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President Carter responded to the challenge by dispatching Ramsey Clark and William Miller, two long-time opponents of America's alliance with the shah, to Tehran. They brought with them a letter signed by Carter that they were supposed to deliver to Khomeini. It contained the assurance that the shah would remain in the U.S. only for the duration of his illness, as well as an offer to procure access to the shah's doctors for Iranian representatives. Second, Carter explicitly recognized the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and expressed his willingness to resume arms exports. Third, he politely asked Khomeini to have the hostages released ("I ask that you release unharmed all Americans presently detained in Iran") and pleaded for dialogue: "I have asked both men to meet with you and to hear from you your perspective on events in Iran and the problems which have arisen between our two countries. The people of the United States desire to have relations with Iran based upon equality, mutual respect and friendship."
Thus was the first approach by the American president to the leader of the Iranian Revolution. No one could regard the tone of this letter as provocative -- above all, on the background of an act of violence that in other circumstances would have been treated as a declaration of war. What Bowden writes of Precht, the head of the Iran desk at the State Department, applies also to Carter: he "was less concerned with expressing American indignation than with persuasion. He wanted to convince the imam [Khomeini], not confront him." In light of the content of the Carter letter, it is astonishing that it is precisely the U.S. that is continually blamed for the deterioration of relations between the countries.
Carter's attempted gesture of goodwill was dashed by the stony determination of the ayatollah. Khomeini was not even prepared to permit American emissaries into the country -- not even the likes of Miller and Clark. The catalogue of American punitive measures that would then be taken -- the expulsion of some Iranian diplomats, as well as all Iranians in the U.S. illegally; the cessation of oil imports from Iran; the freezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks -- likewise failed to make the slightest impression.
As his next step, Carter, via French mediators, entered into drawn-out negotiations with Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his minister of foreign affairs, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh: two high-profile but in comparison to Khomeini virtually powerless figures. The negotiations quickly took on a peculiar pattern that Bowden describes as follows: "Carter would latch on to a deal proffered by a top Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only to have it scotched at the last minute by Khomeini."
It was not until April 7, 1980 -- the 154th day of the hostage crisis -- that Carter finally broke off diplomatic relations and began to prepare economic sanctions. But not even this seemed to disturb Khomeini. On the contrary, in a message to the Iranian people, he declared: "If Carter has ever done anything in his life to serve the interests of the oppressed, it is this breaking off of relations between an ascendant country that has freed itself from the clutches of the international plunderers and a world-devouring plunderer."5
America had hoped to influence Iran by using the habitual mix of carrots and sticks. But the Ayatollah Khomeini was indifferent not only to all material incentives -- the carrots -- but also to the threat of violence. Just after the hostage-taking, he dismissed the possibility of an American military response as follows: "We will destroy you all, even if we ourselves die in the process." Later, he would go so far as explicitly to reject the primacy of national interests. "We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah," he declared in a speech in 1980 in Qom. "For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world."
Any attempt at intimidation was bound to fail in the face of this mentality of self-sacrifice. With the Iranian Revolution, the international community found itself confronted by a new form of irrationalism. Nonetheless, the attitude of the Europeans and the United Nations only made America's dilemmas worse.
On January 14, 1980, the U.S. submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that would have required all member states "to prevent the supply of all goods, raw materials, and manufactured products -- with the exception of foodstuffs and medicines -- to firms active in Iran." The Soviet Union used its veto.
At this point, the U.S. tried to convince at least its NATO allies to join it in applying sanctions independently of the UN. But even the closest allies of the U.S. declined. "England's response was lukewarm," Bowden writes; "Canada promised to consult with other nations first; Japan said it would 'carefully study' the idea; West Germany declined outright; Denmark announced it was 'hesitant' to break ties; Italy called such punitive steps 'a mistake.'" In April 1980, Iranian President Bani-Sadr warned the Europeans: If they "followed the USA, they will neither get any oil from us, nor will we buy anything from them." In the first quarter of 1980, West German oil imports from Iran -- at the height of the hostage crisis -- increased by some 50 percent in comparison to the previous year. When the European Community finally agreed on embargo measures on May 17 -- the 195th day of the crisis -- the result was farcical. It was unanimously decided to impose an embargo on all contracts concluded after November 4, 1979 -- i.e., after the occupation of the embassy. All contracts concluded before the hostage crisis remained in force. For Great Britain, even this half-measure went too far. Parliament passed a bill that merely prohibited new contracts -- whereas British firms were authorized to "alter, supplement and expand" existing contracts.6 One can only agree with Bowden when he writes: "The world community deserves blame for failing to respond adequately to the insult. Apart from pronouncements, the United Nations and most of our allies were content to leave the captive American mission to its fate."
When the hostages were finally set free on January 20, 1981, this was thanks neither to international nor even just allied solidarity, nor, for that matter, to any particular American policy moves. The idea of providing positive incentives had failed just as much as the threat of armed intervention. The hostages were liberated because Tehran had grown weary of holding them. Moreover, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in September 1980, the Iranian regime had other priorities: for instance, the provision of replacement parts for Iranian fighter jets. The hostages represented an obstacle in this connection. But even the liberation of the hostages was presented as a triumph by Khomeini: they were only permitted to leave Iran on the day when Jimmy Carter left the White House. America thus came away from its first major confrontation with Islamism without suffering major losses. But the outcome hardly represented a victory over Khomeini. Quite the contrary.
After Iran's Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the American government actively sought a modus vivendi with the new regime. The occupation of the embassy was the turning point in the relationship between Islam and the West. It set in motion the process that would issue in the Shiite suicide attacks of the 1980s. On April 18, 1983, Iranian-sponsored suicide bombers blew up the American embassy in Lebanon (50 dead, including 17 Americans). On October 23, 1983, Islamist terrorists destroyed the barracks of American and French troops in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 58 French. On January 19, 1984, the president of the American University in Beirut was also killed by Islamists. As Khomeini celebrated the fifth anniversary of his revolution in February 1984, America, subjected to yet another humiliation, withdrew from Lebanon.
Thus was the first approach by the American president to the leader of the Iranian Revolution. No one could regard the tone of this letter as provocative -- above all, on the background of an act of violence that in other circumstances would have been treated as a declaration of war. What Bowden writes of Precht, the head of the Iran desk at the State Department, applies also to Carter: he "was less concerned with expressing American indignation than with persuasion. He wanted to convince the imam [Khomeini], not confront him." In light of the content of the Carter letter, it is astonishing that it is precisely the U.S. that is continually blamed for the deterioration of relations between the countries.
Carter's attempted gesture of goodwill was dashed by the stony determination of the ayatollah. Khomeini was not even prepared to permit American emissaries into the country -- not even the likes of Miller and Clark. The catalogue of American punitive measures that would then be taken -- the expulsion of some Iranian diplomats, as well as all Iranians in the U.S. illegally; the cessation of oil imports from Iran; the freezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks -- likewise failed to make the slightest impression.
As his next step, Carter, via French mediators, entered into drawn-out negotiations with Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and his minister of foreign affairs, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh: two high-profile but in comparison to Khomeini virtually powerless figures. The negotiations quickly took on a peculiar pattern that Bowden describes as follows: "Carter would latch on to a deal proffered by a top Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only to have it scotched at the last minute by Khomeini."
It was not until April 7, 1980 -- the 154th day of the hostage crisis -- that Carter finally broke off diplomatic relations and began to prepare economic sanctions. But not even this seemed to disturb Khomeini. On the contrary, in a message to the Iranian people, he declared: "If Carter has ever done anything in his life to serve the interests of the oppressed, it is this breaking off of relations between an ascendant country that has freed itself from the clutches of the international plunderers and a world-devouring plunderer."5
America had hoped to influence Iran by using the habitual mix of carrots and sticks. But the Ayatollah Khomeini was indifferent not only to all material incentives -- the carrots -- but also to the threat of violence. Just after the hostage-taking, he dismissed the possibility of an American military response as follows: "We will destroy you all, even if we ourselves die in the process." Later, he would go so far as explicitly to reject the primacy of national interests. "We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah," he declared in a speech in 1980 in Qom. "For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world."
Any attempt at intimidation was bound to fail in the face of this mentality of self-sacrifice. With the Iranian Revolution, the international community found itself confronted by a new form of irrationalism. Nonetheless, the attitude of the Europeans and the United Nations only made America's dilemmas worse.
On January 14, 1980, the U.S. submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that would have required all member states "to prevent the supply of all goods, raw materials, and manufactured products -- with the exception of foodstuffs and medicines -- to firms active in Iran." The Soviet Union used its veto.
At this point, the U.S. tried to convince at least its NATO allies to join it in applying sanctions independently of the UN. But even the closest allies of the U.S. declined. "England's response was lukewarm," Bowden writes; "Canada promised to consult with other nations first; Japan said it would 'carefully study' the idea; West Germany declined outright; Denmark announced it was 'hesitant' to break ties; Italy called such punitive steps 'a mistake.'" In April 1980, Iranian President Bani-Sadr warned the Europeans: If they "followed the USA, they will neither get any oil from us, nor will we buy anything from them." In the first quarter of 1980, West German oil imports from Iran -- at the height of the hostage crisis -- increased by some 50 percent in comparison to the previous year. When the European Community finally agreed on embargo measures on May 17 -- the 195th day of the crisis -- the result was farcical. It was unanimously decided to impose an embargo on all contracts concluded after November 4, 1979 -- i.e., after the occupation of the embassy. All contracts concluded before the hostage crisis remained in force. For Great Britain, even this half-measure went too far. Parliament passed a bill that merely prohibited new contracts -- whereas British firms were authorized to "alter, supplement and expand" existing contracts.6 One can only agree with Bowden when he writes: "The world community deserves blame for failing to respond adequately to the insult. Apart from pronouncements, the United Nations and most of our allies were content to leave the captive American mission to its fate."
When the hostages were finally set free on January 20, 1981, this was thanks neither to international nor even just allied solidarity, nor, for that matter, to any particular American policy moves. The idea of providing positive incentives had failed just as much as the threat of armed intervention. The hostages were liberated because Tehran had grown weary of holding them. Moreover, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in September 1980, the Iranian regime had other priorities: for instance, the provision of replacement parts for Iranian fighter jets. The hostages represented an obstacle in this connection. But even the liberation of the hostages was presented as a triumph by Khomeini: they were only permitted to leave Iran on the day when Jimmy Carter left the White House. America thus came away from its first major confrontation with Islamism without suffering major losses. But the outcome hardly represented a victory over Khomeini. Quite the contrary.
After Iran's Islamic Revolution of February 1979, the American government actively sought a modus vivendi with the new regime. The occupation of the embassy was the turning point in the relationship between Islam and the West. It set in motion the process that would issue in the Shiite suicide attacks of the 1980s. On April 18, 1983, Iranian-sponsored suicide bombers blew up the American embassy in Lebanon (50 dead, including 17 Americans). On October 23, 1983, Islamist terrorists destroyed the barracks of American and French troops in Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 58 French. On January 19, 1984, the president of the American University in Beirut was also killed by Islamists. As Khomeini celebrated the fifth anniversary of his revolution in February 1984, America, subjected to yet another humiliation, withdrew from Lebanon.
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