the nuclear program, primarily the uranium enrichment component. This is no longer true. Perceptions are important. After the NIE, the Iranians are at ease, believing that they're off the hook. So what is really left is only military action to try to destroy parts of the program which will slow down the Iranian attempt and to gain time. Gaining time is an important goal of foreign policy, it's doable by the US if it wants to. The US is close in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, it has tremendous military power.
If the US doesn't do this, and I pre-empt the question already, the Israelis will have to think seriously about whether to do it on their own. Israel has done such a military feat in the past on Osirak in 1981. This is a different type of operation nowadays, it's much more complicated, but it can be done. In my view as a former paratrooper there is no such thing as an impregnable target. We just have to be ready to pay the price.
A nuclear Iran would also affect the subcontinent. The Iranians are very close to India, which is just 300 km away. It will have a domino effect on the precarious Indian-Pakistani nuclear balance. Pakistan, which borders Iran, will have to adjust its nuclear posture to a nuclear Iran. Whatever it does will influence India. This is the basic security dilemma we teach in international relations courses. So we may see a negative influence on the India-Pakistan nuclear balance, which could reverberate even to China, and we shouldn't forget that India and Pakistan were close to a nuclear exchange during the Kargil war.
A nuclear Iran may not hesitate to transfer nuclear technology to other bad guys in the region. It's not likely, but we may even see the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists or radical states. The danger of nuclear bombs falling in the hands of extremists if chaos comes to Iran is obviously something we have to think about.
The most important repercussion of a nuclear Iran is that it would heighten threat perception in the Middle East. In contrast to other parts of the world, in the Middle East, threat perceptions are very high. It's not only the Israelis who are concerned about security, Jordanians are afraid of the Syrians and Iraqis, the Syrians are afraid of the Turks and Israelis, and the Saudis are afraid of everybody. A nuclear Iran will only heighten those threat perceptions and bring about nuclear proliferation in this region. We see already the first steps of many countries trying to gain some nuclear technology. Turkey has renewed its civilian nuclear program, which uses the same technology as nuclear weapons. Egypt is doing the same. We cannot be sure that the Pakistanis will not supply weapons to the Saudis, who have subsidized part of their nuclear program.
Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is a nightmare, because a nuclear Middle East cannot be stable. It is very dangerous to believe that the type of nuclear stability that existed between the Soviet Union and United States can be easily emulated in the Middle East. Americans like Kenneth Waltz produce theories that the more weapons, the better, that spreading nuclear weapons is bringing about stability because leaders are afraid of conflicts escalating. I doubt this. If the countries in the Middle East have nuclear weapons, there's a greater chance than ever before they will use them.
Of course, there is no extended deterrence. I don't think the Arabs believe that an American nuclear umbrella is effective, for the same reason the French didn't believe that a US umbrella would be effective - namely that Americans would not risk Washington to save Paris. The same type of rationale would be adopted by the Middle East elite, who have seen Ottomans coming and going, French, British, and I think they also see Americans coming and going and don't know exactly how the Americans would play out the Iraqi scenario. But many people in the Middle East believe the Americans have already decided on an exit strategy and are just groping for how to do it. So I don't think that an American promise to the Arab countries to defend them in the case of a nuclear attack will be trusted. And also there is no defense against nuclear weapons at this stage. Israel's Arrow system, which is attuned to intercept such ballistic missiles, can intercept only 80-90 percent, but if it comes to missiles armed with nuclear warheads, 90 percent is not good enough.
Therefore, there is a regional consensus that Iran must be stopped. There is wide agreement across the Middle East that a nuclear Iran is very bad news. So what can be done? Diplomacy has just about run its course. Actually, everyone in the world is on a different page. The world has already decided to go for sanctions. So far the sanctions were rather vegetarian, and diplomacy without sharper teeth will be ineffective.
Furthermore, I don't think economic sanctions alone would be effective, because Iranians are willing to pay a heavy price to get the bomb. The record is not encouraging. Cuba is still under sanctions, Saddam Hussein was under sanctions and he did not care whether the children in the streets of Baghdad or Basra had enough medicine, he just blamed it on the Americans. The same is true in Iran. If they had no refined oil and gas, the ayatollahs would reconcile to seeing their people ride donkeys rather than in cars.
As to regime change, don't hold your breath. We are talking about a police state. It's true that this type of state does not last forever, but the Iranian police state has been successful so far at staying in power even though it's not very well liked. There don't seem too many courageous Iranians fighting the regime within Iran. I see opposition here and in Los Angeles, but to be in opposition in Iran is a different story.
That leaves us with two options. One is a credible threat to act militarily, which I hoped could be effective in supporting the diplomacy, but since the NIE report I think the only thing we really have left is military action. A credible threat means someone that Iranians are afraid of. To great extent Bush served this purpose before the NIE because he was viewed in the Middle East as a cowboy, ready to draw his gun. He has acted militarily in Afghanistan, in Iraq, why not Iran? An ultimatum by Bush could have been useful in freezing the nuclear program, primarily the uranium enrichment component. This is no longer true. Perceptions are important. After the NIE, the Iranians are at ease, believing that they're off the hook. So what is really left is only military action to try to destroy parts of the program which will slow down the Iranian attempt and to gain time. Gaining time is an important goal of foreign policy, it's doable by the US if it wants to. The US is close in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan, it has tremendous military power.
If the US doesn't do this, and I pre-empt the question already, the Israelis will have to think seriously about whether to do it on their own. Israel has done such a military feat in the past on Osirak in 1981. This is a different type of operation nowadays, it's much more complicated, but it can be done. In my view as a former paratrooper there is no such thing as an impregnable target. We just have to be ready to pay the price.
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