Khamenei Is Sick

[Rasputin]

More articles by more newspapers :

Friday election may be turning point for Iran

Friday could be a pivotal day in the history of Iran, as Iranians go to the polls in nationwide municipal elections while also electing members to the Assembly of Experts, Iran's most powerful religious body.

The elections are the first real test of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political influence since he unexpectedly came to power 18 months ago. But they also could set the stage for a possible "Talibanization" of Iran.

Two rival factions within Iran's ruling conservative religious establishment are vying to seize control of the Assembly of Experts, which plays a pivotal role in Iranian politics by appointing and technically supervising Iran's supreme religious leader.

This week's elections are being held against a backdrop of persistent rumours that Iran's current Supreme Leader, 67-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may be suffering from cancer.

Since those who are elected to the Assembly of Experts on Friday will hold their posts for 10 years, it's almost certain they will select Iran's next Supreme Leader and thereby determine both Iran's future domestic policy and its relationship to the rest of the world.

Ayatollah Khamenei is only the second Supreme Leader in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He succeeded the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979.

Friday's municipal elections hold out the possibility of a return of Iranian reformists, who lost much of their influence during the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, as the poor and middle class protest against a stagnant economy dominated by high inflation and high unemployment and young people rebel against increasingly strict Islamic social standards.

But the ultra-conservative backers of Mr. Ahmadinejad aim to sidestep any defeats on the municipal front by seizing control of Assembly of Experts to tighten their control of Iran's religious establishment.

If hardline supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad control the Assembly of Experts, that could remove all restraints on their exercise of power.

As a result, the election for the Assembly is turning into a three-way fight between 72-year-old Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah Yazdi, the hardline spiritual and political mentor of Mr. Ahmadinejad who calls for a return to "the values of the Islamic Revolution," and former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative who unsuccessfully challenged Mr. Ahmadinejad in last year's presidential election and has recently begun to side with Iran's reformists.

The third and still dominant element in the Assembly is the traditional conservative faction of Iran's "Militant Clergy," who are fiercely loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei.

Some observers suggest Ayatollah Khamenei has deliberately tried to balance the contending conservative factions by using Iran's Guardian Council to disqualify candidates from the Assembly elections.

Under Iran's complicated constitution, which limits the impact of popular voting by giving enormous power to the country's Muslim clergy, the Guardian Council vets candidates for all major elections and has the power to veto laws passed by parliament if they are inconsistent with Islamic law and the constitution.

The Council is made up of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six lawyers who are nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament.

This year, the Guardian Council disqualified 330 potential candidates and approved only 163 for the 86 spots on the Assembly of Experts.

Among those disqualified was Majid Ansari, a Muslim cleric who is a member of the current Assembly.

According to Mehdi Khalaji of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, Ayatollah Khamenei was so concerned by Ayatollah Yazdi's ambitions to succeed him as Supreme Leader that he had the Guardians Council step in and disqualify several of his candidates for the Assembly elections, including Ayatollah Yazdi's son, Ali Mesbah Yazdi.

"Essentially, the election results are already fixed and will only serve to consolidate more power in the hands of the current leadership," Mr. Khalaji said.

Still, the vote will highlight some of the growing strains in Iran's political life.

This week Mr. Ahmadinejad was the subject of an almost unprecedented outburst of opposition when students at Tehran's Amir Kabir university interrupted a speech he was giving by burning his picture, setting off firecrackers and shouting "Death to the Dictator".

A week earlier, nearly 3,000 students at Tehran University paraded through their campus chanting slogans "for freedom and against despotism."

It was the biggest show of dissent in Iran since Ayatollah Khamenei ordered paramilitary militias to crush student protests in Tehran at the height of the reformist movement in 1999.

Since he came to power in 2005, Mr. Ahmadinejad and Iran's religious conservatives have tried to dismantle Iran's reformist secularization of everyday life. They have waged war on illicit satellite TV receivers, increased repression of feminists, imposed strict censorship on the Internet and increased attacks on "deviant" religious groups.

Mr. Ahmadinejad has also tried to play to public opinion by adopting a threatening stance towards Israel, while belligerently insisting on Iran's right to develop nuclear technology in the face of stiff international opposition.

Even as Iran prepares to go to the polls on Friday, members of the United Nations Security Council are putting the final touches to a resolution that will punish Iran with selective sanctions that ban the export of equipment and technology that can be used in the country's nuclear program.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

[Michellica]

khoda bozorge.

[Rasputin]

khoda bozorge.

Daghighan !

Ba in hal moshkel ba mordan-e in yaru,Khamenei hal nemisheh,albateh keh Khamenei ghatel hast va kheili az javanha va mardom-e Iran ro beh ghtal va keshanjeh resanideh vali ba in hal bayad tavajoh dasht keh Iran alan rouyeh yek bomb-e sa'ati hast,ehtemal dareh in yaru bemireh va pesaresh keh adam-e avazi va khoun khari hast beh vasileh Sepah vared.e hokumat besheh,injast keh bayad mardom-e Iran havaseshun basheh va amadeh bashan va in akhundha ro az bein bebaran va in jomhurie eslami-e nang bar ro az Iran baray-e hamisheh pak konan !

Beh Omid-e Azadi-e Iran keh motmaen hastam beh zoudi khahad boud.

[Rasputin]

Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is "very ill," and thus elections being held in Iran on Friday to choose a new "Assembly of Experts" - the forum that will in turn select Khamenei's successor - are immensely important, Uri Lubrani, an adviser to the minister of defense and former Israeli ambassador to the Shah's Iran, said on Wednesday.

Lubrani told The Jerusalem Post that Khamenei, 67, only the second supreme leader after Ayatollah Khomeini, is suffering from cancer and other ailments and would soon disappear from the scene.

He added that it was "not impossible" that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's spiritual mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Mesbah-Yazdi, would emerge from Friday's vote as the dominant figure in the Assembly of Experts, and thus in prime position to either succeed Khamenei himself or appoint a successor. But Lubrani stressed dryly that "there are no Gallup polls" or reliable information on which to base any election predictions.
Iranians are voting Friday in both municipal elections and for the Assembly of Experts. Israel Radio's Menashe Amir, who has been broadcasting to Iran for 47 years, noted that a selection panel, the "Guardians of the Constitution," had rejected hundreds of would-be candidates for the 86-member assembly; 163 candidates are standing. Among those reportedly rejected was Mesbah-Yazdi's son.

Amir said half the members of this pre-selection panel were religious leaders loyal to Khamenei and the other were jurists who also had to be approved by the ruling leadership, and thus there was no prospect whatsoever of dissident figures winning seats in the assembly.

The notion that there was any profound distinction between the perceived extremists such as Mesbah-Yazdi and the relative moderates such as former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is also seeking to become the chairman of the assembly, was baseless, Amir said.

Lubrani also stressed that "all the candidates are from the regime."

Nonetheless, both men noted that a successful outcome for Mesbah-Yazdi and his camp would bolster Ahmadinejad's standing and his confidence, even as Iran defies international pressure to halt its drive to a nuclear capability.

"It would be a psychological victory for Ahmadinejad," said Amir, and would set the stage for possible further radicalization. Amir added that he was not convinced that Khamenei was as sick as has been suggested.

Lubrani, acknowledging that he was seeking crumbs of comfort, said "if Mesbah-Yazdi wins, I try to tell myself it could be a case of 'the worse it gets the better it is'" - in that such success for a known extremist might help galvanize the international community into action against Iran.
"It would also be a blow to freedom seekers in Iran," he added. They would know that they faced further limitations, and thus might, too, be moved to try and confront the regime.

[Rasputin]

The organism has an influential say in Teheran’s strategic decisions. Pitted against each other are two factions led by controversial leaders: the “pragmatic” Rafsanjani and the “ultra” Yazdi. The ballot will also test Ahmadinejad’s policy.


Teheran (AsiaNews) – Stratford Global Intelligence believes that the upcoming elections to the Assembly of Experts could well be the most crucial ballot in the history of the Iranian Republic. The 86 mullahs sitting on the assembly have the power to choose – and in theory even to depose – the Supreme Guide of the Revolution, who is the real head of State. Although they only meet twice a year – usually in the religious centre of Qom but at times in Mashad too, another place of pilgrimage, or in Teheran – the Assembly has an influential say, directly or indirectly, in country’s strategic decisions, although it does not occupy itself with current affairs.

One factor that gives the upcoming election – structurally not very democratic – more weight is the mystery surrounding the current state of health of the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, 67. Rumour has it that he has cancer. Another factor is that the current president of the Assembly, 80-year-old Ali Meshkini, seems inclined to step down.

Elected for eight years, the 86 members of the Assembly – which once elected cannot be subjected to any controls and hence is a sort of regency council – could pave the way for regime reform. The 144 candidates are picked from 495 who put themselves forward. As happens in the presidential election, their names were selected by the Guardians’ Council, composed of six theologians appointed by the Guide and by six jurists proposed by the courts and approved by Parliament. All non-clerics and women are eliminated, and “dubious” candidates must pass an exam on Islamic law to be admitted.

The 144 candidates represent just over two candidates per seat. Only Muslims can vote for them: Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians cannot vote or be elected.

Two factions oppose each other, both led by men of dubious reputation, who aspire to step into the shoes of Khamenei:

a) the “pragmatics” who are led by the former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, recently named by Argentine judges for involvement in anti-Jewish attacks in their country, and indicted by the Swiss courts in the murder of Kazem Radjavi. Considered to be Iran’s richest man, he lost the last presidential ballot because of his renown as a profiteer and corrupter.

b) The “ultra-conservatives” who follow Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Held by some – but the claim seems excessive – to be the spiritual leader of President Ahmadinejad, Yazdi wants to make application of Islamic laws more rigid, he exalts the use of force and he would like, for example, the extermination of the bahai (because they are heretics) and slavery for non-Muslims captured in the future Holy War.

The “reformers” no longer exist (or not yet) as such: the ex-president Khatami has carved out a niche for himself touring the world (from Washington to Istanbul), and he presents a positive image of the regime and steers clear of criticism. The rest, the former candidate for the presidency and Speaker of Parliament, Mehdi Karroubi, and the ex-chief negotiator on nuclear affairs, Hassan Rowhani, have teamed up with Rafsanjani in an anti-Ahmadinejad coalition. They have been joined by the head of the Guardians’ Council, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the man had described the letter of the Iranian president to Bush as “inspired”.

For the Iranian voters, who do not know the candidates and who will not follow their debates on TV, it is a case of choosing between a revolutionary extremist, a symbol of the group in power, and the “opposition” represented by Rafsanjani. A vote against Rafsanjani, as happened in the presidential election of 2005, would mean not just approving the line taken by the government of Ahmadinajad, it would also pave the way for one of the most extremist mullahs of the regime. He would benefit from a high voter turnout and a good result for “ultraconservatives”.

The opposite applies to a low turnout or a good result for Rafsanjani. The electoral results could have an adverse impact on international policy matters, from the nuclear question to Iraq, from Lebanon to Palestine. Already in 1995, Rafsanjani earned himself a reputation as a pragmatic, hinting at a possible opening of his country, even towards the USA. Yazdi, meanwhile, seeks confrontation: at the beginning of the year, he claimed that the use of nuclear arms against the United States would be licit. On a domestic level, from the economy to human rights, there are few positive developments to be expected: a victory for Yazdi would however mean further progress in the regime’s more extremist tendencies.

[abadani69]

hanooz zendast?man ke fekr kardam siamak khabare marge khamenie ro elam kard. khoshhal shodim goftim mirim ba siamak aragh khori

[zubin]

dictator? isn't that a little simplistic?

[Rasputin]

dictator? isn't that a little simplistic?

What you mean my dear friend !?

[zubin]

What you mean my dear friend !?

Its too simple a description. It doesn't mean I hang a picture of him on the wall.

Its like calling Hamas a terrorist. There is a bad element, but Hamas is a dynamic organization that also does humanitarian work and has support of many Palestinians. In this case, there is complex history, context, constitutional dynamics. To ignore that is inaccurate. Also, imagine if Khamenei was reading that. What is that important? Because Khamenei would think it is an inaccurate representation of him, not a well formulated academic reasoning, and he would become stubborn. That proves that simplistic labels/terms/rhetoric makes things worse rather than better from a pragmatic point of view.

The term is also democratic. It is imposed on me for instance. I don't accept it and media is trying to force it on me.

Last, "dictator" means something different in Farsi than in English. In Farsi it means someone who imposes. In English it is more specific and implies a certain style and method of imposing, not just imposing, usually with racist connotation of the person we are talking about such as with Hitler. It implies more single-handedly ruthless and ideological imposition, not part of government (association with Fascism). The dictator in English is faced with less opposition and is usually a military state. The dictator comes to power in a more ruthless way in English.

These are all reasons why I think if someone is serious they will discuss it logically and not through rhetoric. But that's my opinion. Ofcourse, in order not to impose my opinion it is open for debate. I know it is hard to be objective when looking at some of the events in Iran. If you are Kantian you might believe that one immoral act makes every other part of that person forever unacknowledgable, but logically I think a more pragmatic view is better and more moral if it achieves better results for people and nation. It is an objective question and not an ideological question: what works, what will make things better in this situation? Also it becomes a question of double standards and equality. If Khamenei is dictator then who else is dictator in global context? Though many people look at all political leaders and compare them implicitly, many people do not do this and single-out Iran, but why? I don't think it works.

Hamin deege Redwine jan. In nazare mane. Agar harfam doroste pas loghate dictator *bedune analysis va teste manteghi* simplistic hastesh va neshundahandeye badiye kheyli media-hast baraye ensaniyat.

[Rasputin]

Its too simple a description. It doesn't mean I hang a picture of him on the wall.

Its like calling Hamas a terrorist. There is a bad element, but Hamas is a dynamic organization that also does humanitarian work and has support of many Palestinians. In this case, there is complex history, context, constitutional dynamics. To ignore that is inaccurate. Also, imagine if Khamenei was reading that. What is that important? Because Khamenei would think it is an inaccurate representation of him, not a well formulated academic reasoning, and he would become stubborn. That proves that simplistic labels/terms/rhetoric makes things worse rather than better from a pragmatic point of view.

The term is also democratic. It is imposed on me for instance. I don't accept it and media is trying to force it on me.

Last, "dictator" means something different in Farsi than in English. In Farsi it means someone who imposes. In English it is more specific and implies a certain style and method of imposing, not just imposing, usually with racist connotation of the person we are talking about such as with Hitler. It implies more single-handedly ruthless and ideological imposition, not part of government (association with Fascism). The dictator in English is faced with less opposition and is usually a military state. The dictator comes to power in a more ruthless way in English.

These are all reasons why I think if someone is serious they will discuss it logically and not through rhetoric. But that's my opinion. Ofcourse, in order not to impose my opinion it is open for debate. I know it is hard to be objective when looking at some of the events in Iran. If you are Kantian you might believe that one immoral act makes every other part of that person forever unacknowledgable, but logically I think a more pragmatic view is better and more moral if it achieves better results for people and nation. It is an objective question and not an ideological question: what works, what will make things better in this situation? Also it becomes a question of double standards and equality. If Khamenei is dictator then who else is dictator in global context? Though many people look at all political leaders and compare them implicitly, many people do not do this and single-out Iran, but why? I don't think it works.

Hamin deege Redwine jan. In nazare mane. Agar harfam doroste pas loghate dictator *bedune analysis va teste manteghi* simplistic hastesh va neshundahandeye badiye kheyli media-hast baraye ensaniyat.

Doust-e khoub-e man ...

Avallan man bayad begam keh,Man hich guneh alagheh va ya ehsas-e khassi beh masael-e Israel Palestine va Lebanon nadaram.Beh man cheh marbuteh ? bezanan hamdigar ro bekoshan.. bezanan hamdigar ro az bein bebaran,beh man HICH rabti nadareh ! Man nah felestini hastam va nah israeli ! Man Irani hastam va tanha masael-e marbut beh Iran beh man marbut hast chounkeh keshvar-e man az hameyeh in masael mohemtar hast,hala Zionism bad-e ya Hamas khubeh,beh man marbut nist va intor midunam keh Irani hay-e vaghei ham,mesl-e man fekr mikonan,beh ma ha marbut nist keh inha mikhan cheh konan.

In ta inja ...

Tamam-e masaeli keh gofti dorost va kamel hast,khosh hal hastam keh la'aghal yek nafar inja hast keh in masael ro dark mikoneh va Politic Science ro mishnaseh !

Dar mored-e Khamenei bayad begam keh in adam,roo beh marg hast,dareh mimireh va situation Iran,shadidan beh khatar khahad oftad az in nazar keh mabada jang-e dakheli besheh chounkeh Sepah az Khamenei defa'a mikoneh va Basij az Ahmadi Nejad,va Army ham az Rafsanjani. ma bayad mottahed beshim va dast dar dast berim jelo va ba in kesaffat ha bejangim va akhound ha ro az keshvar beh birun bendazim,in hadaf-e man va hadaf-e irani hayeh azadi khah hast.

Sepas Gozaram keh deghatt kardi beh sohbat hayeh man doust-e aziz :=) .

[Rasputin]

From Khomeini to Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in New York in September 2006 for the opening of the UN General Assembly, his appointment book was full. He had breakfast at the Intercontinental Hotel with American academics and journalists; he chatted with the members of the Council on Foreign Relations about whether or not the Holocaust occurred; and he was expected up at Columbia for the university's "World Leaders Forum" speakers series. Ahmadinejad gave his talk at the UN and later was greeted with standing ovations by 500 Iranian-American dignitaries at the Hilton. "We've really progressed," he exulted before his audience at the Hilton, making allusion to his diplomatic forays to Indonesia, Cuba, and Shanghai: "118 countries have specifically supported Iran's nuclear program."1

The world seems spellbound in the face of this populist, who says what he wants and does what he says. Ahmadinejad's limitless self-confidence impressed the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, who in interviewing the Iranian President found himself reminded of the triumphalism of the Ayatollah Khomeini: "I sensed the same certainty that was expressed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini back when this confrontation began in the late 1970s: 'America cannot do a damn thing'" (Washington Post, September 24, 2006).

On November 4, 1979, 400 Khomeini followers, armed with sticks and chains, broke down the door of the American embassy in Tehran, stormed the compound, and took hostage all the Americans on the grounds. It was in fact these hostage-takers who in 1979 would pose for the cameras next to a poster with a caricature of then American President Jimmy Carter and the slogan "America cannot do a damn thing." Khomeini did not release his prisoners until January 1981. Could America really "not do a damn thing"?

This is the key question raised by Mark Bowden's gripping account of the hostage crisis in his new book Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War With Militant Islam. The "guests" in question obviously were no guests. Not only were the Americans robbed of their liberty, but they were subjected to mock executions and beatings. Hardly any of them believed that they would get out of the compound alive. But in this "first battle," the battle was never really joined either. Bowden's account clearly reveals the helplessness of the Carter administration: The more assiduously President Carter sought compromise, the more contemptuously he was mocked by Khomeini.

Today, we are not only facing a second major conflict with Iran, but the West is confronted by the same theological regime, the same ideology of martyrdom -- and indeed by some of the same persons. In 1979, a 23-year-old Mahmoud Ahmadinejad figured among the core group that prepared the seizure of the American embassy. According to then-Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Ahmadinejad was not only present in the occupied compound, but served as liaison between the hostage-takers and Ali Khamenei, at the time one of the most important Friday preachers in Tehran.2 Khamenei himself, today Iran's Supreme Leader, visited the hostage-takers repeatedly in the compound. Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani, today Iran's third most important political figure, was in 1980 the chairman of the Parliament and in this capacity he shared responsibility for the prolongation of the hostage crisis.

As Bowden rightly puts it, the hostage-taking was "a crime against the entire civilized world." Nowadays, when the sacking of embassies by Muslim fanatics has become a nearly daily occurrence, this assessment might not seem so obvious. But even at the height of the Cold War, it would have been unthinkable for the Kremlin, for instance, to attack the American embassy in Moscow and take its employees hostage. Such an action would have amounted to a declaration of war not only against the U.S., but indeed against the whole world. The free and secure movement of diplomats is the first form of civilization in the conduct of nations. Any nation that violates this rule places itself outside the community of nations, since it substitutes war for diplomacy and chaos for international law. Khomeini's approval of the hostage-taking made clear already in 1979 that Islamism represented for the West an opponent of an entirely different nature than the Soviet Union: an opponent that not only did not accept the system of international relations founded after 1945 but combated it as a "Christian-Jewish conspiracy."

The hostage-taking was ostensibly supposed to force America to extradite the shah, who was temporarily in the U.S. to receive medical attention. In fact, much more was at stake. The occupation of the embassy, Khomeini explained in a radio address from November 1979, amounts to a "war between Muslims and pagans": "The Muslims must rise up in this struggle, which is more a struggle between unbelievers and Islam than one between Iran and America: between all unbelievers and the Muslims. The Muslims must rise up and triumph in this struggle." It was precisely this aim that resulted in the Islamic Republic's disregard for diplomatic custom.

Only after 444 days did Khomeini finally let the hostages go. Mark Bowden places his readers imaginatively in the seemingly endless situation of their captivity. His account is based on some 130 interviews: with hostages, hostage-takers, political decision makers, and the members of the Delta Force special commando unit whose rescue attempt ended disastrously in the Iranian desert. The principal scene of the book's action, however, is the U.S. embassy compound in Tehran, where the ragged band of hostages spent 15 fearful months. "My goal," Bowden writes, "was to reconstruct their experience as they lived it." He achieves his goal. He depicts for us not only how the disaster transpired, but also and above all the subjective dimension: the fears of the hostages, their own analyses of the situation, their hopes and their survival strategies. How does one behave -- while much of the time being bound and blindfolded -- toward students who are young enough to be your children but who have you in their power, who could torment you or kill you, who are sometimes ridiculous, sometimes malicious and often both? How does one deal with the garrulousness -- or the perspiration -- of one's fellow hostages? What do the captive diplomats -- among them real Iran aficionados -- think of what is going on in Tehran or of the Iran policy of the USA? Bowden masterfully weaves the individual stories of his interlocutors into a novelistic narrative. The most dramatic scenes -- the seizure of the embassy, the mock executions, the attempted escapes -- give the book the air of a thriller.

Whereas these epic passages make the book a genuine pleasure to read, it is Bowden's look back at Jimmy Carter's Iran policy that gives the book its particular political relevance. Certain similarities with the dilemmas of America's current Iran policy are impossible to overlook.

In February 1979, Khomeni's Iranian Revolution forced the shah into exile. It then kept him on the run from Morocco to Egypt, the Bahamas, Mexico, and finally Panama. At the end of October 1979, the U.S. granted the shah, who was gravely ill with cancer, a limited visa to undergo medical examinations at the Cornell Medical Center in New York. By the middle of December Reza Pahlevi had returned to Panama. In late July 1980, he would die in Cairo.

[Rasputin]