Iran-U.S.A

[donsaeid]

بوش تحريم ايران را تا 55 روز ديگر تمديد کرد

جورج بوش رئيس جمهور آمريکا قانون تحريم ايران را تا 29 سپتامبر (هفتم مهر) تمديد کرد.

بر اساس اين قانون که اجرای آن از سال 1996 آغاز شده، شرکتهايی که ظرف يک سال بيش از چهل ميليون دلار در ايران سرمايه گذاری کنند از دادوستد با دولت آمريکا محروم خواهند شد.

اين قانون به نام مبدع آن در مجلس سنای آمريکا، به داماتو شهرت يافته است.

قانون داماتو تا پيش از آنکه دولتی ليبی اختلافات خود با غرب را رفع کند شامل ليبی نيز می شد.

تمديد قانون تحريم ايران يک روز پس از آن صورت گرفته که دولت ايالات متحده اعلام کرد دو شرکت تسليحاتی دولتی روسيه را همراه با دو شرکت صنايع شيميايی هندی، دو شرکت از کره شمالی و مرکز مهندسی ژنتيک و فناوری زيستی کوبا به علت دادوستد با ايران مورد تحريم قرار داده است.

البته تحريم اين شرکتها بر اساس قانون ديگری است که اجرای آن از سال 1999 آغاز شده و با موضوع سلاحهای کشتارجمعی ارتباط دارد.

بنابر اين قانون هر شرکت يا فردی که مواد، تجهيزات يا دانشی در اختيار ايران قرار دهد که در ساخت سلاحهای کشتار جمعی کاربرد داشته باشد از دادوستد با دولت ايالات متحده آمريکا و استفاده از امکانات اين دولت ممنوع می شود.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

در حالیکه دو هفته بیشتر به جلسه شورای امنیت سازمان ملل متحد برای بررسی پرونده اتمی ایران نمانده، تعدادی از مقام های سابق آمریکایی طی نامه ای به جورج بوش رئیس جمهور این کشور گفته اند برنامه های اتمی ایران به مرحله بحرانی نرسیده است.
روزنامه لس آنجلس تایمز روز چهارشنبه نوشت یک گروه از ژنرالها و دیپلماتهای سابق آمریکایی طی نامه سرگشاده ای به جورج بوش هشدار داده اند که وارد منازعه با ایران نشود.

در این نامه که قرار است فردا منتشر شود آمده است شرایط ایران بحرانی نیست زیرا این کشور توانایی ساخت سلاح اتمی را در آینده نزدیک ندارد و دولت بوش در عوض باید بطور مستقیم با تهران بر سر برنامه های اتمی اش مذاکره کند.

به نوشته لس آنجلس تایمز در میان امضا کنندگان این نامه اسامی 21 نفر از جمله ژنرال بازنشسته جوزف هور رئیس فرماندهی مرکزی آمریکا بین سالهای 1991 و 1994، زنرال بازنشسته رابرت گارد دستیار سابق رابرت مک نامارا وزیر دفاع اسبق آمریکا در دهه 1960 و نیز مورتون هالپرین مقام ارشد وزارت خارجه آمریکا و عضو شورای امنیت ملی در دولت بین کلینتون رئیس جمهور پیشین آمریکا دیده می شود.

ژنرال گارد در مصاحبه با لس آنجلس تایمز گفت بحرانی خواندن شرایط ایران به معنای این است که باید دست به اقدامی نظیر بمباران تاسیسات اتمی این کشور زد.

وی ضمن ابراز نگرانی نسبت به تهدیدهای اخیر چند مقام سابق اسرائیلی به حمله به تاسیسات اتمی ایران گفت که ارتباط دولت بوش با اسرائیل آنقدر عمیق است که ممکن است آمریکا وارد منازعه نظامی با ایران شود.

امضا کنندگان نامه به تلاش های ایران برای مذاکره با آمریکا از طریق مقام های سوئیسی اشاره کرده و گفته اند دولت آمریکا باید برای کاهش تنش ها در منطقه به ایران پاسخ می داد.

به نوشته لس آنجلس تایمز در این نامه نسبت به تضعیف امنیت آمریکا هشدار داده شده و از کاخ سفید خواسته شده است دست به تغییرات جدی در سیاست خود در قبال ایران و عراق بزند.

[Rasputin]

What friends?

This is in response to "How to make enemies" by Saeid Bozorgui-Nesbat in which he shared his friend's story and the way he was treated by the U.S. Homeland Security officers. After the usual grumbling about the U.S. policies and chastising the U.S. government, he, as is common among many Iranians, mixed this incident with issues such as Hamas in Palestine and the infamous prison in Iraq and a few others that somehow he believes are all related to his friend's misfortune.

While at it, Nesbat could have at least said something about the rights and the misfortune of the common criminals as well. But that does not seem to bother him at all. Who cares about such mundane issues when the highly respectable alumni of Sharif University are in trouble. In my view, many of the issues he has raised are irrelavent to this incident and should have been avoided. I would rather stick to what concerns his friend, Mohammad, and other Iranians who were not allowed to enter the U.S.

Here I am not trying to belittle or ignore any of the issues Nesbat mentions. After reading his letter carefully, however, I have this feeling that he simply does not care about these problems. He only uses them to add some weight to his facile argument. Now, let's see where the real problem lies. U.S. embassies and consulates issue about seventy-three types of visas to citizens of other countries. B1/B2-visitor for business and pleasure- visa is one of them.

If we consider B1 and B2 separately then the number gets much larger. The Department of Homeland Security has a very comprehensive website explaining all the details related to such visas. There are also contact numbers that you can call and talk to an agent in case of emergencies or send faxes and ask questions concerning how to get a visa or other related issues. There is also a number in Washington, D.C. you can call. If Nesbat or other interested individuals could download the website, thers is a section titled, "Coming to America-Getting Your Visitors Visa."

In that section under the part that says, "What is a visa?" you can read the following paragraph:

"The visa allows a foreign citizen to travel to a port-of-entry in the United States, such as a(n) international airport, a seaport or a land border crossing. At the port-of-entry, an officer of the Department of Homeland Security decides whether to allow you to enter and how long you can stay."

This is very clear and to the point. Obtaining a visa does not automatically guarantee entry into the United States. As far as I know, most other countries have the same regulation in regard to visas issued by their respective consulates and embassies.

Also looking at question number 35 of the Nonimmigrant Visa Application form provided on the same website you can read, "Has Your U.S. Visa Ever Been Cancelled or Revoked?" This question implies that it is possible for a visa to be revoked after it has been issued by a consulate or an embassy. Without any precedents, there would be no need for this question.

It might prove comforting to read the U.S. Homeland Security Website and find out that the regulations which are in there are not aimed at humiliating Iranians. They concern citizens of all other countries as well.

Having lived in the U.S. for some time and, as his letter indicates, becoming a nturalized citizen of the United States, Nesbat must have realized by now that whether one is a member of the elite of a country or a financially deprived citizen of a poor country coming to the U.S. in search of better livelihood, they should be treated equally and by the same law. No individual should stand above the law merely based on his social status. Perhaps Nesbat, in his zeal to solicit sympathy for his friend, has forgotten that even some heads of states need to apply for visas before coming to the U.S.

Also I would like to remind Nesbat of the fact that the world is glutted with highly educated people who cannot find the jobs they like. I am saying this because Nesbat seems to be under this culturally misplaced and anachronous impression that somehow the alumni of Sharif university deserve special treatment because they are, as he calls them, "cream of the crop." Had Nesbat bothered to take a look at number 41 of the Nonimmigrant Visa Application, perhaps he would not have been as enraged as he seems to be. Number 41 in the application is where the applicant puts his signature and is extremely important. It reads as follows:

"I certify that I have read and understood all the questions set forth in this application and the answers I have furnished on this form are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that any false or misleading statement may result in the permanent refusal of a visa or denial of entry into the United States. I understand that possession of a visa does not automatically entitle the bearer to enter the United States of America upon arrival at a port of entry if he or she is found inadmissible."

Applicants read the above statement and sign the application bearing in mind that giving any false information may entail unpleasant consequences. It is self-explanatory and anyone reading it can understand its significance. The fact that the final decision is made at the port of entry is also clearly stated. Cultural or individual differences may cause misreading of the laws and regulations of other countries, however, having this statement at the end of the application should be taken seriously.

Right or wrong, Iranians who were refused entry into the U.S. must have been deemed undesirable or a threat to the security of Americans. Every government has the right to protect its citizens the way they know best. Being treated as a criminal is understandable in a situation where an individual has been found to have given false or misleading information to the authorities. This is for the Department of Homeland Security to decide.

Watching from the sidelines uninformed and out of touch with the realities of the exceedingly strained situation at hand, it would only be unwise to ground one's judgement on sheer emotional attachment to someone or something. If I am not mistaken, fingerprinting of Iranian citizens is nothing new. I believe it started in 1996. Later, and after 9/11 citizens of other countries were required to undergo fingerprinting and have their mug shots taken.

As Nesbat has, correctly, poited out in his letter, the Homeland Security officers who handcuffed the Iranians and took them to jail were doing their job. Most probably, they could not keep them at the airport for security reasons. It has been known that certain individuals, while in custody, have escaped from airports around the world. Keeping about a hundred Iranians and perhaps a bigger number of citizens of other countries at an airport involves great risk that the U.S. government is not willing to take at the moment.

The officers at the airports are given lists of undesirable elements who are not supposed to set foot on the U.S. soil. These undesirable elements may include mobsters, common criminals or the elite of a country. Security officers have to follow orders given to them by their superiors. Dealing with a vast number of cases daily, they are not given much information as to the nature of the intelligence that leads to such decisions. And they are not accountable to those who are refused entry into the U.S.

Nesbat could have tried to be more objective instead of maliciously accusing the U.S. government of purposefully antagonizing Iranians. According to a recent article by an American journalist, in the state of California alone there are more than 600,000 (six hundred thousand) Iranians. In the past twenty-seven years, the U.S. and Canadian authorities have been exceptionally generous toward Iranian citizens who have chosen to call those countries their homes. Their humane immigration and naturalization policies have helped hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from Iran to build much better lives than they could have back home.

Nesbat wrote something about enticing Iranians to come to the U.S. which I did not fully understand. If by enticing he means giving visas, then he is being audaciously unreasonable. The U.S. government authorities did not go knocking on these people's doors offering them visas and begging them to hold their reunion in California. They were granted visas after they applied for them. Since these individuals seem to be extremely intelligent they should have known getting a visa for a country and entering that country are two separate things. Based on my experience, it is customary for consulates and embassies to give out information regarding important matters including the ones I have mentioned above.

Nesbat seems to be worried about the U.S. losing friends. He should rest assured that his fears are unfounded. I only hope this is not the case of the Iranian proverbial cockroach falling into a puddle.

[Rasputin]

The US lacks reliable intelligence on Iran's weapons capability, including its possible plans to develop a nuclear bomb, a US Congressional report says.
The House Intelligence Committee report says more must be spent spying on Iran.

Given the "significant gaps" in US intelligence, the report questions whether the US can engage in effective dialogue with Iran.

Iran this week offered to discuss its nuclear work with world powers who suspect it is trying to build a bomb.

Iran maintains its nuclear programme has a purely civilian purpose and has rejected a UN demand to immediately stop uranium enrichment.

Iran's proposal for "serious talks" - made in response to a package of incentives offered in exchange for abandoning uranium enrichment - has drawn a cool response from Washington.

The US has indicated it is considering the threat of sanctions against Iran because its response falls short of UN demands.

Iraq echoes

The House Intelligence Committee report says: "Iran is a serious security threat on which the United States needs better intelligence."


A special concern is major gaps in our knowledge of Iranian nuclear, biological, and chemical programs

House Intelligence Committee


Iran 'boosted' by US-led wars


"There is a great deal about Iran that we do not know," it says, warning that "policymakers will need high-quality intelligence to assess Iranian intentions to prepare for any new round of negotiations".

"A special concern is major gaps in our knowledge of Iranian nuclear, biological, and chemical programmes," the report says.

The committee's report recommends the US strengthen its ability to gather information on Iran's nuclear capability by hiring more agents fluent in Farsi.

According to the BBC's Jonathan Beale in Washington, the report contains worrying echoes of US intelligence failures over the weapons programme of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

The report says Iran presents a serious security to the US and cites intelligence sources as saying it could have a nuclear weapon within a decade.

However, the report says, Iran may equally be engaged in a campaign of denial and deception designed to make its nuclear programme appear more advanced than it is.

A spokesman for the Bush administration said intelligence chiefs were "already taking steps along the lines the committee has recommended".

[Rasputin]

The head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council has told Washington to stop threatening the Islamic republic and start talking.


Speaking on state television on Monday, Hasan Rohani said negotiations would resolve the issues that currently surrounded the country's nuclear programme.

"The only way to resolve Iran's nuclear problem is steady dialogue, not putting pressure or threatening us," Rohani said.

The US accuses Iran of secretly working on an atomic bomb and has been pushing for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to report Iran's case to the UN Security Council for possible economic sanctions.

Tehran rejects the charge and says its ambitions are limited to generating electricity from nuclear reactors.

"Iran has never pursued nuclear arms but we are serious about having peaceful nuclear technology," Rohani added.

Enrichment continues

In June, Tehran ended a deal with Britain, France and Germany by resuming the production and testing of nuclear centrifuges.

"We assure the world that our enrichment-related activities are for peaceful purposes," Rohani said.

The EU trio will draft a resolution to be presented to the IAEA's 35-member Board of Governors which will meet on 13 September to discuss Iran's nuclear case.

Iran believes the IAEA would give its nuclear programme a clean bill of health in its September report as Iran has removed the agency's major ambiguities over Tehran's nuclear activities.

[Rasputin]

The likely US course on Iran: Go slow

Expect Thursday's deadline for Iran to stop enriching uranium to pass with more of a whimper than a bang.
As the United States experiences what one observer calls "confrontation fatigue," and as international unity against a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to splinter under pressure, quick action against Iran is not likely - even though the Iranian leadership continues to taunt the West with rhetorical jabs.

It's been a week since Iran essentially said "no" to international offers of economic incentives in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program. Since then, two scenarios have emerged - one predicting the United Nations will move swiftly toward sanctions against Iran, and the other foreseeing a slow diplomatic response.

Patient and methodical will win out, most analysts say, because the US wants to preserve the semblance of international unity against Iran as long as possible. At the same time, these observers add, the likelihood of getting any sanctions soon - or any other meaningful action to pressure Iran - is not very good.

"Slow motion is likely to prevail," says George Perkovich, a proliferation expert with particular expertise in Iran at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Russia, China, and Israel developments

The key reason that a quick move to economic sanctions - something the US has hoped for - seems less likely now is that Russia and China have cooled to such a step, which they ostensibly supported just weeks ago.

In the meantime, the brief war between Israel and Hizbullah has diverted Western attention, put the wind in Iran's sails, and helped elevate the question of Iran's nuclear program to a topic of debate in the Muslim world. And it's not a debate that international powers are anxious to enter and lose in the eyes of Muslim populations - thus the likelihood of a reasoned and methodical approach.

"The argument for not taking a confrontational approach is looking right to more people, even to some hard-liners in the [Bush] administration," says Daniel Brumberg, an Iran expert at Georgetown University in Washington. "In the first place, this is an administration suffering from confrontation exhaustion or fatigue, but also this has become an image battle in some respects, and no one wants to lose that."

The Iranian leadership continues to put the nuclear question in terms of a grand Muslim-world-versus-the-West battle, insisting that Iran has a right to develop technology that traditional Western powers like the US and Britain would deny it. Iran insists its nuclear program is solely for peaceful energy development, but the US, European leaders, and many nuclear experts say its years of clandestine research and insistence on uranium enrichment suggest otherwise.

Tuesday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad scoffed at the looming UN Security Council deadline, calling the US and Britain the "origin of all disturbances in the world" since World War II. Although not repeating his past call for Israel to be "wiped off" the map, he did call Israel's creation a "tale" that has denied Palestinians "a single day of peace."

Mr. Ahmadinejad also said that Iran's Aug. 22 response to the offer of incentives was an "exceptional opportunity" to end the dispute with dialogue. In Iran's response, it did offer an eventual suspension of enrichment once talks were under way, but Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said this week that Iran's program for fully mastering the fuel cycle is "irreversible."

But Mr. Perkovich says that Iran is clearly in violation of its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and should have been "hauled before the Security Council" years ago.

Still, he says the international context will probably dictate a slow approach. "We have this debate going on," he says, between those who want quick action and those who say the problem is that "right now, more people fear the US more than Iran." He adds, "So they are counseling patience."

This is not, however, the approach that Perkovich, with long experience watching nuclear developments, would like to see. "We ought to fast-forward," he says, by skipping the months of additional debate and moving to a vote on sanctions in the Security Council. "We should dare the Russians and Chinese to veto" a sanctions regime against Tehran, he says.

Touchy option: military action

Perkovich admits that the problem with his argument is that a failed Security Council initiative would seem to leave military action against Iran's nuclear installations as the only option.

Indeed, one reason the Russians and Chinese are softening on pursuing sanctions is that they fear it would open the door to military action down the road. While they may also be concerned that not going along with other Security Council members could precipitate military action outside it, they are probably calculating that neither the US nor anyone else (for example, Israel) is there yet.

"The Russians and Chinese may be worried that derailing the sanctions route now could mean that [that] alternative is exhausted, and could lead to other actions they don't want to see," says Mr. Brumberg. "But they may be calculating that while that time might come, it's not now."

The US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, has suggested that the US will come up with a resolution that will answer the worries of those fearful of an Iraq-like scenario, where resolutions are later interpreted as opening the door to the use of force. But Mr. Bolton has opened the door to another alternative to Security Council sanctions. In that scenario, countries thwarted in the Council would join the US in imposing sanctions on Iran.

On Monday, Bolton told reporters at the UN, "You can envision sanctions being imposed outside of the Security Council, as the United States has unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran pursuant to its own statutes, and other governments can do the same."

But some experts doubt such a "sanctions regime of the willing" would have much impact, especially if it were limited to restrictions on Iranian travel and officials' bank accounts. Japan, for example, is already said to be pushing for any sanctions to exclude oil exports, since its economy depends on Iranian oil.

[Rasputin]

دولت آمريکا در گزارشی که تحت عنوان 'استراژی ملی مبارزه با تروريسم' منتشر کرده، ايران را بزرگترين حامی تروريسم بين المللی خوانده و نگران کننده ترين خطر از جانب ايران را احتمال پيوند ميان تروريسم و سلاح های کشتار جمعی از طريق اين کشور دانسته است.
کاخ سفيد روز سه شنبه پنجم ماه سپتامبر با انتشار اين سند ترکيبی از دو خطر بالقوه "تروريسم" و "سلاح های کشتار دست جمعی" ايران را "نگران کننده ترين تهديد" برای آمريکا دانسته است.

اين گزارش ساعاتی پيش از سخنرانی دوم جرج بوش رييس جمهور آمريکا درباره "جنگ عليه تروريسم" منتشر شد.

کاخ سفيد ايران را "فعال ترين دولت حامی تروريسم در جهان" شناخته است و می گويد وزارت اطلاعات و سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی عمليات "تروريستی" ايران را برنامه ريزی می کنند.

آمريکا همچنين ايران را به عدم همکاری در زمينه استرداد تعدادی از اعضای شبکه القاعده که به گفته آمريکا در اختيار ايران هستند متهم کرده است.

کاخ سفيد همچنين سوريه را يکی از حاميان اصلی تروريسم در دنيا دانسته است.

"نارضايتی جهان اسلام"

در اين گزارش، تاثير پيامدهای ناشی از نارضايتی جهان اسلام از جنگ در عراق و اختلافات اعراب و اسرائيل بر گسترش تروريسم در جهان، کم اهميت تر از آنچه منتقدين مطرح می کنند، خوانده شده است.

کاخ سفيد پيشرفت در زمينه مبارزه با تروريسم را "قابل توجه" خوانده ولی هشدار داده است که اين کشور هنوز به طور کامل از خطر حملات تروريستی مصون نيست.

گزارش دولت آمريکا از سوی ديگر، خبر از تضعيف شبکه القاعده می دهد با اين همه می نويسد که اين گروه از روش های جديدی برای حمله به منافع آمريکا استفاده می کند.

گزارش کاخ سفيد در حالی منتشر شده که حزب جمهوری خواه در آستانه انتخابات ميان دوره ای آمريکا به مساله امنيت ملی توجه خاصی نشان داده است.

اين حزب که کنترل کنگره را در دست دارد موضوعات مربوط به امنيت ملی آمريکا و "جنگ عليه تروريسم" را در دستور کار کنگره قرار داده است.

کنگره روز سه شنبه کار خود را با پايان تعطيلات تابستانی از سر می گيرد.

آقای بوش همواره عراق را جبهه اصلی در جنگ عليه تروريسم معرفی کرده و تعيين جدول زمانی برای خروج نظاميان آمريکايی از عراق را رد کرده است.

[Rasputin]

While diplomats at the United Nations ponder what to do next about the Iranian nuclear program, the state-owned media in Teheran are conducting a psychological campaign to prepare the public for a long crisis if not actual war.

Many Iranians, however, are not sure what the fuss is about and are asking whether the confrontational course adopted by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the only, not to say the best, strategy.

Doubts about the wisdom of Ahmadinejad's defiant posture, initially voiced by the anti-regime opposition at home and abroad, are now spreading to factions within the Khomeinist regime itself. One example is an article by Mostafa Tajzadeh, a former deputy interior minister and advisor to former president Muhammad Khatami. The article, published by an online newspaper owned by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, warns that the Islamic Republic may be courting diplomatic isolation and possible UN sanctions solely because the new radical administration wishes to cultivate a macho image at home and abroad.

At first glance, Tajzadeh's concern, echoed by several members of the Islamic Majlis (parliament), appears well placed. Ahmadinejad decided to reject the package offered by the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany, because he was not prepared to offer a minor concession in return.

The concession demanded was that Iran should agree to suspend its uranium processing and enrichment activities. This should not have been difficult for two reasons.

The first is that Iran, in any case, is doing very little uranium processing and no enrichment, despite the threat to embark upon enrichment on an industrial scale at the Isfahan plant.

The second is that Iran has no immediate need of any enriched uranium. In fact, Iran does not have any nuclear power station at all and thus does need enriched uranium for fuel. The only nuclear power station that Iran is building, with Russian help, is scheduled to go on stream next March. Even then, Russia has already signed contracts to provide all the fuel that the plant would need for the first 10 years of its existence. Russia is even ready to provide the fuel for the entire 37-year lifespan of the plant.

AT THE very least, Iran could have agreed to a temporary suspension until next March, allowing negotiations on the 5+1 package to begin. The talks could then have helped foster an atmosphere of trust on both sides and shifted the focus from the very narrow and precise issue of uranium enrichment.

Accepting a temporary suspension would not have hurt Ahmadinejad's macho image. For one thing, his opponents, both within the regime and outside it, support the suspension and could not have blamed him for accepting it. The Rafsanjani-Khatami faction would have had nothing to say on the issue because it had itself accepted a three year-long suspension without receiving any rewards whatsoever.

Launching a process of negotiations would have had further benefits for the Islamic Republic, if only by alleviating the political tension that is already wreaking havoc with the Iranian economy.

Locking the United States into a process of negotiations with the Islamic Republic would have tied the hands of all those in Washington who support regime change in Iran. The process would have enabled the Islamic Republic to call for a lifting of American sanctions that have already crippled the nation's vital oil and gas industry.

In other words, the Islamic Republic would have had everything to gain and virtually nothing to lose from a process aimed at preventing it from doing things that it shouldn't be doing anyway in exchange for massive economic, scientific and technological aid, not to mention international acceptability.

[Rasputin]

SO, WHY did Ahmadinejad, no doubt with the consent of the "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenehi, choose to reject the package and vindicate the "regime change" faction in Washington?

There are three reasons:

The first is that Ahmadinejad believes that the Bush administration will not be in a position to turn the heat on Iran at least until the November mid-term elections in the US. If Bush manages to maintain a majority in Congress, Teheran could always agree to a temporary suspension and re-start the process. If, on the other hand, Democrats win control of one or both of the chambers of Congress, Bush would become a lame duck president facing a political elite and public hostile to any new confrontation in the Middle East.

The failure of Americans to develop bipartisan positions even on issues of vital national interest, plays into the hands of adventurers like Ahmadinejad.

The second reason is that Ahmadinejad and his faction have their own electoral calculations. Soon, Iranians would be called upon to choose a new Assembly of Experts and local and municipal councils across the country. If Ahmadinejad's faction succeeds in winning control of the assembly, they would be in a position to either replace Khamenehi as "Supreme Guide" with one of their own, or divest the position of much of its real power.

Finally, it is clear that the Islamic Republic fears any prospect of normalization with the American "Great Satan" at least as much as it worries about ineffective sanctions. The Islamic Republic does not feel self-confident enough to enter a process through which the US will exercise some influence on the course of Teheran's policies. While the conventional wisdom is that it is the US that does not want to talk to the Islamic Republic, there is evidence that the opposite may be true. This is why Teheran has refused to make the symbolic gesture of goodwill the 5+1 group demanded as a prelude to talks.

[Rasputin]

دولت بوش قصد دارد پاييز آينده با دعوت از حدود 200 متخصص ايراني جوان و معلمان زبان خارجي با ايران تبادل فرهنگي انجام دهد.



به نقل از خبرگزاري آسوشيتدپرس، دولت آمريكا از كنگره اين كشور خواسته است پنج ميليون دلار براي تامين بودجه اين برنامه تعيين كند و ابراز اميدواري كرد اين درخواست پيش از تعطيلي كنگره تصويب شود.



يك مقام وزارت خارجه آمريكا كه خواست نامش فاش نشود، جزئيات اين پيشنهاد را در روز سهشنبه اعلام كرد.



در دوران فقدان روابط رسمي ميان ايران و آمريكا، دولت واشنگتن اين مسئله را از طريق سازمانهاي غيردولتي در ايران و سفارتخانههاي آمريكا در منطقه خليج فارس پيگيري ميكند.



هنوز مشخص نيست دولت ايران به اين ابتكار چه عكسالعملي نشان ميدهد اما دو كشور سالها است كه تبادل فرهنگي نداشتهاند.



شون مككورمك، سخنگوي وزارت امور خارجه آمريكا روز سهشنبه گفت: ما تماس خصوصي بين ملت ايران و مردم آمريكا را تشويق ميكنيم. ما معتقديم اين تماسها سالم هستند.

[Rasputin]

'I was surprised by the extent of their knowledge and understanding of the Iranian issue," said former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, after meeting with a group of senators and with Vice President Dick Cheney this week. In his brief visit to Washington, the Israeli opposition leader got the same impression most everyone who hears American decision-makers these days gets: They are very serious about Iran - from President Bush declaring that "Iran must face consequences," through Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saying that it is time for the Security Council to "understand its obligation," and on to any other politician and administration official making clear that the time has come.

But time for what?

The passing of the deadline set for Iran to freeze its nuclear program took place less than two weeks before the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks. The connection between the two may seem vague, but in the American public perception they have much to do with one another. This is not only because Iran sponsors terror, or due to the fact that conflicts in the Middle East all "look alike," but also because President George W. Bush, whose presidency began with the terror attacks on New York and Washington, will end his tenure with Iran. If the American people judged him harshly for the way he has handled the war on terror, the road to restoring his credibility goes through Iran.

The question troubling those who follow the Iran situation in the American capital these days is just how committed Bush is to stopping Iran from achieving nuclear capability. There is no doubt that the US wants to take the Iran crisis into the next stage and finally take action - diplomatic action - to stop the Iranian bomb. But moving ahead is not all that easy, and involves delicate negotiations with Russia and China.

THE AMERICAN strategy for achieving its goal is comprised of two elements: making Russia and China live up to their commitment to impose sanctions if necessary, and showing the world that sanctions aren't all that terrible, as they are no more than another form of diplomacy.

The extent of Chinese and Russian "commitment" is now a matter of interpretation. While leaders of these two countries don't necessarily believe that supporting the resolution calling for Iran to stop its nuclear activity means that sanctions are the next stage, the US sees things differently.

"The fundamental bargain has been struck and that bargain is reflected in the Security Council resolution from 31 July," said Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph in a briefing to the foreign press, "and that does say that the intention is to move to appropriate measures under Chapter 7, Article 41, if Iran doesn't meet the deadline. Iran didn't meet the deadline; that's where we are now."

In order to make China and Russia join hands with the US as the international community steps into the next phase of the conflict, the US is willing to sugarcoat the entire notion of sanctions, both in definition and in content. The US is emphasizing the concept that sanctions aren't the end of diplomacy, but rather the extension of diplomacy, since they do not involve force and are done in an international setting. The administration is also now specifying what the sanctions will look like, making sure that they do not come out as collective punishment against the Iranian people. The US is assuring its allies that sanctions will target only the Iranian leadership, and that initially they will focus only on banning material and money used for procurement related to weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

[Rasputin]

SENIOR OFFICIALS estimated this week that the process of approving a sanctions resolution against Iran might be over by the end of the month. Some diplomats voiced skepticism, saying that since the Russians are holding the cards now, the process could drag on for several months.

Whatever the timetable, the key is the political willingness in the US to go forward. "My impression," said Netanyahu this week, "is that there is a big debate going on over Iraq, but not over Iran."

In general terms, his impression is right. Both Republicans and Democrats are on the same page about the need to be tough on the regime in Teheran. Yet there are other voices, too. Former director of Middle East affairs at the National Security Council Flynt Leverett this week presented his critique of the administration's policy in the region. According to Leverett, who served under Bush in his first term, the US should now offer Iran a "grand bargain" according to which it will promise not to attack the country and not to try and change its regime, in exchange for an Iranian agreement to accept limitations on its nuclear activity and to stop sponsoring terrorists.

This view, so far, is not echoing in mainstream American discourse, but it might surface as an alternative to sanctions and military action, when the time comes for the US to decide if it is going all the way with Iran and making clear it will use military force if necessary.

Even if there is no debate on the need to be tough with Iran, this does not mean that Bush has the backing to take action. When the time comes to make the decision, the president will have to look back and see if the American people are behind him - and that will be much more difficult.

One person who was absolutely confident this week that Bush would not go all the way and attack Iran was former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, who is on an unofficial visit to the US. "America will not make the mistake of attacking Iran," he said in an interview to The Washington Post, adding, "Iran is not Iraq."

While his analysis may be accurate, the reasoning is not. If anything can save Iran from an American attack down the road, it is precisely the fear of the American public that Iran Iraq, and that entering an armed conflict with it would result in the same dire consequences as those that emerged from the confrontation with Iraq.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

THE POLITICAL RELATIONS between Iran and the USA date back to the time the Shah of Persia, Nassereddin Shah Qajar, during the 1800s. The two countries shared an amicable political and cultural tie until the post-World War 2 era. However, the relationship turned sour post 1979, when militant Iranian students occupied the American Embassy in Tehran with the support of Ayatollah Khomeini on 4 November 1979. The militants held fifty-two Americans hostage for 444 days.

Following the Islamic revolution and the hostage crisis, the USA imposed several economic sanctions against Iran. The USA accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons and sponsoring terrorism. It not only blocked US-based oil companies from operating in Iran but also blocked US firms’ foreign competitors from operating in Iran as well. On 7 April 1980, the USA broke all diplomatic relations with Iran. The Swiss Government on 24 April 1981 started representing the USA in Tehran. Similarly, Pakistan represented Iran in the USA. Later in compliance with the Algiers declaration of 20 January 1981, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was set-up to handle claims of the USA nationals against Iran and of Iranian nationals against the USA.

However, the relation between the two countries took a tragic turn on 3 July 1988, when the US missile cruiser, USS Vincennes, shot down an Iranian Airbus killing 290 civilians on board. Later, on 22 February 1996, the USA agreed to pay Iran US$ 61.8 million in compensation. The USA, however, denied any responsibility or liability for the incident.

Another issue of contention between the two countries is the Iranian assets worth $12 billion frozen by the USA after the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. Although, the USA officials claim to have released most of these assets, the Iranian officials allege that around $10 billion still remain pending. Since 2003, Iran has also been complaining about the unlawful flying of unmanned aerial vehicles by the USA over its territory.

The relationship took a further downward turn when in February 2003, Iran publicised its uranium enrichment program at Natanz. Iran claimed that it would use the technology for peaceful purposes and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear monitoring body, to visit its nuclear facilities. The USA alleged that Iran was using the program to develop nuclear weapons and sought to refer the issue to the UN Security Council.

Iran signed a temporary agreement with Germany, France and Britain in November 2004 to cease uranium enrichment. This led IAEA to issue Iran a clean chit and helped Iran in avoiding the intervention of the Security Council. However, in spite of giving it a clean chit, the IAEA could not confirm that Iran is not pursuing undeclared nuclear activities.

The hostility between the two countries has especially intensified in 2005-2006. The period is marked with tensions and threats of military actions. The period also witnessed the escalation of the nuclear weapon issue. The tension between the two countries mounted even when IAEA inspections of nuclear sites in Iran were taking place.