LEVERETT: And in the end -- you know, look, in the end, even if that were the case, I would still say this pre-publication review process is not supposed to be about making life comfortable for an incumbent administration. It is supposed to be about the protection of classified information and nothing more.
There is no classified information in the draft that I submitted, but the White House is intervening in the process to use that rubric of protecting classified information to keep a critical view from coming out. That's what's going on.
QUESTION: Could you take a step back and look at the region and try to identify where it's going, provided no serious change of U.S. policy, or maybe articulate that window?
QUESTION: How much time do the U.S., Israel, others, have to change reality in a significant way to, fundamentally, save the region?
LEVERETT: I'm not very good at timelines, but the trends are all running in the wrong direction.
You do have Iran emerging as a more powerful, more influential state in the region.
You do have U.S. leadership and effectiveness in the region declining at the same time.
I think you have a number of radical actors in the region, whether it is Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas in the Palestinian context, whose influence and political standing has risen dramatically over the last two years.
You have Iraq, basically, in civil war, and no prospect on the horizon for the U.S. doing anything that might put that situation on a more positive trajectory.
You have other external players; China, for example, emerging as more influential players in the region.
You have long-standing American allies and partners, such as the Saudis, questioning the durability of U.S. leadership in the region and hedging their bets, strategically, in some significant ways.
I do not yet, in my own view, reach a point where I would say the U.S. position is an unrecoverable.
I think if we were to begin to pursue different kinds of policies on all of these fronts, we could repair and bolster our strategic position in the Middle East; and, by the way, along with that, do much to improve Israel's strategic position.
LEVERETT: I mean, does anybody want to argue that Israel is today in a more secure position, that its political standing in the Middle East is better today than it was five years ago?
I think that would be a hard argument to make.
We could still recover from this, but it's going to take new policies.
I don't know exactly when the window for changing course closes. But that window is not going to be open forever.
I can only hope that things don't get so bad over the next two years that whoever succeeds President Bush doesn't have the opportunity to try and put things on a better trajectory.
QUESTION: Flynt, you've criticized Baker-Hamilton for wanting to take a piecemeal approach and have argued all that is possible isn't all or nothing right now. Let me probe that just for a second.
I don't understand Baker-Hamilton as wanting to exclude a grand bargain, but rather to analyze that the situation in Iraq is so dire that there's a timeline project. When a grand bargain will take more time than a piecemeal approach, then you're going to have to concentrate on first things first.
And when the Iranians have an interest in seeing the U.S. fail in Iraq, it doesn't necessarily mean they have an interest in seeing Iraq disintegrate.
So there may be an argument for a shared interest in a very limited way that could lead to a shared outcome.
What do you say to that argument?
LEVERETT: I think, as I said, it really tries to impose a different context on the Iranians from the one that they think they're actually living in.
And that context is that -- and Secretary Baker said it when he was testifying before the Armed Services Committee after the report was released, he said, "They helped us in Afghanistan because they wanted to get rid of the Taliban and avoid instability there, and they may help us in Iraq for the same reason, because they don't want chaos there."
LEVERETT: And my argument is simply that I don't think they helped us in Afghanistan primarily because they hated the Taliban. They helped us in Afghanistan because they thought that was the way to get a better relationship with us.
And I don't think they will help us in Iraq unless we, in some way, put on the table that, "This is not just about cooperation on one issue where we have, maybe, some shared interests; this is about a bigger process that will ultimately get you a different relationship with us."
QUESTION: Are you then implicitly saying that Iran can deal with chaos and disintegration; it doesn't care about it as much as it needed to to embark on a course (ph)?
LEVERETT: I'm saying that Iran is, in my view, very well positioned right now on the ground in Iraq to defend its interests in Iraq without cooperating with the U.S. They don't need us to protect their equities in Iraq.
QUESTION: If the security guarantees from the U.S. were important enough to Iran for them to satisfy us on all these issue areas, one of them would be that they would withdraw support for violent resistance against Israel.
Do you think that would actually promote -- that would require a two-stage solution, for them. Do you think that would promote a two- state solution, their willingness to reach a grand bargain?
And if there wasn't a two-state solution and they couldn't withdraw support for Hamas and Hezbollah, would that torpedo the rest of the grand bargain?
LEVERETT: I think that Iranian -- first of all, there been a number of serving and former Iranian officials who have said that if there were to be a two-state solution that the Palestinians were to negotiate freely with Israel, that Iran would not, in a sense, be more Palestinian than the Palestinians about it.
LEVERETT: Yes, I think it would be possible, as part of a grand bargain, to modify significantly Iran's position toward the Arab- Israeli conflict, toward a negotiated resolution of that conflict and toward violent and terrorist activities that have had the effect of making a negotiated settlement far more difficult to reach. I think that is possible, yes.
QUESTION: Do you think that would help bring about such a settlement?
LEVERETT: It would certainly remove one of the obstacles and sources of difficulty.
QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) that potentially would could be going on is that there could be some fragile piece of diplomacy that we don't know about that this op-ed could derail.
And as I agree with Flynt that I don't think that this administration could pivot on the fundamental issues involving Iran and the region at this point, what is problematic about the op-ed is that if they wanted to pivot -- either on the fundamental issues are even on piecemeal diplomacy involving Iraq or anything else -- what this op-ed argues and makes a solid case for is that this administration embarrassingly decided to squander those opportunities that it has had over the past five years to do so repeatedly.
So if they decide to do it again, they inevitably are going to be paying a much higher price than they would have at any point over the past five years, and that is politically embarrassing.
MODERATOR: So what you're basically saying is if my friend is correct that there may be fragile diplomacy -- as one of the options; he didn't say there was -- that amnesia is needed?
LEVERETT: Yes.
MODERATOR: For those of you who don't know, I keep a big firewall between my blog -- the Washington Note -- and my work at the New American Foundation. Sometimes that firewall works better than at other times.
But I want to thank Flynt Leverett not only for being a great colleague here at the New American Foundation, but also for just pumping up my blog hits.
(LAUGHTER) So in about 30 minutes we'll have the stat of the CIA response with lots of black lines...
(LAUGHTER)
(CROSSTALK)
MODERATOR: ... 1,000 thousand words, which we'll get up on the blog at thewashingtonnote.com.
I want to thank Flynt. Please help me in thanking him for, I think, a very brave and important talk.
(APPLAUSE)
END
There is no classified information in the draft that I submitted, but the White House is intervening in the process to use that rubric of protecting classified information to keep a critical view from coming out. That's what's going on.
QUESTION: Could you take a step back and look at the region and try to identify where it's going, provided no serious change of U.S. policy, or maybe articulate that window?
QUESTION: How much time do the U.S., Israel, others, have to change reality in a significant way to, fundamentally, save the region?
LEVERETT: I'm not very good at timelines, but the trends are all running in the wrong direction.
You do have Iran emerging as a more powerful, more influential state in the region.
You do have U.S. leadership and effectiveness in the region declining at the same time.
I think you have a number of radical actors in the region, whether it is Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas in the Palestinian context, whose influence and political standing has risen dramatically over the last two years.
You have Iraq, basically, in civil war, and no prospect on the horizon for the U.S. doing anything that might put that situation on a more positive trajectory.
You have other external players; China, for example, emerging as more influential players in the region.
You have long-standing American allies and partners, such as the Saudis, questioning the durability of U.S. leadership in the region and hedging their bets, strategically, in some significant ways.
I do not yet, in my own view, reach a point where I would say the U.S. position is an unrecoverable.
I think if we were to begin to pursue different kinds of policies on all of these fronts, we could repair and bolster our strategic position in the Middle East; and, by the way, along with that, do much to improve Israel's strategic position.
LEVERETT: I mean, does anybody want to argue that Israel is today in a more secure position, that its political standing in the Middle East is better today than it was five years ago?
I think that would be a hard argument to make.
We could still recover from this, but it's going to take new policies.
I don't know exactly when the window for changing course closes. But that window is not going to be open forever.
I can only hope that things don't get so bad over the next two years that whoever succeeds President Bush doesn't have the opportunity to try and put things on a better trajectory.
QUESTION: Flynt, you've criticized Baker-Hamilton for wanting to take a piecemeal approach and have argued all that is possible isn't all or nothing right now. Let me probe that just for a second.
I don't understand Baker-Hamilton as wanting to exclude a grand bargain, but rather to analyze that the situation in Iraq is so dire that there's a timeline project. When a grand bargain will take more time than a piecemeal approach, then you're going to have to concentrate on first things first.
And when the Iranians have an interest in seeing the U.S. fail in Iraq, it doesn't necessarily mean they have an interest in seeing Iraq disintegrate.
So there may be an argument for a shared interest in a very limited way that could lead to a shared outcome.
What do you say to that argument?
LEVERETT: I think, as I said, it really tries to impose a different context on the Iranians from the one that they think they're actually living in.
And that context is that -- and Secretary Baker said it when he was testifying before the Armed Services Committee after the report was released, he said, "They helped us in Afghanistan because they wanted to get rid of the Taliban and avoid instability there, and they may help us in Iraq for the same reason, because they don't want chaos there."
LEVERETT: And my argument is simply that I don't think they helped us in Afghanistan primarily because they hated the Taliban. They helped us in Afghanistan because they thought that was the way to get a better relationship with us.
And I don't think they will help us in Iraq unless we, in some way, put on the table that, "This is not just about cooperation on one issue where we have, maybe, some shared interests; this is about a bigger process that will ultimately get you a different relationship with us."
QUESTION: Are you then implicitly saying that Iran can deal with chaos and disintegration; it doesn't care about it as much as it needed to to embark on a course (ph)?
LEVERETT: I'm saying that Iran is, in my view, very well positioned right now on the ground in Iraq to defend its interests in Iraq without cooperating with the U.S. They don't need us to protect their equities in Iraq.
QUESTION: If the security guarantees from the U.S. were important enough to Iran for them to satisfy us on all these issue areas, one of them would be that they would withdraw support for violent resistance against Israel.
Do you think that would actually promote -- that would require a two-stage solution, for them. Do you think that would promote a two- state solution, their willingness to reach a grand bargain?
And if there wasn't a two-state solution and they couldn't withdraw support for Hamas and Hezbollah, would that torpedo the rest of the grand bargain?
LEVERETT: I think that Iranian -- first of all, there been a number of serving and former Iranian officials who have said that if there were to be a two-state solution that the Palestinians were to negotiate freely with Israel, that Iran would not, in a sense, be more Palestinian than the Palestinians about it.
LEVERETT: Yes, I think it would be possible, as part of a grand bargain, to modify significantly Iran's position toward the Arab- Israeli conflict, toward a negotiated resolution of that conflict and toward violent and terrorist activities that have had the effect of making a negotiated settlement far more difficult to reach. I think that is possible, yes.
QUESTION: Do you think that would help bring about such a settlement?
LEVERETT: It would certainly remove one of the obstacles and sources of difficulty.
QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) that potentially would could be going on is that there could be some fragile piece of diplomacy that we don't know about that this op-ed could derail.
And as I agree with Flynt that I don't think that this administration could pivot on the fundamental issues involving Iran and the region at this point, what is problematic about the op-ed is that if they wanted to pivot -- either on the fundamental issues are even on piecemeal diplomacy involving Iraq or anything else -- what this op-ed argues and makes a solid case for is that this administration embarrassingly decided to squander those opportunities that it has had over the past five years to do so repeatedly.
So if they decide to do it again, they inevitably are going to be paying a much higher price than they would have at any point over the past five years, and that is politically embarrassing.
MODERATOR: So what you're basically saying is if my friend is correct that there may be fragile diplomacy -- as one of the options; he didn't say there was -- that amnesia is needed?
LEVERETT: Yes.
MODERATOR: For those of you who don't know, I keep a big firewall between my blog -- the Washington Note -- and my work at the New American Foundation. Sometimes that firewall works better than at other times.
But I want to thank Flynt Leverett not only for being a great colleague here at the New American Foundation, but also for just pumping up my blog hits.
(LAUGHTER) So in about 30 minutes we'll have the stat of the CIA response with lots of black lines...
(LAUGHTER)
(CROSSTALK)
MODERATOR: ... 1,000 thousand words, which we'll get up on the blog at thewashingtonnote.com.
I want to thank Flynt. Please help me in thanking him for, I think, a very brave and important talk.
(APPLAUSE)
END

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