Iran-U.S.A

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The Concluding Words

This paper has challenged the current and proposed coercive diplomacy (i.e., the “carrot and stick” policy) as “a road to nowhere,” and rejects the use-of-force approach as “a road to hell.” These approaches make incomplete assumptions about Iran and fail to realize that the prevailing “no-peace no-war” status quo is the Islamic Republic’s best option. To entice Iran for better relations with the U.S, the Obama Administration should eliminate the “no-war no-peace” option and give Iran a “peace alternative.” The Obama policy should be based on two pillars: a new paradigm of Iran predicated upon a more accurate set of assumptions and understanding as well as a bold roadmap that centers on irresistible material incentives. A visionary Speech by President Obama can set in motion this “Big Push” way forward.

Officials in the Iranian Administration take issue with the suspicion that Iran might develop bombs if its views are not addressed. Citing the I.A.E.A. findings and the declaration by the Supreme Leader that nuclear bombs are impermissible under Islam, Iran maintains that it has not diverted its civilian enrichment programs toward military use. However, the I.A.E.A. cannot determine whether or not Tehran has any undisclosed nuclear sites or that it will stay with the civilian track. The U.S. and its allies share this assessment given the lack of confidence in Iran’s intention. Tehran must freeze nuclear enrichment and build trust before it can restart.

The multilateral and bilateral approaches applied thus far to resolve the deadlock have not worked. The new prescriptions that are being offered, as I have argued, will not work either. Some would consider the approach I have offered too ambitious or unrealistic. Others would see in it the beginning of some useful thoughts for ending the 30-year old conflict. Extremist groups opposing the Islamic Republic will dismiss the “Big Push” way forward as pro-regime, while the most zealous pro-regime crowds would suspect this roadmap as yet a new trick to endanger the life of their nizam. The problem with these groups is that they are either for greater conflict or the status quo.

True enough, the ideas outlined here are ambitious and require further refinements. However, I take issue with those who suspect my best intentions. Arguments should stand or fall based upon their merits. In my view, the “Big Push” way forward offered here is one that has the best chance to succeed if truly implemented. It leaves Iran with no option but better relations; it gives the Islamic regime the security it seeks; it accounts for the rights and interest of the Iranian people; it deals directly with the possibility of Iran building nuclear bombs; it grants Iran the credit it merits; it helps increase Israel’s security and the prospect for a Palestinian state; and it opens Iran to American trade and investments, a bonus to both economies.

Iran and the U.S. should give the proposed approach a chance to succeed. They should be guided by trust and transparency, and avoid any game playing or deceptive behavior. Otherwise, the rapprochement can lead to a disastrous conflict. For Iran nothing could be more dangerous than a disillusioned Obama, who has become “globalized” and has the ear of the global community. This could happen if Iran were to reject the lucrative deal. The U.S. must also realize that there is no better approach than the one offered here. It makes Iran an offer to take a comprehensive peace in exchange for its future bombs. True, the U.S. will pay a price but that will be less than maintaining the status quo or engaging Iran in a war. President Barack Obama has called for “change” and the time has come for a change of direction in U.S. policy toward Iran.

[Rasputin]

http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/03/post_8360.html

[Rasputin]

On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to the cheers of millions of Iranians, ousting the pro-American Shah and instituting an Islamic Republic in what would later be known as the Islamic Revolution. To put it mildly, US-Iranian relations have been strained ever since, beginning with the 1979 hostage crisis in which over 50 US diplomats were held in Iran for over a year. Even today, there are no official diplomatic US relations with Iran (Mahbubani 207). Many of the policies instituted by the Islamic theocracy in Iran since 1979 are incompatible with the most basic and traditional American ideals – the separation of church and state, freedom of speech, and equality for all.

Support for secularism - the idea that government should be separate from religion - originated in the US because many of the very first American colonizers were fleeing state-sponsored religious persecution in Europe. As a result, there was fervent support of creating a “high wall between church and state,” as Thomas Jefferson wrote in a famous letter to the Danbury Baptists (Floyd 2). The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 solidified the separation of church and state as a key concept in American society, with the very first amendment to our constitution forbidding Congress from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” (Wise 185). While religion has always been a very important aspect of American society, it has never played an extremely large role in government.


In Iran, on the other hand, church and state are inextricably entwined. This is the definition of a theocracy - the church is the state. In Iran, the Supreme Leader must be an expert in Islamic jurisprudence and the “Assembly of Experts,” the elected body that chooses the Supreme Leader, is comprised completely of Mujtahids, or Islamic scholars (Dilip 61). Iran’s constitution even states that all laws are to be based on Islamic criteria (Maggi 129). If there exists a complete opposite to the American model with regards to the relationship between church and state, it exists in Iran.

Another right that has existed in American society ever since the ratification of the Bill of Rights is the freedom of speech - certainly one of American’s most guarded personal liberties. Again, in the very first amendment, Congress is forbidden from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” (Taylor 230). These rights are a staple of American society, in which the press is free to criticize the government to their heart’s content (and they do – just turn on the radio and listen to Rush Limbaugh!). The government does not control newspapers or censor material, protestors are allowed to assemble peacefully, and most everyone can say whatever they want to say, provided they don’t incite violence.

An entirely opposite system operates in Iran. In fact, Iran has its own ministry, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, to decide what Iranian citizens are allowed to read and watch, banning books such as “The Da Vinci Code” and many Western websites, even NYTimes.com (Tait 1). As seen in the BBC documentary “Rageh Inside Iran”, all newspapers and magazines must have their articles approved before publication. There is no private television, only state-controlled television that consists of seven channels, and ownership of satellite dishes is illegal (Samii 1). With total power, the Iranian government is able to completely control the media in a manner that would make most Americans cringe. But it doesn’t stop there; even dress codes are enforced. Iran detained 150,000 people in its annual sweep against non-Islamic clothing in 2007 (MacFarquhar 1). Bloggers face threats and jail time for publishing ideas or images seen as threatening to the Islamic regime. Journalists could even face death, as in the case of Zahra Kazemi, a Candian-Iranian woman who was detained after attempting to take pictures of a controversial Iranian prison and died in prison of a head wound after reportedly being raped (CBC News 1). This clear absence of the freedom of speech is a direct result of a theocracy intent on keeping an iron grip on control. Naturally, the theocracy uses religion to justify its actions. Shaikh Fazlallah, one of the most influential clerics to oppose the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, took issue with the call for liberty during the early 20th century, especially the freedom of the press, arguing that it caused “sedition and permitted the spreading of calumny” (Martin 186). The current leaders of Iran use his example, and today he is celebrated in Iran as a martyr for defending Islam against democracy. In other words, thanks to government promotion of the choice interpretation of the Qur’an by certain conservative influential clerics like Fazlallah, there is no freedom of speech in Iran – Iranian citizens see what their government allows them to see. Regardless of the root of this reality, freedom of expression in Iran stands in stark contrast to the situation in the US.

Equality for all is an American value embedded in arguably one of the best-known phrases of any American political document: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal…” (Jefferson 43). Penned in 1776 by Thomas Jefferson as the first line of the Declaration of Independence, this simple truth has been repeated throughout American history, by Abraham Lincoln in his famous Gettysburg Address and by Martin Luther King, Jr. in his equally famous “I Have a Dream” speech. Granted, American society hasn’t always allowed equality for all races and all genders, but in comparison to most other countries we are relatively egalitarian.

In contrast, the Iranian theocracy allows for major inequality between men and women and between Muslims and non-Muslims. Women especially face blatant discrimination under the law. In Iran, by law women inherit half of what men do from their parents, by law women do not have the right to seek divorce, and by law women need a male guardian’s permission to marry (Peters 72). Women who have been raped run the risk of being charged with adultery if they speak out but can’t prove it (Iran Focus). Perhaps most shocking is that the current minimum marriage age for girls under Iranian law is age 13 (an improvement, believe it or not, from age 9 in 1979), occasionally resulting in the marriages of extremely young girls to men much older (Keddie 116). Time Magazine reported in 2001 that the minimum marriage age has occasionally been exploited by child predators who marry poor young girls from rural areas, use them, and then abandon them (Spencer 187). Even still, this law has been strongly supported from the highest levels of Iranian leadership. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution and a true icon in Iran, once intimated that a girl should have her first menstrual period in her husband’s house, not her father’s (Peters 72). Perhaps Khomeini had personal experience – he, at the age of twenty-eight, married a ten year old, and described marriage to a prepubescent girl as “a divine blessing” (Spencer 187). It is absolutely unfathomable to imagine Americans supporting such a leader. Clearly American views of women’s rights differ greatly from those propagated by the Islamic regime in Iran.

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Additionally, under the Iranian theocracy there is inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Shaykh Fazlollah, the aforementioned admired conservative cleric, was completely against the notion of “equality of all subjects, regardless of their creed,” noting that such a law would allow the Zoroastrians to freely propagate their faith (Martin 186). Fazlollah preferred a system of law based on the “Divine Will, in which believers have a privileged position distinct from that of unbelievers,” based in his interpretation of Islamic law (Martin 186). Today, true to Fazlollah’s word, the Iranian government actively persecutes members of the Baha’i faith. Seven leading members of the Baha’i community in Iran were arrested last year and will soon stand trial under charges of spying for Israel, desecrating Islam, and campaigning against an Islamic Republic, although it seems clear that no real crime was committed (Moss 1). The persecution of peaceful followers of a minority religion is an act few Americans look positively upon considering our nation’s history.

Clearly the policies instituted by Iran’s Islamic theocracy stand against many American values we hold dear, from simple equality among citizens to freedom of speech and the separation of church and state. Additionally, considering that Iran seems to be pursuing nuclear technology, publicly supports Hezbollah, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, and that the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, periodically calls for “Israel to be wiped off the map,” it is no wonder that the US and Iran are constantly butting heads – we simply do not have compatible political ideologies (BBC News 1). Just as American democracy is incompatible with communism, it is similarly incompatible with the current Islamic theocracy in Iran. Without a similar base of state values, it is unlikely that the development of mutual respect necessary to improve US-Iranian relations will occur anytime in the near future.

Works Cited


Da Vinci Code book banned in Iran, BBC, 26 July 2006. BBC News. 3 Mar. 2009.

Floyd, Charlene. Christian Voices: Journeys through Faith and Politics in Contemporary American Protestantism. New York: Praeger, 2007.

Hiro, Dilip. The Essential Middle East: A Comprehensive Guide. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003.

Iran leader's comments attacked, BBC, 27 Oct. 2005. 3 Mar. 2009.

"Iran's Changing Story." CBC News 27 Nov. 2007. 3 Mar. 2009.

Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 1776-1781. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.

Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East Past and Present. New York: Princeton UP, 2006.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Iran Cracks Down on Dissent." The New York Times 24 June 2007. 3 Mar. 2009.

Maggi, Michael. Review Of The Convention On Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods Cisg 2002-2003. New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004.

Mahbubani, Kishore. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.

Moss, Meredith. "Baha'i plan prayer gathering for 7 members jailed in Iran." Dayton Daily News 21 Feb. 2009. 3 Mar. 2009.

Peters, Julie Stone. Women's Rights, Human Rights International Feminist Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Samii, Bill. "Iran: State Media Control Extends To Provinces, Airwaves." Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2 Oct. 2006. 3 Mar. 2009.

Spencer, Robert. Religion of peace? why Christianity is and Islam isn't. Washington, D.C: Regnery Pub., 2007.

Tait, Robert. Censorship fears rise as Iran blocks access to top websites 4 Dec. 2006. The Guardian. 3 Mar. 2009.

Taylor, Hannis. The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution. Houghton Mifflin company, 1911.

"UN women's rights official raps Iran over abuses." Iran Focus 6 Feb. 2005. 3 Mar. 2009.

Wise, John S. A Treatise on American Citizenship. Edward Thompson Co., 1906.

[Rasputin]

پیام نامنتظره نوروزی *باراك اوباما با پاسخ صریح و سریع علی* خامنه*ای روبرو شد و فضای جدیدی در *روابط سیاسی جمهوری *اسلامی* با آمریكا ایجاد كرد. رییس جمهور جدید آمریكا از فرصت نوروز كه جشن ملی همه ایرانیان است و صبغه مذهبی ندارد برای ارسال پیام صلح و آشتی كمك گرفت. او با احترام از تاریخ و فرهنگ و ادبیات ایران سخن گفت و پیام خود را مشتركا به مردم ایران و رهبران جمهوری اسلامی خطاب كرد. او پاسخ خود را بسیار زودتر از آن كه انتظار می*رفت از ولی *فقیه گرفت. این پاسخ البته به زبانی دیگر بود، ولی بر خلاف گذشته خشن نبود. علاوه بر این، پاسخ، همان طور كه آقای اوباما امید داشت، نه از زبان رییس جمهور تداركاتچی و بلكه از سوی كسی داده می*شد كه قدرت اصلی* تصمیم*گیرنده در ایران است. خامنه*ای البته نمی*توانست به یك باره پارانویای ضد خارجی/ضد آمریكایی خود را كنار بگذارد و دستی را كه به سوی او دراز شده است بفشارد. ولی لحن او تغییر كرده بود، و در برابر پیشنهاد اوباما برای صلح و آشتی، خواسته*های خود را به زبان دیگری مطرح كرد. طرح خواسته به معنای آمادگی برای گفتگو است. طلسم عدم مذاكره با آمریكا شكسته شده - و مذاكره شروع شده است.

تغییر در سیاست خارجی آمریكا در برابر ایران یكی از شعارهای انتخاباتی باراك اوباما بود. سیاست جورج بوش در مورد ایران به بن بست رسیده بود. آمریكا نه می*توانست پس از تجربه فاجعه*بار عراق استراتژی تغییر رژیم ایران را پیش ببرد و نه راه حل عملی دیگری برای شكستن بن*بست مناسبات خود با ایران در دست داشت. از آن سو اتمی شدن ایران كابوسی بود كه مرتبا آمریكا و متحدان آن در جهان را آزار می*داد. اوباما با شعار «تغییر» بر روی *كار آمد و این تغییر، سیاست خارجی آمریكا را نیز در بر می*گرفت. او به خصوص از تغییر سیاست آمریكا در برابر ایران نیز سخن گفت. روشن نبود كه او چگونه می*خواهد این سیَاست را پیش ببرد. بر اساس ارزیابی*های موجود، از نظر زمانی، بحران ناشی از اتمی شدن ایران در دوران ریاست جمهوری آقای اوباما به نقطه غلیان خود خواهد رسید. از این رو گفته می*شد كه مسئله ایران (و نه عراق، افغانستان یا اسراییل و فلسطین) بزرگترین چالش سیاست خارجی آقای اوباما خواهد بود. از این رو نه فقط مردم ایران و بلكه جامعه جهانی و به خصوص متحدان آمریكا در انتظار آن بوده*اند كه ببینند آقای اوباما این سیاست خود را چگونه پیش خواهد برد.

قبلا در این ستون گفته شده است كه در سیاست آقای اوباما در برابر ایران به لحاظ استراتژیك تغییری اساسی با سیاست جورج بوش در سال*های اخیر دیده نمی*شود. آقای بوش نیز پس از كنار گذاشتن برنامه تغییر رژیم، آمادگی خود را برای مذاكره با رژیم ایران اعلام كرد. در هر دو مورد (بوش و اوباما) نیز گزینه نظامی كنار نرفته است. تغییری كه پیش آمده بیشتر تاكتیكی است تا استراتژیك. آقای بوش پیش*شرط**هایی برای مذاكره داشت كه رژیم ایران آن*ها را نمی*پذیرفت. آقای اوباما آماده است كه حد اكثر انعطاف را از خود نشان دهد. برای بوش، حمله نظامی «یك» گزینه بود. برای اوباما این امر «آخرین» گزینه می*تواند باشد. بوش به دلیل از دست دادن اعتبار خود در سطح داخلی و بین*المللی نه می*توانست از موضع قدرت با ایران بر سر میز مذاكره بنشیند و نه اقتدار آن را داشت كه حمله نظامی به ایران را توجیه كند. اوباما، به عكس، از پشتوانه اعتبار زیادی برخوردار است. این اعتبار به او اجازه می*دهد كه با اعتماد دست خود را به سوی رژیم ایران دراز كند - و اگر این دست با خشونت رد شد او برای توجیه حمله نظامی به ایران مشكل چندانی نخواهد داشت.

پیام نوروزی اوباما اولین اقدام مستقیم اوباما برای مذاكره با رژیم ایران بود. این پیام رهبران جمهوری *اسلامی* را غافلگیر كرد. لحن ومحتوای پیام چنان بود كه آقای خامنه*ای را بلافاصله به پاسخ واداشت. صرف نظر از محتوای پاسخ، دو نكته در این جا مطرح است: یكی سرعت در پاسخ و دیگری مقام پاسخ*دهنده. روابط ایران و آمریكا در سطحی نیست كه این پیام*های «دوستانه» پاسخ*های سریع را به دنبال داشته باشد. تعدادی از نامه*های آقای احمدی*نژاد به سران غرب (حتا به كشورهایی مانند آلمان كه ایران با آن*ها روابط حسنه دارد) هنوز بلاجواب مانده است. حتا آقای اوباما نیز هنوز به پیام تبریك احمدی*نژاد (به مناسبت احراز مقام ریاست جمهوری او) پاسخ نداده است. دیگر این كه در ایران معمولا پاسخ اظهاراتی از این قبیل به وزیر خارجه یا سخنگوی او سپرده می*شود، و یا دست بالا محمود احمدی*نژاد به عنوان «رییس» جمهوری اسلامی در مقام جوابگویی بر می*آید. ولی در این مورد آقای* خامنه*ای لازم دیده است كه شخصا و سریعا به این پیام پاسخ دهد - و ظاهرا همراه با این امریه به عمله و اكره حكومتی كه دیگران سخنی نگویند (و یا اگر می*گویند تنها سخن او را تكرار كنند).

اوباما و خامنه*ای گرچه در پیام*های خود به دو زبان* مختلف (و هر یك متناسب با سطح فرهنگ سیاسی و اجتماعی خود) سخن گفته*اند، ولی در مورد دستور گفتگو به نوعی توافق رسیده*اند. اوباما می*گوید شما از ترور دست بردارید و ما هم تهدید را كنار می*گذاریم. خامنه*ای می*گوید تحریم*ها را بردارید و پول*های بلوكه شده ما را پس دهید و ما هم رفتار خود را عوض خواهیم كرد (از ترور دست می*كشیم؟) (این گونه معامله رژیم جمهوری اسلامی* با آمریكا بی*سابقه نیست. در اواخر دهه ۱۳۶۰ نیز رژیم در برابر گرفتن امتیاز از آمریكا به كار گروگان*های غربیان در لبنان خاتمه داد و به تروریست*های تحت كنترل خود دستور داد كه گروگان*ها را آزاد كنند.) اوباما در پیام خود نه فقط اشاره*ای به حقوق بشر نمی*كند كه از مسئله اتمی شدن ایران نیز ذكری به میان نمی*آورد. این امر ظاهرا به مذاق جمهوری اسلامی خوش آمده است، و متقابلا نه فقط مسئله فلسطین در ردیف آخرین خواست*های آقای خامنه*ای نام برده می*شود (یعنی كه اولویت درجه چندم دارد) و بلكه او فقط می*خواهد كه آمریكا از اسراییل «دفاع بی*قید و شرط» نكند. فراموش نكنیم كه رژیم جمهوری اسلامی همواره با موجودیت اسراییل مشكل داشته است - در صورتی كه خواسته* اخیر خامنه*ای انتظاری است كه همه طرفداران صلح و عدالت در خاورمیانه از آمریكا دارند و آن را برای استقرار صلح بین اسراییل و فلسطین لازم می*دانند.

خامنه*ای البته به مقتضای زبان و فرهنگ حاكم بر جمهوری اسلامی رجز زیاد خواند و «مطالبات» زیادی را مطرح كرد. جمهوری اسلامی را با مردم ایران یكی به حساب آورد و رفتار جمهوری اسلامی را به حساب مردم گذاشت. آمریكا را یك سره مقصر دانست و از عملكرد رژیم جمهوری اسلامی در تیره كردن روابط با آمریكا سخنی نگفت. این زبان و این نامربوط*گویی*ها برای جهانیان ناآشنا نیست، و آنان می*دانند كه این*ها بیشتر مصرف داخلی دارد. ولی در ورای ظواهر الفاظ و شعارهای دهان*پركن او، یك واقعیت به چشم می*خورد: جمهوری اسلامی آماده مذاكره با آمریكا است و از فرصتی كه باراك اوباما پیش آورده استقبال می*كند. برای این كار نیز كمی*«عجله» دارد (سرعت در پاسخ). بحران*های سیاسی و اقتصادی و اجتماعی بزرگی در پیش است كه باید پیش از غلیان آرام شوند. علاوه بر این، مذاكره با آمریكا مهمتر از آن است كه او بتواند كنترل آن را به كس دیگری* بسپارد. او خود باید طرف اصلی* مذاكره با آمریكا باشد، و آن را هدایت كند. نباید اجازه داد احمدی*نژاد یا لاریجانی یا هر كس دیگری كه در ساختار قدرت ایران محلی از اعراب دارد سخنی گویند یا كاری انجام دهند كه از كنترل او خارج باشد. پس در مرحله اول باید دیگران را امر به سكوت كرد یا پیش از آن كه آنان لب به سخن بگشایند او خود به پیام اوباما پاسخ دهد.

این هر دو (سرعت در پاسخ و مقام پاسخ دهنده) مطلوب آقای اوباما و مشاوران او بوده است. آنان معتقدند كه احمدی*نژاد (یا هركس كه جای *او بیاید) كاره*ای نیست، و گفته بودند كه مایلند با شخص خامنه*ای وارد گفتگو شوند. آقای خامنه*ای به این تمایل آنان پاسخ مثبت داده است. آنان هم*چنین از سرعت عمل خامنه*ای و محتوای پاسخ او صرف نظر از شعارها و رجزخوانی*ها راضی* به نظر می*رسند. از این رو، سخنگویان كاخ سفید از آن استقبال كرده*اند. اوباما خواسته است با خامنه*ای گفتگو كند، و خامنه*ای بی*صبرانه به این دعوت پاسخ داده و آماده گفتگو است. رأی**گیری خردادماه آینده نیز در این رابطه محلی از اعراب ندارد. بنا بر این دلیلی* ندارد كه آمریكا به انتظار نتایج این رأی*گیری بنشیند. گام اول برای مذاكره برداشته شده است و می*توان آن را پیش برد. به این دلیل سخنگویان كاخ سفید گفته*اند كه هم*اكنون آقای اوباما در حال بررسی قدم بعدی است. این گام به احتمال زیاد به صورت نامه*ای رسمی به آقای خامنه*ای خواهد بود، كاری* كه به گفته این سخنگویان قرار است در یكی دو ماه آینده انجام شود. آمریكا منتظر رأی*گیری خردادماه نخواهد *ماند چون آن را در سیاست خود مؤثر نمی*داند. ولی اقدامات آمریكا در این فاصله بر فضای سیاسی ایران و از جمله رأی*گیری خردادماه تأثیر خواهد گذاشت، و همان طور كه هفته گذشته گفته شد این امر یكی از دو عامل اصلی خواهد بود (همراه با بحران* اقتصادی) كه سرنوشت این رأی*گیری را رقم خواهد زد.

[Rasputin]

تماس مستقيم ايران و آمريكا در لاهه

وزير امور خارجه آمريكا مي گويد فرستاده ايران در اجلاس لاهه با نماينده ويژه باراك اوباما دست داده و آمريكايي ها نامه اي به هيأت ايراني داده اند كه در آن درخواست هايي درباره "سه شهروند آمريكايي كه نمي توانند از ايران بازگردند" مطرح شده است.

به گزارش كسري ناجي، خبرنگار اعزامي بي بي سي فارسي به لاهه، هيلاري كلينتون در يك نشست خبري اعلام كرد كه ريچارد هولبروك، نماينده ويژه رئيس جمهوري آمريكا در امور افغانستان و پاكستان ملاقاتي مختصر با محمدمهدي آخوندزاده، معاون وزير امور خارجه ايران داشته و آن دو در فضايي صميمي با هم دست داده اند.

به گفته خانم كلينتون، آقاي هالبروك و آقاي آخوندزاده قول داده اند كه در آينده تماس خود را حفظ كنند.

پس از سال ها، اين نخستين بار است كه ملاقاتي ميان مقامات ايران و آمريكا در اين سطح صورت مي گيرد.

خانم كلينتون در نشست خبري خود همچنين اعلام كرد كه آمريكا نامه اي به نمايندگان ايران تحويل داده و در آن در مورد "سه شهروند آمريكايي كه نمي توانند از ايران خارج شوند"، از مقامات ايران كمك خواسته است.

يكي از اين سه تن رابرت لوينسون، افسر سابق پليس فدرال آمريكا (اف بي آي) است كه حدود دو سال پيش در كيش ناپديد شد و اينك دولت آمريكا از مقامات ايران خواسته است كه به روشن شدن سرنوشت او كمك كنند.

در نامه آمريكا به مقامات ايران همچنين در خواست آزادي ركسانا صابري (خبرنگار ايراني - آمريكايي) و رفع محدوديت از عشا مومني (عضو كمپين يك ميليون امضاء براي حقوق زنان) مطرح شده است.

ركسانا صابري كه پدري ايراني و مادري ژاپني دارد، در آمريكا متولد و همانجا بزرگ شده است.

او از حدود شش سال پيش به ايران رفت و به عنوان خبرنگار براي رسانه هايي چون "راديوي عمومي آمريكا"، بي بي سي، اي بي سي نيوز و چند رسانه ديگر كار كرد.

او در بهمن ماه سال 1387 بازداشت و بعدا به زندان اوين منتقل شد. گفته مي شود بازداشت او به دليل ادامه دادن به ارسال پاره اي گزارش هاي خبري به رغم عدم تمديد مجوز كارش بوده است.

پدر خانم صابري مدتي پيش در نامه اي سرگشاده به رهبر ايران از آيت الله خامنه اي خواست دستور آزادي دخترش را صادر كند.

آقاي صابري و همسرش كه نگران حال دخترشان هستند، گفته اند براي ملاقات با او به ايران سفر خواهند كرد.

عشا مومني هم عضو كمپين يك ميليون امضا براي رفع تبعيض قانوني عليه زنان است كه مهرماه 1387 بازداشت و به تبليغ عليه نظام جمهوري اسلامي متهم شد.

خانم مومني چندي بعد با سپردن وثيقه از زندان آزاد شد، اما مقامات او را ممنوع الخروج كردند.

[Rasputin]

It is customary in an Iranian wedding ceremony, when asked, "Do you take this man?", for the bride to not answer "Yes!" the first time the question is posed. By tradition, the bride, but not the groom, is asked the signifying question three times. To show her proper upbringing, she must wait until the third time before answering 'Yes!' Otherwise, she may come off seeming too eager, not ladylike, not coy enough, aggressive or too enthusiastic (implying further bad things), way too much in a hurry, not able or patient enough to observe the proper decorum. Not good.

The Obama administration's recent overtures for a reconciliation with Iran have come in the form of sweet talk of opening up of fisted hands, accompanied with a quotation from the wily and clever Sa'di, one of our more popular poets (1184-1283?). The initial Iranian responses to these Obama overtures are starting to resemble the coy Iranian bride's ladylike silence upon first being asked if she would take the man.

Initial reactions from the Iranian government were predictable rebukes and denunciations to the effect that nothing has changed in reality, that the Americans should draw some lessons from their past and present behavior if they really want better relations with Iran. Yet, the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, left open the possibility that the Americans can and may change their attitude, in which case the Iranians likewise will change theirs; which is to say, "Keep talking! I'm listening."

Of course, the Iranian government would like nothing better than to have full and complete recognition from the global bully, a recognition that comes with a guarantee of unfettered turf and a ticket to actual and concrete cooperative joint projects with the global bully in regional matters, such as in 'stabilizing' Iraq and Afghanistan, where the Iranians can play a substantial role in furthering the agenda set out by the global bully. But, of course, the Iranians cannot come out and just say it like that. They have to play coy, or actually, even pissed off a bit initially, demanding the unfreezing of assets, the stopping of economic embargo and the hostile language; basically, demanding the stoppage of all abusive behavior, and a show of some real sweetness before this principled and pious bride is convinced that she can live comfortably within the coming union of objectives.

One of the signs of attitude change the Iranian side expects to see, one of the most obvious, is the un-freezing of the their assets held in American banks. This can easily be arranged without any loss of face on the part of the Americans, since not a really big deal, yet can be used in Iran as the proof that the Americans are starting to step on the righteous path and yielding to the Iranian people's demands. This in turn will lead to more open Iranian cooperation with, say, the NATO, providing them whatever help they can in the war against Afghanistan. In time, further concrete measures will be taken to bring the two states closer.

But, the 'bringing closer' of the two states will only work as long as the union is beneficial to the imperialists. As long as the major interests of the imperialists are reinforced and fortified, they will have no problem throwing around some crumbs.

Signs of relational improvements between the two sides have already manifested themselves. "[A] meeting took place on March 9 between NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Martin Erdmann and Iran's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, Ali-Asghar Khaji," (see: "NATO confirms first high-level meeting with Iran on Afghanistan"). There is also the invitation offered to Iran (and Iran's acceptance) to participate in a NATO-organized international conference, held on March 31, to deal with the war in Afghanistan.

And, as pertains to some of the things the Iranian government would like to see done by the American side, we have seen the throwing to the wolves of about 3,500 members of an Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahedin (or Mojaheddin-e Khalq-e), camped for the past twenty years in a military compound north of Baghdad, some 50 miles from the Iranian border. This organization has been a major irritant to the Iranian regime ever since 1980. The Mojahedin in Iraq have been told their camp will be moved to a location far removed from the border and much more remote, and that they will have to leave Iraq. Their presence in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussain had been tolerated by the invaders and, presumably, held as a card to be used in any potential negotiations with the Iranian government. It seems that card is now in play.

* * *

The support base of the current Iranian state -- this particular form of government, a post-modern capitalist theocracy -- comprises a host of actors with a variety of socio-political backgrounds.

Internally and on the far right, there are obviously the obsessive, clerical advocates and functionaries of this despotic, religiously based state apparatus, and they have their own ideologically correct armies in the Basiji Forces and the Revolutionary Guards (which are separate from the regular armed forces), as well as in loose networks of religious vigilantes. They also have allies across the higher academia and the larger educational system, in the judiciary, in the majlis (parliament), and they control a substantial amount of print and electronic media (and theirs never get shut down by the government).

But not all theocrats are extremist zealots dependent on a cocktail of one part ideology mixed with three parts bullying. Khatami, to name an internationally known 'moderate', is a representative of another strand of theocrats, those with a gentler face (and their 'reformist' newspapers regularly get shut down; theocrats can't even fully tolerate their own!). As the reader may well know, the moderates have been more vocal, and for a longer time, about finding it reasonable to have relations with the Great Satan as long as those relations are based on respect. Khatami famously advocated a 'Conversation between civilizations'. But, 'hardliners' too welcome better relations and even cooperation with the Great Satan. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly said that relations with the U.S. are welcome as long as some face saving issues are addressed. And the most recent contacts between Western and Iranian diplomats, lest we forget, did occur under his presidency. Of course, Iran observers and Iranian people know that the Supreme Leader has the final say on all matters and the thumbs-up to diplomatic contacts must have come from him. But, he too is considered a 'hard-liner'.

The theocratic state apparatuses have their backs watched by ideological armed forces of their own but, more significantly, they make great use of the state run foundations that form an echelon-specific welfare state, making sure that the relative well being of millions of lower-working class and poor people is directly dependent on the survival of this particular form of government. Additionally, the state can count on the support of the bazaari merchant classes, though merchants may not be the most reliable of the state's allies since, from time immemorial, they have had their own independent social interests, regardless of who wields the state power. But, it must be said that this particular state has been a particularly good friend of the merchant classes.

Internationally, the Islamic Republic has also built strong alliances. They have very cooperative relations with major western European powers, including France, Germany, and Italy; they have economic and trade ties with the U.K.; their strategy of building trade and bilateral economic alliances with Russia and China, as well as with Japan, South Korea and others, has extended their independence from purely western connections. They have also made sure to create key political alliances with Latin American leftist leaders in countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, which furthers their standing among the left-leaning elements of societies in those countries as well as internationally.

Finally, they have developed a network of international lobbyists cleaning up the Iranian state's image abroad, trying to win it business as well as parliamentary and congressional allies in Europe and the U.S. In the case of the U.S., beside seeking and securing key business and some Congressional allies, we have seen a particular effort by the Iranian state's lobbyists since 2004-2005 to neutralize any radical left objections to the Iranian state's violations of basic human rights, and to preempt any objections to the fact of it being a theocracy; inherently anti-democratic, an abhorrent phenomenon for any Westerner, the inheritors of the Enlightenment project advocating the separation of state and religion.

[Rasputin]

II

This is not an insignificant move. Iranian state functionaries have basically clipped the wings of any American leftist critique of the normalization of relations between the U.S. and a theocratic state -- a normalization that will most definitely include Iran's active and direct participation in the American war against the people of Afghanistan, a war opposed by most Americans and anybody who thinks of themselves as being on the left.

So, all in all, one can say the Iranian mullahs have covered most of their bases pretty well. And if their calculations are correct, they are about to load all the bases and hit a home run.

And what calculations are those? They are derived simply from basic facts of human history: as omnipotent as imperialists would like to make themselves look, their powers are not infinite, meaning they are not god, and their wishes are not the only determinants in the calculus of international power relations.

Just like everybody living in the world outside the gated U.S.A, Iranians have eyes and can see that this particularly American global bully -- with all the mountains of resources, the trillions of dollars of expenditure on hi-tech armory, 'intelligence' and know-how, with a military budgetary might that equals the combined military expenditures of all the rest of the world -- cannot successfully pacify an infinitely poor and most devastated country like Afghanistan. Further, the American imperialists have not been able to pacify the people of Iraq; not with mass slaughter nor with creating mini-civil wars and proliferation of death squads, not with incineration of entire cities and neighborhoods, not with open bribery, not even while a great portion of the majority Shiite population of the country is either with them (since the imperialists put their representatives in power) or passively hoping and wishing to hell that they wouldn't have to take up arms against the imperialists.

Further, in both cases, the U.S. attacked countries that had already been devastated by over a decade of warfare (in the case of Afghanistan, over two decades): of bombings, of economic strangulation, and the destruction of infrastructure.

Iran's case, in contrast, is greatly different. An attack on Iran would be countered by two sets of armies (the regular, traditional army and the ideological one created after the revolution), a well-fortified military infrastructure totally intact, and by an army of civilian support that will easily swell in ranks to millions in short order (who knows how many thousands or more of even expats and exiles would rush back home to fight the imperialists?).

So, a war against Iran is not in the imperialists' short to mid-term interests, nor is it their real wish. Not at this point. To use a very crude analogy (with all its pitfalls), when building a tunnel, after you've dug for a while, with the completion of each section and before going farther, you need to reinforce each bit of the tunnel just dug. If you don't, many a dead miners would tell you, you get buried alive when the tunnel collapses.

The permanent foothold into the Middle East and the West- and Central-Asia that the American imperialists have been constructing needs to be reinforced at this point. By recklessly expanding the war further, as some neocon crazies have been espousing, imperialists run the highly explosive risk of having everything blow up in their faces and lose all they have achieved so far, particularly in Iraq.

For those who believe that the Iraq war has been a fiasco, it is worth reviewing the American achievements in their war against the people of Iraq. Those achievements are: destruction of Iraqi society's structural protections that previously limited and shaped western multinationals' access to Iraq's natural and social resources and markets; destruction of Iraq's taxation regime, and its replacement with one far friendlier to foreign capital investments; destruction of some of the most fundamental rights of Iraqi women, thereby lowering the floor for expected, overall social misery; structural integration of parts of the leadership of the Iraqi society into the American imperial machinery; under the cloak of war, the Iraqi organized labor has been driven further into the ground, to assure it would not pose any serious strategic challenge to the imperialist designs for Iraq; tribalization, or Balkanization, of a unified Iraqi society into religious and ethnic based identities (Shiite's, Sunni's, and Kurds); and most importantly, the establishment of an Iraqi government absolutely dependent on the American military and political backing for its survival. For imperialists, these are tangible strategic achievements, not the stuff of 'utter disaster', which is how the liberals like to portray the results of the neocons' policies in Iraq.

But, again, for these achievements to last and become part of the 'permanent', long-term and structural setup in the Middle East, they need to be reinforced.

Enter Iran. In the contextual scenario of a global bully wanting more than its might allows, the differences between the Iranian state acting as an outright enemy (which it would have to, the minute an attack against it is launched) and a friendly and cooperative Iran are not small. In fact, the differences are huge, and can make the difference between utter disaster and the possibility of some salvation. Especially at this historical junction, when it comes to the available tools at the disposal of the American imperialists. The crazies may well yell and scream bloody murder, or, "Bomb, bomb Iran," all they want, but such chest thumping is more like the overjoyed outbursts of a crotchety old, impotent yet macho man momentarily caught up in the euphoric delusion of real potency induced by Viagra.

Social reality has its own dynamics and those dynamics invariably slap all power-wielding idiots in the face equally dispassionately. The Iranian government's bet has been that at some point the tunnels being burrowed by the Americans into the social life of the region will need their Iranian, able hands in constructing the needed reinforcements.

Of course, more than anybody, the Iranians know that once the reinforcements are built, they themselves may come under a real attack. But, that is always the rub when dealing with imperialists: there are no guarantees. Look at Pakistan and how miserably enslaved she is in the American imperialists' bear hug.

So, there may be grumblings by the Iranians about the release of their bank assets and the need for a lifting of trade sanctions, as there will surely be demands by the U.S. for Iran to reject 'terrorism' (coming from the U.S., that's balls!) and suspend their 'nuclear activities', or to stop their support for 'terror groups' such as Hamas and Hezbollah, but by the end of this dance, the bride will say 'Yes!' and the gathered celebrators of normalization will happily cheer the newly reconciled into the dark chambers, where big deals shall be made.

But, do not be fooled by either side. Normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran will have nothing to do with reaching a civilized agreement, in which the U.S. agrees not to interfere in the affairs of the Iranian society and Iran agrees to be nice. Quite the contrary, the normalization will have to be about integrating more methodically the Iranian government's resources into the ongoing American imperial projects for the region, and this by nature will have to lead to increased U.S. interference in how things are run in Iran.

[Rasputin]

III

When social and natural resources of the Iranian society are put into creating a 'corridor' for the NATO to transport its supplies to Afghanistan, that must be called what it is in plain language: aiding and abetting the imperialists in their war of aggression in Afghanistan.

Socialists must ask, Why should any amount of the Iranian social wealth be integrated into some sub-section of a NATO planner's schemes? Gradually and by extension, are we to become a cog in the American imperial military machinery? That cannot be considered progress for the Iranian people. It would be more like the Pakistanization of Iran.

From the standpoint of the Iranian socialists, the best form of relations with the imperialists is no relation at all. That means both no negative or adverse relations (no embargoes, no economic harassment, no military bullying, no diplomatic bullying, no covert interferences, no destruction of any of our resources, human or otherwise), and no so-called positive relations, either (no U.S. corporations in Iran to steal our natural and social resources, no one-sided trade agreements, no shared production agreements in oil industry, ditto for gas resources or any metals and minerals in Iran).

Imperialists do not enter any relations based on equality or respect or any such irrelevant principles. They enter relations of dominance. Only. To not do so is fundamentally against their nature. It should be enough to observe how the Yankee imperialists approach their European allies; not based on equality. So, for the Iranian theocratic state to seriously expect to be treated as an equal by the American imperialists ... well, as politically (not to forget romantically) correct as that may be for some, such notions will simply not become operational in the really existing world capitalist system of today. Not by a long shot.

But, a marriage does not have to be one between equals, as most marriages rarely are. Just as in actual marriages anywhere in the world, and especially as is the case with marriages of convenience (which the Iran-U.S. rapprochement will surely be), both sides will continue to pretend that all is worth the sacrifices made internally and externally, both will do their best to keep up the pretenses, no matter how awkward it may become at times to keep appearances and hold things together. But, hold things together they will, because bigger objectives are at stake.

For the U.S., the bigger objectives at stake include the continuation of its project of tunnel building into the deep structures of social life in the Middle East as well as West- and Central-Asia. For the Iranian theocrats, the larger goals include a much awaited sigh of relief, a reprieve for sure, and the golden opportunity to bring water for the global bully in a fashion that saves face and assures the expansion of Iran's own regional power plays.

Alas, happy together and happily ever after they shall not live. This one will be a messy marriage, filled with sour bickering about past affairs, past abuses and aggressions, past failings of character and failures to allow for possibilities of better lives; there shall be arguments over current flaws, current neglects and continued abuses. There will, for sure, be some trouble over wife number one, Israel, that the U.S. keeps in the same neighborhood. Expect major catfights.

So, all in all, this Iran-U.S. rapprochement dance will make for a very entertaining but overall abusive relationship to be worked out, as well as observed and chronicled. Brace yourselves and try not to be too taken by the bickering coming down the line. It's all about uniting over a miserable cause anyway.

[Rasputin]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090417/ts_nm/us_iran_usa_mottaki_3

[Rasputin]

On March 31, Washington took its first step toward engagement with Tehran through a diplomatic encounter with the Iranian government at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague. Even though the initial contact was awkward, it was clearly a step forward for the Obama administration, and both countries agreed that the opium/heroin trade was a destructive force in both the region and the world. As such, the United States should consider using collaboration on counternarcotics as an effective means to jump-start diplomacy with Iran. Although such an approach would be difficult, it could succeed if both sides focused solely on law enforcement, without the intrusion of politicians, intelligence operatives, and diplomats.

Background
Afghanistan produces roughly 90 percent of the world's opiates -- principally opium and heroin -- and the resulting drug trade fuels the Taliban's war effort. The Taliban is becoming increasingly reliant on this illicit multibillion-dollar industry to fund its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is evidence of growing al-Qaeda involvement.

The UN's 2008 World Drug Report states that more than half of the world's opiate users -- over 9.3 million people -- reside in Asia and are found mostly along the major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. More than 2.3 million of the users live in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, many in Afghanistan and Iran.

Estimates for the number of Iranian users vary widely. Iranian government sources report that between 1.2 million and 2 million Iranians are addicted to opiates, while other estimates are generally higher, especially when frequent users are added to the figures. In other words, at least 2.5 percent of the adult population is addicted, and since 90 percent of Iranian users are male, 5 to 8 percent of adult men in Iran are using opiates regularly.

Opiates are the traditional intoxicant of choice in Iran, with opium use well established in tradition, in contrast to the negative social image of alcohol consumption. Opium was a significant problem in Iran before World War II, when it was the drug's leading international producer. In the decades before the revolution, much progress was made in addressing drug addiction, but the problem roared back after 1979.

Part of the problem was government attitude, since not all clerics disapproved of opium. The problem is compounded by geography, since Iran has served for many years as a major transshipment route for opium and heroin to Turkey, Europe, and other international destinations. As in many other countries, outside traffickers, in this case Afghans, work with Iranian organized crime to create the infrastructure necessary within Iran to support the transshipment of Afghan opiates to Western markets. The Afghan traffickers pay their Iranian partners with product rather than cash, thus contributing to the development of markets and increased demand inside Iran.

Not only is the Iranian addiction rate extremely high, a number of Iranian military personnel have been killed in the line of duty as a result of drug-related violence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose al-Quds Force is the country's primary support organization for regional terrorists, is at the same time a main actor in the fight against drug trafficking. A number of IRGC units appear to be involved in both tasks, which poses a significant problem for U.S.-Iranian counternarcotics cooperation.

Another potential obstacle for a collaborative effort is the perception that Washington supports at least one of the major organizations smuggling opiates into Iran, Jundallah, an ethnically Baluch "political" group also known as Iranian People's Resistance Movement. This organization has engaged in acts of terrorism against the Iranian government, and its leader has spoken on Voice of America.

The Way Forward
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be allowed to establish direct communication and cooperation with its Iranian law enforcement counterparts. Iranian officials have sought this kind of arrangement in the past, and some senior U.S. State Department leaders have even lobbied for it; however, previous administrations have prohibited the DEA from moving forward.

This year the DEA is cohosting -- with its Mexican counterparts -- its twenty-seventh annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Cancun, Mexico. The IDEC has grown from a five-country, Western-hemisphere-centric endeavor, to a global effort involving approximately one hundred nations. Ninety-one countries participated in the 2008 event in Istanbul, Turkey. The IDEC venue could provide an ideal opportunity to open relations between the DEA and Iranian law enforcement, as well as other law enforcement agencies from around the globe, ultimately paving the way for a new era of cooperation between the United States and Iran.

After initial exchanges, the next step is to share intelligence and evidence, ideally though the establishment of a DEA office in Tehran. The DEA has the largest U.S. law enforcement presence abroad (eighty-six offices in sixty-seven countries), made possible only by the acceptance of DEA agents as federal narcotics officers, not spies. Gaining that acceptance in Iran will be a great challenge, and it certainly would not happen overnight. But it is important to set long-term goals. Although no foreign government has succeeded in working with Iran in this manner -- and the recent conviction of a foreign journalist as a spy is alarming -- the DEA has been extraordinarily effective in sharing related leads and sensitive drug intelligence with their counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries throughout the region and the world.

The Challenge
Policing is a science, and complex counternarcotics policing is even more challenging. Senior politicians from both countries becoming involved in police business could be disastrous. Since the problem will be compounded by the role of the IRGC, a reflexively anti-American force, the challenge will be to find a way for cooperation among senior law enforcement leaders, working at a "cop-to-cop" level.

From there, law enforcement officials could conduct collaborative work on efforts to address drug demand reduction and treatment, with professionals from those disciplines taking the lead. In this context, it is discouraging that Iran arrested two brothers, Arash and Kamiar Alaei, as they were heading to the 2008 international AIDS conference where they were due to be awarded a prize for their work with mostly drug-addicted AIDS victims. The brothers were convicted as spies on the charge that their foreign collaboration was promoting the "soft overthrow" of the Islamic Republic -- a preoccupation of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who sees cooperation with foreigners as potentially dangerous to his regime.

To succeed, any U.S. effort to cooperate with Iran on counternarcotics efforts must draw upon the DEA's successful and decades-long experience with law enforcement partners from around the globe. Although Iran does not subscribe to U.S. terrorist designations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is nonetheless in Iran's interest to work aggressively with the United States to target the drug-trafficking activities of these groups, which destabilize Iran and the region.

[Rasputin]

A familiar specter is haunting foreign policy circles, hovering in particular over liberal experts and intellectuals, compelling them to re-examine their views on two former ideological adversaries, namely Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. In an exceptional turn of events, the two ex-presidents are being unanimously hailed as a pair of foreign policy visionaries--Nixon for going to China, and Reagan for embracing Mikhail Gorbachev. The specter, of course, is Henry Kissinger.

Nowhere is this transformation better evident than in the debate about Iran. These days, the new conventional wisdom in Washington advocates the pursuit of a diplomatic solution with Tehran. The only existing disagreement is not over whether to negotiate but when to negotiate. Some believe that Washington must wait to reach out to Tehran after Iran's presidential elections in June. Others contend that waiting is unnecessary since the key figure to reach out to, the Supreme Leader, will remain the same.

In their book Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President, Richard N. Haass and Martin S. Indyk tackle the subject of Iran from multiple angles to arrive at a Kissingerian solution. Though the book covers a gamut of pressing issues in the region--from Iraq policy, to Arab-Israeli peace, to nuclear proliferation--Iran is the major common theme throughout much of their discussion. Its authors present as new an approach that is reminiscent of the old dual containment policy of carrots and sticks, except that the carrots are far from tangible and the sticks hardly defined. They acknowledge Iran as a tough challenge but, they argue, diplomacy can work because the regime does ultimately care about its immediate interests.

However, the question that goes unanswered is this: What reward could the U.S. possibly offer Tehran that could not only trump the allure of nuclear hubris but also substitute for the regime's anti-American fabric, of which its very identity is made?

Even if such a carrot were to magically sprout, the delivery of it to so fractured a regime would be a monumental feat. The Islamic facade of Iran's regime keeps us, in the West, so focused on our ideological divisions that we fail to see the commonalities in what plagues our politics. Much of Iran's economy and political infrastructure is in the firm grip of a handful of mafias. If there were to be a negotiation with Iran, the task of finding a reliable partner among the bosses would be daunting.

The fate of Iran's leaders in the past 30 years best demonstrates the impermanence of power among them. Ever since 1979, the vast majority of the country's leading figures have either fallen from grace--like former President Abolhassan Banisadre who defected to France, or Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who was executed, or Ambassador Mohammad Hossein Moussavian who was imprisoned--or they have lost momentum and popularity, like former President Mohammed Khatami. Iran's leadership landscape is quicksand.

But let us suppose that the miracle carrot was on hand and a single leader existed in Iran. Still, a major shift would first have to occur for the carrot-and-stick approach to succeed. At the heart of the proposal by doctors Haass and Indyk is a recommendation for political surgery to incise a "realistic and legitimate Iran" from its conjoined evil twin, "revolutionary Iran," which is driven by the zeal and impulses that defined Ayatollah Khomeini's rule.

It is here, in the strategy of separating a revolutionary state from its revolutionary moment, that a familiar vision and voice from the past reverberates. This view gives no heed to the ideals that spark revolutions in the first place. It cloaks its disregard for the subject of revolution in "pragmatism." Its foremost architect, Henry Kissinger, remains the perennial muse of the imagination of American foreign policymakers.

Nearly four decades ago, Kissinger introduced his policy to deal with communism, which in essence moved the U.S. to recognize the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the 1949 Chinese revolution. His doctrine accorded legitimacy to an established revolutionary state in the hopes of isolating it from the revolutionary movements and moderating its international behavior.

The revolutionary governments were served judicious helpings of carrots and sticks--the heartiest carrot being the accord of legitimacy itself, and the lesser being an array of trade and economic deals. The stick was America's massive military superiority, and her network of "regional gendarmes," such as Iran and South Vietnam at the time, who were to maintain U.S. influence in strategic areas of the world without overt presence. Kissinger argued that, after Vietnam, military intervention was not a viable policy for the United States.

Today, Kissinger claims that the demise of America's totalitarian rivals did not come as a result of the triumph of American democratic ideals. Rather, it came through the triumph of his policy toward the Soviets, which led to confrontational Reaganite tactics and the subsequent end of the Cold War. This point especially matters to Haass and Indyk in making their Iran proposal. That the authors agree that it was, indeed, the Kissinger Doctrine that broke the Bolsheviks' backs and pushed China toward more openness can be deduced from the model they propose for Iran.

However, there is a glaring distinction not simply between Iran and the former Soviet Union, but also between the Henry Kissinger of the late 1960s and his American counterparts in the new century. Whether it was the kidnapping and assassination of the Chilean General Rene Schneider, or supervision of extensive bombing raids into Laos and Cambodia, Kissinger's political calculus could never be called humanitarian. Yet he was always deeply engaged with the details of the internal politics of the country of his focus.

Haass and Indyk, on the other hand, while maintaining the same pragmatist disregard for the plight of Iranians, admit to a broad and general lack of understanding of critical details related to Iran: "Previous U.S. attempts to play on internal political dynamics in Iran have all proved counterproductive; the United States simply lacks the knowledge and the guile to do so effectively." Beneath all carefully crafted proposals of carrots and sticks for Iran, there is a clear message for the region, that once again American interests, not American ideals, will drive the U.S. foreign policy.

And there lies the glaring omission. The revolutionary movement that Indyk and Haass propose we excise is only a hollow posture when it comes to Iran's regime. But for the nation--for the young women who have spurred the grassroots One-Million-Signature campaign for equal rights, for the bus drivers who want their own union, for the scores of journalists and bloggers who languish in prisons, that movement is everything.

What if the U.S. were to turn its back on the plight of Iran's nation to embrace its government? If so, America is not about to blaze a new path. Rather, once again, as in the time of the Shah, the U.S. will align itself with those whom the nation regard as oppressors. It was precisely such an alliance that sparked the anti-imperialist fury among ordinary Iranians, which Ayatollah Khomeini exploited. That fury became the bonfire we now call the Iranian revolution of 1979.

[Rasputin]

One of the most interesting debates to emerge in the past month is about whether or not the US should reach out to Iran. This debate encompasses many of the controversial issues that divide the Iranian community outside Iran. But like most debates, this one is full of passion and strong feelings and sometimes the parties involved get personal and nasty with those that they take to be their opponents. In this way the debate becomes murky, confusing and often distorted. I want to clear away some of the confusion and shed some light on the issues involved in this debate and what the different sides are saying.

As a background, I begin by looking closely at Roger Cohen’s views on better relations with Iran and Obama’s recent New Year message to Iranians. I will analyze their ideas and words and I speculate about what is behind them and their significance. I will then focus on regime change and argue against it. Next I will look at how the way Iranian-Americans define themselves in the wake of 9/11 compels them to embrace regime change. I will then plead for civility in politics.


Cohen’s Suggestion


Roger Cohen who is a N.Y. Times journalist recently went to Iran and spoke to many Iranians including Iranian Jews. He has subsequently written about his trip and has started a campaign of urging the US government to engage and have a dialogue with Iran. Cohen argues that despite the regime's provocative rhetoric, those who govern Iran can be very pragmatic when it comes to politics. He gives a few examples of Iran’s actions in the international arena to support this. He points out that Iranians ended the Iraq war, have worked with Israel and the US when it suited them, and they have periodically allowed more freedoms and liberalism, even though later in some cases they have taken some of these back. He then argues that the best way for the West and in particular the US to avert Iran from developing the bomb, is to change its threatening posture towards Iran and to develop relations with Iran and in this way to take away the main justification for having it, i.e., to deter and prevent an attack by the US and the West.


Obama’s Overtures


Cohen’s proposal goes along with U.S. President Obama’s shift in policy towards Iran and his offer of an olive branch to the Iranian government. Recently Obama sent a message of good wishes to the people of the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’ for the Iranian New Year and he called for a peaceful and honest dialogue to resolve outstanding differences between the two nations which have had no diplomatic relations since 1980.


As he had promised in his campaign, Obama offered a ‘new beginning’ and extended a hand of friendship seeking to end decades of mutual suspicion and ill feelings between the US and Iran. Obama referred to Iran’s great and celebrated culture and its contributions to the world civilization and he appealed to our common humanity. He recognized for the first time the Islamic revolution and the current regime. Obama's address also signalled that his administration recognizes Iran as a potential negotiating partner. Obama said that the US wants Iran to take its ‘rightful place’ in the international community.


What was most significant about Obama’s message was that it shows a real and important rethinking and change in US policy towards Iran and in this way Obama made a decisive break with his predecessor George Bush who called Iran a member of the ‘axis of evil’ and led the charges against Iran in the international arena that it wanted to build a nuclear bomb and was sponsoring terrorism. Instead of threatening Iran, talking tough, and saying things like ‘all options are still on the table’, Obama was reconciliatory and he spoke of mutual respect.


Skepticism about Better Relations within the Iranian-American Community


As can be expected, there are those who are sceptical about the wisdom of seeking closer relations with Iran. Some Republicans and Neo-Conservatives who have supported President Bush's disastrously failed policies in Iraq and who are still incapable of even admitting that they were wrong, warn not only that nothing good will come out of being friendly with Iran, but they also argue that there is a great danger in the idea that you can have a dialogue and reason with evil. These are the people who want to bomb and occupy Iran in order to topple the current regime. They are crying wolf and they are convinced that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and they want to stop it.


But there are also many Iranian-Americans who believe that the best way that the US administration can help the people of Iran is to rid them of their current leaders. Some Iranian-Americans fear that normalizing diplomatic relations with Iran will only strengthen the current regime and their hold on power. Some argue that Cohen is whitewashing Iran’s regime and overlooking its repression and brutality. They believe that both Cohen and Obama are at best naïve, ignorant and misguided.

Opposition to a War with Iran


The problem with these various arguments is that they overlook the fact that the main reason the administration and people like Cohen promote closer relations with Iran is that they do not want the US to have a war with Iran. The war with Iraq has cost many lives. It has drained the US economy. It has made the US a villain in the international community and it has not made the Middle East any more secure and stable. A war with Iran would be a big mistake because it would hurt the US standing even more. It would put unbearable constraints on the economy and bring more instability to the region. It would also undoubtedly bring misery and hardship to many Iranians. Arguably, in the aftermath of the war with Iraq, every conscientious American has a responsibility to look closer at the issues surrounding the conflict with Iran and not to let him/her self be lied to, scared, and fooled by the powers to be, yet again.


Cohen is against another war therefore he is trying to humanize the people of Iran and to some extent the Islamic regime. That is also why Obama’s tone is friendly and he is seeking closer ties with Iran. It is important to remember that just as demonization and the rhetoric of cultural difference promote and justify conflict and aggression, the emphasis on commonality and respectful dialogue bring people closer and facilitate peace. Cohen and Obama are certainly in no way champions of the Islamic regime or its founding principles. They are well aware of its repressions and brutality. But they want to change the perception that Iran is a totalitarian evil empire like the Nazi Germany, or the greatest danger to world peace, because on the first look, these caricatures provide good justifications and pave the way for the use of force against Iran.


Cohen is warning us against fear mongering and the view that Iranians are religious nuts with a commitment to acquiring nukes and using them for a holy war. Cohen tries to dispel this by shedding light on the richness of the Iranian culture. He also argues that the Iranian government has not been monolithic for the past 30 years and that when necessary it has been flexible. Cohen argues that Iran has some democratic institutions such as presidential elections which are genuine contests. He points out that there is some political openness in Iran and that there is also a variety of points of view along with serious debates and discussions of important issues. Moreover Cohen argues that Iran is a multi-cultural society where various ethnic and religious groups live in relative peace with each other. The main line of thinking which is behind Cohen’s ideas about Iran is that ‘they are a lot like us, so let’s talk to them’. Instead of a war between Islam and the West, Cohen is promoting a dialogue between civilizations.


Obama’s overtures are aim at giving diplomacy and engagement a chance. Obama knows that conflicts are made worse by hostility, intimidation, disrespect, and a war of words, and that they can only be resolved by talking. Respectful dialogue is not cowardly or naïve. But it is the only way to dissipate tension, build confidence and transform relationships. Talking and discussion are essential to peace building. To speak respectfully and sincerely to one’s opponents is the civilized way to approach differences of opinion. This is more than just talking, it is taking solid action. Obama acknowledges that the US and Iran have serious differences on some issues, but he thinks that some of these can be resolved through closer relations.


Obama invited Iran to re-enter the world community on the condition that it stops military build-up and meddling in the affairs of other countries by appealing to our common humanity and suggesting that there can be a new U.S.-Iranian relationship based on what the two countries and people have in common. Obama’s emphasis on our commonalities and universal connectedness was an attempt to bridge differences and to bring the two nations and their people together. His main goal was to lessen the religious and ideological splits that divide US and Iran, so that the problems of the region can be more effectively dealt with. In this way Obama signaled his desire to find common ground with Iranians and the recognition that the US and Iran need each other in order to establish long term peace in the region.

[Rasputin]

Regime Change versus Democratic Reform


Another problem with skepticism about closer ties with Iran and advocating regime change is that there is no guarantee that a regime change will bring about a better system of government in Iran. The US and other foreign powers have always first and foremost looked out for their own interest and the multinational corporations, when it comes to the Middle East. There is no reason to think that things will be different this time. Moreover, the bombardment, destruction, and looting of Iran will only strengthen the worst elements of the ruling class, both in the long run and in the short run.


Generally it is undeniable that over the past few years outside threats and intimidation have led to militarization, more security concerns and crackdowns, and a weakening of the reformist camp in Iran. In the past 30 years, the Iranian government has always been less willing to listen and take seriously the concerns and worries of the people and their wishes, and has put these in the back burner, when it is been threatened from outside. The hardliners and other worse parts of the regime such as the security apparatus use these circumstances to seize and hold power.


Another consideration is that while the regime may not be very popular, it has the backing of many Iranians from nearly all segments of society. Toppling the regime may disenfranchise these folks and end the theocracy, but then a restoration of all inclusive democracy will bring them back to fold and having been the subject of foreign enmity, they may well become more popular and win major elections. In any case, no matter how much we may dislike them, we need to admit to ourselves that the religious conservatives will always be part of the political scene in a free Iran, since many Iranians are traditionalists and religiously conservative, just as religious traditionalists are part of the political scene and a force to be reckon with in the US, the Netherlands, and many other democratic societies.


Legitimate political change in Iran can only come from the people of Iran and through supporting the reformists and beating the hardliners who are supported by the revolutionary guards and other militant groups in elections rather than with sticks and stones or by bombing. This requires a lot of work in organizing, conscious raising and winning the hearts and minds of people. This is in part how the civil rights movement in the US succeeded.


Iran is a society in transition. It is an authoritarian and repressive society, but it also has democratic institutions which make reform possible. Iran is a young democracy and much work has to be done for it to transform into a mature and advanced democracy. We ought to remember how restrictive American democracy was in its inception and take the lesson that democratic reforms can only come from within and with much struggle. But change and reform in Iran require peace and stability. They will not come about unless the US ends its threats.


Iranian-American Identity and Regime Change


A violent regime change in Iran led by foreign forces is a murderous and terrible idea, yet it has many adherents among Iranian-Americans. The reasons for this are complex but they have everything to do with the way Iranian-Americans perceive themselves and in particular their American–ness in the wake of 9/11. Reader, just in case you have not noticed because you were not paying attention, the events following 9/11 were devastating and very disturbing for Iranian-Americans.


When President Bush put Iran in the axis of evil and closely connected Islam with 9/11 by saying things like ‘they hate us because of our values’, in doing so he made all Moslems and all Iranians into the enemies within. When many Americans and nearly the entire American media (particularly the comedians) embraced these moves, the pressure on the Iranian-Americans became enormous and impossible to resist. As a result most Iranian-Americans particularly those who had never developed any political values and principles of their own, because of fear and concerns for safety, embraced wholeheartedly the neoconservative agenda, their underlying assumptions about what is happening in the world, and their threat to shut up and go along if you know what is good for you, so that they can blend with the mass and not to stand out. This can best be discribed as asymmetrical aggregation under panic conditions.


Consequently in the aftermath of 9/11 Iranian-Americans in large numbers have embraced the idea of civilization war between Islam and the West, they have distant themselves from Islam or have left it completely and many consider it along with all Moslems (in particular Arabs) as evil, many have also started to embrace the pre-Islamic culture of Iran, the late Shah, and Monarchism which had been largely abandoned as a hopeless and losing cause by most Iranian-Americans before 9/11.


Bush’s plea to American people after 9/11 to just mourn and not to be critical of American foreign policy and blame it in anyway for what happened, allowed him to define what had happened in 9/11 and to set the political agenda for how to respond to it. Then in a very loud and clear way Bush repeatedly told Americans and the world ‘you are either with us or against us’ bullying and intimidating people into submission to his will and supporting the war with Iraq and proving that authoritarian ways of government can exist side by side with democratic ways, if the contradictions between them are masked and overlooked. Bush like a tyrant was clearly signalling that there is no legitimate dissent when it comes to characterizing 9/11 and supporting the Iraq war.


What I found most strange and surprising was the way Iranian-Americans and particularly the Monarchists embraced these authoritarian ideas and ways of governing with ease. They suddenly found their form, i.e., going along with the powerful, mimicking those in authority, and policing those who do not go along. This was because many Iranian-Americans got their political mentality from living under an absolute and repressive monarchy and the only politics that ever existed under the horizon of monarchy was ‘you are either with us or against us’. But democratic politics is about discussions and debates and listening to and taking seriously the concerns and worries of many different people from a variety of different backgrounds and blind loyalty and complete submission to those in authority has no place in it.


Possibly because many Iranian-Americans are actually Iranians in America whose language skills are too poor to seriously engage in democratic politics and handle and sieve through various political opinions, disagreements and differences, they have had little choice in embracing authoritarian dichotomies because it is the only kind of politics they can comprehend and get their head around. However, what was desperately needed at the time to resist these authoritarian overtures was a little critical thinking, some political consciousness rooted in the ideas of enlightenment and the courage to stand apart, risk disapproval, and not to cave into political bullying. Only those who knew other ways of acting, being and perceiving things and doing politics had the option of saying to the president and his administration ‘I am neither with you or them and that respectfully, my ideas of what is best for the US are very different from yours,’ breaking through the narrow options that they put on the table.


The regime change and enmity towards Islam are therefore psychological responses to fear and a kind of posture to ease the concern of our fellow Americans about who we are and what are our motives. They are forms of righteous indignation and those who defend them, often do so with a lot of venom. I know Iranian-Americans who identified themselves as Moslems and did not have any major problems with Mohammad the prophet of Islam before 9/11 but now the moment they hear the name of the prophet they loudly, quickly, and publicly, hurl the most vulgar profanities at him, just to let every one around them know what their new loyalties are and with whom they stand. I know some opportunistic and rootless Iranians-Americans who were sympathetic to the left and called themselves liberals before 9/11 but who took a 180 degree change in their social, political, and cultural views and situated themselves to the right of the most rightwing Americans such as Cheney, Rumsfeld and the Fox News. They are born again and they are wholly and completely shaped by 9/11 and the ugly, aggressive, and mean politics that emerged from it. They are virtually unrecognizable when compared to who they were before.


I also know some Iranian-Americans who took in Bush’s suggestions about what is happening in the world not only on the political level but also on the religious level, treating the president Bush as a new Christ and a holy prophet ushering in new final truths about what we should believe and how we should perceive ourselves, others, and politics in general. Some of these people because they are so wishy-washy and fickle and always have their finger in the air would now claim that they hate Bush, not recognizing that they have not in any way lost the mindset that they took from him and that they are still in his grip, participating in his performance.

[Rasputin]

I know a few Iranian-American women who instantly became the victims of Islam after 9/11 and they began to recast any and all conflicts they have had with Iranian-American men in their family as originating in cultural difference and bad Islamic modes of being. This is because the war on Islam is really a war on Moslem men who are viewed as aggressive and mean but Iranian women are perceived as exotic victims and they can get a pass and be embraced by the majority culture in the US if they reinforce the negative perspectives on Islam and cast the men in their lives as evil and turn on them. Truly, one has to have a lot of self-worth and her own ways of finding worth and meaning in order not to succumb to bringing others down and to these self-serving invitations. What has been most disconcerting is that the monarchists then proceeded to bring these authoritarian forms of thinking and intolerance for difference of opinion into the debates among Iranian-Americans about what is best for Iran, and what does it mean to be a good American. Some of them make it their business to crush different opinions and any sign of individuality in the Iranian-American community. They suspect that their own views may well be faulty and empty, they can not bear to look at them closely, and this makes them very cruel and unapproachable. The monarchists regularly and in many different forms label those who do not mirror their view as fundamentalists and as the servant of the regime and attack them most viscously and with no sympathy. Because there are so many of them and they are not committed to a civil debate about the issues, they manage to often create an unpleasant and mean spirited atmosphere which drives away those who think differently.


Civility and Respect for Our Opponents


We Iranian-Americans must learn to respect each other and differences of opinions and we also need to remember and focus on our commonalities and not get carried away with our differences. Reader, I beg you to recall that nearly all expatriates no matter what political camps they come from reject the connecting of religion and politics, theocracy, political repression and brutality, the attack on free press, the Islamic dress codes and the crack down on those who do not pay enough attention to it, the mistreatment of Bahais, and the idea of a Supreme Leader and the Assembly of Experts. But we differ on how to bring about the needed changes. We all want what is best for Iran and we want to see Iran and Iranians to prosper and we want to see Iran become much more democratic, peaceful and stable. But we disagree on how to bring this about.


The Monarchists and the followers of Mujahedin who fought Iran along side Saddam Hussein want regime change. They think that they have legitimate grievances, so when they are confronted with their opponents, they want to use force. They want to get rid of those who rule Iran by using violence, but their views are clouded by the desire for revenge and hate. They both have great enmity towards the Islamic regime. The Monarchists had to leave in a hurry leaving behind their properties, possessions and their former social status. They are very hurt and they want restorations of their former lives. The Mujahedin participated in the revolution but they fell out with the Islamists and Khomeini and were declared to be the enemies of Islamic revolution after bombings which were linked to them. Some of them were murdered in cold blood and while they were under arrest. Others served long sentences and consequently many left Iran afraid for their lives and with the aim of changing the regime from outside. But fighting along side the enemies of Iran has made them very unpopular in Iran.


What is very interesting is that although the Monarchists and the Mujahedin see themselves as antithetical to the Islamic regime, they actually have a lot in common with them and they all embrace a number of pre-modern and backward political ideas. Just as the Islamists think of Khomeini as without any fault and worthy of veneration, the Monarchists deify the Shah and the Mujahedin do the same to Rajavi. But politics has to do with ideas and finding solutions to practical social problems, not personalities and cult-following. This cult following shows that even though the Monarchists and the Mujahedin may want to distance themselves from Islam as a religion and political Islam, they display the same religious instincts and thinking as the fundamentalists.


These instincts also manifest themselves in their attitudes towards their opponents and political differences. Islamists let the Monarchists leave Iran and they tried to get rid of the Mujahedin. They were not interested in the views of their opponents and saw them as enemies and worthless people who are going to hell. Both the Monarchists and the Mujahedin also paint with broad brushes and see themselves as the children of light and see their opponents as in the grip of darkness. When there is no civility and desire for peace, then people can only think of why they must hate their political opponents and their mind just can not access reasons for treating them with a certain amount of respect that is due to every human being.


But we need to learn to be tolerant of difference of opinions and perspectives and to treat the mullahs and their types not as enemies but as our opponents, restrict our enmity to their ideas and political views, and then engage these views, show why they are bad ideas, and beat them at the polls. It is up to us, not to the US. The Monarchists and the Mujahedin seem to think that politics is about sitting in front of mirror and agreeing with yourself. But politics is about debating and discussing the concerns and worries of all the parties involved and hashing out a compromise. This is so even when those who we disagree with have a completely different social, political and cultural background than us and appear very different and even in some way threatening and weird. Politics without discussions and debates between various groups and listening to them is not politics; it is certainly not democratic politics. We also need to be realistic and acknowledge that the clerical regime is here to stay and it is not about to go away. Any change in Iran is going come from within and in this context. But who knows just how far the reforms can go, once they begin in earnest.


The Emerging Generation Gap


One of the problems with seeing one’s Iranian-American identity in terms of distancing ourselves from Iran and Islam is that it does not work very well, it is often ineffective, and it is not convincing. No matter how much you distant yourself from them, you will be seen as one of them and belonging to them, especially when there is conflict and others are thinking badly of you. Moreover think of the psychological and moral damage that denying who you are in order to melt in with others can do to you in the long run, i.e., loss of personal identity and authenticity, and the surrender of personhood.


A better strategy may be not to demonize Iran and Islam but to defend them as not being entirely evil. It should not be difficult to see that this does not mean embracing the regime or Islam. We are likely to be treated better by Americans and feel better about ourselves, if the idea of a civilization war between Islam and the West gives way to a dialogue, exchange, or compromise between civilizations, if the US and Iran have better relations, and there is peace between Israel and the Palestinians. This road is of course much more difficult and challenging than blind submission to the views of the powerful which is too easy. It is about changing the world rather than lazily asking others to do the work for us. We must ask what does this demand of me and learn to make great demands of ourselves, instead of passing the buck and shifting responsibility. We must get involved rather than just be spectators.


I think that with the election of Obama, in this context a new generation gap is starting to emerge between older Iranian-Americans who favour regime change and demonizing the regime and Islam and younger Iranian-Americans who want normalizing diplomatic relations with Iran and removing the sanctions. I am with the later group who are less angry and more open-minded than their parents.