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Part VI. The United States and Efforts to Lower Opium Production
While the UN and Britain have attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to decrease the exploding growth of opium production in Afghanistan, the United States has done little either militarily or economically to aid in the fight against Afghan opium production. Concerning its military involvement, as recently as a few days ago the Los Angeles Times reported that Pentagon “has resisted entreaties from U.S. anti-narcotics officials to play an aggressive role in the faltering campaign to curb the country’s opium trade” (Meyer). The Los Angeles Times reports that U.S. military forces, when pursuing terrorists, have in fact actively ignored the obvious production and movement of opium within Afghanistan (Meyer). Furthermore, DEA requests for military air-strikes against drug facilities have been ignored on numerous occasions because the military claimed that such an attack would “create a disturbance in an area where [the military was] trying to chase down terrorists and the Taliban” (Meyer). In terms of its economic contributions focused upon reducing opium production, the United States has contributed little. It is true that in 2004 the United States contributed 2.2 billion dollars to Afghanistan, and in 2005 Washington contributed another 929 million dollars in aid (Hartung). However, about 80 percent of this money was set aside for military projects or long-term economic development plans (Hartung). Little money has been contributed by Washington that might be used to pay off farmers to avoid growing opium. America is the foreign nation most responsible for the recent re-emergence of opium production mainly because Washington has failed to contribute any assets of value to lower opium production.
The United States does not seem particularly intent upon lowering opium production within Afghanistan for two reasons. First, Washington realizes that the majority of drugs entering its borders come from Latin America and not from Afghanistan, and therefore contributing significant military and economic assets might be detrimental towards its drug fight in Latin America. According to the DEA, “only an estimated 5 percent of illicit opiates consumed in the United States comes [sic] from Afghanistan” (United States Cong., 10). Even with Afghanistan producing 92 percent of the world’s opium, there seems little incentive for the U.S. to contribute the assets needed when other regions of the world are more responsible for opiate addiction within the United States. Second, the U.S. policy makers seem to believe (or at least articulate) the fear that actively pursuing a policy against opium production may anger warlords and cause a civil war. According to Raymond Millen, any strategy that focuses on undermining warlord power confrontationally (such as eradicating poppy fields within their domain of influence) will lead to political and military instability in Afghanistan. The U.S. military directly admits that this fear has been a factor in their refusal to consider drug eradication as part of its operational mandate in Afghanistan. According to the Los Angeles Times, “[m]ilitary officials [... ] fear that cracking down on opium traffickers [as well as poppy fields] could alienate the Afghan people and warlords who profit from the trade [of opium]” (Meyer). Suffice to say, despite the challenges to fighting opium production in Afghanistan, the United States’ strategy of ignoring it will only make the problem worse and anger neighbors (such as Iran) who have to deal with the consequences of Washington inaction.
Part VII. Opium’s Influence on U.S.-Iran Relations
As the levels of opium production have increased in Afghanistan, so has the amount of opium entering into Iran. As has been previously discussed in this paper, Iran has constantly struggled with stopping the importation of opiates from Afghanistan -- even before Afghanistan began to produce 92 percent of the world’s opium supply. Such a large increase in Afghanistan’s production of opium poses a serious social and economic threat for Iran whose population already has high addiction levels. As supply increase in Afghanistan, prices in Iran for opium decrease; this decrease makes consumption by the poor and unemployed more likely. In fact, so much opium has flooded across the Iranian border during the last few years that opium is easier to obtain than whiskey and can also be significantly cheaper to purchase (Chamka).
It has become clear that Tehran is beginning to become frustrated over the slow progress of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Earlier this year, a high-ranking Iranian official “criticized American and British efforts in Afghanistan because of the failure to stop drug trafficking [... and] accused them of wanting to legalize opium cultivation” (“Iran, Afghanistan Continue”). A few other leaders, such as the Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani demanded that the coalition forces in Afghanistan use chemical sprays to reduce poppy cultivation (“Iran, Afghanistan Continue”). Leaders in Iran seem to be placing the blame for Afghanistan’s increasing opium production squarely on coalition forces with a military presence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, on occasion, Iranian leaders have suggested that they will stop combating the trafficking of opium through its borders (Mirzai). Some long-discussed plans would involve opening drug corridors in Iran for the easy passage of opium smugglers on their way to European markets (Raisdana 154). Such a policy could prove devastating for European countries.
While the UN and Britain have attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to decrease the exploding growth of opium production in Afghanistan, the United States has done little either militarily or economically to aid in the fight against Afghan opium production. Concerning its military involvement, as recently as a few days ago the Los Angeles Times reported that Pentagon “has resisted entreaties from U.S. anti-narcotics officials to play an aggressive role in the faltering campaign to curb the country’s opium trade” (Meyer). The Los Angeles Times reports that U.S. military forces, when pursuing terrorists, have in fact actively ignored the obvious production and movement of opium within Afghanistan (Meyer). Furthermore, DEA requests for military air-strikes against drug facilities have been ignored on numerous occasions because the military claimed that such an attack would “create a disturbance in an area where [the military was] trying to chase down terrorists and the Taliban” (Meyer). In terms of its economic contributions focused upon reducing opium production, the United States has contributed little. It is true that in 2004 the United States contributed 2.2 billion dollars to Afghanistan, and in 2005 Washington contributed another 929 million dollars in aid (Hartung). However, about 80 percent of this money was set aside for military projects or long-term economic development plans (Hartung). Little money has been contributed by Washington that might be used to pay off farmers to avoid growing opium. America is the foreign nation most responsible for the recent re-emergence of opium production mainly because Washington has failed to contribute any assets of value to lower opium production.
The United States does not seem particularly intent upon lowering opium production within Afghanistan for two reasons. First, Washington realizes that the majority of drugs entering its borders come from Latin America and not from Afghanistan, and therefore contributing significant military and economic assets might be detrimental towards its drug fight in Latin America. According to the DEA, “only an estimated 5 percent of illicit opiates consumed in the United States comes [sic] from Afghanistan” (United States Cong., 10). Even with Afghanistan producing 92 percent of the world’s opium, there seems little incentive for the U.S. to contribute the assets needed when other regions of the world are more responsible for opiate addiction within the United States. Second, the U.S. policy makers seem to believe (or at least articulate) the fear that actively pursuing a policy against opium production may anger warlords and cause a civil war. According to Raymond Millen, any strategy that focuses on undermining warlord power confrontationally (such as eradicating poppy fields within their domain of influence) will lead to political and military instability in Afghanistan. The U.S. military directly admits that this fear has been a factor in their refusal to consider drug eradication as part of its operational mandate in Afghanistan. According to the Los Angeles Times, “[m]ilitary officials [... ] fear that cracking down on opium traffickers [as well as poppy fields] could alienate the Afghan people and warlords who profit from the trade [of opium]” (Meyer). Suffice to say, despite the challenges to fighting opium production in Afghanistan, the United States’ strategy of ignoring it will only make the problem worse and anger neighbors (such as Iran) who have to deal with the consequences of Washington inaction.
Part VII. Opium’s Influence on U.S.-Iran Relations
As the levels of opium production have increased in Afghanistan, so has the amount of opium entering into Iran. As has been previously discussed in this paper, Iran has constantly struggled with stopping the importation of opiates from Afghanistan -- even before Afghanistan began to produce 92 percent of the world’s opium supply. Such a large increase in Afghanistan’s production of opium poses a serious social and economic threat for Iran whose population already has high addiction levels. As supply increase in Afghanistan, prices in Iran for opium decrease; this decrease makes consumption by the poor and unemployed more likely. In fact, so much opium has flooded across the Iranian border during the last few years that opium is easier to obtain than whiskey and can also be significantly cheaper to purchase (Chamka).
It has become clear that Tehran is beginning to become frustrated over the slow progress of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Earlier this year, a high-ranking Iranian official “criticized American and British efforts in Afghanistan because of the failure to stop drug trafficking [... and] accused them of wanting to legalize opium cultivation” (“Iran, Afghanistan Continue”). A few other leaders, such as the Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani demanded that the coalition forces in Afghanistan use chemical sprays to reduce poppy cultivation (“Iran, Afghanistan Continue”). Leaders in Iran seem to be placing the blame for Afghanistan’s increasing opium production squarely on coalition forces with a military presence in Afghanistan. Furthermore, on occasion, Iranian leaders have suggested that they will stop combating the trafficking of opium through its borders (Mirzai). Some long-discussed plans would involve opening drug corridors in Iran for the easy passage of opium smugglers on their way to European markets (Raisdana 154). Such a policy could prove devastating for European countries.
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