About Al Qaeda

[Rasputin]

Casablanca police arrest 5th cell member

Moroccan police arrested the fifth member of a cell cornered by police in a Casablanca suburb earlier this week, a government official and a local resident said on Thursday.

Both denied earlier reports that a bomb had exploded in Fida, a working class neighborhood of Casablanca.

Three suspected suicide bombers blew themselves up on Tuesday following a raid in which a fourth suspect was shot dead, according to police sources.

"There was no explosion. The police seem to have arrested the last of the terrorists whose house they raided on Tuesday," a local resident said by telephone. "It was about one kilometer from their safe house."

Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa said late on Wednesday he suspected three to four of them might still be on the run.

[Rasputin]

Two bombers attack U.S. targets in Morocco

Two suicide bombers killed themselves in an attack on U.S. diplomatic offices in Morocco's commercial hub Casablanca on Saturday, the scene of three suicide blasts four days ago, witnesses said.

"Only the two bombers were killed," a police source said of the mid-morning attack on the U.S. cultural center and the nearby U.S. consulate in an upscale district of the port city.

Police later arrested three men, winning cheers from hundreds of onlookers angered by the blasts as officers pushed the three into a police car to be taken away for questioning.

Witnesses said the first blast happened about six meters (yards) from the cultural center and the second went off about 60 meters away from the consulate.

Police cordoned off the area and were hunting for a third man seen running from the scene who was suspected to also be rigged with explosives on the suicide mission, witnesses said.

Police were checking reports a suspected fourth bomber was at large but there was no immediate confirmation.

Mohammed Bouhassine, a witness to the consulate blast, said of the bomber: "His body was blown into four pieces. His head and hands fell into the courtyard of a bank building."

Flesh fragments from the body of the bomber who attacked the cultural center were embedded in a nearby tree, witnesses said.

A senior police source said the bombers clearly intended to attack the U.S. buildings, indicating they were the first targeted suicide bombings of a recent series in the city.

On Tuesday three suicide bombers killed themselves in a poor neighborhood of Casablanca after police raided a safe house and shot dead a fourth bomber, setting off their explosives so as not to be taken alive by police who were on their tail.

"There is no doubt they aimed at the U.S. targets. They made that statement with their own bodies," the source said of Saturday's explosions. He said the two could not get closer to the two buildings because of security fortifications.

The government said the bombers were linked to a ring dismantled last month, which included suicide bombers who planned to blow up foreign ships docking at Casablanca's port and hotels in Morocco's main tourist cities.

The Rabat government insists that bombers were "home-grown" militants with no links to international terror networks.

However, analyst Miloud Belkadi said the targets of Saturday's bombings set them apart from those of Tuesday which were clearly detonated as a tactic to deny pursuing police.

"The bombing today underscores links with al Qaeda strategy focusing on U.S. targets. They are different from the suicide bombers killing themselves in slums," he said.

The killings of the suicide bombers followed bombings in neighboring Algeria this week where 33 people were killed in attacks claimed by an Islamist armed group known as the al Qaeda Organisation on the Islamic Maghreb.

[Rasputin]

Bombers seek "second Iraq" in Algeria: Islamist

The founder of the group that claimed responsibility for last week's deadly Algiers bombings called on militants to put down their weapons under a government amnesty and stop trying to turn Algeria into a "second Iraq".

Hassan Hattab made the comments in a letter to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika published on Monday by Echorouk daily after three bombs exploded in Algiers on Wednesday killing 33 people.

He described the group that claimed responsibility for the bombings, which changed its name in January from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) to al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, as "a small group that wants to transform Algeria into a second Iraq".

"I call on the militants to give up the fight and join national reconciliation," said Hattab, also known as Abu Hamza.

"We urge the President to reopen the national reconciliation file and extend its deadline. I can thump those seeking to take Algeria to its painful past," he added without elaborating.

Hattab remains an influential figure among Islamist fighters even though the group he helped found is now headed by another man, Abdelmalek Droudkel, also known as Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

The explosions raised fears that the north African oil- and gas-exporting country might return to the intense political violence of the 1990s when tens of thousands of Islamist guerrillas fought the army to try to set up Islamic rule.
Bouteflika offered an amnesty for Islamist rebels last year as part of a peace and reconciliation policy aimed at ending almost 15 years of political violence in Algeria.

More than 2,000 rebels were freed from jail and dozens of fighters surrendered under the amnesty, which lasted from late February to late August 2006.

Droudkel has rejected the amnesty offer and it is not known whether Hattab himself has officially accepted amnesty.

But speculation Hattab had won some sort of accommodation with the government arose last year when he gave an interview in Algeria to the Asharq al-Awsat daily supporting the amnesty.

Algeria plunged into conflict when militants unleashed a holy war or jihad after the army cancelled elections in 1992, which the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was set to win.

Authorities then feared an Iranian style revolution and up to 200,000 people were killed during the Islamic uprising.

The GSPC was formed in 1998 when Hattab broke away from the Armed Islamic Group in protest at its massacres of civilians. He said the GSPC would focus its attacks on police and soldiers.

ORIGINAL ISLAMIST REBELS CONDEMN ATTACKS

The founders of the FIS, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, also condemned the attacks. "Al Qaeda made a big mistake in using violence in a country in desperate need of a political solution," Madani, who lives in Qatar, was quoted as telling daily El Khabar, adding: "We can't stay silent."

Belhadj said: "They were inadmissible acts that targeted innocent people."

The FIS remains banned and a state of emergency imposed in 1992 remains in place.

Overseas-based FIS leaders Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam also condemned the attacks. From Germany where he lives, Kebir said in a statement: "The acts were criminal and unjustified because they targeted the Algerian people and its institutions."

Washington-based Haddam said: "You can't serve our people by killing innocent Algerians."

[Rasputin]

Taraneh Hemami: Most Wanted

Walking up the stairs to the Intersection for the Arts gallery, potential spectators might be somewhat bewildered at the sight that greets them; coating the steps is a sheet of white felt, covered with ostensibly Persian names, in dispassionate block letters. Among the more obscure appellations, one can pick out “Saddam” and “Osama” almost instantly, as the eye’s natural tendency is to wander to what’s recognizable and fill it out with familiar meaning. In some ways, you can say that’s the very crux of Taraneh Hemami’s collection of installation work, "Most Wanted".

It’s safe to note that rarely is contemporary Persian American art, so steeped in the contradictions inherent in our current epoch, fueled by meandering rages or creative chaos. Amid the hybrid realities of war and peace, insider and outsider, presence and anonymity, artists like Hemami slither gracefully across landscapes and concepts bruised by violence and nearly unnavigable cultural rifts. All the same, rarely is Hemami’s work exhortative or unduly preachy. She works in a framework as detailed as Persian miniatures, but spectators can sense a deadly calm settling over even the most hairsplitting commentary.

Hemami’s work emerged from a poster she found on an official U.S. government website shortly after 9/11: a low-resolution image of the most wanted international terrorists. Strangely, no names were associated with the blurry faces, which gets to the very absurdity of the poster’s encouragement of fear-laden vigilantism on the part of “unmarked” Americans. While individual characteristics are impossible to discern in each of the faces, the collective shared features -- dark skin, facial hair, head scarves (over a third of the people presented are females) -- manifest in an unspoken incrimination of ANY of the individuals who could possibly fit the picture. This sort of lazy, distorted representation of Arabs and Persians -- sanctioned with a prima facie credibility -- is an apt pictorial trope for what has gradually become the very fabrication of what Hemami considers America’s “new enemy.”

But spectators would be doing the art a grave injustice if they were to view it as a simple indictment of racial profiling, as Hemami intentionally confounds context and perception with the other elements of the show. For instance, the same names on the steps leading up to the gallery are scrawled in dirt across several gallery walls in Arabic script, which can be read from right to left in alphabetical order. As obviously foreign signifiers, they can be seen as pretty, exotic, and abstruse, decorative rather than intrinsically meaningful. Those who read Arabic might understand the names as elements of a quasi-memorial; artists and cultural critics might understand the graffiti’d screeds as a symbolic act of resistance, an act that is both anonymous and that names.

Or, if you’re a staunch adherent of homeland security, the writing could very well be a terrorist manifesto. The point is that all of these options are viable, depending on who’s looking at them. The names and the Arabic script are simultaneously recognizable and unrecognizable, known and unknowable, and persistently shrouded in the veil of perception, which pays no heed to simple facts.

Other examples of Hemami’s keen eye to perception include a hand-beaded curtain, which features expanded, heavily pixilated versions of the faces in the most wanted poster. The curtain itself is a schlocky curio -- the kind of harmless commodity one might find at a flea market. It’s an excellent example of how digitized packets of information are imbued with permeable meaning. It’s also, in a much larger way, suggestive of the indeterminacy of information available over the Internet, a nebulous realm in which data is constantly mutating, depending on what it’s fed into, and in which even our most passionately held beliefs fail the test of ultimate scrutiny.

Hemami’s large-scale replicas of Iranian soldiers’ tombs accordingly frame her characters in opposing contexts. On the outside face of each structure (all of which are organized into a crescent-shaped assortment) is a luminous, fuzzy image of a face from the most wanted poster -- a Rorschach blot of amorphous light and color that is scarcely identifiable. But when you walk across, to the inside of the semi-circle, the digitized faces are covered in ornate Persian flower motifs. While the outside seems to denote imprisonment and exile, the inside is permeated with a hushed reverence, as if it stands as a testament to enshrined saints.

The possibility of spiritual salvation flings open another trapdoor, leading to several interpretations. In the midst of anonymity and indictment, there is the possibility of exaltation and liberation—but this is undermined by the conflicting meta-narrative of relentless jihadists and Islam’s catastrophic potential, which even the most informed and progressive spectator can’t help but think of.

The great thing about "Most Wanted" is that it needn’t strive to be educative. In fact, the power of the exhibition lies in the very lack of placards and art criticism, which would otherwise define the presented work and pinion it into some overarching, acutely stated context. But since the purpose of the exhibition is to make the spectator recognize, question, and challenge her own perceptions, there are no high-falutin’ instructions on HOW to look at the work. The gallery space, accordingly, is suffused with an impalpable sparseness, an almost antiseptic quality suggestive of the absence of meaning or value judgments. Such neutrality can be contrasted with the soiled, besmirched stairway of Persian names, an overtly sardonic signifier of the symbolic desecration of an entire group of people.

Like life, there are no signposts leading spectators around the gallery or explaining to them what everything means. Hemami seems to be saying that any meaning we imbue the work with will understandably stem from the stereotypes and misrepresentations that are so deeply entrenched in our society. Hemami is no apathetic chronicler, but she is certainly aware that every interpretation we apply to her images will be somehow biased or distorted, and some of the fictions we will create around the images will have more sinister ramifications than others.

After all, in an era in which an image is tantamount to an actual person, and a person is representative of an entire nation or abstract ideal, the notion of viewing politicized images neutrally is obsolete. But this is not an exhibition that is so clinical that it reduces the medley of names and blurry faces to nobodies. Rather, Hemami’s work is beautifully elegiac; if we remember history’s lessons, we can also begin to see that the “most wanted” encompass both the vilified and the innocent, the seen and unseen, those who are marginalized and at the same time made painfully aware of their otherness. They’re all of us.

[Rasputin]

عصبانيت القاعده عراق: مذاكرات ايران و آمريكا "شيطاني" است

گروه القاعده عراق با انتشار بيانيه اي از مذاكرات اخير بين ايران و آمريكا انتقاد و آن را "مذاكرات شيطاني" خواند.

به گزارش رويترز، گروه "حكومت اسلامي عراق" وابسته به شبكه تروريستي القاعده در اين بيانيه مدعي شد كه ايران خواهان دست كشيدن از برنامه هسته اي خود است تا به اين وسيله رضايت آمريكا براي تسلط بر عراق كه داراي يك دولت شيعي است را جلب كند.

در بيانيه اين گروه كه بر روي شبكه اينترنت ارسال شده، آمده است: شيطان بزرگ (آمريكا) و متحدانش بعد از پايان پروژه جنگ هاي صليبي در كنار يكديگر مي نشينند و عليه سني هاي مسلمان توطئه مي كنند.

به ادعاي گروه القاعده عراق، چانه زني ايران و آمريكا بر سر اين مساله است كه ايران از برنامه هسته اي خود دست كشيده و در ازاي آن واشنگتن نفوذ ايران در عراق را به رسميت بشناسد و در اين بين كشتن مردم سني مشروعيت پيدا كند!

گفتني است گروه موسوم به "حكومت اسلامي عراق" كه تحت رهبري اعراب تندروي سني قرار دارد به عنوان شاخه القاعده در عراق شناخته مي شود.

ايران و آمريكا روز دوشنبه اولين دور از مذاكرات خود درباره مسائل امنيتي عراق را در بغداد برگزار كردند.

[Rasputin]

ادعاي عجيب القاعده: انفجارهاي سامرا كار ايران بود

گروه موسوم به "دولت اسلامي عراق" كه توسط سازمان القاعده شاخه عراق بنيان گذاشته شده در بيانيه اي مدعي شد كه انفجارهاي سامرا در توافقي ميان كابينه نوري المالكي نخست وزير عراق و دولت ايران درميان سكونت خائناني از اهل تسنن كه شب و روز در حال ديدار با مالكي و حكيم هستند، صورت گرفت.



در همين حال ارتش آمريكا نيز اعلام كرد كه از روز چهارشنبه تاكنون 650 نظامي از ميان نيروهاي امنيتي عراق و مشاوران آمريكايي در نزديكي مرقد دو امام عسگري در شهر سامرا مستقر شده اند.



همچنين "عبدالله الجبوري" معاون استاندار صلاح الدين عراق نيز سرويس هاي اطلاعاتي امنيتي ايراني را به دخالت در انفجارهاي سامرا متهم كرد و گفت:" نيروهاي امنيتي محلي، دلايلي را به دست آورده اند كه نشان مي دهد افراد مسلح وابسته به سازمان القاعده در سامرا با سرويس هاي اطلاعاتي و امنيتي ايران در ارتباط بوده اند. "


وي اضافه كرد:" پيش از اين نيز اسناد، سلاح ها و مبالغ پول ايراني نيز در ميان اموال نيروهاي القاعده كشف كرده بوديم ، ارتباطات و تماس ها و ديدارهايي ميان سران القاعده و افسران ايراني در داخل و خارج از عراق صورت مي گيرد.

[Rasputin]

U.S. Army Begins Offensive Against Al-Qaeda in Iraq

The U.S. military, bolstered by troop reinforcements in Iraq, began an air and ground offensive today against al-Qaeda insurgents northeast of Baghdad.

The operation, codenamed ``Arrowhead Ripper,'' began with nighttime air strikes in Baquba and continued as ground forces, backed by helicopters, killed about 22 insurgents in and around the city. About 10,000 soldiers are taking part in the offensive, the military said by e-mail.

``The end state is to destroy al-Qaeda influences in this province and eliminate their threat against the people,'' Brigadier General Mick Bednarek said in the statement.

Five additional U.S. brigades, or about 30,000 soldiers, have deployed to Iraq since the start of the year in an attempt to crack down on sectarian violence and attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces, taking the total number of U.S. military personnel in the country to about 150,000. The reinforcements have allowed the military to expand anti-terrorist operations around the capital.

About 1,200 soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division pushed into Baghdad's southeastern Arab Jabour district at the weekend in an operation codenamed ``Marne Torch'' to stop terrorists moving bomb-making equipment into the capital, the military said in an e-mailed statement yesterday.

Fighter jets dropped four ``precision-guided bombs'' on June 16 to support the operation, named after a U.S.-British offensive in North Africa in World War II.

Supply Lines

U.S. troops in Baghdad are also increasing operations northwest of the city to cut terrorists' supply lines from Ramadi, the capital of al-Anbar province, Associated Press said.

``Now that the entirety of the five combat brigades as part of the `surge' are here, we can implement the counterinsurgency strategy as it was designed,'' said Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Garver by e-mail from Baghdad. ``We have forces in the belts around Baghdad and Baghdad proper in order to find the insurgents, terrorists and extremists and capture or kill them.''

The operation in Baquba, the capital of Diyala province, is in its ``opening stages'' and involves the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division and the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, according to the statement.

Al-Qaeda militants have conducted public executions in Baquba's main square and sought to enforce Islamic law, AP reported. A new U.S. operations center in Diyala province will try to coordinate police and army operations, help Iraqi ministries provide services and ``build the trust and confidence of the people in the provincial government,'' Bednarek said.

Neighboring Iran

In southeastern Maysan province, coalition forces yesterday targeted a terrorist cell bringing armor-piercing bombs and fighters across the border from Iran, the military said in an e- mailed statement.

At least 20 insurgents were killed when troops called in air support during fighting in the cities of Amarah and Majjar al-Kabir, according to the statement.

The number of U.S. military deaths has risen every month since intensified security operations in and around Baghdad began in February. More than 500 U.S. service members have died in Iraq this year, bringing the total since the 2003 invasion to 3,517, including 2,888 who were killed in action. More than 25,000 have been wounded, 11,667 of them so seriously that they couldn't return to duty, according to the Department of Defense Web site.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in a report to the Security Council last week that the U.S. security surge is failing and that the fortified Green Zone in Baghdad has become too dangerous for UN workers.

[Rasputin]

7 Spanish tourists die in Yemen carbomb attack

Seven Spanish tourists died on Monday, and six more Spaniards were injured, due to carbomb attack in Yemen, Spain's Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

The attack took place at about 6:00 p.m. local time (1500 GMT) in Marib, some 190 km from Sanaa, Yemen's capital. The victims were part of a group of 14 Spaniards who were touring the area.

The tourists were part of a convoy of 20 all-terrain vehicles, which was around 100 meters from the landmark 3,000-year-old Mahram Belques Temple, building during the rule of the legendary Queen of Sheba.

The injured were transferred to a hospital in Mareb. No one hasyet taken responsibility for the attack.

A Yemen Interior Ministry official told reporters that, "preliminary information indicates that Al Qaida is behind this cowardly attack".

He said that the attack had also killed two Yemenis who worked as chauffeurs and tour guides, and injured two other Yemenis.

The Al Qaida group in Yemen had recently issued a statement, demanding the release of fighters from Yemeni jails and threatening to carry out attacks if demands are not met.

[Rasputin]

A suicide bomber ploughed his car into a group of Spanish tourists on Monday outside a temple in Yemen, killing 10 people. The attack comes less than two weeks after the US Embassy in Yemen warned Americans to avoid the area.

Seven Spanish tourists and three Yemenis, including the suicide bomber, were killed in the attack. It happened at the three-thousand-year-old Queen of Sheba temple in the central province of Marib.

Several others were wounded.

People nearby witnessed the car drive into the group of tourists on a road outside the temple site.

Police say they received information last month about a possible attack, but did not elaborate.

In April, the Spanish government advised travellers there was a risk of terrorists action and some tribes kidnap of foreigners to win favor with the government.

There were no immediate claims of responsibility, but authorities link the suicide bomber to al-Qaida.

The area, which is home to four powerful tribes with more than 70 branches, has been known to be a hotbed of support for al-Qaida.

About 100 foreigners have been kidnapped in this area since the 1990s.

[Rasputin]

Yemen said seven Spanish tourists and two Yemenis were killed in a suspected al Qaeda suicide car bomb attack on their convoy in the province of Marib on Monday.

Six Spanish tourists were wounded in the attack and were taken to hospitals in Sanaa and Marib, about 95 miles east of the capital, the official Saba news agency quoted an Interior Ministry source as saying.

"Preliminary information indicates that al Qaeda is behind this cowardly terrorist attack," the source said.

The bomber targeted the tourists after their vehicles left a temple in Marib at about 5:30 p.m. (10:30 EDT), the source said.

Two of their Yemeni drivers and tourist guides were killed and two were wounded.

"The security bodies will spare no effort to track down the terrorist elements behind this criminal act and present them to justice for a deterring punishment," the source said.

Security sources told Reuters earlier the attack followed an al Qaeda statement last week demanding the release of some of its members jailed in Yemen and warned of unspecified actions.

Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos said the tourists were accompanied by Yemeni security personnel when the suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into their convoy as they left the Queen of Sheba Temple.

"The convoy they were traveling in was made up of four vehicles with Yemeni security ahead of and behind them," he told reporters.
A suicide car drove into the two central vehicles causing the death of seven tourists and injuring another six, one of them seriously."

PRISON ESCAPEE

Residents said body parts were strewn around the charred and damaged vehicles used by the Spaniards. One resident said the blast was very strong and had been heard miles away.

Security measures around foreign interests and tourist sites were intensified after the attack, one security source said. Another said the bomber might be one of 13 convicted al Qaeda members who escaped from prison in 2006.

Yemen is the ancestral home of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It joined the U.S.-led war on terrorism launched after the September 11 attacks on the United States and has been battling Islamic militants for years.

The security sources said al Qaeda also demanded that Sanaa reconsider its cooperation with Washington.

In March a French student and a Yemeni man were killed and another Frenchman was wounded when Shi'ite rebels attacked an Islamic college in a volatile area in northern Yemen. The rebels are not linked to al Qaeda.

Yemen foiled two suicide attacks on oil and gas installations in 2006, days after al Qaeda urged Muslims to target Western interests, especially oil installations.

Al Qaeda's wing in Yemen claimed responsibility for the foiled attacks and vowed more strikes.

In 2002 militants bombed the French oil supertanker Limburg off Yemen's coast. In 2000, a suicide attack on the U.S. warship Cole killed 17 U.S. sailors.
Yemen, on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, has been widely seen in the West as a haven for Muslim militants, including al Qaeda supporters.

Scores of tourists and foreigners working in Yemen have been kidnapped over the last decade by tribesmen demanding better schools, roads and services, or the release of jailed relatives.

Most hostages were released unharmed, but in 2000 a Norwegian diplomat was killed in crossfire and in 1998 four Westerners were killed during a botched army attempt to free them from Islamic militants who had seized 16 tourists.

[Rasputin]

قتل جهانگردان اسپانیایی در انفجار یمن


تاکنون کسی مسئولیت این حمله در معبد کهن در یمن را بر عهده نگرفته است
یک بمبگذار انتحاری در یمن اتومبیلی پر از مواد منفجره را به یک کاروان جهانگردان کوبیده و باعث مرگ حداقل 9 نفر شده است.
مقامات یمنی می گویند دست کم هفت گردشگر اسپانیایی و دو یمنی در این انفجار در معبد "ملکه شبا" در استان مارب کشته شده اند.

در حدود هفت نفر دیگر در این حمله که وزارت خارجه اسپانیا آن را به شدت محکوم کرد زخمی شده اند.

یمن در سال های اخیر با نا آرامی فزاینده که دولت این کشور اغلب به عاملان القاعده نسبت می دهد روبرو بوده است.

خبرگزاری دولتی یمن به نقل از یک مقام وزارت کشور نوشت که حمله ظاهرا توسط القاعده انجام شده است.

این مقام به خبرگزاری صبا گفت: "اطلاعات اولیه حاکی از دخالت سازمان القاعده در این حمله بزدلانه است."

شاهدان عینی گفتند خورویی را دیده اند که پیش از انفجار به دروازه معبد بلقیس داخل شده و سپس راننده اش آن را به جمع خودروهای جهانگردان کوبیده است.

ظاهرا کشته شدگان اسپانیایی از یک گروه چهارده نفره از جهانگردان اسپانیایی بوده اند که از این معبد در 170 کیلومتری شرق صنعا، پایتخت، بازدید می کردند.

شاهدان گفتند که انفجار در حدود ساعت شش بعد از ظهر دوشنبه زمانی که سیر و سیاحت بازدید کنندگان در این معبد سه هزار ساله رو به اتمام بود روی داد.

نیروهای امنیتی یمن در سال های اخیر با کمک نیروهای ويژه آمریکایی در جیبوتی، در شاخ آفریقا، سرگرم نبرد با پیکارجویان اسلامگرا بوده اند.

القاعده از دولت یمن خواسته است شبه نظامیان زندانی در این کشور را آزاد کند.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

ابوعمر البغدادی، رهبر یک گروه مرتبط با القاعده در عراق، با انتشار یک پیام صوتی، جمهوری اسلامی ایران را تهدید کرد که اگرتا دو ماه، حمایت خود را از دولت شیعه عراق قطع نکند، علیه ایران وارد جنگ خواهد شد.
البغدادی که خود را رهبر "دولت اسلامی عراق" می* نامد، فاش کرد که جنگجویان القاعده از چهار سال پیش خود را برای جنگ با ایران آماده می *کنند.

اعتبار این نوار صوتی تا کنون از سوی منابع مستقل تایید نشده است، اما اگر آنچه در این نوار گفته شده، واقعا مربوط به رهبر گروه وابسته به القاعده در عراق باشد، آن را باید تحولی مهم در نوع برخورد القاعده با کشورهای خاورمیانه دانست.

القاعده، شبکه *ای از نیروهای افراطی در سراسر جهان اسلام است که در جریان حمله به برج* های دوقلوی سازمان تجارت جهانی در نیویورک در سال ۲۰۰۱ شهرت جهانی کسب کرد.

نوع تشکیلات، سازماندهی، منابع مالی و تسلیحاتی و ارتباط زیر مجموعه های شبکه القاعده تا کنون همچنان اسرارآمیز مانده است، اما این گروه مسئولیت بسیاری از حملات تروریستی در سرتاسر جهان را به عهده گرفته است.

از سال ۲۰۰۳ میلادی که ارتش آمریکا دولت صدام حسین را سرنگون کرده، عراق به محل تمرکز نیروهای القاعده تبدیل شده است.

هدف القاعده در عراق، بیرون راندن نظامیان آمریکایی از عراق و ساقط کردن دولت تحت رهبری نوری المالکی، نخست وزیر شیعه آن کشور است تا بتواند حکومتی مشابه حکومت ساقط شده طالبان در افغانستان، در عراق تاسیس کند.

گروه القاعده از زمان شروع فعالیت های گسترده خود تا کنون – به جز مورد بمب *گذاری در حرم امام رضا در مشهد که برخی منابع آن را به القاعده نسبت داده اند – در داخل ایران عملیات تروریستی انجام نداده است.

با وجود تضاد عقیدتی شدید القاعده با جمهوری اسلامی، به نظر می *رسد که اختلافات عمیق دو طرف با آمریکا سبب شده است که القاعده از انجام عملیات در داخل خاک ایران خودداری کند.

با این حال، رابطه ایران و القاعده همواره محل بحث محافل امنیتی و رسانه*ای جهان بوده است. مقام*های امنیتی کشورهای غربی و بخصوص آمریکا، بارها ایران را به پناه دادن به نیروهای القاعده متهم کرده *اند، اتهامی که در سال *های اخیر کمتر مورد تاکید قرار گرفته است.

پس از جنگ آمریکا علیه طالبان در افغانستان، مقام* های آمریکایی مدعی شدند که بسیاری از سران القاعده به ایران فرار کرده و توسط جمهوری اسلامی مورد حمایت قرار گرفته *اند.


ایران و القاعده
رابطه ایران و القاعده همواره محل بحث محافل امنیتی و رسانه*ای جهان بوده است. مقام*های امنیتی کشورهای غربی و بخصوص آمریکا، بارها ایران را به پناه دادن به نیروهای القاعده متهم کرده *اند، اتهامی که در سال *های اخیر کمتر مورد تاکید قرار گرفته است

مقام*های ایرانی هرگونه پناه دادن به افراد القاعده را به شدت رد کردند، اما فرار آنها به ایران و دستگیری شماری از مهره های مهم آنها را مورد تایید قرار دادند.

استرداد سران دستگیر شده القاعده در ایران که گفته می *شد سعد بن لادن، فرزند اسامه بن لادن رهبر القاعده نیز در بین آنها است، برای مدتی به صورت مساله *ای مناقشه *انگیز بین ایران و آمریکا در آمد، اما به تدریج فراموش شد.

ظاهرا مقام های آمریکایی به این نتیجه رسیدند که برخی سران القاعده در ایران تحت کنترل هستند و اجازه انجام عملیات علیه آمریکا و متحدانش را ندارند، از همین رو، از پیگیری استرداد آنها به کشورهایشان منصرف شدند.

به هر حال آنچه تاکنون بین ایران و القاعده جریان داشته، نوعی ترک مخاصمه اعلام نشده بین دو طرف بوده، ولی اینک یکی از رهبران وابسته به القاعده در عراق، به تهدید علنی ایران برخاسته است.

اگر تهدید ابوعمر البغدادی علیه ایران واقعی باشد، مشخص نیست که این تهدید تا چه اندازه مورد حمایت سایر شاخه* های القاعده بخصوص رهبری آن از جمله ایمن الظواهری معاون اسامه بن لادن باشد.

پیش از این، محافل امنیتی آمریکا گزارش *هایی را در باره مخالفت ایمن ظواهری با عملیات ضد شیعی شاخه القاعده در عراق در زمان حیات ابومصعب الزرقاوی منتشر کرده بودند.

هر چند که تعیین میزان صحت این نوع گزارش* ها ممکن نیست، اما به نظر می *رسد که افرادی مانند ظواهری به خلاف همتایان خود در عراق، علاقه چندانی به برافروختن جنگ فرقه*ای در جهان اسلام ندارند و ترجیح می* دهند که عمده نیروی خود را صرف مبارزه با آمریکا و متحدان آن در سراسر جهان کنند.

شاخه القاعده در عراق اما شیعیان را به طور خاص، یکی از اهداف اصلی خود معرفی کرده و بویژه احزاب شیعه در عراق را متحد آمریکا و هدفی مشروع برای قتل عام می *داند.


تهدید ایران از سوی القاعده
آنچه تاکنون بین ایران و القاعده جریان داشته، نوعی ترک مخاصمه اعلام نشده بین دو طرف بوده، ولی اینک یکی از رهبران وابسته به القاعده در عراق، به تهدید علنی ایران برخاسته است

با این حال، اینکه چرا رهبر گروه وابسته به القاعده در عراق در شرایط کنونی به تهدید ایران پرداخته است، به راحتی قابل فهم نیست.

شاید ابوعمر البغدادی بر این تصور است که ارتش آمریکا به دلیل فشارهای کنگره بر دولت جرج بوش به زودی از عراق عقب می *نشیند و در آن صورت، ایران به عنوان مهمترین حامی دولت شیعه مالکی مانع تسلط القاعده بر عراق خواهد شد.

شاید هم مساله بسیار پیچیده *تر از این باشد و به بازی*های پشت پرده امنیتی اعراب، غرب و ایران ارتباط پیدا کند، بازی *هایی که به دلیل ماهیت پنهان و اسرارآمیز آن، از صورت ظاهر و علنی نمی توان به واقعیتش دست یافت.

با این حال، مساله اصلی این است که شاخه القاعده در عراق تا چه اندازه می*تواند تهدید خود علیه ایران را عملی کند؟

به نظر می *رسد القاعده عراق در انجام عملیات انتحاری علیه اهداف غیر نظامی، بی *رحمی خاصی دارد، اما سازمان *های اطلاعاتی ایران نیز در کشف و خنثی سازی عملیات پنهان نظامی بی *تجربه نیستند.

با این حال، رویارویی علنی ایران و القاعده، بازی خاورمیانه را بیش از پیش پیچیده و بغرنج می *کند.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

Bush and the liberal intellectuals who gathered under the banner of a “war on terror” were emphatic in claiming that the enemy has no political agenda except a “cult of death and irrationality” which somehow entails the end of the world as we know it. Here is Bush on October 6, 2005: “In fact, we’re not facing a set of grievances that can be soothed [sic] and addressed. We’re facing a radical ideology with unalterable objectives: to enslave whole nations and intimidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the killers—and no concession, bribe or act of appeasement would change or limit their plans for murder.” Here is Berman at an even more delirious, and incomprehensible, pitch of prophetic dread, in Terror and Liberalism (2003): “The successes of the Islamist revolution were going to take place on the plane of the dead, or nowhere. Lived experience pronounced that sentence on the Islamist revolution—the lived experience of Europe, where each of the totalitarian movements [fascism and communism] proposed a total renovation of life, and each was driven to create the total renovation in death.”

But in fact, al Qaeda, like every other terrorist movement before it, has a legible political agenda that flows directly from its specific grievances against the West—especially against the US, the exemplar of western, liberal, imperialist capitalism. To be sure, this agenda is often animated by the religious vernacular that shapes public discourse in Muslim countries; but in essence it is a set of political goals which has little room for the imagery of Armageddon. Osama bin Laden insisted in 2003, for example, that the American way of life was neither his.personal concern nor the object of Islamic jihad: “their leader, who is a fool whom all obey, was claiming that we were jealous of their way of life, while the truth—which the Pharaoh of our generation conceals—is that we strike at them because of the way they oppress us in the Muslim world, especially in Palestine and Iraq.” Before and after the US invasion of Iraq, moreover, he consistently listed three examples of such “oppression”: the American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula; the US-sponsored economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Iraq after the first Gulf War (which, according to a UNICEF report, killed 500,000 Iraqi children under the age of five between 1991 and 1998 ) ; and the unwavering American support for Israel during its ill-fated invasion of Lebanon and during its ongoing settlement of Palestinian territory.

Now we may say that each of these three strategic positions was, or is, an important element in the national security of the United States, and with it the global order over which it presides. But in doing so, we must understand that none is a permanent or even long-standing fixture of US foreign policy—for all date from the very late 20th century (the consummation and militarization of the US-Israel relation, for example, dates from Reagan’s second term). We must also understand that each was, and is, a matter of choice by policy-makers; alternatives to all three positions were, and are, presumably available, especially in view of the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan and its subsequent dissolution, both of which reduced Russian power in the Middle East. Finally, we must understand that the adoption of alternatives to these strategic positions does not entail any disruption in the American way of life.

So, regardless of what we think about, say, Israel’s treatment of Palestinian claims—whether we think it is just or unjust—we can acknowledge that what we do (and support) in the Muslim precincts of the Middle East is far more significant than the way we live in North America. By the same token, we can acknowledge that what we do in that world elsewhere is subject to reconsideration and revision. Once we have made these acknowledgments, we can see that our approach to al Qaeda and related threats need not take the form of a borderless, endless “war on terror.” We can see that this approach might well take the form of diplomacy, perhaps even changes in US strategic positions. At least we can conclude that the militarization of American foreign policy is not the inevitable result of the terrorist threat to peaceful economic development on a global scale.

To boil this conclusion down to its essentials, let us ask an impertinent question. What if it had informed the US response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? What if the story told soon after 9/11 had portrayed these men as rationally using the principal weapon of the weak in seeking to redress specific political grievances and to change recent American foreign policy? Clearly, war would not have been the only actionable answer, the only conceivable consequence. Changes in the relevant strategic positions would not necessarily have been the appropriate response, either. But we would have known that the American way of life was not at stake in responding to the attacks of 9/11, that maintaining the distinction between law and strategy was necessary, and that bargaining with the enemy was therefore possible. The consequence of this narrative, this knowledge, would be a very different world than the one we now inhabit; at any rate we can be sure that it would not be on a permanent war footing, and that the Middle East would not still be the site of desperate armed struggle.

But it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative—that is why historians are not supposed to ask “what if” questions. Fortunately, there is another way to prove that, if our purpose is to explain, address, and contain the new terrorism, war is not the answer. It takes us to Iraq in the fourth year of the American-led invasion, when the so-called surge placed 30,000 additional troops in Baghdad. On the face of it the “surge” of 2007 was a military solution to a military problem, the lack of security. And on the face of it, the “surge” worked by reducing violence and improving security. In these terms, war was the answer to the rise of terrorist movements of resistance in Iraq, particularly Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. But in fact, the so-called surge did not work as a military solution. It worked instead as a counter-terrorist strategy that acknowledged the primacy, and the legitimacy, of specific political grievances (most of which pertained to perceived inequities of proportionate power within postwar Iraq), and that accorded Iran significant influence over Shi’ite militias in Baghdad.

In sum, a war of position worked where a war of maneuver had failed. Or rather, war as such was not the answer in stabilizing Iraq, or, in a larger sense, when fighting terrorism. The militarization of US foreign policy is not, then, the inevitable result of containing the new terrorism.