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  • zubin
    Member
    • Aug 2006
    • 1567

    #1

    Iranian Independence

    US sends the wrong messages to Iran

    by Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi

    October 24, 2006
    Asian Times




    The US media are inundated with reports that the recent United Nations resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea is meant as a "lesson" for Iran, and the United States' ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, has warned Tehran that it could face similar "international isolation" if it follows Pyongyang's path toward nuclear proliferation.

    Thus a Wall Street Journal editorial titled "The arms-control illusion" glosses over any distinctions between Iran and North

    Korea and accuses Tehran of following the same path of signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), "only to pursue its own secret bomb-building effort". Another editorial in the Christian Science Monitor, "The think-twice sanctions on North Korea", states: "The UN sanctions approved Saturday against North Korea won't really roll back its nuclear program. Yes, they partly punish the North for its atomic test and may block bomb exports. But the real target is likely Iran and others eyeing the bomb." An editorial in The Economist, on the other hand, claims that Iran and North Korea are "bent" on the "destruction" of the non-proliferation regime.

    After one week, major powers cannot agree on UN measures to punish Iran over its nuclear program. US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said there was "widespread agreement, although not total agreement", among the US, France and Britain on a proposed resolution that would pressure Iran to halt nuclear-fuel work, including enriching uranium. The US wants initial sanctions to target Iranian activities related to its suspected weapons program - which Tehran denies.

    Indeed, there is no evidence that Iran is proliferating, that it deserves the same punishment as North Korea. This is a point emphasized by the Iranian leadership, as well as others, including the former chief UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, at a recent talk sponsored by the Nation Institute in New York, also featuring veteran investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who has written extensively on the United States' plans for military strikes on Iran.

    According to Ritter, whose new book Target Iran is a powerful jab at the Bush administration's Iran policy, if the US bombed Iran's nuclear facilities today, there would be "no environmental damage" because Iran's facilities are mostly concrete buildings and rudimentary equipment with little actual nuclear material involved. "That is the whole insanity of this thing. Iran has no nuclear-weapons program and its enrichment program is at the lab scale," said Ritter. He added that the United States' Iran policy was pushed by a nexus of Washington's neo-conservatives and Israel's right-wing Likud politicians who have a "faith-based" rather than a "fact-based" approach with regard to Iran, that is, the Israelis have adopted the wrong policy toward Iran by deluding themselves into believing that Iran is proliferating nuclear weapons and is at the advanced stages of this process.

    Dangerous consequences What if there is a military strike on Iran? According to both Ritter and Hersh, the consequences could be dire and even catastrophic. Ritter, who has visited Iran in the recent past, is convinced that Iran is prepared to inflict pain on the US and its allies in the region in response to any such military strike, inviting more punishing blows by the US. These might include the use of "usable nuclear weapons" sanctioned by President George W Bush's nuclear doctrine and the idea of "preemption".

    One scenario entertained by Ritter is that in a multi-pronged offensive against Iran, some US forces infiltrating Iranian territory might be trapped, in which case the US might resort to small, tactical nuclear weapons to get them out of harm's way and to bring Iran to its knees. The present limitations of the US military imposed by its overstretch around the world make the notion of "usable nukes" more plausible from the point of view of the US and, in Ritter's words, this is the ultimate danger. This is because if Iran is ever nuked, "You can bet at some future time, at least one US city will be knocked out. So take your pick, which city: San Francisco, Chicago, New York?"

    Even short of such a nightmare scenario, Ritter is convinced that the US and world economies would be hit hard as a result of a US war on Iran. First, it could prompt Tehran to impose an oil embargo on the United States, perhaps followed by a similar "sympathy embargo" by Tehran-friendly Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, thus depriving the world of some 4.5 million barrels of oil a day. "American taxpayers will be hit in the pocket immediately, and perhaps then they will seriously question the sanity of Bush's policies," said Ritter.

    Compared with Ritter, who is adamant that the Bush administration will launch its planned strike on Iran in the near future, Hersh sounded more cautious without, however, disagreeing with the gist of Ritter's analysis. "The danger is that the Bush people believe what they say," said Hersh.

    And now the Bush team has convinced itself that there is a lesson for Iran from the UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, irrespective of the stark contrasts and dissimilarities between the two cases. Unlike North Korea, Iran has neither exited the NPT nor expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, nor has it embraced nuclear weapons. Moreover, unlike North Korea's one-man Stalinist dictatorship, Iran is ruled by an Islamist democracy with competing factions pushing for alternative nuclear policies.

    Even IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has called for dialogue with North Korea and Iran, saying that sanctions are not the answer. "We need ... to bite the bullet and find the way to talk to them [North Koreans], to talk to the Iranians, to talk to all other adversaries because without dialogue we are not moving forward.

    "I don't think sanctions work as a penalty," he said, in reference to sanctions imposed after Pyongyang's nuclear test. "We have to move away from the idea that dialogue is a reward; dialogue is an essential tool to change behavior," the IAEA director general said. Of course, there are certain similarities in the geostrategic predicaments of Iran and North Korea. Both are faced with the formidable power of the US in their vicinity. The Eisenhower carrier group (aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower and its accompanying strike force of cruiser, destroyer and attack submarine) has slipped into the Persian Gulf amid reports of a mission for a possible strike on Iran. This alone explains Tehran's decision to place the blame for North Korea's nuclear test on the United States' "bullying". But given Iran's formal commitments against nuclear proliferation, one would have expected a more nuanced approach that would have reinforce those policy commitments.

    Alas, Iran is seemingly drawing its own lessons from the North Korea situation, that is, the ceaseless manipulation of UN machinery by "the hegemonic powers", to paraphrase President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. That is not exactly what Bolton had hoped for, but was perfectly foreseeable had Bolton paid more attention to the dissimilarities between North Korea and his next target for sanctions, Iran - for example, Iran's shared interest with the US in maintaining the new status quo in Iraq.

    Indeed, Iran and the US have much to gain by cooperating with respect to the escalating crisis of authority in Iraq. A new study commissioned by the US Congress urges the United States to turn to Iran and Syria with respect to Iraq. Yet this timely call will likely be buried in the coming weeks and months by the mutual hostilities generated over the nuclear row.

    A careful disentangling of nuclear and non-nuclear - that is, regional - issues by both sides is necessary, as difficult as it may be. Equally necessary is to differentiate regional and relatively "out of area" issues, such as Lebanon, which ranks as a second-order priority for Iran's foreign policy. Overlooking this, Robert Hunter, a former top US diplomat, in an article titled "Averting war with Iran", asserts that the recent war in Lebanon solidified the United States' hostility toward Iran while simultaneously making it harder for the US to start a war with Iran in light of Hezbollah's proven capability to strike at Israel.


    continued...
    Take him and cut him out in little stars,
    and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
    that all the world will be in love with night,
    and pay no worship to the garish sun

    - Shakespeare

    "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill
  • zubin
    Member
    • Aug 2006
    • 1567

    #2
    VALI NASR ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SHIITES AND SUNNIS
    "We Need Engagement with Iran"


    American political scientist Vali Nasr discusses the bloody sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq as well as Tehran's rise as a regional power.

    Vali Nasr: "Violence in Iraq is producing more and more radical ideologies on both sides."
    Zoom
    Martin H. Simon

    Vali Nasr: "Violence in Iraq is producing more and more radical ideologies on both sides."
    SPIEGEL: Mr. Nasr, in your book "The Shia Revival," you paint a dire picture of the future of the Middle East. You predict that the conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis will dramatically increase.

    Nasr: Sectarian identity and sectarian tensions will be the backdrop of all the other issues in the Middle East. We saw this in Lebanon where a war that was initially an Arab-Israeli war -- a war that belongs to the old conflicts of the region -- very quickly became all about the Shiite-Sunni issue. Some Arab governments and radical Sunni clerics came out and characterized this as a Shiite power grab and said Hezbollah cannot legitimately fight for the Palestinian cause because it is Shiite and a heretical organization.

    SPIEGEL: What caused the revival of the Shiites?

    Nasr: First, there was Iraq, but also it's Iran's influence in the region. Everything has to do with what happened in the past few years -- the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran was contained by these two Sunni powers, but the United States removed the barrier. Now Iran was provided with elbow room to expand its power because the United States' own ability to contain Iran has been limited by its involvement in Iraq. It's an opportunity for Iran to expand, a sort of Prussian moment.

    SPIEGEL: And Shiites all over the region feel emboldened?

    ABOUT VALI NASR
    Vali Nasr, 46, is professor for Middle East studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He serves as a Middle East policy advisor to United States president George W. Bush and is the author of the book "The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future."
    Nasr: They represent about half the population in the countries of the Middle East. When President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt says that the Shiites are more loyal to Iran than their own countries, he is saying that the Shiites are not genuine Arabs, that they are somehow Iranian tools. They are not accepted as members of the nations, they don't have a share of the wealth. In Saudi Arabia, for example, there is no Shiite ambassador; in Lebanon, they are the largest community and the most they have is the speakership of the parliament.

    SPIEGEL: Tensions between the two religious groups have existed for centuries.

    Nasr: The relationship between these two sects is somewhat like those that existed earlier between the Protestants and Catholics. Germans must be able to identify with this since they were at the heart of the Thirty Years' War. It's never about theology alone, it's also about power. The Shiites don't want to split from the region, they want a seat at the table. But the real drama is the conflict is Iraq, which has ended up the worst way in which this could have happened.

    SPIEGEL: Because of the open violence between the ethnic groups?

    Nasr: It is the worst-case scenario for the region because you had a minority Sunni regime that ruled over a majority of Shiites. When the regime change came, the Sunnis refused to accept a change in power, and then things went particularly bloody and badly. In other words, the very first case of a transfer of power from Sunnis to Shiites has ended up becoming the worst nightmare, and the shadow of Iraq now will loom over the region. Iraq is so corrosive to politics there because it raised the Shiite-Sunni issue.

    SPIEGEL: What are the consequences?

    Nasr: The violence in Iraq is producing more and more radical ideologies on both sides, the kind of activities we haven't seen before: beheadings, large-scale executions, kidnappings. And ultimately that violence doesn't stay there, it is going to travel elsewhere in the Middle East. If Iraq really collapses, it will be difficult to assume that other countries in the region are not going to get involved. The Turks will look after the Kurdish issue, Iran and Hezbollah will be on the side of the Shiites, and other Sunni governments will be on the side of the Sunnis. So the potential to impact public opinion in the region along sectarian lines and to produce a sort of broader struggle of power and regional competition is there.

    SPIEGEL: Isn't Iraq already in the midst of a civil war?

    Nasr: By some definitions it is, like it was in India in 1947. At the end of the British rule the Hindus and Muslims got involved in a kind of communal violence. There was no civil war as such -- there were no armies, there were no battle lines, and yet millions of people died.

    SPIEGEL: The conflict in India ended with the splitting of the country, an idea which is heatedly debated by American politicians.

    Nasr: Well, a split happens when one side cannot impose its will on the other, and it is at the same time not willing to submit to the other side's will. Then two things can happen: One is that the conflict will go on for many years to come, like in Lebanon where it took 15 years before they came to an agreement. Or they decide that neither side can win and neither side wants to live with the other side and they will separate.

    SPIEGEL: According to US intelligence, Iran already supplies Shiite militia with advanced weapons.

    Nasr: Yes. And the Shiites believe that the Saudis, Jordanians and Syrians are supplying the Sunnis with those kinds of things. The hundreds of millions of dollars going into the insurgency has to be coming from somewhere. There is all kinds of evidence that wealthy individuals in the Gulf have been subsidizing the insurgency.

    SPIEGEL: Today, the Shiite militias are just as brutal and murderous as their Sunni counterparts.

    Nasr: Oh, absolutely, it's a sort of degeneration of Shiite power into Shiite militia rule, driven by the inability of the central government to govern. When you are in a war, power shifts to those who carry the guns.

    SPIEGEL: Grand Ayatollah Sistani is considered an influential man by all sides. Couldn't he serve as a voice of moderation?

    Nasr: He is a very popular leader, like a John Paul II for the Shiites. But he is exactly like the Pope: He has no army divisions; and when there is a battle on the street, he cannot impose his will. His influence is purely moral.

    SPIEGEL: President George W. Bush still hopes that democracy and not sectarian violence will shape his "New Middle East."

    Nasr: Democracy is very important to the future, but right now, it is not what is shaping the Middle East. Task number one is to deescalate tensions in the region, create stability for Iraq, making sure that Lebanon does not flare up again, making progress on the Palestinian issue. The most popular Middle East leaders according to a recent poll in Egypt are Hassan Nasrallah, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamas leader Khalid Meshal.

    SPIEGEL: You are an influential voice in Washington, even the president asks for your advice. What do you propose?

    NEWSLETTER
    Sign up for Spiegel Online's daily newsletter and get the best of Der Spiegel's and Spiegel Online's international coverage in your In- Box everyday.

    Nasr: The two-ton elephant is the Iran issue. War is not an option, we need engagement with Iran. The strategic implications of Iran for the West are far broader than just the nuclear issue. We shouldn't only look at the Iranian government and it's theocracy and authoritarianism. Persian is now the third language of the Internet -- there are 85,000 Iranian blogs, and every Iranian cleric, every Ayatalloh and even Ahmadinejad has his own.

    SPIEGEL: You have to cut a deal with the new regional power?

    Nasr: Whether you like it or not, they are the new power. It's a matter of overlapping convergence of certain trends -- Iranian society, culture, economy, combined with a turning point in favor of Shiites in the region and America's traditional allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan weakened. We need Iran. It's about the whole stability and future of the Middle East.

    SPIEGEL: But the Iranians also have a tendency to overplay their hand.

    Nasr: Absolutely. Now, the question is which way Iran will go. Will it be an India, or China, which would be good, or Germany of the inter-war period which ended up ultimately forcing an international alliance against itself. I would like to think that ultimately there is greater realism on the part of Washington, and greater realism means you need to engage Iran. Otherwise you had better be prepared to spend a lot of money on troops for the region for a long time.
    Take him and cut him out in little stars,
    and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
    that all the world will be in love with night,
    and pay no worship to the garish sun

    - Shakespeare

    "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

    Comment

    • zubin
      Member
      • Aug 2006
      • 1567

      #3
      Manufactured Crisis 1

      Of Real and Manufactured Crisis:
      Iran in the Eye of the Storm
      by Faramarz Farbod

      November 04, 2006



      A popular joke in the United States of the late 1980s depicted Iran as a country that had for long generated substantial troubles for successive U.S. administrations. A U.S. President, so the joke went, had his State Department tasked with bringing him the U.S. government file on Iran. The Department was unable to find the Iran file under the letter “I.” The President asked that the search be conducted under the letter “P” for Persia, Iran’s pre-1933 name. As the second search also failed, confusion set in the White House whereupon an advisor suggested that perhaps Iran had been filed under the letter “U,” to which the President asked what it stood for. The reply: Ulcers.

      Clearly many North Americans agree and consider the U.S. as the
      aggrieved party. If asked they would point to the year 1979 as when it all began. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution toppled a key U.S. ally, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Later in the same year, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 52 North Americans captive for 444 days. Establishing time-lines that tell of origins is critical to historical storytelling. To Iranians their troubled history with the United States did not begin in 1979. For them 1953 is the key year. In that year, an Anglo-U.S. coup toppled the parliamentary government of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. The coup ended the only democratic experiment in government in modern Iranian history.




      The 1979-Centered Version of History



      To this day the U.S. continues to view its history with Iran by privileging the events of 1979 over any other historical account. The salient theme in their version of “1979” is that of modernization and its discontents. Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) of Iran, so it goes, was eager to modernize his people, the majority of whom were governed by traditional Muslim ways. As he pushed modernization on them they began to view him as cruel. By 1978 bloody riots swept the country, forcing the Shah to leave the following year. Khomeini, a Muslim fundamentalist leader, replaced him and established an Islamic republic. The new regime was very anti-U.S. and keen on eradicating western cultural influences in Iran. When the U.S., in a humane act, allowed the Shah, who was ill with cancer, to come to the U.S. for medical treatment, the revolutionaries in Iran were angered and overtook the US Embassy and held its staff hostage. The fundamentalist Khomeini manipulated this rage to his advantage and further consolidated his power while fanning the flames of anti- North Americanism. The U.S. responded by freezing Iranian assets in the United States, placing a trade embargo on Iran, and taking the side of a lesser evil, Saddam Hussein, in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. In the 1990s, Washington adopted the policy of containing Iran (and Iraq) while Iran secretly worked on its nuclear programs. Now in the aftermath of 9-11, the U.S. cannot sit idly by while Iran pursues its programs to acquire nuclear weapons.



      In the 1980s, Iran was summed up in the minds of many North Americans with the oft repeated “The United States Held Hostage” headline. The U.S. public officials and media focused almost exclusively on the hostage-taking. North Americans were fed daily images of angry mobs burning the U.S. flag, and striking and burning the effigies of President Carter in front of the Embassy gates in Tehran. The display of mass rage was often staged just for the western news cameras. As a result, to most North Americans, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 became practically indistinguishable from those images of visceral mob anger. And so many North Americans simply failed to comprehend what had been unfolding before their eyes. As a result, tensions began to grow between North Americans and Iranian-Americans in the U.S.



      My brother and I had a firsthand experience of this growing tension. We were attending college in the United States at the time of the hostage-taking. One afternoon we found ourselves surrounded by two dozen angry fellow students. The incident had been triggered by a student from a dormitory where we also resided who had thrown a soda can at us and a visiting Iranian friend. Our friend unwisely returned the favor by throwing the can back at the dorm floor and smashing a window. He then left the campus in a hurry, leaving us to deal with the angry crowd.



      Facing grave danger, we asked if any of them knew of the real history behind the news headlines, and whether they were willing to let us tell that story before they would carry out the sordid business of injuring their fellow dorm-mates. Reluctantly, they agreed. So we began and when we had ended a good many of the students were still left standing and listening attentively, and some were visibly affected. When it was all over, no one had been hurt, and some even offered us protection from abuse in the future. That day we learned the following lesson. Sometimes history can help heal historical wounds suffered by contending communities, and that its misuse can do the exact opposite, replacing natural feelings of human empathy and solidarity with contrived animosity and aggression.





      The 1953-Centered Version of History



      Iranians emphasize the themes of national sovereignty and democracy, or constitutional government, in their national historical narrative. From their perspective, the years 1951-3 represent an exceptional period in which the nation came closest to achieving political independence and establishing a lasting constitutional monarchy. In 1951, the popular Mossadeq had put an end to British colonialism by nationalizing Iran’s oil industry, which had been under British control since the 1910s. Naturally, nationalization angered Britain. But what surprised most Iranians was that in the end the U.S. sided with Britain. To many Iranians, the U.S. enjoyed an exalted moral status. The United States had sympathized with the Iranian constitutionalists during the constitutional revolution of 1905-11, and many Iranians tended to view the United States as an anti-imperialist great power.



      In the aftermath of the nationalization act, Iran faced an embargo and a blockade from the west. Just when its oil revenues were dramatically reduced, the U.S. withheld aid and denied loans to Iran, despite Mossadeq’s pleas. As this created a climate for disaffection and subversion among the people, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored a royalist coup (Operation AJAX) that put a halt to the only experiment with democracy and independence in Iran. Mossadeq himself was tried in a military court and convicted on charges of treason, sent to prison for three years and subsequently banned to his remote home village under house arrest until his death in 1967.



      In the three years that followed the coup, total U.S. economic and military aid to the Shah increased by nine fold. In 1954, the oil industry was in fact (not on paper) denationalized, with the rights to, and management of, Iranian oil transferred to a western oil consortium. In 1957, the CIA, according to William Colby, its former Director, “created SAVAK,” a repressive national secret police agency, “and taught it proper methods of intelligence.”[1][1]The veteran investigative reporter, Seymour M. Hersh, reported that, according to Jesse Leaf, the chief CIA analyst on Iran in the period 1968-73, the CIA had instructed the SAVAK on torture techniques, which “were based on German torture techniques from World War II.”[2][2]In later years, as the Shah became an absolutist monarch the U.S. continued to back his rule.



      By the early 1970s, as the price of oil quadrupled, and Iran’s state revenues expanded dramatically, the U.S. assigned a regional mini-hegemonic role to the Shah, a role which required transferring vast amounts of U.S.-made armaments to Iran. A 1977 report by a Senate committee explained: Iran’s role is to block any “threat to the continuous flow of oil through the Gulf,” which “would so endanger the Western and Japanese economies as to be grounds for general war.” It continued, “…the most serious threats may emanate from internal changes in Gulf states … If Iran is called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of any Gulf state it must be recognized in advance by the United States that this is the role for which Iran is being primed and blame cannot be assigned for Iran’s carrying out an implied assignment.”[3][3]The report concluded that “a strong and stable Iran,” serves “as a deterrent against Soviet adventurism in the region,” and “against radical groups in the Gulf.”[4][4]



      In sum, the Shah was a modernizing dictator who pushed economic modernization initiatives, as did his father (Reza Shah, 1925-1941) before him, but who forfeited any chance of gaining legitimacy for his rule when he went along with the Anglo-U.S. coup against nationalist democratic aspirations of his nation, became dependent on foreign (U.S.) tutelage, and relied increasingly on state terror to rule. And it was the fact that the U.S. backed his rule despite the gross violations of the human rights of ordinary Iranians that alienated many of them from the United States.



      (continued below)
      Last edited by zubin; 11-07-2006, 06:26 PM.
      Take him and cut him out in little stars,
      and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
      that all the world will be in love with night,
      and pay no worship to the garish sun

      - Shakespeare

      "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

      Comment

      • zubin
        Member
        • Aug 2006
        • 1567

        #4
        #2

        (continued from above)


        The Present Confrontation



        In the aftermath of September the 11Th, the paths of these two nations seem once more to be set on a collision course with ruinous consequences for both peoples. And once again history is being misused, manipulated, and ignored. One senses in the air the forming of that mindset of havoc and destruction that necessarily feeds on fear and ignorance. And again we are called upon to halt the death train set in motion towards greater ruins ahead. Let’s begin by outlining what each side says the confrontation is about before lifting their rhetorical veils to see what lurks underneath.





        An Issue of Security: The Bush administration presents the conflict in terms of global security. It claims Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. And given the radical Islamist nature of its clerical regime the world cannot permit this destabilizing outcome. Iran’s pledges that it will abide by its legal obligations to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is no consolation to Washington. Bush administration argues that after two decades of deception, recent outrageous threats against Israel, and the backing of Hizbullah in the recent Israeli war in Lebanon, Iran cannot be trusted.





        An Issue of Sovereignty & Rights: Iran presents the conflict as primarily a rights issue. Iran is a sovereign nation and has the right to pursue a national nuclear development policy that includes producing nuclear fuel domestically. Furthermore, such an activity is a permitted activity according to Article IV of the NPT, to which Iran is a signatory. The problem, they argue, stems from the U.S. opposition to this right to development.





        What Is the Quarrel Not About?



        The available evidence belies stated U.S. concerns about a nuclear weapon Iran. The issue seems more of a device of obfuscation than indication of a real concern. The evidence in fact shows that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has not been a top priority for Washington. Let’s review part of this record.



        Washington has to date refused to endorse the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 2003 proposal to place all production and processing of weaponized materials under international control. In 2004, the Bush administration cast the lone “no” vote (147-1) in the UN committee on disarmament against a verifiable fissile material ban. In 2005, Washington again cast a “no” vote (179-2) on the same issue in the General Assembly of the UN. The U.S. has also been pushing to develop new generations of tactical nuclear weapons, and threatening to use them, including against Iran, in violation of Article VI of the NPT, which obliges all nuclear-weapons states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Furthermore, the application of Bush’s Doctrine of preemptive war, and regime change, has prompted proliferation efforts by targeted states and others.



        Of more significance is the relevant U.S. record with Iran on this issue. On three known occasions since 9-11 the U.S. either failed to take advantage of a strategic opening with Iran or indeed rejected them out of hand. The first opportunity occurred after Tehran cooperated with Washington in toppling the Taliban regime and helped in establishing a new political order in Afghanistan. President Bush returned the favor by initiating the campaign of vilification against Iran in his 2002 state of the union address when he included Iran in the infamous “axis of evil” list and thereby squandered any chance of leveraging tactical cooperation over Afghanistan into a strategic opening.



        The second opportunity was consciously rejected when, immediately after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the Bush administration rebuked the Swedish ambassador for delivering a letter from Iran’s Foreign Ministry. The letter had contained a detailed proposal by the moderate President Khatami’s government for comprehensive negotiations to resolve all bilateral differences including full cooperation on Iran’s nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel, and the ending of support for Palestinian militant groups. According to a National Security Council official at the time “the administration’s response was to complain that the Swiss diplomats who passed the document from Tehran to Washington were out of line.”[5][5]



        The third opportunity was squandered when in 2004 the U.S. refused to join the ongoing European negotiations with Iran and crucially refused to offer a security guarantee (that it, or Israel, will not attack Iran) and thus guaranteed instead the failure of the negotiations. Iran had voluntarily agreed to suspend its enrichment program and accepted the IAEA’s intrusive inspections at any recognized site and without any prior notification (the Additional Protocol). Iran, in its turn, has not been entirely forthcoming with its real concerns either. She presents the confrontation in terms of a conflict between her sovereign rights and an international bully (the U.S.) bent on opposing them. Although Iran is within its rights, as guaranteed by NPT, to own its own nuclear fuel cycle, it was only a short while ago (2004) that Iran voluntarily suspended its uranium enrichment without arguing that doing so violated its sovereign rights.



        Iran may have hardened its position on this issue for the following reasons. First, it did try the soft approach, under the soft-spoken former President Khatami, in the aftermath of the quick fall of Baghdad, when the new-conservative ideologues seemed emboldened and ready to extend their muscular regime change policy to Tehran. Second, it had become increasingly clear that the neo-con planners in Washington had shifted the U.S. Iran policy from what it was under the Clinton presidency, namely a cold war policy of containment and behavior change, to one of regime change, as signaled by President Bush’s famous “axis of evil” speech of 2002. Iran may have concluded from this that it not only needed a new strategy but also a new president that would not hesitate to stand up to Washington’s new belligerency. Third, as the situation in Iraq dramatically deteriorated for the U.S., Iran benefited enormously as its Shiite allies came to power there. This could not but embolden Iran’s leaders.





        What Does Washington Want?



        The evidence suggests that Washington is driven by other motivations, for it seems keen on never missing an opportunity to miss opportunities to enter into strategic dialogue with Iran and resolve the issues between them. Below I suggest three factors behind the persistent U.S. hostility to Iran.





        (I) Punishing Defiance: In 1954, after the dusts had settled and the passage of time permitted a retrospective look at what the sordid events of 1953 had signified, the New York Times editorialists mused thusly: “Costly as the dispute over Iranian oil has been to all concerned, the affair may yet be proved worthwhile if lessons are learned from it. Underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism. It is perhaps too much to hope that Iran’s experience will prevent the rise of Mossadeghs in other countries, but that experience may at least strengthen the hands of more reasonable and more far-reaching leaders.”[6][6] The powerful rarely abandon the task of teaching harsh lessons to those who defy them. We cannot underestimate the strong desire of Washington to continue to teach the defiant ruling clerics in Iran the same “object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid.” The U.S. has imposed a unilateral trade embargo on Iran, threatened sanctions on companies seeking to invest more than $20 million in Iran’s oil and gas industry (thus ensuring that Iran’s energy industry remains underdeveloped and continues to perform below capacity), backed Iraq in the devastating Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 (with 300,000 Iranian deaths alone), not to mention several unsuccessful coup attempts in the 1980s.





        (2) The Neo-Conservative Hegemonic Plans: The Bush White House has announced that it will not tolerate any “peer competitors” in any region of the globe, particularly in the oil-rich Middle East. Iran has been a rising regional power for some time but one whose power had been balanced by its regional rivals, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Ba’thist Hussein in Iraq. The removal of both regimes since 9-11 by Washington has led, predictably, to a rapid ascendancy of Iran’s power in the region. In particular, Iran’s power in the region has received a dramatic boost as a result of the coming to power of its Shiite allies in the post-invasion Iraq. Even so, Iran is still acting with some restraint in Iraq due to the presence in Iraq of the U.S. forces. If and when the latter are withdrawn or their influence reduced, Iran will surely step up its activities to fill the vacuum. In that case, Washington’s nightmare scenario of a radical Shiite alliance in control of vast reserves of that greatest of all material prize in history, namely oil, may come to pass.



        (continued below)
        Take him and cut him out in little stars,
        and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
        that all the world will be in love with night,
        and pay no worship to the garish sun

        - Shakespeare

        "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

        Comment

        • zubin
          Member
          • Aug 2006
          • 1567

          #5
          #3

          (continued from above)

          Of course, the state planners in Washington, and Tel Aviv, have not sat idly by. Their ongoing plan seems to consist of encircling Iran and amputating or severely weakening its regional deterrent arms before carrying out a military strike against it or entering the open and active phase of the regime change operations. It is likely that Washington had originally expected the rapid fall of Baghdad to be a prelude to the start of its campaign against Tehran. But as post-invasion Iraq quickly descended into unparalleled chaos and Iraq began to resemble an earthly inferno, Bush was likely forced to revise his administration’s Iran plan. The key obstacle to the plan to attack Iran has always been Iran’s regional deterrent power. Iran has strategic assets in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Israeli occupied territories of Palestine, and southern Lebanon, which it can unleash against U.S.-Israeli targets and interests if attacked. There is evidence that Iran may back Turkish nationalists against Iraqi Kurdish aspirations as well as encourage Turkish authorities to invade northern Iraq in order to deprive the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) of their sanctuaries there. Some observers innocently assume that the new and emerging troubling circumstances, such as the increasing unpopularity of the Iraq war in the US, are sufficient to dissuade even the Bush administration hawks from carrying through their Iran plans. They mistakenly assume that the Bush administration’s turn to diplomacy on Iran nuclear issue is indicative of the constraints imposed on the hawks in Washington by the new realities in the region and at home. They mistake diplomacy for war with diplomacy for peace.



          Alas, a revision is not the same thing as abandonment, as policy animosity towards Iran remains strong and the risk of war cannot be dismissed. Planners have been in active pursuit of implementing their revised Iran plan. This has entailed pursuing policies of utter decimation and destruction of the Palestinians in Gaza and their democratically elected Hamas government (an ally of Iran), and recently a savage military invasion against Hizbullah-Lebanon. The recent Lebanon war was a “dual purpose” military adventure, in which Israel, with clear U.S. backing, attempted to remake Lebanon both for reasons of Israeli interests vis-à-vis Lebanon and for hemming in, if not destroying, the long deterrent arm of Iran in Lebanon as a prelude to a future attack on Iran. The war failed in its maximalist aim as the hoped-for military destruction of Hizbullah did not materialize. Hizbullah was not disarmed, nor was it pushed to the north of the Litani River. In fact, astonishingly, Israel failed to even protect its people from rocket attacks to the last hours of the conflict short of accepting a “ceasefire.” Syria returned the favor for being pushed out of Lebanon in the previous year by backing Hizbullah in the war. And Iran sent a message of how tough it can be if attacked. Iran has also emerged as the primary re-builder of Lebanon’s extensive ruins through the cash it sends to Hizbullah, and thus may be in the position to gain greater strategic depth in Lebanon. The U.S.-Israel may be trying to use the UN “ceasefire” Resolution 1701 in Lebanon to restrain any organized Hizbullah response to a “preventive” attack on Iran. Similar policies will likely be pursued on the ground in Iraq to weaken Iran’s allies there.



          In sum, the neo-conservative planners have for long harbored grand ideological dreams (nightmares) about the kind of world they prefer everyone to live in. They are “revolutionaries” of a strange kind. Readers may remember the famous statement by Karl Marx that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it.”[7][7]The neo-conservatives have their own version of a “revolutionary” dictum to which they adhere to, namely, that the U.S. military has only responded to the world in various ways; the point however is to change it (militarily). As pro-active radical statists with dreams of global dominance, the neoconservatives aim to extend the so-called “unilateral moment” in world history (the present unchallenged U.S. global predominance) to a sustained unilateral epoch. They will not easily be persuaded to abandon their grand ideological dream.



          As a recent statement by the U.S. National Intelligence Director Negroponte illustrates, Bush views Iran as a serious regional deterrent power for its targeted transformational policies in the Middle East. “Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power in order to threaten to disrupt the operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the region, potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding support for U.S. policy towards Iran, and raising the costs of our regional presence.”[8][8]Hence, for Washington it is imperative that Iran’s power be either reduced or removed from the region.





          (3) Oil: Not surprisingly oil plays a crucial role in the U.S. planning as well. Whereas Iran is keen on lifting the unilateral US sanctions on its energy sector in order to modernize and increase its production capacity, the U.S. has shown little inclination to let the clerical rulers of Iran preside over this lucrative and empowering process. This point is best understood in the context of the needs of the global energy sector. It is acknowledged that the latter is facing a shortage of pumping capacity that requires an estimated $3.5 trillion worth of new investment to meet global demand by 2020. Certainly the Middle Eastern oil states shall play a central role in this oil drama. And just as certain, this oil factor generates thorny issues of democracy, nationalism and sovereignty for these states. And particularly for Iran, like Hussein’s Iraq before it, the US seems determined not to let the Mullah’s benefit from a lion share of this fresh investment. Thus it seems very unlikely that Washington would reverse its sanctions policies towards Iran and permit billions of dollars worth of new investment capital to flow to Iran’s energy sector. Such an outcome would vastly enrich the clerical rulers – whom the U.S. has long sought to punish, if not to remove from power – and risk a future use of an enhanced Iranian oil sector by its rulers as a strategic sword against the U.S.-Israeli plans for the region.



          It is interesting to note in passing the authoritarian implications of implementing the required increases in the pumping capacity of oil for the Middle Eastern oil states. A firm principle of national sovereignty precludes sovereign states from waiving control over their rate of depletion of critical natural resources. Whereas both Iran and Iraq favor modernizing their energy sectors, it is not at all clear that this would increase the pumping capacity in each state to a level that meets the future global energy security needs. Only pliant and authoritarian states, like Saudi Arabia, may engage in rapid depletion of their critical natural resources beyond their domestic needs. Any democratic or accountable state must accommodate its public’s wishes in this regard. The obvious conclusion is that to the extent Washington is motivated at all by this longer-term oil factor it will not look favorably upon genuine or serious democratization in the region, its rhetoric notwithstanding.



          What Does Tehran Want? Iran wants a “grand bargain” that includes first, a security guarantee from Washington (and by extension Tel Aviv) that it will abandon its regime change policy and will not attack Iran. Second, it wants Washington to lift its unilateral sanctions on its energy sector. President Ahmadinejad’s 2005 campaign platform included extensive economic promises to the poor in Iran. He cannot deliver on these if the sanctions remain. Third, Iran wants Washington to acknowledge that it is a regional power and to stop blocking it from playing what it considers to be its natural, even hegemonic, regional role, just as, for example, Russia insists on seeing itself in this privileged light vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics. Iranian rulers consider the enrichment of uranium program as their best bargaining chip in this regard. But they also have come to realize that the nature of their problem with Washington is not legal but political. That is, even if they had responded positively to the August 31 UN ultimatum regarding suspension of their uranium enrichment, the U.S. would have searched for another excuse or pretext to carry on with the neo-con’s targeted transformational policies for the region.
          Take him and cut him out in little stars,
          and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
          that all the world will be in love with night,
          and pay no worship to the garish sun

          - Shakespeare

          "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

          Comment

          • zubin
            Member
            • Aug 2006
            • 1567

            #6
            Conclusion & References

            In the meantime, Iran stresses the right-to-development aspect of the conflict. The discourse of rights and sovereignty permits President Ahmadinejad to remake himself as an Islamic Mossadeq defending Iran’s sovereignty against western imperialism. This will-to-development adds an element of popularity to his presidency and further shifts the predominant public discourse in Iran from one of democracy, reform, political rights, civil society, etc. to one of mainly security and national rights. What’s more, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also emphasizes the international aspects of Iran’s developmental dilemma. He frequently decries the privileging of power over justice and rights in the international arena and points to the misuse of multilateral institutions by the powerful nation-states. As a result, just as Mossadeq had won great respect from the secular nationalists and liberal anti-imperialists of the region, today Ahmadinejad is gaining in stature among the region’s varied Muslim populations. In this regard we should note that Ahmadinejad’s reckless comments about the Holocaust can be read as attempts to further endear him to segments of the region’s Sunni Arab population as well as to defy the labeling of Iran as a strictly Shi’a power. The increasing sectarianism in the region could mean that Iran will likely overemphasize both the Arab-Israeli issue and its Islamic character, when appropriate, over its Shi’a identity.


            Conclusion The real Iran crisis has involved the struggle to achieve national political independence and to defeat despotism and arbitrary rule at home. In fact the hundredth anniversary of Iran’s constitutional revolution just passed in August of this year. Iranians achieved political independence when they replaced the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 with a republic. But their struggle for a democratic republic continues.



            Many observers of Iran’s internal politics concur with the assessment that the social conditions for democracy are ripe inside the country but that there is as yet no strong pro-democracy movement to carry through its agenda. The present confrontation between Iran and the U.S. ill serves this struggle for dignity, liberty, and rights. In fact, many have argued that the present rulers in Iran live on crisis. They have for more than a quarter century used the often brutal actions of the U.S. and Israel in the region to maintain a discourse of anti-North Americanism. The ruling clerics have learned to transform this discourse into a tool, or a mechanism, used by the state to mobilize segments of the population in favor of their policies and to silence dissenting voices and groups.



            Naturally the more Washington heats up the war of words with Iran, the more dangerous the work of human rights workers, democracy activists, etc. becomes inside of Iran. Even a limited military strike would likely consolidate the rulers’ position in Iran, for Iranians are quite nationalistic and will rally behind their government, as indeed North Americans had in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The likely longer term prospect of such an attack would be an even harsher state treatment of dissent in Iran and the introduction of further national security state measures to the detriment of all concerned. A greater Washington adventurism involving a wider use of force, perhaps occupation of southwestern Iran (where Iran’s oil fields are located), resort to stirring up ethnic minorities, a strategic shock-and-awe bombing campaign, etc., will likely make the future Iran look like the present Iraq only on steroids.



            No rational person can desire a hyper-security-state Iran or an Iraq-on-steroids model of Iran. But tragically, we cannot assume that key individuals in the inner circle of the warrior faction in Washington are similarly motivated by strong aversion to such future likelihoods. The sheer magnitude of their recklessness in so short a period of history has been astonishing and belies making any optimistic assumptions about their future actions. I like to believe that we can pressure the Washington warriors to abandon their coming wars, and when it comes to Iran choose normalization of relations over dangerous saber-rattling and clandestine war planning. Normalization of relations with the U.S. deprives the ruling clerics in Iran of one of their most potent tools in their state arsenal for mobilizing and silencing the public. Without the latter the course of Iran’s internal politics will likely resume its natural evolutionary course and democracy and rights advocates will have a greater and calmer social space to pursue their objectives. Otherwise, the resolution of the manufactured Iran crisis through the favored neo-conservative muscular policy tools will only gravely exacerbate the real Iran crisis for a very long time to come.



            Faramarz Farbod teaches political science at Moravian College in Bethlehem, PA, and is a native of Iran. He can be reached at mefnf01@moravian.edu







            [1][1] Herald Journal, November 10, 1978.

            [2][2] “Ex-Analyst Says C.I.A. Rejected Warning on Shah,” New York Times, January 7, 1979.

            [3][3] “Access to Oil – The United States relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran,” Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, (chaired by Henry M. Jackson), 1977, p. 84.

            [4][4] Ibid., p. 111.

            [5][5] The New York Times, January 24, 2006.

            [6][6] “THE IRANIAN ACCORD,” New York Times, 6 Aug 1954, p. 16.

            [7][7] Theses on Feuerbach, No. XI, as an appendix to The German Ideology, (Moscow/London, 1964), p.647.

            [8][8] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006.
            Take him and cut him out in little stars,
            and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
            that all the world will be in love with night,
            and pay no worship to the garish sun

            - Shakespeare

            "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

            Comment

            • zubin
              Member
              • Aug 2006
              • 1567

              #7
              Russian Maneuvers, American Incoherence

              By JOHN VINOCUR
              International Herald Tribune
              Published: November 7, 2006


              WASHINGTON Overlooked during months of electioneering, America's least talked about big problem remains in heightened form. Russia now considers the United States its principal adversary, and it functions as an antagonist by hindering efforts to stop Iran's drive toward nuclear weapons.


              America's wars of grief have become Russia's leverage.

              In the past year, as American misery in Iraq and Afghanistan deepened, Russia developed into a decisive energy supplier to Europe, an influential investor there, and into an increasingly threatening opponent of would-be democracies on its borders with Ukraine and Georgia.

              These days, with sanctions against Iran for continuing enrichment of uranium under discussion at the United Nations Security Council, Russia is watering down and slowing the pace of any international response.

              This doesn't just demonstrate Russia's return to force as an international player. In the context of Iran, it raises the issue whether the United States, Republican or Democrat, can handle exerting frontal pressure on Russia in a world where America must fight off accusations that it is a central cause of its most dangerous confrontations.

              In a sense, concerning Iraq, there are easier or simplistic answers to a problem that America, at least in theory, alone controls: Win the war or get out.

              But when it comes to the intersection of Russia and Iran, because the administration has chosen a multilateral approach, involving the Security Council and direct negotiations with Tehran through France, Germany and Britain, the Americans must deal, beyond the mullahs' intentions, with Russia's willingness to intimidate the Europeans and embarrass the United States.

              Both Republicans outside the administration and Democrats have identified the problem.

              Senator John McCain, a likely Republican presidential candidate in 2008, wanted America to boycott last summer's G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg because it legitimized Russia's course away from democracy and its threats to halt energy supplies to countries like Ukraine.

              The United States' presence at Vladimir Putin's side also diminished any incentive Russia, as Iran's main nuclear equipment and weapons supplier, would have to lean on Iran in the future, American Russian experts with links to both parties argued in the run-up to the summit meeting in July.

              Last week, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, who could be McCain's Democratic opponent, in emphasizing that the United States must be unequivocal in not letting Iran build nuclear weapons (and saying that "we have to keep all options on the table," shorthand for a U.S. military strike), complained that American policy had been "outsourced" to the British, French and Germans.

              Russia, and China, too, she said, have shown themselves "particularly allergic to any kind of international intervention" and often at odds with "global imperatives like nonproliferation."

              That comes down to firmer talk, but like the administration, no offer of anything close to a plan.

              The administration itself, in the words of a senior official, now says Russia regards the United States as a "principal adversary." That's a long way from a strategic partnership, the tag-phrase of years of hopeful joint communiqués and embrace, or the officially "fluid" U.S. appraisal of Russia's attitudes only six months ago.

              Instead, Russia is described as not wanting Iran to have nuclear missiles, but unwilling to send a strong message to the Iranians. "Russia does not want to break with the United States, but does not want to help on Iran," said the senior official. Russia, he said, is "conflicted" on Iran.

              Conflicted? Russia has rejected a European-sponsored resolution in the Security Council, described as too weak by the Americans, that would freeze the assets and bar travel by people and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Moscow also claimed last week that it had "no information Iran is carrying out a nonpeaceful program"

              And Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is now arguing, in the margin of Russia's take on Iran, that there was really no point in holding Hamas to renouncing its commitment to destroy Israel as a condition to reopening international talks on Palestine - overtaking Putin's own pronouncement that Iran's writing another state's annihilation into its Constitution was "not in the interests of world security."

              Over all, in the absence of an American response to its pressure, Russia has been having success in leaning hard on the Europeans. In France, Le Monde reported last week that French investments worth €20 billion to €25 billion have been made in Iran in the past 15 years. The newspaper took the occasion to quote an official close to President Jacques Chirac as offering this view on Russia and Iran:

              "Our position is very close to that of the Russians. The Russians want to gain time. They want that any measure concerning Iran aim only at inciting it to move in the right direction."

              So while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, perhaps another presidential hopeful in 2008, has said she thinks the Russians ultimately won't block the current UN resolution - once the limited asset freeze is removed - she added, "It won't be as strong as if we had written it ourselves." This, in response to an Iranian threat to international insecurity that some American officials have described as greater than North Korea's.

              Who's conflicted here? George Bush and Rice, both burdened by what may be their historical error in insisting too long on seeing democracy and cooperation in Putin's heart, still seem hesitant to openly link Russia and Iran together as part of one problem.

              This means that there is no agreed- on, coherent American plan to deal with the issue. And much uncertainty.

              The fact is, a possible next step toward restraining Iran would represent a potential leap over the heads of the Russians.

              It would require a new surge of American resolve, but once past the insignificant restrictions on Iran now being rewritten in the Security Council, the United States and Europe could warn Iran of sanctions by the West alone - measures with a sharp economic bite that also would s***t Moscow's current role running interference for Tehran.

              If the proposal were coupled with an American offer to Iran of participation with the Allies in direct talks, in terms of American and European opinion it wouldn't signify rumbles of a new Cold War, but a positive initiative meant to draw Iran away from nuclear weapons - one that includes a clearer approach to a Russia that conceives of itself as reborn in strength as an actively contradictory player to America.

              E-mail: pagetwo@iht.com
              Take him and cut him out in little stars,
              and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
              that all the world will be in love with night,
              and pay no worship to the garish sun

              - Shakespeare

              "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

              Comment

              • mike435
                Senior Member
                • Aug 2006
                • 2104

                #8
                wow man i bet you have read it can you like post a theseis or breif summary
                i


                G-d determines who walks into your life....It is up to you to decide who you let walk away, who you let stay, and who you refuse to let go.


                Comment

                • zubin
                  Member
                  • Aug 2006
                  • 1567

                  #9
                  one of the posts called "conclusion" is a summary; the other ones are relatively short.

                  essentially the claim is that the US or anyone else does not have the right to interfere with Iran culturally, acting as if they are superior to Iranians people.

                  Also that human rights will be delayed when leaders like Bush use unreasonable logic and threats based on a false superiority and moral authority in the world, because attention can be diverted to national security issues.
                  Take him and cut him out in little stars,
                  and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
                  that all the world will be in love with night,
                  and pay no worship to the garish sun

                  - Shakespeare

                  "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

                  Comment

                  • zubin
                    Member
                    • Aug 2006
                    • 1567

                    #10
                    No one can interfere

                    Iran: the elite against the people
                    Nasrin Alavi
                    22 - 5 - 2006
                    A United States attack would set back reform a generation, says Nasrin Alavi, author of "We Are Iran" – for Iranians can do it for themselves.
                    ------------------------------------------



                    If you watch Iran's state television evening news with its staple diet – the horror and strife of the western world, British protesters jeering Condoleezza Rice, rallies for immigrant rights in the "inherently racist" United States, anti-government marches across France, the images of mayhem, carnage and Abu Ghraib-type abuse in Iraq – then you might form an impression that confirmed the judgment of President Carter at a state dinner in the Shah's Iran at the end of 1977, a year before the revolution: that Iran was "an island of stability" in a troubled region.

                    Indeed, the worldview of state media in Iran – according to which nothing seems more remote than the prospects of war or sanctions – is a serious concern for the country's rulers. In 2004, Ali Larijani vacated his job of ten years as head of state broadcasting for another pivotal role as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's representative in the supreme national security council and Iran's top nuclear negotiator.

                    At the same time, what is transmitted is also partly a consumer-driven affair. Viewers are increasingly indulged with an array of expensive programming, from Hollywood blockbusters that have yet to make it to terrestrial television screens in the west to slick homemade dramas and comedies.

                    While the western world's fears about Iran's nuclear crisis were gathering pace, the Iranian public's attention appeared to lie elsewhere. The whole country would come to a halt as people would switch on to watch The Nights of Barareh, a controversial comedy set in a fictional village at the turn of the 20th century. Its satirical script enthralled a whole nation, brazenly touching on topics that viewers could associate with daily life: sham elections, establishment corruption, women's rights and censorship; with a dour comical policeman who feverishly censors the local rag. The show was soon dropped, after outcries from hardliners, one declaring that state resources were being used to "wage war on the revolution".

                    But even within the context of a tightly-controlled organ of state, boundaries are pushed to the limits on a daily basis: the young interviewer who asks an official uncomfortable questions live on air; a documentary that features a poem by a dissident writer; or the scheduler who with a delicious irony shows a director's cut of the timeless Italian classic Cinema Paradiso (1994), a story about love and the futility of puritanical religious censorship, on the Islamic Republic of Iran's state television network.

                    Meanwhile, as the nuclear crisis fuels the United States-Iran gap, Iranian cinema-goers get to see an Iranian-American happy ending. Marriage, Iranian Style showing nationwide is a love story between an American boy and an Iranian girl. The American gives in to the demands of the heroine's religious family, they get married and live happily ever after.

                    Back in the real world, the Americans appear at best set on freeing Iranians' minds from the conformist stupor which their state media attempts to inculcate. The preferred instrument is increased satellite television programming via the Voice of America, whose programmes – popular amongst Iran's urban middle classes – are broadcast seven days a week; this is in marked contrast with Iran's own al-Alam channel, beamed into Iraqi homes by powerful transmitters on the border. Al-Alam reached Iraq in 2003, before the soldiers of the US-led coalition, and is now available to most people in a country where (not unlike Iran) satellite dishes remain largely unaffordable. Iran remains committed to resisting the cultural invasion by increasing the number of jamming stations capable of disrupting VOA-style broadcasts.

                    The friends of freedom

                    The Iranian regime remains skilled at media management. In the last decade it has closed down more than a hundred media publications (including forty-one daily newspapers) for crossing its red lines. But along the way some have dared to continue crossing these lines and in doing so they are steadily shifting Iran's cultural and political landscape.

                    The journalist Akbar Ganji was imprisoned for six years for exposing a "power mafia" network behind the murders of writers and intellectuals. Unabated he continued his criticism of Iran's regime from behind bars. Ganji like many of his countrymen who have lived through a recent revolution and experienced the radicalism and terror that it unleashed does not advocate another revolution. But he has openly called for the Iranian supreme leader to stand down.

                    The human-rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, a committed Muslim, has battled for an interpretation of her faith that is compatible with democracy; she is convinced that change in Iran must come peacefully and from within. Ebadi writes that she has been imprisoned and threatened to death for her efforts by those who denounce her "as an apostate for daring to suggest that Islam can look forward and denounced outside the country by secular critics of the Islamic Republic, whose attitudes are no less dogmatic."

                    Ganji and Ebadi are only two examples of people willing to stand for freedom and dignity in Iran; they are far from lone, friendless voices. The acclaim of the public and their peers is evidence enough: after receiving the Nobel peace prize in 2003, Ebadi was greeted at Tehran airport by a joyous crowd numbering "hundreds of thousands", while more recently Ganji received Iran's highset accolade for a journalist, the "golden pen award" from his professional colleagues.

                    What is the connection between these critical voices and issues of national security? In an interview on 5 May in Washington, Shirin Ebadi reminded us that despite the qualms people have with the regime, faced with outside aggression they will unite and "defend their country" adding that "democracy in Iran is not moving forward because censorship is being applied in Iran more seriously"; a prevailing censorship that has intensified in the face of outside pressure.

                    While a frantic western media debates Iran's nuclear crisis, an aggressive media effort in Iran reassures the public that there is no crisis to speak of. A national security council directive to journalists prohibits negative mention of Iran's nuclear negotiations. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, quizzed by reporters about his letter to George W Bush published on 7 May 2006, responded that it was not about the "nuclear issue" and that "we don't consider the nuclear matter a significant issue to write about it".

                    Although many Iranians may believe that acquiring nuclear energy is Iran's "inalienable right" and in their long-term economic and national interests, in reality the picture is more complex. Iran's largest nationwide student group, Tahkim Vahdat published an open letter warning of the dangers facing the country "under conditions where the Iranian people have no role or presence in the situation and as always the regime considers them strangers or outsiders".

                    Yet there is no crowing about uranium enrichment among ordinary Iranians, who are more interested in whether Ahmadinejad can deliver on his electoral promises. They don't speak in hushed voices as they go through a daily litany that makes up much of the conversations on busses and taxis: inflation, economic stagnation, unemployment, corruption, poverty and drugs. To them, Ahmadinejad is not an all-powerful head of a monolithic regime, but a toothless president that can be overruled at any time by figures and institutions that make up a fracturing elite.

                    Travelling through the provinces Ahmadinejad has made blank-cheque promises that may yet come back to haunt him; while the majlis (parliament) has resisted endorsing his extravagant inflationary handouts.

                    On 1 May, when Iran was entering a critical stage of the nuclear crisis, Iranian workers celebrated international workers' day by protesting for secure employment opportunities. Their chanted slogans included variations on the regime's claim that nuclear technology is the country's "inalienable right": "To strike is our inalienable right" and "Permanent employment is our inalienable right". Such satirical adaptations of the current favourite official line also form the punchline of many popular jokes. An example is an online sketch by Iran's leading cartoonist, Nikahang Kowsar (now living in exile in Toronto), alluding to renewed efforts by the regime to block internet sites and weblogs; it portrays Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, disabling a PC while saying "not knowing is our inalienable right"...
                    Take him and cut him out in little stars,
                    and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
                    that all the world will be in love with night,
                    and pay no worship to the garish sun

                    - Shakespeare

                    "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

                    Comment

                    • zubin
                      Member
                      • Aug 2006
                      • 1567

                      #11
                      (continued from top)

                      ...The cyberspace republic

                      With an estimated 700,000 blogs, Farsi is now the fourth most popular language for keeping online journals. The internet has opened a new virtual space for free speech in a country dubbed the "the biggest prison for journalists in the Middle East", by Reporters sans Frontières (RSF). Those who lived through the Iranian revolution of 1979 are now a minority. In the post-revolution baby-boom, Iran's population has more than doubled to almost 70 million, of whom 70% are under 30 years old. At the same time, literacy is well over 90%, even in rural areas; and in 2005 more than 65% of students entering university were women.


                      This demographic shift means that young people dominate Iranian society and that educated young voices speak most clearly and sharply in the Iranian blogosphere. They have experienced the limitations of a theocracy in the restrictive absurdities imposed upon their daily lives, and they see radical Islam more as a problem than as a universal remedy. For them, Ahmadinejad is not the champion of political Islamism around the world but at best a figure of fun.

                      The fears, hopes, dreams and aspirations of these young Iranians are no different to modern young people elsewhere in the world and likewise they are more concerned by issues that immediately affect their lives: relationships, job prospects and tighter social restrictions.

                      Since his election, President Ahmadinejad has been under a frenzied western media spotlight, his every move and directive making headlines. He was even reported to have banned western music. But the gap between the president's desires and what actually takes place is vast.

                      Among Tehran's maddening traffic, the trance-techno soundtracks of homegrown pop sensation Benyamin relentlessly boom out of rickety taxis and flash cars. You won't hear him on state radio or television. Benyamin is detested by much of the older generation Iranian literati and conservative clerics alike. He sings about love, boredom, but also about his faith with tributes to Shi'a imams. His popular demographically-driven "reformation" hymns, which couldn't have been aired before the Islamic revolution, reveal so much about Iran's journey in the past generation. If any attempt were made to broadcast them in Shi'a regions of Iraq today, they might well trigger riots similar in scale to those unleashed over the Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.

                      Iran's flowering youth are described by the philosopher Ramin Jahanbegloo as the "fourth generation" who are moving away from political Islam towards an "Iranian secularism", based on Islamic traditions and Persian cultural history. In his latest book Moje Chaharom (The Fourth Wave) he argues: "Today, the youth rejects violence and values tolerance and dialogue." Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent then in Iran's burgeoning blogosphere.

                      Jahanbegloo is head of the department for contemporary studies at Iran's cultural research bureau and "(like) many intellectuals of his generation who have experienced revolution, war, and violence … deeply committed to political dialogue, non-violence, and democratic processes". Following his arrest in Tehran on 27 April, Jomhouri Eslami (a hardline regime daily newspaper) accused him of being on the "US payroll" and "part of the American strategy for the smooth overthrow" of the regime.

                      In such circumstances, more external pressure and declarations by the United States – such as the request for $75 million additional financial aid for democracy promotion in Iran – is another pretext for hardliners to suppress internal activists. A military attack against Iran would have obvious disastrous humanitarian repercussions. It would also undermine the brave efforts of Iran's young people and independent thinkers to carve a space of freedom at the very time they need support – and in thus reinforcing the most hardline elements of the regime, set back Iranian society by another generation.
                      Take him and cut him out in little stars,
                      and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
                      that all the world will be in love with night,
                      and pay no worship to the garish sun

                      - Shakespeare

                      "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

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