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  • #31
    "I never knew about it at the time, although it was a full 24 hours a day with teams of people following me, looking for my sources," Getler said. He said he went to see Colby afterward, with Washington lawyer Joseph Califano. Getler recalled, "Colby said it happened under Helms and apologized and said it wouldn't happen again."

    Personal surveillance was conducted on Anderson and three of his staff members, including Britt Hume, now with Fox News, for two months in 1972 after Anderson wrote of the administration's "tilt toward Pakistan." The 1972 surveillance of Marchetti was carried out "to determine contacts with CIA employees," the summary said.

    CIA monitoring and infiltration of antiwar dissident groups took place between 1967 and 1971 at a time when the public was turning against the Vietnam War. Agency officials "covertly monitored" groups in the Washington area "who were considered to pose a threat to CIA installations." Some of the information "might have been distributed to the FBI," the summary said. Other "skeletons" listed in the summary included:


    · The confinement by the CIA of a Russian defector, suspected by the CIA as a possible "fake," in Maryland and Virginia safe houses for two years, beginning in 1964. Colby speculated that this might be "a violation of the kidnapping laws."
    · The "very productive" 1963 wiretapping of two columnists -- Robert Allen and Paul Scott -- whose conversations included talks with 12 senators and six congressmen.

    · Break-ins by the CIA's office of security at the homes of one current and one former CIA official suspected of retaining classified documents.


    · CIA-funded testing of American citizens, "including reactions to certain drugs."

    The CIA documents scheduled for release next week, Hayden said yesterday, "provide a glimpse of a very different time and a very different agency."

    Barred by secrecy restrictions from correcting "misinformation," he said, the CIA is at the mercy of the press. "Unfortunately, there seems to be an instinct among some in the media today to take a few pieces of information, which may or may not be accurate, and run with them to the darkest corner of the room," Hayden said.

    Hayden's speech and some questions that followed evoked more recent criticism of the intelligence community, which has been accused of illegal wiretapping, infiltration of antiwar groups, and kidnapping and torturing of terrorism suspects.

    "It's surely part of [Hayden's] program now to draw a bright line with the past," said National Security Archive Director Thomas S. Blanton. "But it's uncanny how the government keeps dipping into the black bag." Newly revealed details of ancient CIA operations, Blanton said, "are pretty resonant today."

    Comment


    • #32
      پرونده معروف سازمان سيا بين سال های 50 و 70 که به خاطر حساسيت آن زير فشار گروه بندی های اصلی قدرت مخفی نگاه داشته شده بود، سرانجام منتشر شد و اکنون در شبکه قابل دسترسی است: gwu.edu.

      اغلب توطئه ها و اقدامات غير قانونی در خارج که در اين پرونده منعکس است شناخته شده است، هرچند نام ها و مشخصات ومدارک در زمان خود ميتوانستند از نظر قانونی درد ساز باشند. اما آنچه در اين پرونده تکان دهنده است، اقدامات غير قانونی سازمان سيا و دستگاه دولتی و دولتمردان در داخل آمريکا و عليه خود شهروندان کشور است.اين بخش ميتواند برای کسانی که بوجود چماق طبقه حاکم حتی در پشت سر دموکراتيک ترين دولت ها باور ندارند، مفيد به شمار می آيد.

      برخی از موارد اين پرونده که در گاردين امروز آمده است، عبارتند از:
      *بازجويی های غير قانوني، تعقيب و مراقبت روزنامه نگاران، چندين مورد ورود غير قانونی به خانه ها شهروندان.

      * استفاده از دارو برای مغز شويی و تغيير رفتار زندانيان

      * پرونده سازی غير قانونی برای 9900 فعال ضد جنگ ويتنام

      * در خارج برنامه ريزی يااجرای طرح ها هايی برای ترور فيدل کاسترو ی کوبا،لومومبای کنگو، رافائل تروخيلوی دومينيکن...

      در مورد طرح ترور کاسترو، بر اساس اين پرونده و به نقل از کی سنيجر که در آن سال ها به شدت برای جلوگيری از انتشار پرونده تلاش ميکرد، رابرت کندی شخصا عمليات ترور فيدل کاسترو را هدايت ميکرد. رابرت کندی وزير دادگستری وقت بود.

      Comment


      • #33
        سیا پرونده تخلفات گذشته خود را منتشر کرد


        ژنرال هیدن گفت که این اسناد نگاهی است به یک دوره کاملا متفاوت
        سازمان اطلاعات مرکزی آمریکا، سیا، صدها سند در تشریح جزئیات برخی از بدترین تخلفات قانونی این سازمان در فاصله دهه های 1950 تا 1970 را از حالت محرمانه خارج کرده است.
        این اسناد حاوی جزئیات برخی موارد توطئه برای سوءقصد به جان افراد، تجسس داخلی از جمله استراق سمع، آدم ربایی و انجام آزمایش هایی به روی شهروندان "بی خبر" است.

        سایر اسناد منتشره به تجزیه و تحلیل دستگاه های رهبری اتحاد جماهیر شوروی و چین مربوط می شود.

        بسیاری از این اقدامات سیا قبلا برملا شده اما این اسناد شرح جامع تری از وقایع ارائه می کند.

        مایکل هِیدن، رئیس سیا، هفته پیش با اعلام تصمیم برای انتشار این اسناد گفت که این اسناد "مایه خجالت" اما بخشی از تاریخ این سازمان است.

        ژنرال هیدن به کنفرانسی از مورخان سیاست خارجی آمریکا گفت: "هدف، گفتن این موضوع به مردم آمریکاست که به نام آنها چه کرده ایم."

        به گفته وی این اسناد که "جواهرات خانوادگی" لقب داده شده "نگاهی دارد به دوره ای کاملا متفاوت و سازمانی کاملا متفاوت".

        این پرونده 693 صفحه ای از فعالیت های غیرقانونی سیا به دستور جیمز شلسینگر، مدیر وقت سیا در سال 1973 جمع آوری شد.

        گزارش های مربوط به دخالت سیا در رسوایی واترگیت زنگ خطر را برای آقای شلسینگر به صدا در آورده بود و به همین دلیل وی از مقام های سیا خواست او را از کلیه فعالیت هایی که خارج از منشور حقوقی سازمان انجام شده آگاه کنند.

        فعالیت هایی که گفته شد "ابهامات حقوقی پدید می آورد" از جمله شامل این موارد است:


        حبس یک مقام شوروی در دهه 1960 که به آمریکا پناه آورده بود
        توطئه سوءقصد به جان رهبران خارجی، از جمله فیدل کاسترو رهبر کوبا
        استراق سمع و تجسس بر کار خبرنگاران
        انجام آزمایش های اصلاح رفتاری به روی شهروندان "بی خبر" آمریکایی
        نظارت بر گروه های مخالف بین سال های 1967 تا 1971
        باز کردن نامه ها از 1953 تا 1973 با مبدا یا مقصد شوروی؛ و همینطور نامه هایی با مبدا یا مقصد چین از 1969 تا 1972

        مجموعه دیگری از اسناد منتشره شامل 11 هزار صفحه تحلیل های انجام شده در فاصله 1953 تا 1973 درباره شوروی و سازوکار سیاسی چین است.

        در میان این اسناد، گزارشی از وضعیت شوروی است که چهار ماه پس از مرگ ژوزف استالین در سال 1953 تهیه شد.

        این گزارش سیا، که مهر "به نهایت محرمانه" خورده می گوید که رهبران شوروی پس از مرگ استالین دست به یک خانه تکانی شتابزده در پست های کلیدی زدند تا مانع "هراس و بی نظمی" شوند.


        Comment


        • #34
          Memo says CIA wanted Castro killed

          The CIA has declassified documents from the 1960s proving that the spy agency tried to assassinate Fidel Castro, the Cuban president.

          The documents describe the agency's efforts to persuade Johnny Roselli, believed to be a mobster, to help plot the murder of Castro.

          "The mission target was Fidel Castro," one memo said.




          The CIA declassified hundreds of pages of long-secret records that detail some of the agency's worst illegal abuses during about 25 years of overseas assassination attempts, domestic spying and kidnapping.






          In August 1960, a CIA official approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards of the Office of Security to determine if he "had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action."

          On Monday, Castro accused George Bush, the US president, of "authorising and ordering" an attempt on his life, although his rambling essay on the subject provided no details.



          The CIA documents also provided information on wiretapping of US journalists, spying on civil rights and anti-Vietnam war protesters, opening of post between the United States and the Soviet Union and China and break-ins at the homes of former CIA employees and others.

          Comment


          • #35
            CIA details Cold War skulduggery

            The CIA has made public the details of its illicit Cold-War-era activities, including spy plots, assassination attempts and experiments with drugs.
            Documents declassified on its website include plans to use Mafia help to kill Cuba's Communist leader Fidel Castro.

            They reveal the extent to which the CIA spied on US journalists and dissidents and on the Soviet Union.

            They are part of a report commissioned by a former CIA chief in 1973 in response to the Watergate scandal.

            Press reports from the period had implicated the CIA in a break-in which took place at Democratic Party offices at the Watergate Hotel.

            Unflattering but part of CIA history

            Michael Hayden
            CIA director


            Documents of troubled times

            A newspaper investigation into the burglary eventually led to the downfall of the Republican President, Richard Nixon.

            The spy agency's former director, James Schlesinger, responded by ordering all "senior operating officials" to report on all activities, past and present, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this agency".

            The CIA is barred by law from conducting spy activities within the US.

            'Unflattering history'

            CIA officers in service in 1973 largely used their memory to compile the 693-page report for Mr Schlesinger.

            Documents relating to Castro [186k]
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            The abuses and illicit activities listed within date from the 1950s to the 1970s.

            The documents were initially referred to as "skeletons" by Mr Schlesinger's successor at the CIA, William Colby. They were later nicknamed the "family jewels" and have been referred to as such ever since.

            Much of the information contained within them was already known.
            The CIA tried to kill Cuban leader Fidel Castro (left)

            Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh revealed in the New York Times newspaper in 1974 that the CIA had been spying on anti-war dissidents and civil rights campaigners.

            However, the documents declassified on Tuesday provide a more comprehensive account of events.

            Last week, CIA chief Michael Hayden announced the decision to declassify the records, saying the documents were "unflattering but part of CIA history".

            The documents detail assassination plots, domestic spying, wiretapping, and kidnapping.

            The incidents include:


            the confinement of a Soviet KGB defector, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, in the mid-1960s
            attempts to use a suspected Mafia mobster, Johnny Roselli, in a plot to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro
            the wiretapping and surveillance of journalists, including in 1972 columnist Jack Anderson who broke a string of scandals
            the testing of hallucinogens such as LSD on unsuspecting citizens
            Among the documents is a request in 1972 for someone "who was accomplished at picking locks" who might be retiring or resigning from the agency.

            'Soviet succession'

            Another set of documents, also just declassified, is known as the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers.

            This is an 11,000-page analysis, done between 1953 and 1973, on Soviet and Chinese internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations.

            Among the papers are an analysis of the Soviet leadership completed some four months after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953.

            The CIA's report, stamped "Top Secret", said the Soviets carried out a hasty shake-up of top posts to head off possible "panic and disarray" following Stalin's death.

            "It is strongly suggested that the leaders in this moment of crisis had moved swiftly to show their unity and to gird themselves for any battle that might be coming from inside and out," the CIA report said.

            Comment


            • #36
              List of interesting CIA files on IRAN

              Interesting CIA analysis on post-Khomaini Iran. From potential internal struggle and the importance of Revolutionary Guard

              "...we do not see any likely alternatives to an Islamic-oriented regime with a strong clerical influence in the aftermath of Khomeni's death. In our judgment, neither the Shas's son nor any other Iranian exile leader possesses the domestic assets to gain control...."

              Comment


              • #37
                CIA Said Instability Seemed 'Irreversible'

                Early on the morning of Nov. 13, 2006, members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group gathered around a dark wooden conference table in the windowless Roosevelt Room of the White House.

                For more than an hour, they listened to President Bush give what one panel member called a "Churchillian" vision of "victory" in Iraq and defend the country's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki. "A constitutional order is emerging," he said.

                Later that morning, around the same conference table, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden painted a starkly different picture for members of the study group. Hayden said "the inability of the government to govern seems irreversible," adding that he could not "point to any milestone or checkpoint where we can turn this thing around," according to written records of his briefing and the recollections of six participants.

                "The government is unable to govern," Hayden concluded. "We have spent a lot of energy and treasure creating a government that is balanced, and it cannot function."

                Later in the interview, he qualified the statement somewhat: "A government that can govern, sustain and defend itself is not achievable," he said, "in the short term."

                Hayden's bleak assessment, which came just a week after Republicans had lost control of Congress and Bush had dismissed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, was a pivotal moment in the study group's intensive examination of the Iraq war, and it helped shape its conclusion in its final report that the situation in Iraq was "grave and deteriorating."

                In the eight months since the interview, neither Hayden nor any other high-ranking administration official has publicly described the Iraqi government in the uniformly negative terms that the CIA director used in his closed-door briefing.

                Among the 79 specific recommendations the Iraq Study Group made to Bush was withdrawing support for the Maliki government unless it showed "substantial progress" on security and national reconciliation. And it recommended changing the primary mission of U.S. forces from combat to training Iraqis so that combat units could be withdrawn by early 2008.

                In effect, the report from the bipartisan group -- co-chaired by former secretary of state James A. Baker III, a Republican, and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) -- was an urgent message from the old Washington establishment to the Bush administration to change the direction of its Iraq policy. But Bush did not initially embrace any of the key recommendations, although bipartisan groups in the House and Senate have recently introduced legislation that would make them official U.S. policy.

                Instead, the president in January announced that he was sending more troops to Iraq as part of a "surge," which he said would lead to the victory that had so far eluded U.S. forces.

                Both Bush and Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, have repeatedly said that there is no military solution to Iraq and that the sectarian strife and the insurgency can be resolved only by the Iraqi government.

                Hayden's description of Iraq's dysfunctional government provides some insight into the intelligence community's analysis of Maliki and the situation on the ground. Five days before his testimony, national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley had written a memo to Bush raising doubts about Maliki's ability to curb violence in Iraq, but his assessment was not as bleak as Hayden's.

                Comment


                • #38
                  Bush's own optimistic statement to members of the study group did not reflect the viewpoint of his CIA director. But a statement from another administration official interviewed by the panel the same day -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice -- took it into account.

                  Asked by former Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a member of the study group, if she was aware of the CIA's grim evaluation of Iraq, Rice replied, "We are aware of the dark assessment," but quickly added: "It is not without hope."

                  A spokesman for the CIA, Mark Mansfield, disputed this account of Hayden's testimony to members of the study group. "That is not an accurate reflection of what Director Hayden said at that meeting, nor does it reflect his view, then or now," Mansfield said.

                  A senior intelligence official familiar with Hayden's session with the Iraq Study Group said that Hayden told the panel his assessment was "somber" and acknowledged that Hayden had used the term "irreversible." But the official insisted that Hayden instead said, "The current situation, with regard to governance in Iraq, was probably irreversible in the short term, because of the world views of many of the [Iraqi] government leaders, which were shaped by a sectarian filter and a government that was organized for its ethnic and religious balance rather than competence or capacity."

                  But another senior intelligence official confirmed the thrust and detail of Hayden's assessment, saying that the intelligence out of Iraq this month shows that the ability of the Maliki government to execute decisions and govern Iraq remains "awful."

                  Hayden, 62, a four-star Air Force general and career intelligence officer, has a reputation as a candid briefer. Since 2003, the CIA, which has more than 500 personnel in Iraq to assist in providing intelligence and analysis, has offered the most pessimistic view of any intelligence agency of both the Iraqi government's performance and the situation on the ground there.

                  Testifying publicly before the Senate Armed Services Committee two days after meeting with the study group, Hayden was more cautious in his conclusions. He said that there were serious problems in Iraq but that the government was "functioning."

                  Former defense secretary William J. Perry, one of the five Democrats on the Iraq Study Group, confirmed that Hayden told them the Iraqi government seemed beyond repair.

                  "That was what we'd been hearing everywhere," Perry said. "He just said it a little more clearly and more explicitly than other people."

                  O'Connor, a Republican, also confirmed Hayden's assessment. She said she did not agree with his conclusion that it was irreversible, but she said she was pessimistic.

                  "It is a dire situation," she said. "I don't think it has gotten any better. It just breaks your heart. . . . Iraqi people are dying, American soldiers are dying. So far it does not seem we have achieved any kind of security there."

                  Arriving at the White House on the morning of Nov. 13, members of the study group spent the day interviewing almost every key figure involved in Iraq policy. In addition to Hayden, Bush and Rice, they also questioned Rumsfeld; Gen. Peter Pace, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Zalmay Khalilzad, then U.S. ambassador to Iraq; and, by videoconference from Baghdad, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., then the top U.S. commander in Iraq.

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Bush was joined in the interview by Vice President Cheney, White House Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten and Hadley, but they did not speak. "We thought with that whole group there, we were going to get briefings, we were going to get discussions," said Perry. "Instead the president held forth on his views on how important the war was, and how it was tough."

                    In his meeting with members of the study group, Hayden described a situation in which the Iraqi government either would not or could not control the violence consuming the country and questioned whether it made sense to strengthen its security forces. He depicted the United States as facing mainly bad choices in the future.

                    "Our leaving Iraq would make the situation worse," Hayden said. "Our staying in Iraq may not make it better. Our current approach without modification will not make it better."

                    According to the written record and others in the room, Hayden at one point likened the situation in Iraq to a marathon. He said there comes a point in each race when the runner knows he can complete the challenge. But Hayden said he could see no such point in Iraq's future.

                    "The levers of power are not connected to anything," he said, adding: "We have placed all of our energies in creating the center, and the center cannot accomplish anything."

                    Numerous U.S. generals already had told the study group that success in Iraq could not come without national reconciliation between the Sunnis and Shiites. Hayden agreed, saying: "The Iraqi identity is muted. The Sunni or Shia identity is foremost."

                    But he clearly saw no end to sectarian killings. "Given the level of uncontrolled violence," Hayden said, "the most we can do is to contain its excesses and preserve the possibility of reconciliation in the future."

                    He compared the Iraq situation to the prolonged warfare in the Balkans. "In Bosnia, the parties fought themselves to exhaustion," Hayden said, suggesting that the same scenario could play out in Iraq. "They might just have to fight this out to exhaustion."

                    Hayden catalogued what he saw as the main sources of violence in this order: the insurgency, sectarian strife, criminality, general anarchy and, lastly, al-Qaeda. Though Hayden had listed al-Qaeda as the fifth most pressing threat in Iraq, Bush regularly lists al-Qaeda first.

                    Members of the study group said Hayden's stark assessment of the Iraqi government dovetailed with what they had heard in September during their visit to Iraq. There, they met with a senior CIA official who held an equally unenthusiastic view. "Maliki was nobody's pick," the CIA official had said, according to written notes from that meeting. "His name came up late. He has no real power base in the country or in parliament. We need not expect much from him."

                    Given the constant threats and persistent violence, the official had said, it was remarkable that Iraqi government employees showed up for work.

                    "We continue to be amazed that the Iraqis accept such high levels of violence," he told the study group. "Maliki thinks two car bombs a day, 100 dead a day, is okay. It's sustainable and his government is survivable."

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      But the government itself was responsible for some of that violence, the CIA official said. "The Ministry of Interior is uniformed death squads, overseers of jails and torture facilities," he said. "Their funds are constantly misappropriated."

                      In his testimony, Hayden said that the United States had fundamental disagreements with Maliki's Shiite-dominated government on some of the most basic issues facing Iraq.

                      "We and the Iraqi government do not agree on who the enemy is," Hayden said, according to the written record. "For all the senior leaders of the Iraqi government, Baathists are the source of evil. There is a Baathist behind every bush."

                      Several participants in the interview described Hayden as dismayed by the startling level of violence in the country but skeptical of the ability of Iraqi forces -- either the military or the police -- to do anything about it.

                      "It's a legitimate question whether strengthening the Iraqi security forces helps or hurts when they are viewed as a predatory element," he said. "Strengthening Iraqi security forces is not unalloyed good. Without qualification, this judgment applies to the police."

                      In one bit of qualified good news, he said that the training of the Iraqi army had produced better results than that of the police. "The army is uneven," he said, adding: "Uneven, in this case, is good."

                      Hayden's frustration with Maliki provides a context to the administration's continuing efforts to pressure the Iraqi leader into finding a political settlement between Sunni and Shiite factions in Iraq. During one week last month, three senior administration officials visited Baghdad to try to speed up the political process.

                      In her testimony Nov. 13, Rice recounted her discussions with Maliki in which she bluntly told him the importance of making progress on national unity and reconciliation. Rice said she had told the prime minister, "Pretty soon, you'll all be swinging from lampposts if you don't hang together."

                      Comment


                      • #41

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          یک ابزار اینترنتی که به ادعای آفرینندگان آن می تواند هویت سازمان هایی که صفحات ویکی پدیا را ویرایش می کنند آشکار کند، می گوید که سازمان اطلاعات مرکزی آمریکا در ویرایش برخی از این صفحات دست داشته است.
                          این ابزار کامپیوتری موسوم به "اسکنر ویکی پدیا" ظاهرا نشان می دهد که کارمندان شبکه کامپیوتری سازمان سیا صفحه مربوط به محمود احمدی نژاد، رئیس جمهور ایران، را ویرایش کرده اند.

                          همچنین ادعا می شود این ابزار نشان داده است که واتیکان مدخل های مربوط به "جری آدامز" رهبر گروه شین فین را ادیت کرده است.

                          این ابزار که توسط محققان آمریکایی ابداع شده فهرستی از 3/5 میلیون مورد ویرایش را "تور" کرده و آنها را با آدرس اینترنتی ویرایشگران تطبیق می دهد.

                          ویکی پدیا یک دیکشنری رایگان اینترنتی است که ایجاد یا ویرایش مدخل ها در آن برای همه ممکن است.

                          اکثر ویرایش های ردیابی شده توسط "اسکنر ویکی پدیا" مربوط به اصلاح غلط های املایی یا رفع اشتباهات سهوی در شرح حال افراد است.

                          هشدار

                          اما این ابزار در مورد مدخل مربوط به رئیس جمهور ایران آشکار می کند که یک کارمند شبکه کامپیوتری سیا ظاهرا کلمه "وا" (!Wahhhhhh) را در ابتدای بخشی از مدخل درباره طرح های ریاست جمهوری آقای احمدی نژاد وارد کرده است.


                          "اصلاحات سیا" در مدخل مربوط به احمدی نژاد ظاهرا اکنون پاک شده است

                          در اخطاری در بخش مربوط به ویرایشگر این مدخل آمده است: "شما اخیرا یک مقاله ویکی پدیا را خراب کرده اید؛ اکنون از شما درخواست می شود این نوع رفتارها را متوقف کنید."

                          سایر تغییراتی که در مقالات ویکی پدیا داده شده کمتر جدی است و شامل دستکاری های کوچک در شرح حال پورتر گاس، رئیس سابق سیا، و چهره های سرشناسی مانند اوپرا وینفری است.

                          یک سخنگوی سیا در پاسخ به این سوال که آیا می تواند تایید کند که تغییرات انجام شده با استفاده از یک کامپیوتر سیا صورت گرفته گفت: "من نمی توانم تایید کنم که ترافیک (تغییرات) مورد اشاره شما از کامپیوترهای آژانس نشات گرفته باشد."

                          وی افزود: "به هر صورت مایلم بر یک نکته بسیار وسیعتر و جدی تر صحه بگذارم که هیچ کس نباید در آن شک یا آن را فراموش کند: سازمان اطلاعات مرکزی ماموریتی حیاتی در حفاظت از آمریکا دارد و فعالیت این سازمان بر همین کار سرنوشت ساز متمرکز است."

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                          • #43
                            An online tool that claims to reveal the identity of organisations that edit Wikipedia pages has revealed that the CIA was involved in editing entries.
                            Wikipedia Scanner allegedly shows that workers on the agency's computers made edits to the page of Iran's president.

                            It also purportedly shows that the Vatican has edited entries about Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams.

                            The tool, developed by US researchers, trawls a list of 5.3m edits and matches them to the net address of the editor.

                            Wikipedia is a free online encyclopaedia that can be created and edited by anyone.

                            Most of the edits detected by the scanner correct spelling mistakes or factual inaccuracies in profiles. However, others have been used to remove potentially damaging material or to deface sites.

                            Mistaken identity

                            On the profile of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the tool indicates that a worker on the CIA network reportedly added the exclamation "Wahhhhhh!" before a section on the leader's plans for his presidency.

                            A warning on the profile of the anonymous editor reads: "You have recently vandalised a Wikipedia article, and you are now being asked to stop this type of behaviour."


                            It is claimed the entry was changed by a CIA computer user

                            Other changes that have been made are more innocuous, and include tweaks to the profile of former CIA chief Porter Goss and celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey.

                            When asked whether it could confirm whether the changes had been made by a person using a CIA computer, an agency spokesperson responded: "I cannot confirm that the traffic you cite came from agency computers.

                            "I'd like in any case to underscore a far larger and more significant point that no one should doubt or forget: The CIA has a vital mission in protecting the United States, and the focus of this agency is there, on that decisive work."

                            Radio change

                            The site also indicates that a computer owned by the US Democratic Party was used to make changes to the site of right-wing talk show host Rush Limbaugh.

                            The changes brand Mr Limbaugh as "idiotic," a "racist", and a "bigot". An entry about his audience now reads: "Most of them are legally retarded."

                            We really value transparency and the scanner really takes this to another level

                            Wikipedia spokesperson

                            The IP address is registered in the name of the Democratic National Headquarters.

                            A spokesperson for the Democratic Party said that the changes had not been made on its computers. Instead, they said that the "IP address is the same as the DCCC".

                            The DCCC, or Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, is the "official campaign arm of the Democrats" in the House of Representatives and shares a building with the party.

                            "We don't condone these sorts of activities and we take every precaution to ensure that our network is used in a responsible manner," Doug Thornell of the DCCC told the BBC News website.

                            Mr Thornell pointed out that the edit had been made "close to two years ago" and it was "impossible to know" who had done it.

                            Voting issue

                            The site also indicates that Vatican computers were used to remove content from a page about the leader of the Irish republican party Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams.


                            Wikipedia already collects the IP address or username of editors

                            The edit removed links to newspaper stories written in 2006 that alleged that Mr Adams' fingerprints and handprints were found on a car used during a double murder in 1971.

                            The section, titled "Fresh murder question raised" is no longer available through the online encyclopaedia.

                            Wikipedia Scanner also points the finger at commercial organisations that have modified entries about the pages.

                            One in particular is Diebold, a company which supplies electronic voting machines in the US.

                            In October 2005, a person using a Diebold computer removed paragraphs about Walden O'Dell, chief executive of the company, which revealed that he had been "a top fund-raiser" for George Bush.

                            A month later, other paragraphs and links to stories about the alleged rigging of the 2000 election were also removed.

                            The paragraphs and links have since been reinstated.

                            Diebold officials have not responded to requests by the BBC for information about the changes.

                            Web history

                            The Wikipedia Scanner results are not the first time that people have been uncovered editing their own Wikipedia entries.

                            Wikipedia Scanner may prevent an organisation or individuals from editing articles that they're really not supposed to

                            Wikipedia spokesperson

                            Earlier this year, Microsoft was revealed to have offered money to experts to trawl through entries about the company and its products to make corrections.

                            Staff at the US Congress have also previously been exposed for editing and removing sensitive information about politicians.

                            An inquiry was launched after staff for Democratic representative Marty Meehan admitted polishing his biography

                            The new tool was built by Virgil Griffith of the California Institute of Technology.

                            It exploits the open nature of Wikipedia, which already collects the net address or username of editors and tracks all changes to a page. The information can be accessed in the "history" tab at the top of a Wikipedia page.

                            By merging this information with a database of IP address owners, Wikipedia Scanner is able to put a name to the organisation and firms from which edits are made.

                            The scanner cannot identify the individuals editing articles, admits Mr Griffith.

                            "Technically, we don't know whether it came from an agent of that company, however, we do know that edit came from someone with access to their network," he wrote on the Wikipedia Scanner site.

                            A spokesperson for Wikipedia said the tool helped prevent conflicts of interest.

                            "We really value transparency and the scanner really takes this to another level," they said.

                            "Wikipedia Scanner may prevent an organisation or individuals from editing articles that they're really not supposed to."

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                            • #44
                              If financing and helping terrorism around the world is sufficient to classify oneself as a terrorist organization despite that organization being an agent of a sovereign entity, then it seems also appropriate to classify Mossad and the CIA as terrorist organizations. In the late 1970's, the government of Israel through Mossad, directly and indirectly financed Hamas in hopes of counterbalancing Fatah's influence in the occupied territories. As noted by Ami Isseroff: "the Israelis deliberately promoted the Islamists of the future Hamas by helping them turn the Islamic University of Gaza into a base from which the group recruited activists – and the suicide bombers of tomorrow." Similarly, the United States, throughout the 1960s to the present day, supported guerrilla movements, many of which targeted civilian populations to carry out their political agenda. The CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). The CIA created, structured and trained secret police in South Korea, Iran, Chile and Uruguay, and elsewhere, organizations responsible for untold thousands of tortures, disappearances, and deaths.

                              I have no complaints against listing the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization. My complaints are based upon the hypocrisies behind our foreign policy. If we're going to condemn military agencies as terrorist organizations for their support of terrorism, then for the sake of credibility look beyond the borders of the Middle East. Because this certainly doesn't create a standard for the US itself can meet.

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                              • #45
                                WASHINGTON - The CIA destroyed videotapes it made in 2002 of two top terror suspects because it was afraid that keeping them "posed a security risk," Director Michael Hayden has told agency employees.


                                Hayden's revelation to the CIA employees became public Thursday and it caused a commotion on Capitol Hill where members of the Senate Intelligence Committee immediately vowed to conduct a thorough review. A leading human rights group voiced alarm about it.

                                In his message to agency workers, Hayden said that House and Senate intelligence committee leaders had been informed of the existence of the tapes and the CIA's intention to destroy them to protect the identities of the questioners. He also said the CIA's internal watchdog watched the tapes in 2003 and verified that the interrogation practices were legal. Hayden said the tapes were destroyed three years after the 2002 interrogations.

                                Rep. Jane Harman of California, then the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, was one of only four members of Congress in 2003 informed of the tapes' existence and the CIA's intention to ultimately destroy them.

                                "I told the CIA that destroying videotapes of interrogations was a bad idea and urged them in writing not to do it," Harman said. While key lawmakers were briefed on the CIA's intention to destroy the tapes, they were not notified two years later when the spy agency actually carried out the plan. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va., said the committee only learned of the tapes' destruction in November 2006.

                                Rep. Pete Hoekstra, R-Mich., who was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee from August 2004 until the end of 2006, said through a spokesman that he doesn't remember being informed of the videotaping program.

                                "Congressman Hoekstra does not recall ever being told of the existence or destruction of these tapes," said Jamal D. Ware, senior adviser to the committee. "He believes that Director Hayden is being generous in his claim that the committee was informed. He believes the committee should have been fully briefed and consulted on how this was handled."

                                Jennifer Daskal, senior counsel with Human Rights Watch, said that destroying the tapes was illegal. "Basically this is destruction of evidence," she said, calling Hayden's explanation that the tapes were destroyed to protect CIA identities "disingenuous."

                                The CIA only taped the interrogation of the first two terror suspects the agency held, one of whom was Abu Zubaydah. Zubaydah, under harsh questioning, told CIA interrogators about alleged 9/11 accomplice Ramzi Binalshibh, President Bush said publicly in 2006.

                                Binalshibh was captured and interrogated and, with Zubaydah's information, authorities in 2003 captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the purported mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.

                                Hayden said that a secondary reason for the taped interrogations was to have backup documentation of the information gathered.

                                "The agency soon determined that its documentary reporting was full and exacting, removing any need for tapes. Indeed, videotaping stopped in 2002," Hayden said.

                                The CIA is known to have waterboarded three prisoners since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, but not since 2003. Hayden banned the use of the procedure in 2006, according to knowledgeable officials.

                                The disclosure of the tapes' destruction came on the same day the House and Senate intelligence committees agreed to legislation prohibiting the CIA from using "enhanced interrogation techniques." The White House Thursday threatened to veto the bill.

                                Hayden's message to CIA employees was an attempt to get ahead of a New York Times story about the videotapes.

                                "What matters here is that it was done in line with the law," Hayden said. "Over the course of its life, the agency's interrogation program has been of great value to our country. It has helped disrupt terrorist operations and save lives. It was built on a solid foundation of legal review. It has been conducted with careful supervision. If the story of these tapes is told fairly, it will underscore those facts."

                                The CIA says the tapes were destroyed late in 2005, a year marked by increasing pressure from defense attorneys to obtain videotapes of detainee interrogations. The scandal over harsh treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq had focused public attention on interrogation techniques.

                                Beginning in 2003, attorneys for al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui began seeking videotapes of interrogations they believed might help them show their client wasn't a part of the 9/11 attacks. These requests heated up in 2005 as the defense slowly learned the identities of more detainees in U.S. custody.

                                In May 2005, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema ordered the government to disclose whether interrogations were recorded. The government objected to that order, and the judge modified it on Nov. 3, 2005, to ask for confirmation of whether the government "has video or audio tapes of these interrogations" and then named specific ones. Eleven days later, the government denied it had video or audio tapes of those specific interrogations.

                                Last month, the CIA admitted to Brinkema and a circuit judge that it had failed to hand over tapes of enemy combatant witnesses. Those interrogations were not part of the CIA's detention program and were not conducted or recorded by the agency, the agency said.

                                "The CIA did not say to the court in its original filing that it had no terrorist tapes at all. It would be wrong to assert that," CIA spokesman George Little said.

                                The 9/11 Commission referenced the 2002 interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Binalshibh multiple times throughout its report, but cited written documents and audiotapes only.

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