Ali Khamenei

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  • Rasputin
    Senior Member
    • Jan 2005
    • 63906

    #1

    Ali Khamenei

    Directly reaching the Iranian people can be achieved in two ways: (1) supporting political opposition groups that explicitly advocate regime change, and (2) empowering human rights and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that do not directly engage in political action but support issues such as women and children's rights, labor rights, and religious freedom.

    Although the latter groups do not pursue political goals, the Iranian regime considers them subversive entities seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

    Status of the Opposition

    Whether true or not, most Iranians believe that the United States overtly sponsors Iranian dissidents and opposition groups. The regime furthers this idea by suggesting that all internal political opposition is financed by the United States. At the same time, some opposition groups and individuals have overstated their relationship with Washington in order to bolster their credibility among politically frustrated Iranians and increase their leverage against the regime. The royalists, led by Reza Pahlavi, son of the late shah, are a prime example. A March 6, 2006, New Yorker article asserting that Pahlavi received CIA funding in the 1980s only strengthened the popular belief that his faction cannot act without substantial U.S. support.

    Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, significant changes have occurred among exiled Iranian opposition groups. The first years following the revolution were dominated by pro-American royalists and pro-Marxist, anti-American leftists. The collapse of the Cold War order heralded a makeover in opposition-group ideology, however. In addition, following the failure of the reform movement in Iran, many political activists, journalists, and students fled the country. This wave of departures greatly affected the political makeup of the exile population, forcing activists to regroup and redefine their ideological frameworks. One result is the Berlin-based Union of Republicans, an international alliance of formerly left-leaning dissidents and secular nationalists.

    The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is a political and military opposition organization that does not fit on the traditional political spectrum. During the Iran-Iraq War, it relocated to Iraq and supported Saddam Hussein against the Iranian regime through sabotage operations within Iran. Many believe that the MEK was funded and supported by the United States. Washington no longer supports the MEK, though its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, is lobbying Congress to change the legal constraints that outlaw such funding. That the United States is supporting groups other than the royalists has become a widespread belief in the last decade, leading to much speculation.

    U.S. Funding

    Since the September 11 attacks, American diplomatic discourse on Iran has changed. In 2002, President Bush labeled Tehran part of the global "axis of evil" and advocated the need for change, while Congress allocated $20 million to promote democracy in Iran. In 2006, the administration requested an additional $75 million for democracy promotion, all the while insisting that it does not want regime change in Tehran, but rather "change in regime behavior." From this amount, $36.1 million was allocated for Voice of America television and Radio Farda broadcasting. The remainder will be spent in Iran and abroad supporting NGOs and human rights organizations such as the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in New Haven, Connecticut.

    Some reports indicate that U.S. financial support is in fact aimed at regime change and goes beyond the allocated $75 million. In May, ABC News reported that the CIA had hired Jundallah, a Pakistan-backed Baluchi group, to carry out sabotage operations inside Iran. (Later, ABC reported that President Bush had in fact authorized a covert CIA program against the regime.)

    In addition to public and covert funding of Iranian opposition groups, the United States also supports individual dissidents through various means. On June 5, for example, President Bush met privately with two such dissidents during the Democracy and Security International Conference in Prague. These meetings might be seen as a means of granting legitimacy to individual dissidents such as Pahlavi and Amir Abbas Fakhravar (who claimed leadership over Iranian student activists when in Iran).

    Fakhravar has an uncertain reputation among Iran-based activists for exaggerating his political power. In 2006, many former and current student activists such as Ahmad Batebi and Nasser Zarafshan publicly refuted Fakhravar's claims about his background. Batebi, an acclaimed activist, remains in prison. Zarafshan -- a lawyer who represented the families of victims killed during the wave of "serial political murders" in November 1998, and who has himself spent five years in prison -- wrote a letter stating that Fakhravar was a known Iranian intelligence asset and that other activists were trying to avoid him.

    Despite its efforts, Washington has not assured Iranians of its intentions to support democracy. Although the United States seeks to amplify the voice of certain Iranian dissidents and ignite a democratic movement within the country, many Iranians assume that Washington actually aims to create an authoritarian pro-American puppet to supplant the current regime. Activists are concerned about the creation of an Iranian version of Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi. American support for controversial figures such as Fakhravar could send the wrong message to the Iranian people and increase their suspicions.


    iran
  • Rasputin
    Senior Member
    • Jan 2005
    • 63906

    #2
    Next Steps for the Opposition

    If they hope to advance their democratic cause, Iranian activists must undertake two concrete steps: (1) delineate a clear ideology and strategic plan for change, and (2) acquire the necessary power to mobilize the masses. Since the Islamic Revolution, the regime has easily suppressed domestic opposition groups. Meanwhile, opposition elements outside Iran have lacked the ideology, strategic planning, consistency, organization, and pragmatism needed to reach the people. Indeed, Iranian opposition groups have had little or no positive, tangible impact on the process of democratization. Many exiled democrats are uncomfortable with the current political groups and, as a result, prefer to use blogs, websites, and the media to provide the Iranian people with information and analysis. Contrary to regime propaganda and conventional wisdom in Iran, most of these individuals are independent of any foreign government.

    Conclusion


    Even if there is little chance Iranian political opposition groups could come to power, American support of such groups can serve two goals: (1) collecting information about public opinion in Iran, and (2) seeking advice that could help shape U.S. policy toward Iran. Problematically, these groups are often detached from the Iranian people. They do not represent any social group and are largely unable to influence constituencies within the country. As a result, they cannot provide the accurate information needed to fulfill U.S. goals. In fact, some Iranian dissident groups know less about Iran than American experts.

    Moreover, U.S. support for political opposition groups could actually sabotage the democratization process in Iran. If the United States sides with discredited groups such as the royalists or illegitimate individuals, its image in Iran will be further damaged. Iranians expect the United States to be actively engaged in promoting human rights and democracy, but most are suspicious of foreign-funded actors. Both the Iranian people and political leadership are quite sensitive about their country's independence. Hence, U.S. funding of even legitimate groups can serve to discredit them.

    The best way to credibly support and influence the Iranian people is to improve the quality of U.S.-funded Persian media, namely Voice of America television and Radio Farda. The United States can also promote human rights in Iran by making human rights a key issue in diplomatic efforts, the media, and NGOs. Finally, Washington can improve its standing with the Iranian people by streamlining the visa process for Iranian academics, artists, and students. This could have a tremendous effect on Iranian society, helping to spread liberal democratic values and fight the regime's anti-American propaganda.


    iran

    Comment

    • Rasputin
      Senior Member
      • Jan 2005
      • 63906

      #3
      حمايت آمريکا از اپوزيسيون ايرانی




      ارتباط مستقيم [دولت آمریکا] با مردم ايران از دو طريق ممکن است: (۱) پشتيبانی از گروه*های اپوزيسيون که صراحتاً طرف*دار تغيير رژيم هستند؛ و (۲) تقويت سازمان*های حقوق بشر و ساير سازمان*های غير دولتی که مداخله*ی مستقيم در عمل سياسی ندارند اما حامی مسايلی چون حقوق زنان و کودکان، حقوق کار و آزادی*های دينی هستند. با وجود اين*که گروه*های اخير در پی اهدافی سياسی نيستند، رژيم ايران آن*ها را گروه*هايی برانداز تلقی می*کند که خواهان سرنگونی جمهوری اسلامی هستند.

      جايگاه اپوزيسيون

      درست يا غلط، بيشتر ايرانی*ها بر اين باورند که آمريکا آشکارا از گروه*های مخالف و اپوزيسيون ايرانی پشتيبانی می*کند. حکومت ایران نیز القا می*کند که تمامی گروه*های سياسی مخالف داخلی از سوی آمريکا تأمين مالی می*شوند. در عين حال، بعضی از گروه*ها و افراد اپوزيسيون درباره*ی رابطه*شان با آمريکا اغراق می*کنند تا اعتبارشان را در ميان ايرانی*های سرخورده*ی سياسی بالا ببرند و اهرمی قوی*تر در برابر رژيم به دست بياورند. سلطنت*طلب*ها، به رهبری رضا پهلوی، پسر شاه فقيد ايران، بهترين نمونه**ی اين دسته هستند. روز ۶ مارس ۲۰۰۶، در مقاله*ای در مجله نيويورکر ادعا شده بود که پهلوی در سال ۱۹۸۱ از سازمان سيا بودجه دريافت کرده بود و اين ادعا مؤيد اين باور عامه بود که جناح او نمی*تواند بدون پشتيبانی عمده*ی آمريکايی کاری از پيش ببرد.

      از زمان انقلاب اسلامی در سال ۱۹۷۹، تغييرات شگرفی در ميان گروه*های مخالف ايرانی در تبعيد رخ داده است. سال*های نخست بعد از انقلاب، سال*های سيطره*ی سلطنت*طلب*های طرف*دار آمريکا، طرف*داران مارکسيسم و چپ*های ضد آمريکايی بود. اما با پايان گرفتن جنگ سرد، در ايدئولوژی گروه*های مخالف تغييری پديد آمد. علاوه بر اين، پس از ناکامی جنبش اصلاحات در ايران، بسيای از کنشگران سياسی، روزنامه*نگاران و دانشجويان از کشور خارج شدند. اين موج مهاجرت تأثير عميقی بر آرايش جمعيت در تبعيد پديد آورد و کنشگران سياسی را وادار به گروه*بندی*های تازه و باز تعريف چارچوب ايدئولوژيک*شان کرد. يک نمونه*ی آن را می*توان در اتحاديه*ی جمهوری*خواهان مستقر در برلين مشاهده کرد. اين گروه، ائتلافی بين*المللی از مخالفان سابقاً چپ*گرا و ملی*گرايان سکولار است.

      سازمان مجاهدين خلق يک سازمان مخالف سياسی و نظامی است که در طيف سنتی سياسی نمی*گنجد. در جريان جنگ ايران و عراق، اين سازمان به عراق رفت و از طریق عمليات خرابکارانه در داخل ايران، از صدام حسين عليه رژيم ايران پشتيبانی کرد. بسياری بر اين باورند که سازمان مجاهدين خلق از حمايت و پشتيبانی مالی آمريکا برخوردار است. آمريکا ديگر از سازمان مجاهدين خلق حمايت نمی*کند، اگر چه شاخه*ی سياسی اين سازمان، يعنی شورای ملی مقاومت ايران، در حال لابی کردن با کنگره است که محدوديت*های قانونی* تأمين مالی آن*ها را از سوی آمريکا از میان ببرد. اين*که آمريکا گروه*هايی به غير از سلطنت*طلب*ها را پشتيبانی می*کند در دهه*ی گذشته تبديل با باوری رايج شده که منجر به حدسيات زيادی شده است.

      بودجه*ی آمريکايی

      بعد از حملات يازده سپتامبر، گفتمان ديپلماتيک آمريکا در برابر ايران تغيير کرده است. در سال ۲۰۰۲، جورج بوش ايران را بخشی از «محور شرارت» خواند و تغییر رژیم را ضروری دانست. کنگره نيز ۲۰ ميليون دلار برای ترويج دموکراسی در ايران اختصاص داد. در سال ۲۰۰۶، دولت بوش خواستار بودجه*ی ۷۵ ميليون دلاری ديگری برای ترويج دموکراسی شد، و بر خلاف گذشته اصرار ورزید که خواستار تغيير رژيم در ايران نيست بلکه خواستار «تغيير رفتار رژيم» است. از اين مبلغ، ۳۶.۱ ميليون دلار به تلويزيون صدای آمريکا و راديو فردا اختصاص داده شد. بقيه*ی اين مبلغ در داخل ايران و خارج از ايران برای پشتيبانی از سازمان*های غير دولتی و سازمان*های حقوق بشر، مانند مرکز اسناد حقوق بشر ايران در نيوهيون در ایالت کِنتیکت، هزینه شد.

      بعضی از گزارش*ها حاکی است که هدف اختصاص بودجه، تغيير رژيم در ايران و رقم*اش بالاتر از ۷۵ ميليون دلار است. در ماه می، شبکه*ی خبری ای*بی*سی (ABC) گزارش کرد که سازمان سيا گروه جند الله را، که يک گروه بلوچ برخوردار از حمايت پاکستان است، استخدام کرده تا در داخل ايران عمليات خرابکارانه انجام دهد. (بعداً، ای*بی*سی گزارش داد که در واقع خود بوش اجازه*ی يک عمليات مخفيانه از سوی سيای را عليه رژيم ايران صادر کرده است.)

      علاوه بر تأمین مالی آشکار و مخفيانه*ی گروه*های مخالف ايرانی، آمريکا از مخالفان فردی نيز به شيوه*های مختلفی حمايت کرده است. به عنوان مثال، در روز ۵ ژوئن، جورج بوش در طی همايش دموکراسی و امنيت بين*المللی در پراگ، جلسه**ای خصوصی با دو مخالف ايرانی داشت. اين جلسات را می*توان به عنوان مشروعيت بخشيدن به افراد مخالفی مانند پهلوی و امير عباس فخرآور تلقی کرد (که مدعی رهبری فعالان دانشجویی ايرانی در زمان اقامت*اش در ايران است).
      فخرآور در ميان فعالان سیاسی داخل ايران به خاطر اغراق درباره*ی قدرت سياسی*اش نام و آوازه*ی خوبی ندارد. در سال ۲۰۰۶، بسياری از فعالان قبلی و فعلی دانشجويی و سیاسی مانند احمد باطبی و ناصر زرافشان آشکارا ادعاهای فخرآور را درباره*ی پيشينه*اش رد کردند. باطبی که از دانشجویان سیاسی شناخته شده است هنوز در زندان به سر می*برد. زرافشان که وکيل خانواده*ی قربانيان «قتل*های زنجيره*ای» سال ۱۹۹۸ است و خود پنج سال در ايران زندانی بوده است، نامه*ای نوشت و در آن اظهار داشت که فخرآور يک عنصر شناخته شده*ی اطلاعاتی و امنيتی در زندان بود که ساير فعالان سعی می*کردند از او دوری کنند.

      آمريکا با وجود تلاش*هايی که کرده، نتوانسته ايرانی*ها را نسبت به نيت*اش درباره*ی پشتيبانی از دموکراسی متقاعد کند. با وجود اين*که آمريکا در پی تقويت صدای بعضی از مخالفان ايرانی و زنده کردن جنبشی دموکراتيک در داخل کشور است، بسياری از ايرانی*ها فکر می*کنند آمريکا در واقع هدف*اش ايجاد يک نوکر گوش*به فرمان اقتدارگرا و طرف*دار آمريکا به جای رژيم فعلی است. فعالان سياسی نگران*اند نسخه*ی ايرانی سياست*مدار عراقی، احمد چلبی، در ايران به وجود بيايد. پشتيبانی آمريکا از چهره*های جنجالی مانند فخرآور می*تواند پيام نادرستی را به مردم ايران بفرستند و باعث افزايش بدگمانی آن*ها شود.

      قدم*های بعدی اپوزيسيون

      فعالان سیاسی ايرانی اگر به پيشبرد اهداف دموکراتيک*شان اميد داشته باشند، بايد دو قدم مهم بردارند: (۱) يک ايدئولوژی روشن و طرحی راهبردی برای تغيير وضعیت ترسيم کنند؛ و (۲) قدرت لازم برای بسيج توده*ها را به دست آورند. از زمان انقلاب اسلامی، رژيم به سادگی گروه*های مخالف داخلی را سرکوب کرده است. در عين حال، گروه*های مخالف خارج از ايران هم فاقد ايدئولوژی، برنامه*ريزی راهبردی، انسجام، سازمان*دهی و عمل*گرايی لازم برای ارتباط بر قرار کردن با مردم ايران بوده*اند. در واقع، گروه*های اپوزيسيون ايرانی هيچ تأثير مثبت يا محسوسی بر روند دموکراتيزه شدن ايران نداشته*اند. بسيای از دموکرات*های در تبعيد حاضر نیستند در قالب گروه*های سياسی فعلی قرار گیرند و در نتيجه ترجيح می*دهند از وبلاگ*ها، وب*سايت*ها و رسانه*ها استفاده کنند و اطلاعات و تحليل خودشان را به مردم ايران منتقل کنند. بر خلاف تبليغات رژيم و تلقی عمومی مردم در ايران، بيشتر اين افراد از هر دولت خارجی مستقل هستند.

      نتيجه

      حتی اگر احتمال به قدرت رسيدن گروه*های مخالف ايرانی بسيار کم باشد، پشتيبانی آمريکا از اين گروه*ها دو هدف می*تواند داشته باشد: (۱) کسب اطلاع درباره*ی افکار عمومی ايران؛ و (۲) مشاوره درباره تنظیم سياست آمريکا در قبال ايران. نکته*ی مشکل آفرين اين است که گروه*های اپوزیسیون اغلب از مردم ايران جدا افتاده*اند. آن*ها نماينده*ی هيچ گروه اجتماعی نيستند و عمدتاً از تأثير گذاشتن بر مخاطبان داخل ايران ناتوان هستند. در نتيجه، آن*ها نمی*توانند اطلاعاتی دقيق برای تحقق اهداف آمريکا را ارايه کنند. در واقع، اطلاعات بعضی از گروه*های مخالف ايرانی از اطلاعات متخصصان و صاحب*نظران آمريکايی هم کمتر است.

      علاوه بر اين، پشتيبانی آمريکا از گروه*های اپوزيسيون ممکن است عملاً به ويران کردن روند دموکراتيزه شدن ايران بينجامد. در آمريکا از گروه*های بی*اعتباری مانند سلطنت*طلب*ها يا افرادی نامشروع طرف*داری کند، وجهه*اش در ايران بسيار بيشتر صدمه خواهد ديد. ايرانی*ها انتظار دارند آمريکا درگيری فعالانه*ای در ترويج حقوق بشر و دموکراسی داشته باشد، اما بيشتر مردم ايران به فعالانی که بودجه*ی خارجی دریافت می*کنند مشکوک هستند. هم مردم ايران و هم رهبران سياسی ايران نسبت به استقلال کشور فوق العاده حساس*اند. در نتيجه، تأمين مالی حتی گروه*های قانونی و مشروع نيز از سوی آمريکا می*تواند باعث بی*اعتباری آن*ها شود.

      بهترين راه پشتيبانی موجه و تأثير گذاردن بر مردم ايران بهبود بخشيدن به کيفيت رسانه*های فارسی زبانی است که از طريق آمريکا تأمين مالی می*شوند از جمله تلويزيون صدای آمريکا و راديو فردا. آمريکا همچنين می*تواند حقوق بشر را در تلاش*های ديپلماتيک، رسانه*ها و سازمان*های غير دولتی اولویت بخشد و از اين طريق از حقوق بشر در ايران حمایت کند. به فرجام، آمريکا می*تواند جايگاه*اش را نزد مردم ايران با تسهيل روند اخذ ويزا برای استادان دانشگاه، هنرمندان و دانشجويان ايرانی بهبود بخشد. اين کار می*تواند تأثير شگرفی بر جامعه*ی ايرانی بگذارد و به گسترش ارزش*های ليبرالِ دموکراتيک بینجامد و تبليغات ضد-آمريکايی حکومت ایران را خنثی کند.

      iran

      Comment

      • csite
        Member
        • Jan 2006
        • 415

        #4
        or imo america can be realistic and support iranian political opposition groups within iran, noone can deny since khatami came to power iranians got increased freedoms and better human rights, he simply lacked the power to make some of the changes i know he wanted and believed in. He should have been supported by the west, instead once again they completely misread the political situation in iran.

        Supporting iranian dissident groups brings no good for iran, it was the same dissident groups who were ultimately responsible for Ahmadinejad coming to power, if you remember the popularity amongst iranian youth who didn't vote as a result of their propaganda which only served a purpose for america to become more hostile towards iran which leads to further suffering for the iranian people!

        Iran can only become democratic within, perhaps a succession of left wing election victories over several elections which can pave the way for gradually increased reform which can possibly one day lead to a democratic free society, any other way imo is unlikely to succeed and likely to be very violent (ofcourse these iranian dissident groups are more than happy to tell students to rush to the streets and start a revolution when in their little safe heavens in America, france, germany or britain! none of them would do it themselves or allow their sons)
        Last edited by csite; 07-15-2007, 02:36 AM.
        I love my Baghali ...

        Comment

        • zubin
          Member
          • Aug 2006
          • 1567

          #5
          I completely agree with you csite. First, they monopolize what "the opposition" is... There are many people working hard for constructive change who go unnoticed when external agents try to monopolize "the movement"...

          It should be a naturally occurring movement, and 100% an independent and internal movement. These are great principles, but they are also the only way good changes will actually happen.

          These people are trying to monopolize the movement by advertising a pipe dream that, if you think about it, is a crazy and haphazard plan. Also their ideologies are anti-democratic. These groups, and whoever receives funding from the US, are anti-democratic by virtue of being funded and attempting to monopolize power "for the good" of Iranians. They have a real problem understanding what democracy is... The PEOPLE, and not elites, decide the fate of the country. Not 50,000 Iranians, not 100,000 westerners, THE PEOPLE. And particularly... no governments decide the fate of our country.
          Take him and cut him out in little stars,
          and he will make the face of heaven so fine,
          that all the world will be in love with night,
          and pay no worship to the garish sun

          - Shakespeare

          "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - JS Mill

          Comment

          • Rasputin
            Senior Member
            • Jan 2005
            • 63906

            #6
            Iran’s broad and destructive activities in Iraq are bringing renewed attention to the Iranian regime’s longstanding role as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. As it continues to fund Shi’ia militias in Iraq and deliver weapons such as IEDs to the insurgency, Tehran is also escalating its presence in the Middle East as part of its goal to export Islamic fundamentalist rule throughout the Muslim world.

            Earlier this month, Sen. Joseph Lieberman discussed this issue in the Wall Street Journal, summarizing that “Iran is acting aggressively and consistently to undermine moderate regimes in the Middle East, establish itself as the dominant regional power and reshape the region in its own ideological image.”

            New intelligence out of Iran reveals that Tehran has instituted several new strategies for building its presence in the neighboring region. According to my sources associated with the National Council of Resistance of Iran — the same group that revealed the secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Ark in 2002 and many additional, validated facts about Iran’s nuclear program and activities in Iraq — one of these tactics is the covert militarization of Iran’s diplomatic corps.

            Today, most of the Iranian ambassadors in Middle Eastern embassies are members of the Qods Force, the elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the few embassies that are not led by a Qods Force officer, the unit has a presence with at least two or three members on the embassy staff whose job is to recruit locals and ensure that the ambassador strictly follows the IRGC line.

            In the case of Iraq, Tehran's ambassador, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, is a senior Qods Force commander. In addition, at least six other Qods Force officers are part of the embassy personnel facilitating the operation of Iran's terror network in Iraq.

            For years, one of the primary functions of the Iranian embassies in the Middle East has been intelligence gathering, which is carried out by Qods Force staff as well as local personnel who are hired and trained by the IRGC.

            A new element of the militarization of Iran’s intelligence-gathering system is the close relationship that has been forged between the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This partnership, developed during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, has created new operations systems that contrasts with the strategies used during the previous administration. Under former Intelligence Minister Ali Yunessi, the majority of Iran’s plans for activities in foreign countries were initiated by the MOIS and then approved by the executive branch or the Supreme National Security Council. Under Ahmadinejad, however, most of the plans for foreign intervention now originate with the IRGC and are immediately sent to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Only then does the MOIS participate in discussions and planning.

            This direct line between the military and the Supreme Leader is facilitated by a special section in Khamenei’s office set up to coordinate the smoothing functioning of the Intelligence Ministry (MOIS), the Qods Force and the Foreign Ministry in spreading Islamic extremism and inciting violence in Muslim countries.

            Traditionally, Iran’s special agents from the MOIS were primarily commissioned to engage in intelligence gathering in their foreign posts. However, under Ahmadinejad, these agents are now heavily involved in recruiting, training and carrying out specific missions using foreign nationals.

            These activities begin with the work of identifying individuals who have the potential and the ability to incite violence and create chaos in their homeland. After determining which of these have the best prospects as recruits, MOIS agents begin contacting them through local personnel and resources from the Iranian embassy.

            Once contact has been made, MOIS agents reevaluate the individual and prepare the proper ground for inviting him to Iran under various pretexts, such as making a pilgrimage, attending a seminar, or simply taking an all-expenses-paid educational trip to learn more about the Islamic Republic of Iran.

            While in Iran, personnel from both the MOIS and the IRGC determine which individuals are ready to cooperate with the Iranian regime and enter into official agreements with them. This is followed by training, after which the recruit is sent back to his country, either with orders in hand or with promises for participation in an upcoming mission.

            The training for these foreign terrorist recruits constitutes just a fraction of Iran’s commitment to terrorist training and support. Tehran has set up 17 camps in Iran dedicated to training terrorists from various countries around the world. These camps are scattered in various cities, including Tehran, Karaj, Qom, Ahwaz, Nahavand and Dezful. Being Muslim is not a requirement for training in one of the camps; the only requirement demanded of the regime is that the trainees be anti-American and willing to fight Americans. My sources report, for example, that some of the trainees in Iran’s terrorist camps are non-Muslim fighters from Somalia.

            This information supports the U.S. military’s recent report about Iran’s deep involvement in Iraq, which reaffirms how many resources Tehran is pouring into Iraq and its proxy terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. As Senator Lieberman states, the United States must establish an Iraq solution that will not allow Iran to advance its goals: “Every leader has a responsibility to acknowledge the evidence that the U.S. military has now put before us: The Iranian government, by its actions, has all but declared war on us and our allies in the Middle East.”

            To counter this Iranian threat, the military option is not necessary and, as the current policy of negotiations and appeasement has failed, serious consideration deserves to be given to the third option: supporting the Iranian opposition. The Iranian challenge should have an Iranian solution, conceived of and implemented by Iranian patriots with the support of the international community. The Iranian opposition, which seeks to replace the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Tehran with a secular democracy, relies on the Iranian people rather than on foreign troops to bring democratic change to Iran, and is the most viable option.

            It is time for the international community to give this option a chance by fully abandoning the policy of appeasement.

            iran

            Comment

            • Rasputin
              Senior Member
              • Jan 2005
              • 63906

              #7
              Navigating the fractious currents of émigré politics is never easy, and especially for the Iranian opposition group known as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) or the People's Mujahedeen of Iran (PMOI).

              Simply put, the rogue oil state regime it opposes terrifies one half the West and tempts the other; and the MEK is itself accused of being a superannuated Marxist-Islamist terrorist cult.

              These obstacles have not, however, prevented the MEK from trumpeting that Islamism is the new global threat, providing important intelligence to the West (for example, about Iran's nuclear program), terrifying the regime in Teheran, and putting on major displays of anti-regime solidarity.

              I witnessed one such display at a vast exposition hall outside Paris last week, where some 20,000 Iranians from around the world met to hear music from the old country, wave flags and banners, and listen to brief speeches by non-Iranian well-wishers - notably US Congressman Bob Filner, Democrat of California, and former Algerian prime minister Sid Ahmad Ghozali. The crowd then settled in for an 85-minute tour d'horizon by the MEK leader, Maryam Rajavi.

              THE MEETING inspired several observations. First, the slick production, with hints of an American political convention (balloons and chaff falling from the rafters, a televised sequence of the leader arriving in cavalcade), was aimed mostly at an audience outside the hall, especially in Iran.

              Second, the event had two apparent goals: reminding Iranians that an alternative does exist to today's theocracy, plus pressuring the European Union to remove the MEK from its terror list. For Iranians, the music portion included pretty girls in (for them, daring) Western clothing. For Europeans, it pointedly included "Le chant des partisans," the anthem of the French Resistance during World War II.

              Third, Rajavi's in-depth analysis mentioned neither the United States nor Israel, something extremely rare for a major speech about Middle Eastern politics. Nor did she even hint at conspiratorial thinking, a deeply welcome change for Iranian politics.

              Finally, no other opposition group in the world can mount so impressive a display of muscle as does the MEK, with its thousands of supporters, many young, and a slate of dignitaries.

              These factors, combined with the mullah's near-phobic reaction toward the MEK, suggest that the organization presents a formidable tool for intimidating Teheran.

              Alas, Westerners presently cannot work with the MEK, due to a 1997 decision by the Clinton administration, followed five years later by the European Union, to offer a sop to the mullahs and declare it a terrorist group, putting it officially on a par with the likes of al-Qaida, Hamas, and Hizbullah.

              Paulo Casaca, a Portuguese member of the European parliament, notes that "Officials on both sides of the Atlantic are on the record as saying that the only reason why the group was put on the US terrorism list in the first place was to send a 'goodwill gesture' to the Iranian regime."

              But the MEK poses no danger to Americans or Europeans, and has not for decades. It does pose a danger to the malign, bellicose theocratic regime in Teheran. The MEK's utility to Western states is reflected in the inconsistent, even contradictory, US government attitude toward it over the past decade. One amusing instance came in October 2003, when Colin Powell, the secretary of state, tartly wrote Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, to remind him that the 3,800 MEK forces at Camp Ashraf in Iraq were supposed to be treated as captives, not as allies.

              But there will be nothing amusing as the American presence in Iraq winds down and thousands of unarmed MEK members are left to the tender mercies of the pro-Teheran regime in Baghdad. Belatedly, the Bush administration needs to take three steps. First, let the MEK members leave Camp Ashraf in a humane and secure manner. Second, delist the organization from the terror rolls, unleashing it to challenge the Islamic Republic of Iran. Third, exploit that regime's inordinate fear of the MEK.

              As Patrick Clawson and I suggested over four years ago, "To deter the mullahs from taking hostile steps (supporting terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq, building nuclear weapons), it could prove highly effective to threaten US meetings with the MEK or providing help for its anti-regime publicity campaign."

              That remains good advice, but there's not another four years to wait.

              iran

              Comment

              • Rasputin
                Senior Member
                • Jan 2005
                • 63906

                #8
                What is Wrong with the Iranian Opposition?

                I do not think anybody in the Iranian opposition would disagree that there is something seriously wrong with the Iranian opposition of the last two decades or it would not have failed so miserably to change the regime in Iran. Islamic Republic of Iran has been around for 23 years although it is one of the most undesired regimes, both by the Iranian people living under its rule, and by the people and states of many other countries. And the mullah's Islamism, contrary to Hitler's Fascism, is not good at technology to compensate for its inabilities in economic and international relations and to nullify its inability to introduce a democratic political system in Iran.



                Also one cannot just say that this regime has been around because the mullahs of Iran, contrary to Mola Omar of Afghanistan, are very sly in game playing, both with various political forces inside Iran and the ones outside. True that Iranian clergy know how to play the game of speaking on both sides of their mouth very well, to avoid a fate like the Shah, where all forces opposing him united against his arrogance. But regardless of all these tricks of the magicians of Islamic Republic, the main reason why this regime is still around is that the opposition has not been able to be a viable alternative to unite the Iranian people to replace this regime.



                And the problem of Iran certainly is not lack of opposition. In fact, comparing Iran to all the Arab countries and Afghanistan, one can see that Iranian opposition is a very *real* thing and anybody who thinks that change of regime in Iran should or will be done by outside forces is blind to see the extent of Iranian opposition forces. Then the question is why this opposition is so real and extensive and yet is not an alternative.



                I think what is wrong with Iranian opposition is that we Iranians do not know how to work as a community of individuals and at the same time we can no longer accept a cult-like organizational structure either. In other words, the Iranians have become very conscious about individual rights, thanks to the Islamic Republic’s wiping out of every vestige of social freedoms in Iran, on top of the political freedoms that were already wiped out by the Shah. I have already written enough on this issue and will not repeat here.

                The bottom line reality is that Iranians are now very aware of individual freedoms and the genie cannot go back in the bottle. Now some consciously deny the free choice to themselves to escape from this free choice, and join cults like mojAhedine khalgh. A similar phenomena was true in Germany of Hitler and this is why Eric Fromm wrote his book "Escape From Freedom" to describe those who although have freedom available to them escape from it to cults to avoid decision-making as a responsible person in a free society. But those going for cults like MKO or Baha'i or Shahmaghsoodi cults are not the main body of Iranian opposition. Thus the question is not about them because Iranian people have already said no to cults like MKO and MKO has already shown that it is not able to mobilize Iranian people to change the regime.



                The question is about those who respect their own individual rights. Those people have the support of Iranian people but they have not been able to form any serious organization of themselves and this is the problem that one needs to solve. I think we Iranians do not know how to work in an organization of free individuals and basically we only know how to form a political cult but political cults cannot be formed by independent individuals and this is why we have failed for 23 years.



                As a result, we have as many organizations as we have individuals in the opposition. Some think this is because in democracy individuals can think for themselves contrary to those who abide by a velAyate faghih. This is half true. In fact, the free individuals should be able to cooperate and they actually have done for centuries in the democracies. If one cannot form a democratic opposition organization, one should also doubt to be able to form a democratic state later after taking over the power. Almost all these organizations of Iranian opposition are trying to get the support of U.S. to be the one leading the future state in Iran. Even the Islamic reformists and the IRI regime itself are in this race for the heart of United States.



                Nonetheless the reality is that the presence of a large Iranian opposition means that not the U.S. but Iranian opposition is the determining factor for any regime change in Iran. But how is the opposition going to solve the problem of the unity of itself to unite all the people. In fact, the unity of the current groupings even if possible means a unity within a fiefdom which is of no value to bring cohesiveness to the movement and it is impossible too, because even the forces that share the same politics and ideology are not able to unit, and are splitting more. Then if closer forces are not able to unite, how can those that are even farther from each other in the spectrum unite. And it is a dream to think a bigger umbrella can bring all of them together. There is no such force today and those in the past who thought MKO or Prince Reza Pahlavi can play such roles have failed in their assessment. I think we should just look closely at the Iranian opposition to see what the reality is.



                Take a look at the monarchists. They are one hundred and one groups. Every person in every geographical area is an organization. Although they all say they are for restoration of monarchy, they cannot even work with each other and continue to split more and more. Look at the organizations like IranMehr, Pars, Derafsh-Kavyani, and many many others. I am not denying their democratic right to be separate groups but I am trying to see where we are in the convergence of the whole movement . The same is true about even the lobbyists, although they are not really opposition to IRI but they are still Iranian political forces. One would think that lobbying for Islamic Republic should make it easier to unite, and it does, but still they have gone the same path and one sees IIC, WPAC, PWC, AIC, and many others. Then look at the leftists. There were actually many groups in the past too but after the revolution, they have split more and more and nowadays there are so many of them. True that their schism has to do with the great schism of Communism worldwide but in Iran's case, this has incredible magnitude. Let's look at mellimazhabis. They split to nehzate AzAdi and mellimazhabi and then again Ezatollah Sahabi from the latter broke off with Vahid Sadeghi and others and the saga continues. Jebhe Melli has different organizations set up in different geographical locations but they are each in a way a separate and this has helped it to incorporate the reality of the movement in its structure, more than others, but still is very far from what one could call a united organization of free individuals. Now among the whole opposition only one force seems to work united and that is mojAhedine khalgh which I call MKO cult. Why have they remained united is because they are a cult of brainwashed masses and are *not* a community of free individuals united for a common goal, program, and action. Would this model work for others. No it will not. The genie is out of the bottle. Maybe 30 years ago, a cult-tike structure would work for forces of many shades of thoughts but not now. And also what is even more important is that the people of Iran would not support a cult-like organization like MKO anymore. This is why free individuals, who are not even cooperating much, have more support of the Iranian people, than the cults like MKO although MKO has a lot more resources at its disposal but people do not even read their papers nor watch their TV.

                iran

                Comment

                • Rasputin
                  Senior Member
                  • Jan 2005
                  • 63906

                  #9
                  Second Part

                  So what is the solution today?



                  I think we should first understand that unless a solution is applied and forces with closer programs unite, any unity of the whole movement is just rhetoric and will never take shape and all umbrella dreams around a force like MKO or Prince Reza Pahlavi are pipe dreams that have already evaporated and there is no traditional organization like masjed for secular alternative in Iran and army will never be a substitute for such organization in Iran. In other words, the monarchists should form their own organization of free individuals because they share the same political platform. The same goes for lobbyists or leftists or others. But we see they are not converging.



                  I think the leaders of all these shades of political thought should make it their first priority to create a *democratic* organization of their own likeminded individuals. In other words to have very simple things like "Robert Rules of Order" voting and quorum, charters and bylaws, etc. For example, I think Prince Reza Pahlavi, if he thinks that he is for monarchy, he should take a lead and create such a *democratic* organization of monarchists. If he abdicates the throne, then he can participate in forming an organization with a republican platform but one has to start making organizations of free individuals and show the people of Iran that the opposition is able to create *democratic* organization for itself before it can claim to run the country by free individuals cooperating as a state.



                  What I think is interesting is that all forces of the Iranian political spectrum now have platforms. This is something hardly any of them had twenty years ago.

                  It is a good thing that all different political forces now have their own platforms. Why? Well to form an organization which is a community of free individuals, one has to first have a platform which specifies the political goals of the organization. Then one has to define the organization's rules. For example, very simple things like the right to leave an organization, something which is so clearly absent in the MKO cult that they even publish the letter of the x-wife of a dissident who has written that they should have shot her x-husband because he had decided to leave that organization. It is worse than mafia. One should be crazy to call such a mafia cult a political organization.



                  So the organizational rules. And then one should democratically go about plans for different areas of politics, economics, culture, human rights, and change of regime in Iran. The organization should use voting and democratic structures to run itself and only then one can work for the unity of the whole opposition. An opposition which is made of a few cults can be united like a fiefdom by a khAn or a sheikh or a shah. But groups of free individuals cannot be united that way. We need to start forming democratic organizations of free individuals who share common political platforms.



                  In fact, inside Iran with less democracy there has been more attempts for democratic structures than among the opposition outside Iran where there has been more of a free environment to do it. The reason is that the Iranian opposition abroad is more focused on quick shortcuts than on creating serious organizations. The latter may be more painstaking and time-consuming but this is the only way to go. Some people may be able to help such efforts financially. Some others may put in more time. That is the individual' s focus. But the goal should be to form organizations of free individuals among Iranians. This is the only way to make a change in Iran that can last because exactly such organizations will be needed not just to change the regime but to run a future democratic Iran.

                  iran

                  Comment

                  • Rasputin
                    Senior Member
                    • Jan 2005
                    • 63906

                    #10
                    Iran Opposition Groups

                    Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran

                    Committee for Humanitarian Assistance to Iranian Refugees (CHAIR) (US)

                    Communist party of Iran

                    Confederacion Foundation (US)

                    Daneshjoo (US)

                    Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar

                    Democracy Network of Iran - DNI (Sweden)

                    Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

                    Dialogue 2001 (Dialogue Among Civilizations)

                    Didgah (views)

                    Ettehaad-e chap - Alliance of Leftist Political Groups (UK)

                    International Campaign for the Release of Ezzatollah Sahabi

                    Fedaian League (Sweden)

                    Fedaian Minority

                    Hasteh-Aghaliat

                    Flag of Freedom Organization of Iran (France)

                    Focus on Iran (US)

                    Foundation For Democracy In Iran (US)

                    Green Party of Iran (Canada)

                    IL GÜN (TORKMANSAHRAJE IRAN) (Germany)

                    Human Rights Watch World Report - 1999

                    Iran Cuba Friendship Society (ICFS) (US)

                    Iran-Daneshjoo (US)

                    Iran Didban

                    Iran Lover's (Germany)

                    Iran National Front (Jebhe Melli) (US)

                    Iran National Front (Jebhe Melli), USA (US)

                    Iranian Federation In Sweden (Ettehadieh) (Sweden)

                    Iranians for International Cooperation (US)

                    Iranian Human Rights Working Group (IHRWG) (US)

                    Iranian People's Fadaee Guerrillas (Canada)

                    Iranian Rationalist Forum

                    Iranpolitics - Alborz Magazine (US)

                    Kar-gah-e Honar-e Iran (Sweden)

                    Kargar-e Socialist - Iranian Revolutionary Socialist's League (UK)

                    Khomeini.com (US)

                    Komala - Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan (Germany)

                    Marze Por-Gohar (US)

                    Melli Mazhabi (Liberty, Equality, Gnosis)

                    International Federation of Iranian Refugees (IFIR) (US)

                    Islamic Iran Participation Front (Iran)

                    Mojahedin (France)

                    Nader Moghadam's "The Messenger" (political commentary)

                    National Council of Resistance of Iran

                    National Council of Resistance of Iran supporters

                    National Socialist Iranian Workers Party

                    Nehzat e Azadi ye IRAN

                    Sama - Organization of freedom seeking movahadin of Iran (US)

                    Sarbedaran (UK)

                    Sedaye Kommunisme Karegari (US)

                    Siahkal News

                    Siasat-e Kargari (Worker Politics)

                    The Socialism Way

                    Tudeh Party

                    Worker-Communist Party Of Iran (Europe)

                    Worker Today (Kargar-e-Emrooz) (Denmark)

                    iran

                    Comment

                    • Rasputin
                      Senior Member
                      • Jan 2005
                      • 63906

                      #11
                      America does not understand Iran (if the baseline criteria to qualify a country for U.S. invasion is "know thy enemy," then Iran is hereby disqualified). Nor does it fully comprehend Iran's multilayered, complex leadership. For one, Americans pay far too much attention to the ranting of its lunatic president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose anti-U.S. and anti-Israel screeds, while disturbing, hardly constitute Iranian foreign policy.

                      Real power lies with Iran's Supreme Leader, not its president. Hence, Washington should pay closer attention to the words of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who remains the final arbiter of all foreign policy matters. Yet his approach to world politics has been anything but consistent. He pushed ahead with Iran's nuclear program in the face of international opposition, but also showed flickering signs of a willingness to suspend it. He repeatedly blew off entreaties to deal positively with the "Great Satan," while periodically dropping hints he might favor restoring relations with Washington. Khamenei condemned the 9/11 attacks, and a few months later, there was limited but successful U.S.-Iran cooperation on Afghanistan (most experts say President Bush's 2002 "Axis of Evil" speech nixed any hope of meaningful rapprochement). An Iranian overture for dialogue with the United States, channeled through a Swiss emissary shortly after the Iraq War began, was reportedly rebuffed by American diplomats.

                      Relations between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei have also been strained. After his first batch of anti-Israel comments, the president was reined in by the Supreme Leader, who publicly reiterated Iran's policy of nonaggression to all UN members. Khamenei also preferred less explosive language to describe Iran's nuclear program, while continually asserting his country's right to peaceful atomic power. But he is no peacenik or democrat. Sure, while casting his vote in local elections in December 2006, he said the Iranian public "can play a major role in sealing the fate of the country and nation and influence the county's decision-making process," but Khamenei also said he was not "prepared to allow flawed and non-divine perspectives and ideas that are aimed at enhancing the power of the individual to dictate [Iran's] social and political lives." He has appointed reactionary clerics to powerful positions and purposefully given the post of presidency little power or room to maneuver. His powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps have stamped out student protests and clamped down on human rights activists (as the recent spate of arrests of Iranian-Americans demonstrates).

                      Hence, that is what makes the death this week of Ali Meshkini so significant (he died of lung disease). The ayatollah chaired the Assembly of Experts, an 86-member body that selects the country's Supreme Leader. His likely successor is rumored to be Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president and behind-the-scenes powerbroker, not to mention once one of the world's richest men, according to Forbes. Rafsanjani also chairs something called the Expediency Council, whose powers he has expanded (the body arbitrates between Iran's parliament and the Guardian Council, a powerful body that has veto power over all parliamentary decisions). Khamenei's health has taken a turn for the worse (earlier this year he dodged a Mark Twain moment when rumors of his demise turned out to be grossly exaggerated by false media reports). If Khamenei checks out, he has no clear successor. Rafsanjani could pull a Cheney -- that is, tasked with the job of selecting a supreme leader, he might reach for the closest mirror and choose himself (though his religious credentials have been called into question). Another possibility, experts say, is replacing the single post of Supreme Leader with a body of Grand Ayatollahs.

                      Regardless, Americans should take note of the fact that within Iran's leadership, there are a number of competing foreign policy agendas (for instance, the views of Iran's foreign ministry and Revolutionary Guard Corps toward Iraq often clash). Washington should wake up to these divisions and not put so much stock in the disturbing musings of Ahmadinejad. Nor should it expect the regime to fall anytime soon. "Abrupt domestic change in Iran is unlikely in the near term and would not necessarily lead to an improvement of the status quo," writes Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment "The only groups that are both armed and organized at the moment are not liberal democrats but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Bassij militia." Yet that is hardly to say Americans should not prepare for the day when the position of Iran's Supreme Leader changes hands, which may come sooner rather than later.

                      iran

                      Comment

                      • Rasputin
                        Senior Member
                        • Jan 2005
                        • 63906

                        #12
                        For awhile, there has been speculation about the deteriorating health of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. As the country’s highest political authority, his death will have major implications for Iran.

                        Indeed, the succession of a new leader will largely determine the direction that Iran will take in the upcoming decades, both in its stance towards the international community and on domestic issues such as economic and political freedom.

                        Thankfully, if Khamenei passes away, it’s far from clear that another hard-line conservative will be elected to take his place.

                        There are two reasons for this.

                        CLERICAL DISILLUSIONMENT:

                        First, amongst the Shia clergy, there is a strong sentiment that Khamenei should be replaced by someone far more moderate, or that his powerful position should be abolished entirely. In Qom, the major center of Shia learning in Iran, a number of senior religious clerics believe that religion and politics do not coincide. They argue that Khamenei, by playing such a major role in Iran’s political life, has overstepped his authority as a religious leader.

                        Indeed, for the Iranian government to even have the position of a ’supreme leader’ arrogantly suggests that this figure somehow speaks for God. Only a strict separation of Islam and politics, these clerics believe, upholds that which is written in the Koran. Interestingly, although rarely covered in the Western press, many Shia clerics have been saying this since the 1979 revolution. Now, with rumors about Khamenei’s health, many of these clerics are again deciding to speak up to call for a more moderate figure, or to suggest that the post should be gotten rid of entirely. (Outside of Iran, I should note, other Shia leaders hold this view as well. Iraq’s Ayatollah Sistani, for instance, believes that politics and Islam are not compatible and should be relegated to different realms.)

                        CITIZEN FRUSTRATION:

                        Second, with popular support for the Iranian regime at all-time lows, there is concern amongst government leaders that unless they make some major changes, the religious regime’s days are numbered. Their concerns are well-placed. Polls have suggested that upwards of 60 or 70% of the Iranian populace wants to see a more democratic, and liberal, Iran. Many Iranians are frustrated with the direction of the religious regime and believe that its style of governance is antiquated and unrepresentative of the will of the people.

                        Some government leaders, although unwilling to bring an end to clerical rule, are reasoning that selecting a more moderate supreme leader will go a long way towards assuaging the doubts of the Iranian people. Ayatollah Rafsanjani (discussed below) is one of those figures.

                        AN INTENSIFYING DEBATE:
                        Now, with the death of Ali Akbar Faiz Meshkini, this debate has again come to the forefront. Meshkini, who led the Assembly of Experts (an important government body that monitors and elects Iran’s supreme leader), was the ideological heir to Khamenei. A long-term conservative cleric, he was likely to appoint someone with similar hard-line credentials, thereby maintaining the status quo. But, with Meshkini no longer on the scene, more moderate members of the Assembly of Experts have begun jockeying for position.

                        At the forefront of this struggle is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president who has argued for a more conciliatory posture towards the West. If Rafsanjani ascends to the leadership role in the committee, he is likely to push for a more moderate leader once Khamenei dies. Increasingly, however, there are questions about whether or not Rafsanjani (if he becomes the head of the Assembly) will merely nominate a more moderate figure or whether he will abolish the position of ’supreme leader’ entirely.

                        Of course, this may be jumping the gun. Khamenei is still alive, and it is far from clear that he will be passing away anytime soon. That being said, Rafsanjani and other Shia clerics clearly believe that his death is not far down the line, and they are (as we speak) trying to position themselves to take full advantage of the situation when it does finally occur.

                        This will be something to watch. What happens to the supreme leader, and who his successor is (or, for that matter, whether or not one is appointed to replace him), will have a tremendous impact on the country and on the region.

                        iran

                        Comment

                        • Rasputin
                          Senior Member
                          • Jan 2005
                          • 63906

                          #13
                          TEHRAN, Iran -- President Bush will one day be tried in court just like deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein for his involvement in the Iraq tragedy, Iran's supreme leader said Friday.

                          Speaking to thousands of worshippers during the first Friday prayer of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Bush will be called to account for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

                          A day will come that the current U.S. president and officials will be tried in an international supreme court for the catastrophes they caused in Iraq," he said.

                          "Americans will have to answer for why they don't end occupation of Iraq and why waves of terrorism and insurgency have overwhelmed the country," he added. "It will not be like this forever and some day they will be stopped as happened to Hitler, Saddam and certain other European leaders."

                          Khamenei mocked the U.S., describing the recent congressional testimony of the top U.S. officials in Iraq as a sign of weakness and the failure of American policy in the war torn country.

                          "More than four years have passed since the occupation of Iraq and today everyone knows that America has failed and is frantically looking for a way out," he said.

                          In their testimony Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker raised allegations _ denied by Iran _ of Iranian meddling in Iraq by financial and military support of militias and insurgent groups. They warned that the U.S. was already embroiled in a proxy war with the Islamic republic.

                          Despite U.N. sanctions and efforts to isolate Iran internationally, the country is flourishing, maintained Khamenei.

                          "Today we are in a better political position compared to four to five years ago," he said. "We have moved forward economically and the spiritual preparedness and happiness of our nation has improved."

                          "A nation like ours, without an atomic bomb and not as wealthy as these other powerful governments, has foiled a whole series of their conspiracies and forced them to give up and withdraw," he added.

                          The U.S. accuses Iran of secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons and has called for further international sanctions against the country. Iran denies the charge.

                          Iran and the U.S. have not had diplomatic relations since Washington cut its ties with Tehran after Iranian students stormed the U.S. embassy there in 1979.

                          iran

                          Comment

                          • Rasputin
                            Senior Member
                            • Jan 2005
                            • 63906

                            #14
                            ولی فقیه بحرالعلوم نیز هست , البته در اسلام (به ویژه درتشیع) چیزی که کم نداشته و نداریم بحر العلوم است , اینان در همه ی عرصه های علوم طبیعی (و ماوراء طبیعی و خفیه) و علوم اجتماعی , از فقه و سیاست و اقتصاد و حکمت و نجوم و ریاضیات و طب گرفته تا فرهنگ و انواع و اقسام هنرهای اسلامی و غیر اسلامی متخصص و صاحب نظر , و معلم و راهنما بوده و هستند. حال اگر نظرات , افاضات و فتاوی این بحر العلوم ها با علوم زمانه ی خود , و این زمانی , همخوانی نداشته و ندارد این مشگل علوم است نه عیب و ایراد اسلام و بحر العلوم های اش, چرا که مسلیمن می پندارند اسلام و بحرالعلوم های اش " گل بی عیب" اند و" به ذات خود ندارند عیبی", و اگر عیب و ایرادی هم گرفته می شود یا از نادانی نامسلمان هاست و یا از نامسلمانی ی مسلمان ها!

                            برای نمونه نگاه کنید به آثار معروف ترین "بحرالعلوم" تشیع , یعنی امام جعفر صادق , به ویژه "طب الصادق" , که اهل تشیع می پنداشتند و می پندارند برجسته ترین و معتبر ترین کتاب طبی در جهان است , وبرخی به گونه ای حیرت انگیز بر این باورند که حتی امروزه نیز قابل استفاده است!( توصیه می کنم این اثر شگفت انگیز را مطالعه کنید اما با احتیاط تا چون من چوب این نوع مطالعه کردن ها را نخورید). (1)

                            نه فقط آثار نوشته شده ویا رونویسی شده ی امام های معصوم ,حتی توضیح المسایل آیت الله ها و مجتهدینی که اکثرا" نیز از روی هم رو نویسی کرده اند,نشان از این دارند که حرف های این حضرات ربطی به علوم اجتماعی و طبیعی زمانه ی خود و این زمانی نداشته و ندارند. برای نمونه نگاه کنید به آثارآیت الله خمینی که در آن ها همه چیز پیدا می شود جز علم و دانش و انسانیت و آزادگی انسان.

                            در این میانه اما تعجب آور تر"شاعر" از آب در آمدن خمینی است. با آنکه اسلام تکلیف" شعر و شاعر را روشن کرده است اما پادو های بارگاه خمینی خلق الساعه امام را شاعر و اشعارش را منتشر کردند.

                            خمینی اما علیرغم" شاعر" شدن لحظه ای دست از دشمنی با شاعران , و بطور کلی با قلم و اهل قلم بر نداشت. او بارها اظهار تاسف کرد که چرا در آستانه ی انقلاب دستور نداد اهل قلم را بر سر چهار راه ها دار بزنند , او فرمان داد تا قلم ها را بشکنند ,و شکستند, او فتوا داد اهل قلم را بکشند, و کشتند و ....نشان داد که نخستین" شاعر" جهان است که شاعران را به شکنجه گاه و قتلگاه فرستاده است!.(2)

                            آیت الله خامنه ای و "اصحاب قلم"

                            ولی فقیه, آیت الله خامنه ای , همچون امام اش "بحر العلومانه" آثاری منتشر کرده است که همان ویژگی های آثار امام اش را دارد. در عرصه فرهنگ و هنر خامنه ای اما با خمینی تفاوت هایی دارد. یکی از تفاوت ها این است که خامنه ای " شاعر " نیست اما " اهل هنر و ادب" می نماید.در رابطه با قلم و اهل قلم نیز در حرف مثل امام اش نمی نماید ولی در عمل راه همان " شاعر" ی که قاتل قلم و اهل قلم بود را رفته و می رود.

                            به هنگام کاندیداتوری ریاست جمهوری گفته می شد که آیت الله خامنه ای اهل موسیقی ست و حتی تار می نوازد. گفتند که " طبع هنر پرورا نه " ای نیز داردو با شعرا , به ویژه برخی شعرای همولایتی اش , همچون زنده یاد مهدی اخوان ثالث , حشر و نشری داشته است . و وقتی اخوان از شاعر گرانقدر اسماعیل خویی خواست تا اجازه دهد او نزد خامنه ای برود و شفیع اش شود تا شاعر بزرگ تبعیدی بتواند به ایران بر گردد و" مثل بچه ی آدم " برود فلسفه درس بدهد , وجود حشر و نشرهای " هنر پرورانه" رهبر تقویت شد. البته به یاد داریم پاسخ زیبا و قاطع اسماعیل خویی به اخوان ثالث را. اسماعیل خویی ضمن رعایت احترامی سزاوارانه نسبت به استادش اخوان ثالث, همراه با رد پیشنهاد او نوشت :" این ما هستیم که باید آخوند های آدمخوار را ببخشیم نه آن ها ما را " .(3)

                            آیت الله خامنه ای در مقام ریاست جمهوری ضمن حمایت از قلم شکنی های خمینی و آزار و کشتار اهل قلم , گاه سیاست به نعل و به میخ را پیش می برد. این ها نمونه هایی از میان ده ها نمونه اند:

                            او در مصاحبه ای 2 ساعته با کیهان ( به سال 1364) از اهمیت نقد سخن گفت اما در جا گفت در نقد کردن : " باید مرزها را رعایت کرد .....ما نباید ورع مطبوعاتی را با سانسور و خود سانسوری اشتباه کنیم و...."(4)

                            خامنه ای چه به وقت ریاست جمهوری و چه در مقام ولی فقیه از خط و نشان کشیدن برای اهل قلم غافل نشد.

                            " ... یک جریان ضد انقلابی و ضد دینی ادعایی لیبرالیسم وابسته در داخل کشور ما وجود دارد که در دوران تسلط رژیم فاسد و ستمگر گذشته , به ساز آن رژیم رقصیده اند و با او همکاری کرده اند و... دست اطاعت و غلامی به او داده اند و آن اوضاع را تحمل کرده اند و دم نزده اند. اینها یا نویسنده یا شاعر یا هنرمند یا مطبوعاتچی بودند. بعد که نطام جمهوری اسلامی سر کار آمده است و به همه آزادی معقولی داده شده است ...اینها در مطبوعات وابسته ای که پول هایش از آن طرف مرز می آید...علیه جمهوری اسلامی شیر شده اند...""(5)

                            ولی فقیه در 15 مهر ماه سال 1377 نیز در دیدار با اعضای جهاد سازندگی گفت: "......نویسندگان و روشنفکران ایران در فعالیت های اقتصادی دولت اخلال می کنند و در عرصه های نظامی, امنیتی , سیاسی و فرهنگی لطمه می زنند "

                            خامنه ای ,رییس جمهوری که بین "ورع مطبوعاتی" و سانسور فرق می گذاشت در مقام ولایت فقیه به توجیه و دفاع از سانسور روی آورد و خطاب به "شورای فرهنگ عمومی کشور" گفت:

                            ".... سانسور باید به نفع خوانندگان کتاب انجام شود" و مدعی شد که همه ی حقوق به نویسنده مر بوط نمی شود بلکه دولت هم باید به نفع خوانندگان دست به سانسور کتاب بزند.(6)

                            ولی فقیه چندی بعد نیز در سخنرانی ای در جمع ده ها تن از ناشران داخلی سانسور مطبوعات و کتاب و ممنوعیت ماهواره را کاری اسلامی و درست خواند و گفت:" باید وسایل لازم برای مصون سازی ذهن ها و افکار جوانان فراهم شود." (7)

                            فرمان سانسور لغت نامه ی دهخدا , از تازه ترین نمونه های تلاش های سانسور گرانه ی ولی فقیه ی" هنر پرور" است.

                            ف.م.سخن , نویسنده و طنز پرداز گرانقدر در این رابطه می نویسد:

                            " ...... آيت الله خامنه ای نيز با اظهار نگرانی از برخی مطالب مندرج در لغت نامه ی دهخدا، حکم به بررسی و تصحيح (بخوانيد حذف) برخی مطالب لغت نامه را می دهند از جمله ماده ی مربوط به حجةالاسلام شفتي.

                            در مقدمه ی چاپ ۱۳۷۷ لغت نامه -که يک جلد مجزا را به خود اختصاص داده- خلاصه ای از نامه های رسيده به موسسه لغت نامه درج شده از جمله نامه ی حوزه ی علميه ی قم. "مطالب اين نامه در بهار سال ۱۳۷۷ تحت عنوان بررسی لغت نامهء دهخدا در رساله ای به همت حضرت آيت الله استادی در دوازده بخش در قم به چاپ رسيده" که بعد از حذف يک بخش و چند سطر، در مقدمه ی لغت نامه نقل شده است. در بخشی از اين نامه آمده(صفحه ی ۵۳۹ تا ۵۴۱ مقدمه):

                            "رهبر معظّم انقلاب، حضرت آیةالله خامنه ای (دامت برکاته) در لغت نامهء دهخدا در شرح حال عالم بزرگوار، فقيه عاليقدر، حاج سيد محمد باقر رشتی معروف به حجةالاسلام شفتی (که قبر شريفش در اصفهان در کنار مسجدی که خود او بنا کرده است(مسجد سيد) مزار مومنان است) به مطالبی توهين آميز که حاکی از کج سليقگی و روحيهء غيرمذهبی و غرض ورزی نويسندهء آن است بر می خورند. بخشی از مطالبی که در شرح حال حجةالاسلام شفتی در لغت نامه آمده، به اين شرح است:

                            ...«چنين طالب علمی که در تمام مدت عمر به عبادت و تقوی و زهد مشهور بوده و غالب اوقات او از خوف خدا به تضرع و ابتهال و نماز و دعا می گذشته، و شب ها از شدّت استغراق و گريه و زاری و عجز و الحاح به درگاه باری تعالی او را حال جنون دست می داده، به تدريج تا آنجا ثروتمند و مالک و تاجر شد که سالی هفتاد هزار تومان به ديوان ماليات می داده و عدد آبادی ها و خانه ها و ميزان نقدينهء او را هيچکس جز خود او نمی دانسته و ضياع و عقار او را نه آفتاب مساحت می توانسته است، نه باد شمال... در شهر اصفهان گويا چهارصد کاروانسرا از مال خود داشته؛ گويا زياده از دو هزار باب دکاکين داشته......"

                            اما قسمتی از زندگی اين حجةالاسلام پولدار و ثروتمند که به مذاق آيت الله خامنه ای خوش نيامده از اين قرار است:
                            "«و چون سيد اقامهء حدود را در زمان غيبت امام واجب می دانسته، خود به امر به معروف و نهی از منکر و اجرای حدود قيام می نمود و مدعی بوده است که حکم من در اين قبيل مسائل، بعينه همان حکم حضرت صاحب الزمان است. عدد کسانی که سيد ايشان را در دورهء سلطهء خود در اصفهان به تازيانه حد زده، از حساب بيرون است. و شمارهء کسانی که او به دست خويش به عنوان اقامهء حدود کشته، تا يکصد و بيست نوشته اند. امر عجيب در کار وی اين است که او متّهمين را ابتدا به اصرار و ملايمت تمام و به تشويق اينکه خود در روز قيامت پيش جدّم شفيع گناهان شما خواهم شد به اقرار و اعتراف وا می داشته، سپس غالبا با حال گريه ايشان را گردن می زده و خود بر کشتهء آنان نماز می گذارده و گاهی هم در حين نماز غش می کرده است

                            اين که چرا نَقل زندگی نامه ی اين سيد آدمکش در لغت نامه، خاطر آيت الله خامنه ای را آزرده و ايشان را نگران کرده به ما مربوط نيست اما اين که به خاطر اين نگرانی، همين سطور، از لغت نامه حذف شده البته به ما مربوط است

                            در چاپ اخير –يعنی چاپ ۱۳۷۷-، در جلد ۶، صفحه ۸۷۸۱، بعد از عنوان "مجلس درس حجةالاسلام و شاگردان و تاليفات او" بلافاصله عنوان "وفات سيد و محل قبر و اولاد او" می آيد، حال آن که در چاپ قديمی تر، يعنی در چاپ سال ۱۳۳۰، جلد ۱۸، صفحه ی ۳۲۹، ميان اين دو عنوان، عنوانِ "حجةالاسلام و اقامهء حدود" آمده که شيوه سربريدن ِ مندرج در نامه ی حوزه از روی همان، نوشته شده است. اين بخش در چاپ جديد –لابد به اشاره رهبر معظم انقلاب- کلا حذف شدهاست...")




                            iran

                            Comment

                            • Rasputin
                              Senior Member
                              • Jan 2005
                              • 63906

                              #15
                              البته" بحرالعلوم"زیرک و حواس جمع است , او ترتیبی داده است که پادو های فرهنگی اش هر از چند گاهی گروهی " اهل هنر و ادب " را به بارگاه اش بکشانند تا ایشان ضمن نشان دادن " هنر پرور"ی اش درس های لازم نیز به این دسته از اهالی " هنر و ادب" بدهد. روزی جماعتی روز نامه نگار و نویسنده, روزی دیگر گروهی ناشر, یک روز مشتی سینما گر و دیگر روز انبوهی شاعر و شاعره جمع می شوند تا از دانش " گسترده وعمیق" ولی فقیه در عرصه های روزنامه نگاری , نشر, سینما و شعر مستفیض شوند. کافی ست سری به تار نمای ولی فقیه بزنید تا درجریان همه ی این دیدارها و در سها و راهنمایی ها و فضل فروشی ها قرار بگیرید.

                              تازه ترین این نوع نمایش ها چهار شنبه 4 مهر ماه سال 1386 بر پا شد:

                              "....طنین نوای ربنای استاد شجریان و اذان زنده یاد موذن زاده اردبیلی در عصر و شامگاه نور باران تهران , شاهد گردهم آیی گروهی از شاعران و اهل ادب بود که نماز مغرب و عشاء را به امامت مقام معظم رهبری حضرت آیت الله خامنه ای قیام بستند و....." و " سپس سروده های خود را در وصف پیامبر اعظم(ص), اهل بیت عصمت و طهارت( علیهم السلام ), انقلاب اسلامی ,دفاع مقدس وهمچنین اشعاری با مضامین دینی و اجتماعی , قرایت کردند."
                              برنامه گذار اصلی این شرفیابی"مرکز آفرینش های ادبی حوزه هنری" بود,و درمیان ده ها شاعر و شاعره ی "گردن کلفت", گردن کلفت ترین ها علی معلم , موسوی گرمارودی , یوسفعلی میر شکاک , حمید سبزواری و علیرضا بدیع بودند.

                              "....وقتی مجری جلسه از یوسفعلی میر شکاک برای شعرخوانی دعوت کرد,احوال جویی گرم مقام رهبری وی را بر آن داشت تا نزد ایشان رفته و پس از آن که ابراز علاقه و ارادت از نزدیک صورت گرفت " (9) , این شاعر " دشمن آزادی و قلم شکن" از همان نزدیک برای مقام رهبری اش شعر خواند!

                              موسوی گرمارودی نیز مورد تفقد و مزاح افتحار آمیز رهبری قرار گرفتند.

                              ".... وقتی مجری جلسه نام علی موسوی گرمارودی , شاعر خط خون , را برای شعر خوانی بر زبان راند, وی با بیان اینکه آثارش در زمینه شعر کلاسیک , بیشتر قصیده است و در زمینه ی شعر نو , آزاد, خواست فرصت وی را به جوانان شاعر اختصاص دهند, اما پس از آن که مقام معظم رهبری به مزاح به وی فرمودند که یک قصیده را انتخاب کنید و نیمی اش را امسال و نیمی اش را سال دیگر بخوانید , گفت: پس یک قطعه کوتاه را با نام مهربانی می خوانم تا پاسخ مهربانی آقای باقری را داده باشم ...." (10) ( ساعد باقری از بر پا دارندگان و مجریان این نمایش ها ست).

                              علیرضا بدیع از نیشابور نیز شعرخواند و خامنه ای پس از استماع اشعارش گفت :"....چگونه می گویند که نیشابور به عطار و خیام نیفزود؟ الحمدالله که افزوده است"(11)

                              "....علی معلم ( دامغانی) نیز به رسم سال های اخیر, یکی از آثار روایی –محاوره ایی اش را خواند:که مقام معظم رهبری در پی آن فرمودند:" این زبان خوبی ست,اما کار هر کسی نیست, مثل شما گردن کلفت های شعر می توانند از عهده اش بربیایند والا اگر یک مقدار سست باشد به ابتذال کشیده می شود,نظیرش را هم قبلا" دیدیم : مثلا" پریا ".

                              همین دو سه قلم اظهار نظردرباره علیرضا بدیع و علی معلم , و مقایسه ی نوشته های اینان با آثار عطار و خیام و شاملوعمق بحر این بحر العلوم را نشان می دهد . این" فرمایشات " در کنار گفتار و کردار ولی فقیه ی " هنر پرور" در باره ی قلم و به قول خودش" اصحاب قلم " بیانگر این واقعیت است که بزرگترین بحرالعلوم در قید حیات عالم تشیع - و لابد عالم اسلام - چقدر با پدیده ی فرهنگ و هنر , و گوهر ادبیات بیگانه است . سوی دیگر نمایش های " شرفیابی" نیز نشانگر واقعیتی ست تلخ تر , که چگونه ساده لوحی , سخافت و حماقت می تواند شعر و شاعر را " سرشار از تهی" و آستان بوس بارگاه قاتل شعر و شاعر , و فرهنگ و هنر کند.

                              ********

                              زیر نویس:

                              1- به سال 1354 , زمان دانشجویی در دوره ی بالینی , در"مرکز پزشکی فیروزگر" در تهران با دو همکلاس مذهبی پیرامون طب الصادق گفت و گویی داشتم , بی آنکه قصد توهین داشته باشم موارد بسیاری از موضوع های مطرح شده در کتاب را که با خوانده های آن روز ما مغایرت داشت با این دو همکلاس در میان گذاشتم و به عنوان دانشجوی پزشکی نظرآن ها را جویا شدم ( برای نمونه نظر امام جعفر صادق در باره ی علت بروز و شیوع جذام –خوره- , یا درمان اسهال و....) . آن دو همکلاس مذهبی گفتند این کتاب به دوره ای تعلق دارد که امام جعفر صادق حیات داشت . نمونه هایی مقایسه ای ارایه شد که نشان می داد بحث ها ی کتاب مذکور برای همان دوره هم بی ربط و عقب مانده بود, آن دو اما نپدیرفتند. باری , پس از انقلاب این دو همکلاس به معاونت پارلمانی وزارت بهداری و ریاست بخش پزشکی کمیته امداد امام خمینی منصوب شدند. حول و حوش سال 1360 به من اطلاع داده شد که در وزارت بهداری مطرح شده است که من " پیکار"ی هستم و در سال 1354 " صب امام " کردم . به آورنده ی خبر گفتم من پیکاری نیستم و سال 1354 هم صب امام نکردم و ماجرا را برای اش شرح دادم. ابتدا از سوی وزارت بهداری به جبهه ی جنگ فرستاده شدم و پس از بازگشت حکم اخراج ام از بیمارستان به من ابلاغ شد. رییس بیمارستانی که در آنجا شاغل بودم با آنکه حزب الهی بود از روی مهر و دوستی گفت: بهتر است دور وبر وزارت بهداری آفتابی نشوی , همو گفت ماجرا به بحث پیرامون طب الصادق ارتباط دارد! و از من خواست خودم را گم و گور کنم و.....

                              2- برای خواندن نمونه هایی از گفته های خمینی به مجموعه ی 5 جلدی بخشی از تاریخ جنبش روشنفکری ایران, بررسی تاریخی و تحلیلی کانون نویسندگان ایران و.... , به ویژه مقدمه ی جلد سوم , مراجعه کنید. این

                              مجموعه توسط انتشارات باران منتشر شده است.

                              3- متاسفانه نامه ی اسماعیل خویی عزیز به اخوان ثالث را در اختیار ندارم , آنچه نوشتم به اتکا ی حافظه ام است.

                              4- کیهان و کیهان هوایی , سال 1364, بخش اعظم این مصاحبه در جلد سوم منبع شماره 2 آمده است. ( رابطه " ورع مطبوعاتی" و سانسور در فرهنگ آخوندی چیزی شبیه رابطه ی تعزیر و شکنجه است!)

                              5- نشریه " یا لثارات الحسین" , نشریه انصار حزب الله , شماره 27 , سیزدهم اردیبهشت 1375

                              6- شهروند( تورنتو), سال ششم, شماره 275 , 14 آبان ماه 1375

                              7- سخنرانی آیت الله خامنه ای در جمع گروهی از ناشران , اردیبهشت ماه 1378- آپریل 1999

                              8- وبلاگ ف.م.سخن ,( برگرفته از تارنمای گویا) ," از آیت الله خامنه ای و لغت نامه ی دهخدا .....",.30 دی ماه 1386

                              9, 10, 11 – " تکریم شعر و شاعری در شب میلاد کریم اهل بیت (ع) , تارنمای خبر گزاری دانشجویان ایران ," ایسنا" سرویس فرهنگ و ادب- ادبیات.

                              iran

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