Nuclear Crisis

[Rasputin]

Tehran praises Russian, Chinese position on Iran nuclear problem

Russia and China hold "the most realistic" position on Iran's nuclear program, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Monday.

"Among all countries of the 'Group of Six' [permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany] the positions of Russia and China [on Iran's nuclear issue] are the most realistic," Mohammad Ali Hosseini said.

He said Iran would continue constructive cooperation with the international nuclear watchdog.

"Certain countries would like to undermine the authority of the [International Atomic Energy] Agency, which has not recorded any deviations from Iran's peaceful nuclear activity," he said.

On January 22, foreign ministers from the six nations are to meet in Berlin to consider a UN Security Council draft resolution on sanctions against Iran.

Two sets of UN Security Council sanctions are currently in place against Tehran over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment. Further rounds of more stringent sanctions have so far been blocked by China and Russia.

Moscow has said it is determined to resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means and stressed the significance of coordinated action in the six-nation format.

Despite Western suspicions of an atomic weapons program, Iran insists that its nuclear work has purely peaceful goals, and has pledged to clear up all remaining questions over the program by late February.

[Rasputin]

The U.S. has recently shared new intelligence with the International Atomic Energy Agency on key aspects of Iran's nuclear program that Washington says shows Tehran was directly engaged in trying to make a bomb, diplomats said Thursday.

One of the diplomats said Washington also gave the IAEA permission to confront Iran with at least some of the evidence in an attempt to pry details out of the Islamic republic, as part of the U.N. nuclear watchdog's attempts to investigate Iran's suspicious nuclear past.

The diplomats suggested that such moves by the U.S. administration would be a reflection of Washington's' drive to pressure Iran into acknowledging that it had focused part of its nuclear efforts toward developing a weapons program.

The U.S. is leading the push for a third set of U.N. sanctions against Iran. Tehran insists its program is intended only to produce energy and has refused U.N. demands that it suspend its uranium enrichment program — technology that can produce both fuel for nuclear reactors and the fissile material for a bomb.

A recent U.S. intelligence assessment that Iran had a clandestine weapons program but stopped working on it four years ago has hurt Washington's attempts to have the U.N. Security Council impose a third set of sanctions.

While the Americans have previously declassified and then forwarded intelligence to the IAEA to help its investigations, they do so on a selective basis.

Following Israel's bombing of a Syrian site late last year, and media reports citing unidentified U.S. officials as saying the target was a nuclear installation, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei turned in vain to the U.S. in asking for details on what was struck, said a diplomat who — like others — spoke on condition of anonymity in exchange for divulging confidential information.

Over the past two years, the U.S. already has shared material on a laptop computer reportedly smuggled out of Iran. In 2005, U.S. intelligence assessed that information as indicating that Tehran had been working on details of nuclear weapons, including missile trajectories and ideal altitudes for exploding warheads.

After declassification, U.S. intelligence also was forwarded on two other issues: the "Green Salt Project" — a plan the U.S. alleges links diverse components of a nuclear weapons program, including uranium enrichment, high explosives testing and a missile re-entry vehicle — and material in Iran's possession showing how to mold uranium metal into warhead form.

Two of the diplomats said the material forwarded to the IAEA over the past two weeks expanded on the previous information from the Americans, but had no additional details.

Iran is already under two sets of U.N. Security Council sanctions for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment, which it started developing during nearly two decades of covert nuclear activity built on illicit purchases and revealed only five years ago.

Since then, IAEA experts have uncovered activities, experiments, and blueprints and materials that point to possible efforts by Iran to create nuclear weapons, even though Tehran insists its nuclear project is peaceful and aimed only at creating a large-scale enrichment facility to make reactor fuel.

Its leaders consistently dismiss allegations that they are interested in enrichment for its other use — creating fissile material suitable for arming warheads.

Instead of heeding Security Council demands to freeze enrichment, Iran has expanded its program. On Wednesday, diplomats told the AP that Iran's new generation of advanced centrifuges have begun processing small quantities of the gas that can be used to make the fissile core of nuclear warheads.

[Rasputin]

The newest and much-anticipated International Atomic Energy Agency report on safeguards activities in Iran was sent to the IAEA Member States on February 22, 2008 and almost immediately leaked to the press. As usual, no one was completely satisfied by it but everyone could find in it something that upholds his or her particular point of view.

And as usual, the most important part of the report – that dealing with Iran's ongoing uranium enrichment program, with the potential to provide the material for a nuclear explosive device -- was relegated to the end of the report. However, this is a much more serious report than its predecessors and it includes much new information, especially about Iran's development of a nuclear explosive device and preparations for testing and mounting a warhead on a ballistic missile. It is not a simple report and it demands more than basic knowledge of the technical issues.

According to the report, Iran has been continuously enriching uranium, albeit at a slow pace, but it is also preparing to install many more enrichment machines and is testing a new type of machine which would allow for a much faster rate of enrichment. Thus, if the IAEA report is correct and if there are no concealed enrichment facilities or activities, the possibility that Iran would have the potential for producing its first nuclear explosive device around the turn of the decade does not seem far-fetched.

As before, the major part of the report deals with the IAEA's search into the past for answers to the "remaining outstanding issues,” and it leaves the discussion of the all-important question of ongoing enrichment activities to the latter part of the report.

What are these issues? The present report enumerates five: the source of highly enriched uranium particles found at a university; a document detailing the method for transforming uranium-hexafluoride gas into metal and machining it into hemispheres "which are components of nuclear weapons;" Polonium-210, whose main use is in neutron sources suitable for use in nuclear weapons; the Gchine uranium mine; and the "alleged studies" of subjects "which could have a military nuclear dimension…", including the conversion of some uranium compounds, the testing of high explosives, and the design of a missile reentry vehicle. The report discloses, for the first time, information about the procurement and attempted procurement of many critical components for the development of nuclear explosives, studies into nuclear explosives-related areas, and the development of specialized detonators and detonation systems. Iran cannot come up with a reasonable explanation for this information and has stated that “the data have been fabricated."

It is not quite clear why the Gchine mine comes under scrutiny, since the document governing safeguards, INFCIRC-153, states: "(35) The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities." The other four issues are all connected to nuclear weapons. Some of these are quite old, such as the Polonium issue and the contamination issue, but it took Iran several years to come up with answers, some of which strike many observers as oddly imaginative. For example, the reason for producing Polonium-210 (perhaps the most radiotoxic substance known to man) was given as "fundamental research" for a simple process that "was not aimed at a specific application". Iran also produced documents claiming that Polonium has potential use in radioisotope batteries.

Still, the IAEA gives Iran the benefit of a doubt and the report states that some Iranian explanations are either "consistent with its findings" (e.g., concerning the Polonium experiments) or "are not inconsistent with its findings" (e.g., concerning contamination). The uranium metal issue has been (inexplicably) assigned minor importance and remains unresolved. The "not inconsistent" assessment means that the Iranians have finally come up with a cover story that the IAEA cannot find fault with but with which it is apparently not very comfortable. Technically speaking, the contamination story leaves many ancillary unanswered questions that the IAEA chose not to delve into. However, the IAEA also gives qualified hope to the Iranians in that most issues could be resolved provided they Iranians comply with Additional Protocol inspections.

The report states that "The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme… Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated." This means that once the issues of the development of the nuclear explosive device and the development of the missile warhead are resolved, the IAEA thinks that it can declare that Iran has come clean and is absolved of all accusations of prior infractions. Can these issues be resolved by the IAEA? Can they be "resolved" at all, when all indications, both technical and political, point at the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program?

The IAEA alone cannot be the judge of this since nuclear explosive mechanisms' development and missile warhead design and testing, including the apparent preparations for underground testing of nuclear explosives, are not within its purview and are outside its areas of competence. These issues must be dealt with elsewhere, by knowledgeable experts (coming from Nuclear Weapons States), and preferably outside the aegis of the IAEA.

There is another surprise emanating from the report. The IAEA Secretariat (the staff that runs the technical work of the IAEA) completely adopts the agreement written by Iran and attached to its report of August 30, 2007. However, Iran's text limits the scope of the Agency's search into the past and sets the scenario for exonerating Iran from all past misdeeds. Admittedly, the IAEA leaves open the option for looking into other matters, but Iran could raise objections that such a search would contradict its agreement with the IAEA. That is a possible trap that greater foresight could have avoided.

To conclude, this is a very serious report, and though it does not explicitly condemn Iran, it implicitly warns that concerns about Iranian nuclear ambitions are far from being dispelled.

[Rasputin]

If there was a time when Iranian analysts and decision makers would question the benefits of continuing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, it would be now. The IAEA has allowed systematic US intervention in Iran's nuclear file paving the way to a third round of sanctions. But while US pressure on Iran with the knowledge that no evidence of a covert weapons programme exists, is perhaps in the hope that it will finally force Iran to leave the NPT in protest, Iran seems to be one step ahead and does exactly the opposite.

On Monday March 3 rd , the UN Security Council following months of political wrestling voted in favour of a third sanctions resolution against Iran, repeating previous demands to stop uranium enrichment but this time covering the country's entire banking sector as well as placing restrictions on air and sea cargo movements; thereby beginning a new phase in US efforts to isolate Iran.

Unlike the two previous resolutions and despite claims by China, Russia and other non-permanent members of the Security Council who tried to justify their unprincipled stance, this time sanctions are not merely 'a signal' but clearly punitive. They go beyond Iran's nuclear programme and for the first time they can potentially bring about physical confrontation leading to a full scale military attack on Iran.

Had history not had a habit of repeating itself, one would be surprised how this resolution could possibly come about against a backdrop of consistent and increased cooperation between Iran and the IAEA which has been reflected in consecutive reports by the agency's inspectors.

Back in August 2007, Iran and the IAEA agreed on a 'work-plan ' under which Iran would answer a number of outstanding questions and in return the IAEA would finally confirm publicly its findings to date regarding US allegations against Iran's nuclear activities. The report in summary gave a clean bill of health to Iran's nuclear programme in general; and in particular to its enrichment activities. It said “The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use.”

The work-plan and further reports by the IAEA, cleared Iran of all the issue referred to by the US as evidence of a covert weapons programme. Plutonium experiments, traces of highly enriched uranium, procurement of dual use technologies, research into polonium-210, Gchine mine and reprocessing activities in Tehran were all examined by the IAEA which found no evidence of any wrongdoing by Iran.

The only major outstanding point in the work-plan was the “alleged studies”. On this particular issue the document said “ Iran reiterated that it considers the following alleged studies as politically motivated and baseless allegations. The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.”

For five months the IAEA, despite this agreement failed to provide Iran with access to the documents on these alleged studies. Then early February for the first time, ahead of the report on 22 nd February, some documents were presented to Iran.After inspecting the material, Iran stated “the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could easily be found in open sources.” Then on 15 February, that's 5 working days before the agency's latest report on Iran , the US instructs the IAEA to present a few more documents to Iran.On this issue the IAEA's report of 22 nd Feb said “the Agency proposed a further meeting to show additional documentation on the alleged studies to Iran , after being authorized to do so by the countries which had provided it. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's proposal.”

This single item, three lines long, in an 11 page report which is otherwise quite positive, became the basis of US and EU claims that Iran has failed to answer questions about its nuclear programme; and enabled them to justify pressuring other UNSC members who were not convinced of the need for harsher measures. Whether this vote too was the result of coercion or not, a number of key questions remain.

Why does the US release only bits and pieces of the information it claims to have and why only on very critical times? Why hasn't there been a single US allegation against Iran's nuclear programme that given time to evaluate has not proved false? In absence of any credible information from the US , isn't it time that the IAEA begins to doubt US motivations?

The famous laptop that has now become a cornerstone of the US case against Iran was first made available to the IAEA in Nov. 2005 which means the US had access to it even earlier. It also means that the people who prepared the NIE two years later in Nov. 2007, knew a lot about this laptop; including whether or not it is fake. They must have assessed its content much more vigorously than the IAEA. What makes them conclude that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons programme, and yet the Bush administration still pushing for sanctions based on concerns that Iran may have a nuclear weapons programme? In short why is George W. Bush not listening to his own intelligence agencies? Does he know something they don't? Or does he want something that they don't? What makes the IAEA believe that the Bush administration given the opportunity will not use unreliable data against Iran ? or that the neo-cons perhaps months away from leaving office, having nothing to lose, will not engage directly into feeding disinformation into Iran's nuclear file?

The US has already implemented measures to protect itself if the contents of the laptop are proved to be fake. First they claimed it came from an Iranian who fled the country, then it was a terrorist cult working to overthrow the Iranian government, then there was the German intelligence stealing it and finally the Israeli Mossad as usual claiming to have a hand in everything. Nobody knows fully were it first came from which is why all the parties can say they were misled by someone else.

Whereas on any suspected nuclear sites the IAEA can take samples of radiating particles and physically confirm the nature of the material, drawings on paper and worse yet those in digital format are extremely easy to fabricate. “I can fabricate that data,” said one diplomat at the IAEA after seeing excerpts from the laptop. “It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt.”

[Rasputin]

On the other hand it is equally difficult for Iran to prove these allegations false. When the IAEA first presented Iran with some documents early February 2008, Iran's response was that these are fake. But the IAEA again on 8 th and 12 th February only a few days later wrote to Iran reiterating its “request for additional clarifications.” Did the agency present new evidence to refute Iran's initial claim that the documents are fake? The answer is no. So what “additional clarifications” does the IAEA expect? Is it not up to the accusers to back their claims with verifiable evidence? Iran again responded on 14 th February “reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final assessment on this point.”

The fact is if Iran had something to hide, it would think twice before immediately branding the documents as fake. In other words Iran would not risk its consistently positive record with the IAEA over something it could simply dismiss as “under investigation.” So what is the agency or those pulling its strings really trying to achieve? Is it that difficult for its nuclear scientists to differentiate between a technical case and one which bears all the marks of an open-ended political circus? The answer perhaps lies deeper in the agency's latest report.

For the first time, the scope of the information that the IAEA is trying to obtain from Iran has gone beyond the agency's mandate which is limited to nuclear technology. Point 39 of the report is effectively asking Iran for details of its missile programme so that it may or may not be convinced that Iran's missiles are'capable' to accommodate a nuclear warhead. This is what Iran's representative to the IAEA referred to as evidence that the UN's atomic watchdog is now acting as a proxy for Western intelligence agencies trying to determine the extent and the nature of Iran's conventional military capacity.

The day the governing board of the IAEA reported Iran's case to the UN Security Council, it started a process that many now believe may ultimately cause the collapse of the entire non-proliferation regime. The IAEA which until then had largely managed to keep itself away from politics by concentrating on technical issues, is now a battleground between political forces which have found a new platform and an excuse to settle old scores. A member-state, party to the NPT, which had voluntarily implemented its additional protocol and consistently voiced its opposition to weapons of mass destruction including atomic weapons, instead of receiving assistance on its fully verified civilian nuclear programme, was reported to the UNSC, vilified and bullied to the extent that many believed a military strike would be inevitable.

By allowing itself to be so blatantly manipulated by the United States , and by failing to defend the rights of a non-weapon state against a gang of nuclear weapon states, the IAEA has facilitated the first major cracks in the NPT which is one of the oldest and most respected pillars of international security. Suddenly being part of the NPT does not protect you anymore from harassments of nuclear weapon states. This situation may well lead to many nations quietly looking at nuclear weapons as a deterrent for the days to come when they may not necessarily share the same world view as the United States.

Fifteen months after the IAEA reported Iran to the UN Security Council, in June 2007 its director general said :

“The [NPT] regime is tattering in many ways. Today when we are talking here, for the last ten days the parties to the NPT can't even agree on an agenda as what to discuss. That's how dismal the state of affairs are.”

For about six years now Iran's nuclear file has been subject to an unprecedented attention from all corners. Not only in rhetorical exchanges between US and Iranian officials which can serve both domestic and international purposes, but also in nearly every discussion regarding world security and the politics of power in the Middle East.

One thing that is clear throughout is that t he players in this game are not simply reacting to one another or to random events, but are following detailed action-plans naturally designed to return maximum gains. Part of this gain for the US is denying Iran what it has declared as crucial to its future development. But another perhaps more immediate gain is using this case and everything associated with it as a catalyst for furthering other US interests.

From contracts between major US military corporations and the GCC states to Cold War-style exchanges between US and Russia on a missile defence system in Eastern Europe; from Israel crying out for support in face of an “existential threat” to France trying to cosy up to the US after Tony Blair; from India receiving US assistance in its unsupervised nuclear programme to South Africa signing nuclear contracts with France, hugely profitable deals are being facilitated in the name of preparing for an “emerging threat.” The beneficiaries of these deals are the very same people who advocate tougher measures against Iran and more often than not disregard Iran's positive gestures, ignore the findings of the IAEA and instead engage in smear campaigns against anyone who attempts to deescalate the tension. These are the same people who take every opportunity to portray Iranians as irrational and incapable of reasoning and therefore deserving to be punished by any means possible.

Iran's nuclear file, its referral to the UN Security Council and the subsequent votes of China and Russia in favour of sanctions cannot be viewed in isolation from these countries' own interests. In other words the US is not the only beneficiary of an isolated Iran.

For so long as Iran's nuclear file makes headlines, certain important issues can be swept under the carpet. Be it the IAEA's failure to implement the 'other half' of the NPT which obliges nuclear weapons states to disarm, or the failures on the Middle East peace process, or perhaps Iran's growing influence in Iraq.This was most evident a few days ago. While Iran's president was touring Baghdad outside the green zone, the UNSC was voting on the third resolution on Iran's nuclear programme. The Iraq story was almost completely boycotted in British media while the nuclear one got all the headlines.

The US has proved in more than one way that the concerns it has expressed regarding Iran's nuclear programme do not have much to do with realities on the ground. For the past few years Iran's nuclear file has been a platform from which the US has coordinated an agenda which goes far beyond Iran itself. We have long past the stage where this was a technical argument between Iran and the IAEA on a few “outstanding issues” This is not even a nuclear proliferation issue anymore. The UNSC passed the third resolution while it had on its table a proposal from Iran to implement the NPT's additional protocol again if its file is returned to the IAEA. The US and the EU3 had another Iranian proposal from 2006 to jointly develop Iran's uranium enrichment facilities so that they would have first hand insight into the programme; and therefore confidence that it remains peaceful. They rejected that too.

While Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment for nearly two years when it was negotiating with the EU3, the US refused to even give security guarantees to Iran so that it would continue freezing enrichment, let alone any incentives to encourage more compromise. Recently in a House of Commons meeting I asked Ilan Berman from the American Foreign Policy Council who has consulted for both the CIA and the U.S. Department of Defense as an expert on regional security in the Middle East, why the US refused to support the EU3 initiative back then while now it sees the suspension of enrichment as a precondition of normalising Iran's nuclear file? His answer shocked the audience. He said he did not know of any suspension of enrichment activities by Iran ! Given the options perhaps this was the best he could do.

Following Monday's UNSC vote, the IAEA's governing board rejected a proposal for an anti-Iran resolution. Iran shortly afterwards announced that from now on its nuclear programme will only be discussed with the UN's atomic energy agency; i.e. it will no longer “negotiate” on this issue with the EU's foreign policy chief who had been responsible to convey EU's demands and by extension those of the US to Iran.

This marks an important development which has come as a direct result of the latest Security Council resolution against Iran.

For the past six years while working with the IAEA at technical and legal levels, Iran had continued the political path with the EU3. Yet despite being betrayed more than once in these negotiations, until now Iran was open to a deal which could include the suspension of uranium enrichment activities. In return it was hoped the US would finally give some form of security guarantee that it would abandon its threats of pre-emptive strike.

This latest move can be seen as a sign that Iran is convinced the current US administration will not or cannot afford to provide such guarantees and that this in fact has nothing to do with the state of Iran's nuclear programme or its cooperation with the IAEA. Put simply Iran has said: “You know what? The deal's off. I'm not selling.”

[Dokhtar Bandari]

[Dokhtar Bandari]

Iran rejects economic incentives in exchange for halting uranium enrichment

Iran rejected recent European overtures to halt its uranium enrichment program in return for incentives, saying it will continue to expand, not halt, its nuclear program, the government spokesman told reporters Saturday.

The European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said last month that his bloc was open for further talks with Tehran to resolve the standoff over Iran's nuclear ambitions despite U.N. Security Council approval of a third round of sanctions.

"Iran does not trade its rights in return for incentives," government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham told reporters. "The Islamic Republic of Iran doesn't need incentives from Europe to obtain its rights."

Though the U.N. Security Council imposed a new round of sanctions on Iran last month for its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment, the foreign ministers of the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France, along with Germany, also pledged to enhance a 2006 package of political, security and economic incentives to Iran in return for a halt on uranium enrichment.

But Iran has refused, dismissing a third round of sanctions imposed March 3 as "worthless" and "based on political motivations."

Elham, however, said Iran will still talk to Europe about its nuclear program.

"Iran has always stated that the door to dialogs and interaction with the outside world, European or non-European is open," he told reporters, while making it clear that the six nations can't replace the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency in dealing with Iran's nuclear rights and obligations.

"Dialogue doesn't mean creating new institutions to replace legal bodies. We do not accept replacing the IAEA (with some countries which themselves possess nuclear weapons)," he said.

Iran has repeatedly said its right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was "nonnegotiable."

The United States, the European Union, Israel and others suspect Iran's goal is to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran insists its program is aimed solely at producing nuclear energy.

Iran says a report released by the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency in February vindicated Iran's nuclear program and left no justification for any Security Council sanctions.

The 11-page report by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said all major past issues surrounding Iran's nuclear activities had been fully resolved or are "no longer outstanding at this stage," repeatedly saying the IAEA's findings are consistent with information available to the agency and explanations provided by Iran.

Diplomats in Vienna told The Associated Press Thursday that Iran has assembled hundreds of advanced machines reflecting a possible intention to speed up uranium enrichment.

One diplomat said more than 300 of the centrifuges have been linked up in two separate units in Iran's underground enrichment plant and a third was being assembled. He said the machines apparently are more advanced than the thousands already running underground.

The location is significant, since the aboveground site at Natanz is for experimental work and the underground facility is the working enrichment plant.

Elham said the government hoped to offer "good news" to the nation on Iran's "achievements" on April 8, declared as the National Day of Nuclear Technology.

It refers to April 8, 2006 when Iran for the first time enriched uranium at Natanz.

[Rasputin]

Tehran offers its nuclear technology to all Muslim countries
Iran intends to make available to all Muslim countries the controversial nuclear technology that it is developing. This was stated yesterday by ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, at a meeting in Doha with the leaders of the Gulf countries.


Doha (AsiaNews/Agencies) - Iran is offering its nuclear technology to the Islamic world. In a meeting yesterday in Qatar with the leaders of the Gulf countries, the Iranian judicial authority - ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi - expressed his country's desire to help other states develop nuclear technology. "Iran is determined", he said, "to make the best use of this technology not only for Iran but also for all Muslim states".

The move, which both provokes and frightens the West, also reveals the growing influence that the Islamic Republic is exercising in the Middle East.

Despite the fact that the UN continues to rain down sanctions against Tehran's nuclear programme, Iranian president Ahmadinejad publicly announced on Tuesday, April 8, the completed installation of 6,000 new centrifuges - used to enrich uranium - at the nuclear station of Natanz. The new centrifuges are added to the 3,000 already in place, and are five times as large.

The West fears that the construction of an atomic bomb is behind the development of Iran's nuclear programme, although Iran continues to deny Washington's accusations. American secretary of state Condoleezza Rice has again exhorted Tehran to stop its enrichment program, and has affirmed that "Iran faces continued isolation in the international community because it will not take a reasonable offer from the international community to have another way".

French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner has also said he is in favour of new sanctions, and the UN security council, which has adopted a fourth resolution against Iran, is asking Javier Solana - head of foreign policy for the European Union - to intervene by meeting with the Iran's spokesman for negotiations on its nuclear programme.

The member states of the United Nations security council with veto power include Russia, which calls Washington's fears excessive, and is proposing, instead of sanctions, a package of incentives that would encourage president Ahmadinejad to suspend the programme for developing nuclear energy.

Meanwhile, the government of Qatar, which welcomed the Iranian ayatollah in Doha, has signed an agreement with Iran for the extradition of prisoners and criminals between the two countries.

[Rasputin]

تاکيد خامنه ای بر تسليحاتی نبودن برنامه اتمی رژيم و پيشبرد غنی سازی عليرغم فشارها


راديو المان
با وجود انتقاد آژانس بين*المللی انرژی اتمی از برنامه*ی اتمی ايران، آيت*الله خامنه*اي، رهبر جمهوری اسلامی مي*گويد، برنامه*ی اتمی کشورش هدف*های غيرنظامی دارد و صرفنظر از مخالفت ديگر کشورها، همجنان پيش برده خواهد شد.

آيت*الله خامنه*ای روز سه*شنبه ۳ ژوئن (۱۴ خرداد) در سخنانی در مراسم سالگرد درگذشت آيت*الله خميني، بر عزم حکومت ايران به تداوم برنامه*ی اتمی تاکيد کرد. وی

گفت: ,ملت و مسئولان ايران با تسليحات هسته*ای مخالفند اما استفاده صلح*آميز از انرژی هسته*ای را دنبال خواهند کرد و به کوری چشم دشمنان به اين هدف خواهند رسيد.,

آيت*الله خامنه*ای اين اتهام غرب را رد کرد که ايران يک برنامه*ی مخفی برای توليد بمب اتمی دارد. او گفت: ,ملت ايران همان*گونه که بارها اعلام کرده به دنبال سلاح هسته*ای نيست و امريکايي*ها نيز اين مسئله را مي*دانند ولی چون نمي*توانند صريحاً حقوق بديهی ملت ايران را انکار کنند برای توجيه افکار عمومی دنيا، اتهام زنی مي*کنند. ,

محمد البرادعي، مديرکل آژانس بين*المللی انرژی اتمی روز گذشته (دوشنبه ۲ ژوئن) در نشست شورای حکام آژانس، دولت ايران را متهم کرد که به قدر کافی با بازرسان آژانس همکاری نمي*کند.

البرادعی در سخنرانی خود در آغاز نشست نوبتی شورای حکام گفت: ,آژانس در راستای شفاف*سازی برنامه*ی اتمی ايران، خواستار دسترسی به افراد، اسناد و تاسيساتی در اين کشور شده بود، اما تهران با اين درخواست*ها موافقت نکرده است.,

به اعتقاد مديرکل آژانس، "سياست عدم همکاری کامل ايران" مانع از آن مي*شود تا ابهام*ها درباره*ی ابعاد نظامی برنامه*ی اتمی اين کشور به*طور قطعی روشن گردد. او ديروز در وين گفت: ,ما اميدوار بوديم درباره*ی مجموعه*ای از ابهام*ها و پرسش*های آژانس درباره*ی ابعاد احتمالی برنامه*ی اتمی ايران، اطلاعات لازم را بدست بياوريم، اما متأسفانه پيشرفتی را که در انتظارش بوديم به دست نياورديم.,
محمد البرادعی در سخنرانی خود در مقر آژانس هم*چنين گفت، آژانس بين*المللی اتمی پنج سال است که تلاش مي*کند به درکی شفاف از برنامه*ی اتمی ايران دست يابد. هر چند "پيشرفت*های اساسی" به*دست آمده، اما آژانس مايل است "در نزديک*ترين زمان ممکن" در مورد برنامه اتمی ايران به "نتيجه*گيری نهايی" برسد.

نشست نوبتی شورای حکام آژانس بين*المللی انرژی اتمی از صبح روز دوشنبه، دوم ژوئن در مقر اين سازمان در وين آغاز شده است. بررسی آخرين وضعيت برنامه*ی اتمی ايران از جمله*ی موضوع*های دستور کار اين نشست يک هفته*ای است.

پاره*ای گزارش*ها حاکی از آن است کشورهای غربی عضو شورای حکام در تلاش*اند براساس آخرين گزارش البرادعي، قطعنامه*ای را درباره*ی ايران تنظيم کرده و به تصويب شورای حکام برسانند. تازه*ترين گزارش البرداعی درباره*ی پرونده*ی هسته*ای ايران، نسبت به گزارش*های پيشين او، از سوی ناظران تند و انتقادآميز توصيف شده است.

علاقه*ی ايتاليا برای ورود به گروه ۱+۵
در همين*حال، بنابر گزارش روزنامه*های ايتاليا، آلمان با درخواست ايتاليا برای پيوستن به*جمع کشورهای طرف مذاکرات اتمی با ايران مخالفت کرده است. ايالات متحده*ی آمريکا، روسيه، چين، بريتانيا، فرانسه و آلمان، اعضای گروه موسوم به ۱+۵ هستند که مذاکرات با ايران در ارتباط با پرونده*ی اتمی اين کشور را دنبال مي**کنند. ايتاليا علاقه*مند است به جمع اين شش کشور بپيوندد.

روزنامه*ی ايتاليايی "لا ريپوبليکا" نوشته است، ايتاليا دو سال است که چنين تمايلی دارد و اين علاقه توسط رومانو پرودی و ماسيمو دالاما، نخست*وزير و وزير خارجه*ی وقت ايتاليا پيگيری مي*شده است.

اولريش ويلهلم، سخنگوی دولت آلمان روز گذشته (دوشنبه دوم ژوئن) در برلين اعلام کرد، تغييری در ترکيب گروه کشورهای طرف مذاکره با ايران پيش*بينی نشده است.


هنوز درباره*ی انگيزه*ی ايتاليا از چنين درخواستی و دليل مخالفت آلمان با آن گزارشی منتشر نشده است. فرانکو فراتيني، وزير خارجه*ی ايتاليا معتقد است، کشورش مي*تواند "نقش مهمی" در مذاکرات اتمی به ايران بازی کند.

روزنامه*ی "لا ريپوليکا" نوشته است، وزير خارجه*ی ايتاليا هفته*ی گذشته در جريان کنفرانس عراق در استکهلم، در اين باره با کاندوليزا رايس، وزير خارجه*ی آمريکا گفت*وگو کرده و خانم رايس از اين درخواست ايتاليا پشتيبانی کرده است.

[Rasputin]

No sane person wants to see more nuclear weapons in the world. They cause horrible destruction. The world needs to find a way to reduce the reliance on these weapons by existing nuclear states, be it by Britain and the United States or by Israel and India. Recent columns in these pages by George Monbiot and John Pilger acknowledged this, but dangerously underplayed the gravest threat to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: Iran.

We equally need to press Tehran about its nuclear programme, and challenge its disdain for international inspections and for the United Nations. Pilger suggests that concerns about the programme are largely a matter of "disinformation ... from a discredited CIA-sponsored Iranian opposition group". No government on the UN security council agrees with him; it adopted three resolutions ordering Iran to suspend its dangerous nuclear and missile programmes without a single dissenting vote.

Britain, France and Germany stepped forward in 2003 to take charge of the Iranian nuclear file. In 2005 Europe, with Britain in the lead, persuaded the Bush administration to set aside its deep concerns and to let the Europeans lead. Between 2006 and 2008, Europe orchestrated a series of security council resolutions about Iran. Under Javier Solana's leadership, Europe has put together a consortium of six great powers - Russia, China and the US, along with Britain, France and Germany - to negotiate with Iran. What an opportunity for Europe to show that it can take on the global leadership role it so craves. Instead, European leaders have had to swallow the bitter pill of admitting that they are making little, if any, progress.

The obvious temptation is to look for a scapegoat. Now the US has shown that it fully endorses the European-led effort, blaming the Bush administration is less plausible. In this context, periodic rumours fly that Israel may soon strike Iran's nuclear facilities. The likelihood of such a strike any time soon remains small for the simple reason that Israel has much to lose from acting, unless in desperate straits. An Israeli strike would convert a global issue about Iran's failure to comply with its obligations under international treaties into a bilateral Israeli-Iranian issue on which many around the world would side against Israel.

Pilger suggests we confront "the real threat [that] remains almost unmentionable in western establishment circles and therefore in the media": namely, Israel's nuclear weapons. Before asking why Israel insists on keeping its nuclear arms, he might ask exactly what threat causes Britain to keep such weapons. Israel has to worry about radicals, from Iran to Gaza, who reject its right to exist. Faced with a much less ominous Warsaw pact, Britain insisted on the right to keep many hundreds of nuclear weapons.

That said, it is not surprising that Israel is more favourably disposed toward preventive action than any other country is. After all, Israel is the country most at risk from a nuclear Iran. Israelis see a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, due to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the potential for miscalculation in a crisis, or the prospect that an irresponsible or fanatical Iranian leader might be tempted to use Iran's nuclear arsenal to expunge Israel from the region.

The challenge facing the international community - the challenge on which Europe has claimed the leadership - is to persuade Iran to step back from the nuclear brink. Diplomacy is more likely to be effective if it is reinforced by sticks and carrots. Besides its key role in the European-led diplomacy, Britain could do much on its own to reinforce the actions of its European partners to press Iran until it agrees to compromise. The City of London's importance as a hub for international finance means that warnings from the British government regarding the risks of doing business with Iranian institutions could appreciably increase the pressure on Tehran.

If Iran were in effect locked out of the world's two largest financial centres, New York and London, even hardline Iranian leaders might reflect on the high cost of their refusal to compromise. British authorities need not take formal action; they have long been skilled in the art of passing quiet messages to business leaders.

Scapegoating Israel sidesteps the issue. Instead, those worried about what Israel might do should take steps to address the security concerns that led Israel to conduct its recent military exercises designed to show that it could strike Iran if need be. Not only Israel but Britain and the whole world will be safer if together we can reduce the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by reinforcing respect for the UN and international inspections.

[IQ]

America - US IS FOUNDING NUCLEAR PROGRAMS IN IRAN !!!

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DzCDGRJi4L8"]YouTube - America - US IS FOUNDING NUCLEAR PROGRAMS IN IRAN !!![/ame]

[Rasputin]

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article5612910.ece

[Rasputin]

محمد البرادعى در گفت*وگو با روزنامه واشنگتن پست به برنامه هسته*يى تهران و رويكرد كشورهاى غربى در برابر آن پرداخته و با تاكيد بر اينكه سياست*هاى دولتمردان سابق آمريكا و شوراى امنيت درقبال ايران ناكارآمد بوده است ابراز اميدوارى كرد كه باراك اوباما با سياست گفت*وگوى مستقيم با تهران بتواند به آژانس بين*المللى انرژى اتمى در حل اين مساله كمك كند.

به گزارش خبرگزارى دانشجويان ايران (ايسنا) متن كامل گفت*وگوى محمد البرادعي، مديركل آژانس بين*المللى انرژى اتمى با روزنامه آمريكايى واشنگتن پست به شرح زير است:

پرسش: برخى در آمريكا مدعي*اند كه بين سال 2003 و 2007 شما از ايران محافظت كرديد؛ چراكه نمي*خواستيد شاهد حمله آمريكا به اين كشور باشيد،* آيا فكر مي*كنيد اجازه داديد ايران از مرز خود فراتر رود؟

پاسخ: اين يك سوءتفاهم بزرگ است. ما تمام تلاش خود را در ايران انجام داديم تا مطمئن شويم تاريخچه و وضعيت كنونى برنامه*هاى آن درك مي*كنيم و سعى كرديم تا جايى كه مي*توانيم و در اختيارمان بود آن*ها را وادار كنيم همه چيز را آشكار كنند. اين ايده برخى افراد مبنى بر اينكه ما خدا هستيم و مي*توانيم از مرزها بگذريم و درها را بگشاييم غلط است. ما چنين قدرتى نداريم. من افتخار مي*كنم كه ما تحت چارچوب قدرت محدودى كه داشتيم توانستيم دامنه*ى حساس*ترين بخش برنامه*ى هسته*يى ايران را كه برنامه*ى غني*سازى است و اكنون تحت بازرسى كامل آژانس قرار دارد درك كنيم.

پرسش: آيا برنامه غني*سازى ايران تحت بازرسى است؟

پاسخ: ما مي*دانيم كه آن*ها چقدر اورانيوم غني* شده توليد مي*كنند.

پرسش: با غناى بالا؟

پاسخ: اورانيوم با غناى پايين. ايران حتى بيشتر از قبل با ما همكارى كرد. آنها هنگامى كه در سال 2005 (پرونده*شان) به شوراى امنيت سازمان ملل فرستاده شد همكارى خود را قطع كردند. آن تصميم يك تصميم سياسى بود. من شش سال است كه تاكيد داشته*ام كه سياست اعتمادسازى بين غرب (و به ويژه آمريكا) و ايران كاملا شكست خورده است. ما حتى يك سانتيمتر هم به جلو حركت نكرده*ايم.

پرسش: آيا فكر مي*كنيد امكان*پذير است؟

پاسخ: فكر مي*كنم امكان*پذير است. من به طور محرمانه و علنى تاكيد داشتم كه كه اين امر اتفاق نمي*افتد مگر در صورتى كه يك مذاكره*ى مستقيم برقرار شود.

پرسش: منظورتان از اينكه اتفاق نمي*افتد چيست؟

پاسخ: منظورم اعتمادسازى است. نمي*توان بدون داشتن مذاكره*ى مستقيم اعتمادسازى كرد. باراك اوباما رييس جمهور آمريكا گفته است كه آماده است بدون پيش*شرط و بر مبناى اعتماد متقابل با ايران مذاكره*ى مستقيم داشته باشد. اين كارى است كه مدت*ها پيش بايد اتفاق مي*افتاد.

پرسش: پس فكر مي*كنيد اوباما كار درستى را انجام مي*دهد؟

پاسخ: من شكى در اين باره ندارم. اين همان قطعه*ى گمشده*ى پازل بود. تا زمانى كه پشت ميز ننشينيد و درباره*ى دشواري*هايى كه در 56 سال اخير (از سال 1953 زمانى كه سيا و MI6 محمد مصدق نخست*وزير وقت ايران را بركنار كردند تا حادثه*ى گروگانگيرى سفارت آمريكا در ايران) بين ايران و جامعه*ى بين*المللى به وجود آمده است صحبت نكنيد مسائل امنيت منطقه*اى به خصوص در خاورميانه هيچ پيشرفتى نخواهد داشت. اينها مربوط به گذشته است؛ اما زمان حال اساسا رقابت قدرت در خاورميانه بين ايران كه ايدئولوژى خاص خود را دارد و آمريكا و برخى از همسايگان ايران است.

پرسش: پس فكر مي*كنيد ايران در برابر غرب قرار دارد؟

پاسخ: خب، اين رقابتى بين ايران و غرب است. ايران خواهان اين است كه نقشش به عنوان يك قدرت منطقه*اى پذيرفته شود. آنها بر اين عقيده*اند كه در حال حاضر قدرتمندترين كشور در منطقه هستند و اين تا حدود بسيارى درست است. آنها فكر مي*كنند كه اگر فناورى را كه به شما اجازه*ى توليد يك سلاح هسته*يى را در فرصت كوتاهى مي*دهد داشته باشند اين امر به آنها قدرت، اعتبار و امنيت مي*دهد. بنابراين يك مساله*ى امنيتى است كه به نقشى كه ايران به عنوان يك قدرت منطقه*اى خواهد داشت بستگى دارد. اينها مسائلى است كه با فحاشى از فراز اقيانوس*ها حل نمي*شود. وقتى كه به ايران لقب بخشى از "محور شرارت" مي*دهيد انتظار نداشته باشيد كه بگويند "خب ما هم برنامه*ى هسته*يي*مان را كنار مي*گذاريم." آشكار است كه آنها نيز به دنبال امنيت خود برمي*آيند و شاهد بوده*اند كه اگر شخصى تسليحات هسته*يى يا حداقل فناورى آن را داشته باشد تا حدودى از حمله در امان مي*ماند. به عقيده*ى من تغيير رويكرد اوباما بهترين راه است. اين نگرانى وجود دارد كه اگر ايران به فناورى هسته*يى دست يابد از معاهده*ى منع گسترش تسليحات هسته*يى (ان. پى. تى) خارج مي*شود، اورانيوم با غناى بالا و در نهايت سلاح هسته*يى توليد مي*كند. اين "اگر"ها بر مبناى "من به نيات آينده*ى ايران اعتقاد ندارم" قرار دارند؛ چرا جهان نگران ژاپن كه چرخه*ى كامل فناورى هسته*يى را دارد نيست؟ براى اينكه اين اعتماد وجود دارد كه اين كشور قصد توليد سلاح هسته*يى را ندارد.

پرسش: دولت ژاپن نگفته است كه هدفش از بين بردن اسراييل است.

پاسخ: اظهارات خصمانه*ى بسيارى از جانب ايران بيان شده است، اگرچه تا جايى كه من مي*دانم ايران خواستار يك راه*حل يك كشورى براى بحران فلسطين و اسراييل است، نه آنچه رسانه*ها در خبرهاى خود گفته*اند، يعنى پاك كردن اسراييل از روى نقشه*ى جهان.

پرسش: و شما مي*دانيد كه يك كشورى شدن به مفهوم پايان كار اسراييل است، چرا كه تعداد فلسطيني*ها از يهوديان بيشتر است.

پاسخ: من در اين زمينه طرف كسى را نمي*گيرم. ما بايد گذشته را فراموش كنيم و بگوييم كه با يك مشكل روبرو هستيم. خاورميانه رو به افراطي*گرايى گذاشته است. ايران در جهان اسلام بسيار محبوب است. بايد ميانه*روها را قدرتمندتر كرد و يك راه*حل پيدا كرد. ايران مي*تواند عنصر مثبتى در برقرارى امنيت در خاورميانه باشد. مساله*ى هسته*يى تنها نوك صخره*ى يخى است. مساله*ى هسته*يى در پس خود مسائل امنيتي، سياسى و اقتصادى بسيارى را در بر دارد. بايد يك بسته*ى بزرگ داشت و اين چيزى است كه اوباما درباره*اش صحبت كرد.

پرسش: در طول هشت سال اخير ايران تعداد سانتريفيوژهايى را كه در اختيار دارد افزايش داده است.

پاسخ: در اين زمينه شكى وجود ندارد و اين نيز بخشى از سياست شكست*خورده است چرا كه اين سياست شكست خورده در تلاش بود پيش از آنكه ايران بتواند در فناورى انرژى هسته*يى مهارت يابد راه*حلى پيدا كند. اما همانطور كه گفتم آنهايى كه تعجيل كرده و گفتند كه ما سعى در محافظت از ايران داشتيم ... خب ما هر سه ماه يكبار گزارش داديم كه ايران همكارى كامل لازم و يا شفافيت كاملى را كه ما خواستار آن هستيم در اختيارمان قرار نداده است و اينكه ايران توضيحات بسيارى را بايد ارايه كند. شوراى امنيت سه قطعنامه عليه ايران تصويب كرد. آنها كجا هستند؟ آيا به پيشرفت ما كمك كردند؟ آنها به جاى اينكه بگويند آژانس از ايران محافظت كرده است آيا به سياست خودشان نگاهى انداخته*اند؟ ما از نظر فنى هر چه را از دست*مان برمي*آمد انجام داده*ايم و به اين كار نيز ادامه خواهيم داد و آمريكا لازم است سياست خود را تغيير دهد.

پرسش: آيا فكر مي*كنيد شانسى وجود دارد كه گفت*وگو موفقيت*آميز باشد؟

پاسخ: بايد تلاش كرد اين امر ممكن است موفقيت*آميز نباشد، اما من مي*دانم كه اكثريت ايران خواستار رابطه*ى عادى با آمريكا هستند. آنها مي*خواهند بخشى از جامعه*ى بين*المللى باشند. هنگامى كه بوش به قدرت رسيد آمريكا از گفت*وگو با كره*ى شمالى خوددارى كرد نتيجه اين شد كه آنها به سلاح هسته*يى دست پيدا كردند. وقتى گفت*وگو با ايران را قطع كرديم آنها در فناورى كه سياست غرب سعى در متوقف كردن آن داشت مهارت يافتند. شما به رويكردى متفاوت نيازمنديد و من خوشحالم كه اوباما بلافاصله اين را درك كرد. من اميدوارم ايراني*ها درك كنند كه او دست خود را به سوى آنها دراز كرده است و آنها بايد علاوه بر آن با آژانس همكارى كنند تا حداكثر شفافيت را ارايه كنند. آن دسته از مقامات دولت سابق آمريكا كه مي*گويند آژانس از ايران محافظت كرده است بهتر است به سياست*هاى شكست*خورده*ى خود نگاهى بيندازد.

پرسش: شما در ابتدا با حمايت آمريكا مديركل (آژانس) شديد اما بعدها آمريكا با شما رفتار بدى داشت.

پاسخ: اين اتفاق هنگامى افتاد كه جان بولتون، نماينده*ى سابق آمريكا در سازمان ملل در راس تلاش*ها براى جلوگيرى از انتخاب مجدد من به عنوان مديركل آژانس قرار گرفت. آنها موفق نشدند حتى يك كشور را متقاعد به مخالفت با من كنند و من در نهايت به اجماع و با حمايت آمريكا انتخاب شدم. شما مي*توانيد با رييس سازمان بين*المللى مخالفت كنيد ما براى اين به آنجا نرفته*ايم كه سياست*هاى تنها يك كشور را به اجرا بگذاريم. ما بايد مستقل، منصف و عادل باشيم. اگر سازمانى همانند آژانس به عنوان آلت دست يك كشور شناخته شود عملا سقوط خواهد كرد.

پرسش: آيا اين چيزى است كه آمريكا انتظار داشت شما انجام دهيد؟

پاسخ: آنها هنگامى كه در سال 2003 گفتيم ايران سلاح هسته*يى توليد نكرده است از اين حرف خوششان نيامد.

پرسش: اين چيزى است كه آژانس گفت؟

پاسخ: ما مدركى مبنى بر اينكه ايران سلاح هسته*يى داشت نديديم. در سال 2007 سازمان*هاى اطلاعات جاسوسى آمريكا در برآورد اطلاعات جاسوسى ملى اين كشور گفتند كه بله، ايران شايد مطالعاتى در اين زمينه انجام داده باشد؛ اما اين امر در سال 2003 متوقف شد. حرف ما درباره*ى ايران و عراق درست درآمد. اينطور نيست كه ما با صداى بلند اعلام كنيم كه "حرف ما درست بود و حرف آنها غلط بود". آنها بايد درك كنند كه ما موظفيم درباره آنچه مي*بينيم گزارش دهيم.

پرسش: كارشناسان گفته*اند كه شما در برابر ايران نرمش به خرج داده*ايد؟

پاسخ: وقتى شوراى امنيت قادر به حركت دادن ايران نبود چطور انتظار داريد آژانس اين كار را انجام دهد؟ ما از همه*ى ابزار خود استفاده كرده و سعى در متقاعد كردن يا اعمال فشار به ايران داشته*ايم و بازرسي*هاى خود را نيز انجام داده*ايم.

پرسش: البته آنها مي*گويند كه شما از سال 2007 به بعد با ايران قاطعانه رفتار كرديد.

پاسخ: ما همواره قاطع بوده*ايم و هيچ تغييرى نكرده*ايم. من وظيفه*ى خود را انجام مي*دهم اما وظيفه*ى من به سياست*هاى آنها بستگى دارد. من در بسيارى موارد به طور محرمانه و علنى به آنها گفته*ام "شما لازم است كه با سياست خود از من حمايت كنيد و سياست شما در حال تاثيرگذارى نيست".

پرسش: برخى مي*گويند شما از اسراييل به خاطر بمباران راكتور هسته*يى در سوريه شديدا انتقاد كرديد اما به اندازه كافى به سوريه سخت نگرفتيد.

پاسخ: من بدين دليل با اسراييل قاطعانه برخورد كردم چون آنها قوانين بين*المللى در زمينه*ى استفاده از نيروى يكجانبه را زير پا گذاشتند و قبل از بمباران اطلاعات لازم را به ما ارايه نكردند، چرا كه در آن صورت مي*توانستيم به راحتى تشخيص دهيم كه آيا سوريه مشغول ساخت يك راكتور هسته*يى بود يا خير؟ در اين زمينه آمريكا نيز مقصر است چرا كه به مدت يكسال (پيش از حمله) و شش ماه پس از بمباران اطلاعات را پيش خود نگه داشت. اكنون ما در تلاشيم همه*ى سعى خود را بكنيم تا ببينيم سوريه مشغول چه كارى بود اما اين مسئله نيز همانند مسئله*ى ايران است. من نمي*توانم زودهنگام قضاوت كنم و بگويم كه سوريه در حال ساخت يك راكتور هسته*يى بود زيرا ما اكنون در تلاشيم تشخيص دهيم چه چيزى آنجا وجود داشت.

[siamak]

Since 2006, Security Council resolutions aimed at compelling Iran to halt its nuclear activities have not only been counterproductive, but they have undermined the Council’s legitimacy even further. This is not just because the Security Council has sheltered an “Axis of Evil” nation from the current global financial crisis by cutting its ties to the doomed market. It is also because the Council’s irrational and illegal demands no longer suit Iran’s new stature within the regional and international conjuncture.

The balance of power has changed in the Middle East in Iran’s favour and this should be reflected in the Security Council’s policies. The Security Council can only obtain results from Iran if it abandons its obsolete, confrontational approach and recognize Iran as a significant regional power. In concrete terms, this means that the Security Council should put a moratorium on the sanctions and reassign Iran’s dossier back to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It must also restore Iran’s trust in the “international community” by establishing a sustainable cooperation regime in which Iran would play the role it deserves as a regional power.

However, there is a long way to go to rebuild that trust. Indeed, Iran’s history with the Security Council is a rather bleak one because of the Council’s rather “selective” approach to collective security.

A History of Unjust Bitterness: The Oil Nationalization Episode

Iran still remembers the Security Council’s attempt to quash Iran’s efforts to nationalize its oil industry in 1951. Iran’s effort to repossess its sole source of income from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was dubbed a “threat to international peace and security” in a resolution introduced by the United Kingdom. This revealed the tendency of major powers to use the Security Council as an instrument of intimidation at the expense of Iran’s right to self-determination. The Security Council displayed its predisposition to use the discretion afforded by Article 39 of the United Nations Charter (to determine what constitutes a “threat” to peace) in a manner that would only serve the economic interests of one of its permanent members. Needless to say, all subsequent proposals to amend Article 39 to specify the criteria for threats have been rejected. The Iranian experience testifies to the fact that the Council is not bound by an objective policy in making its determinations.

The Iran-Iraq War: The Security Council’s Passive Aggressiveness

Iran also remembers when the Security Council remained silent as Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied over 30,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory—in violation of the June 13, 1975 Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighbourly Relations. Iraq’s military intervention was a violation of its conventional bilateral obligations and a breach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which in principle the Security Council should have enforced. By any interpretation, Iraq’s use of force is defined as an act of aggression under Article 3 of the General Assembly’s 1974 Definition of Aggression resolution. Thus, Iraq should have been condemned for committing acts against international peace, as provided in Article 5(2) of the aforementioned resolution and as prescribed by customary law and the binding text of the Charter. But the Security Council chose not to intervene immediately. In fact, it took the Council almost a week to respond to the attacks, before modestly calling upon both parties to “refrain immediately from any further use of force.” Iraq’s premeditated act of aggression was neither explicitly mentioned, nor was the aggressor ordered to withdraw its forces from Iranian territory.

The Security Council’s silence in the previous example becomes even more questionable when compared to similar circumstances. For instance, the Security Council reacted much more swiftly when Iraq invaded Kuwait ten years later. Less than six hours after receiving the first reports of the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait, the Council adopted Resolution 660—which condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq to the pre-war borders. By contrast, in the Iran-Iraq war it had waited for the Iraqi military to advance deep into Iran’s territory, providing Saddam Hussein with the upper hand in the subsequent cease-fire negotiations.

In fact, the Council did not question the legality of the Iraqi attack against Iran in any of the resolutions following the initiation of hostilities. In 1986, after six years of war had caused over half a million Iranian deaths and the displacement of over 1.5 million people, the Security Council contented itself to deplore “the initial acts which gave rise to the conflict between Iran and Iraq” in Resolution 582. It refrained once again from explicitly naming the aggressor. Amazingly, none of the Security Council resolutions mentioned even succinctly Hussein’s three-year, illegal occupation of Iranian land. After all, Saddam Hussein was a major Western and Soviet ally in the 1980s.

Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987 is equally disappointing. In this resolution, which was issued nearly seven years after the beginning of hostilities, the Security Council determined the existence of “a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq” and ”demanded that the parties observe an immediate cease-fire [...] and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay.” But instead of defining Iraq as the aggressor, the Security Council again simply deplored “the initiation and continuation of the conflict.” The aggressor and the victim were once again treated equally.

The Security Council’s and Iraq’s War Crimes: The Morbid Silence

The Security Council also disappointed with respect to Iraq’s violations of humanitarian law. Despite the fact that Iraq was a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Iran conclusively demonstrated that Iraq used chemical weapons against the Iranian military and civilian population. The Council remained mute on the subject until six years after the beginning of the war.

[siamak]

Despite numerous instances in which Iraq had used chemical weapons, the term “chemical weapons” only appeared in a resolution in 1986. The Council timidly deplored “the escalation of the conflict, especially territorial incursions, the bombing of purely civilian centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.” No further action was taken against Saddam Hussein. Instead of laying the blame on Iraq, the Security Council slyly invoked “both parties” in each reference to the use of illicit weapons. There was not a shred of evidence suggesting that Iran had also used such an arsenal.

In total, Iraq dropped over 360 chemical bombs on Iran against both military and civilian targets, resulting in more than 100,000 casualties. Today, between 45,000 to 55,000 Iranians are still suffering from excruciating skin blisters and respiratory problems as a result of their direct exposure to these weapons. Each year many children are born with deformities and chronic disabilities related to the mothers’ exposure to chemical warfare. For millions of Iranians, these victims’ agony is still a vivid reminder of the international community’s morbid silence in the face of the Iraqi regime’s undisputable war crimes.

The Security Council’s Tired Pattern

Today, Iranian public opinion and the political establishment perceive the Security Council’s sanctions against Iran as yet another attempt by entrenched powers to obstruct the country’s development. This time, the conflict is over Iran’s nuclear program. The West’s failure to provide compelling evidence of Iran’s deviation from a peaceful program further reinforces this perception. In fact, the public is well aware that the IAEA has conducted scrupulous inspections of Iran’s military and nuclear facilities, including at least nine unannounced visits in the past few months. So far, all IAEA reports have exonerated Iran of allegations that its peaceful nuclear program had progressed to a weapons program. The IAEA and American, European, and Israeli intelligence communities have never confirmed the existence of a non-peaceful nuclear program in Iran. The IAEA reported in its February 2006 report (GOV/2006/15) that it “has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” and the Agency’s position has not changed to this date. Therefore, the Security Council’s obstinate portrayal of Iran’s nuclear program as a “threat to international peace and security” is as discredited in the Iranian court of public opinion as the Council’s similar understanding of Iran’s attempt to nationalize its oil industry in the 1950s.

A New Approach Needed

Today the strategic landscape has changed, and most experts agree that Iran has become a regional power. It is perhaps the only local actor in the Middle East that can contribute to the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and facilitate the United States’ exit from its current crisis. Since the balance of power has greatly shifted in its favour, Iran can neither be omitted in the Middle Eastern equation nor can it be manipulated or coerced as in the 1950s and 1980s. The world needs Iran to stabilize the region and to contribute to international peace and security.

Iran can very well afford to disregard any resolution emanating from the Security Council. This not just because Iran’s coffers are filled with petrodollars and its influence in the region is growing. It is also because the United States is militarily and financially paralyzed. Furthermore, the instability of the global financial markets has rendered futile and irrelevant any effort to isolate Iran by extending sanctions against it. The sanctions only role is to inflame Iranian public opinion without achieving the desired results.

The only way forward must be to engage Iran in genuine negotiations. International peace and regional stability have long been undermined by an unreasonably protracted enmity between Iran and the United States. Both nations need a shift of paradigm characterized by a clear rupture with hostile rhetoric and outdated policies. The new approach must aim to establish a sustainable cooperation regime that would both secure Iran’s long-term interests, including its inalienable rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and guarantee its cooperation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Middle East peace process.

In order to persuade Iran to cooperate on Middle Eastern security matters and its nuclear program, it is imperative to first address Iran's insecurity. Nuclear states surround Iran. Hostile Arab governments have territorial claims over large swaths of Iran. Terrorist and separatist groups, such as Jondollah in the Sistan-Baluchestan province and Khouzestan Arab separatists, are being financed by external forces. American troops are stationed at Iranian borders and their warships, though technically in international waters, cruise only a few minutes from Iranian shores. Iran will not comply with any demand until Western powers genuinely ally these concerns.

The first concrete step towards a new approach is to prevent a manufactured “Iran threat” from becoming the cornerstone of the new American administration’s foreign policy. The terminology used to describe Iranians must be more culturally sensitive. For instance, the new American administration must avoid condescending terms such as “carrots and sticks”-- which is meant for donkeys rather than human beings in the Iranian cultural context-- must be avoided by the new American policy-makers because they will be counter productive to the trust-building process. As a practical measure, Iran’s nuclear case should be withdrawn from the Security Council’s agenda and sent back to the IAEA, the sole UN institution technically qualified to review the matter. This move would not only “depoliticize” Iran’s nuclear question and pave the ground for a conclusive agreement, but it would also constitute a great step towards a genuine US-Iran rapprochement. The next American president should seize this opportunity, without any precondition, and put this high on his agenda.