Iran-U.S.A

[Rasputin]

The Concluding Words

This paper has challenged the current and proposed coercive diplomacy (i.e., the “carrot and stick” policy) as “a road to nowhere,” and rejects the use-of-force approach as “a road to hell.” These approaches make incomplete assumptions about Iran and fail to realize that the prevailing “no-peace no-war” status quo is the Islamic Republic’s best option. To entice Iran for better relations with the U.S, the Obama Administration should eliminate the “no-war no-peace” option and give Iran a “peace alternative.” The Obama policy should be based on two pillars: a new paradigm of Iran predicated upon a more accurate set of assumptions and understanding as well as a bold roadmap that centers on irresistible material incentives. A visionary Speech by President Obama can set in motion this “Big Push” way forward.

Officials in the Iranian Administration take issue with the suspicion that Iran might develop bombs if its views are not addressed. Citing the I.A.E.A. findings and the declaration by the Supreme Leader that nuclear bombs are impermissible under Islam, Iran maintains that it has not diverted its civilian enrichment programs toward military use. However, the I.A.E.A. cannot determine whether or not Tehran has any undisclosed nuclear sites or that it will stay with the civilian track. The U.S. and its allies share this assessment given the lack of confidence in Iran’s intention. Tehran must freeze nuclear enrichment and build trust before it can restart.

The multilateral and bilateral approaches applied thus far to resolve the deadlock have not worked. The new prescriptions that are being offered, as I have argued, will not work either. Some would consider the approach I have offered too ambitious or unrealistic. Others would see in it the beginning of some useful thoughts for ending the 30-year old conflict. Extremist groups opposing the Islamic Republic will dismiss the “Big Push” way forward as pro-regime, while the most zealous pro-regime crowds would suspect this roadmap as yet a new trick to endanger the life of their nizam. The problem with these groups is that they are either for greater conflict or the status quo.

True enough, the ideas outlined here are ambitious and require further refinements. However, I take issue with those who suspect my best intentions. Arguments should stand or fall based upon their merits. In my view, the “Big Push” way forward offered here is one that has the best chance to succeed if truly implemented. It leaves Iran with no option but better relations; it gives the Islamic regime the security it seeks; it accounts for the rights and interest of the Iranian people; it deals directly with the possibility of Iran building nuclear bombs; it grants Iran the credit it merits; it helps increase Israel’s security and the prospect for a Palestinian state; and it opens Iran to American trade and investments, a bonus to both economies.

Iran and the U.S. should give the proposed approach a chance to succeed. They should be guided by trust and transparency, and avoid any game playing or deceptive behavior. Otherwise, the rapprochement can lead to a disastrous conflict. For Iran nothing could be more dangerous than a disillusioned Obama, who has become “globalized” and has the ear of the global community. This could happen if Iran were to reject the lucrative deal. The U.S. must also realize that there is no better approach than the one offered here. It makes Iran an offer to take a comprehensive peace in exchange for its future bombs. True, the U.S. will pay a price but that will be less than maintaining the status quo or engaging Iran in a war. President Barack Obama has called for “change” and the time has come for a change of direction in U.S. policy toward Iran.

[Rasputin]

http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/03/post_8360.html

[Rasputin]

On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to the cheers of millions of Iranians, ousting the pro-American Shah and instituting an Islamic Republic in what would later be known as the Islamic Revolution. To put it mildly, US-Iranian relations have been strained ever since, beginning with the 1979 hostage crisis in which over 50 US diplomats were held in Iran for over a year. Even today, there are no official diplomatic US relations with Iran (Mahbubani 207). Many of the policies instituted by the Islamic theocracy in Iran since 1979 are incompatible with the most basic and traditional American ideals – the separation of church and state, freedom of speech, and equality for all.

Support for secularism - the idea that government should be separate from religion - originated in the US because many of the very first American colonizers were fleeing state-sponsored religious persecution in Europe. As a result, there was fervent support of creating a “high wall between church and state,” as Thomas Jefferson wrote in a famous letter to the Danbury Baptists (Floyd 2). The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 solidified the separation of church and state as a key concept in American society, with the very first amendment to our constitution forbidding Congress from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” (Wise 185). While religion has always been a very important aspect of American society, it has never played an extremely large role in government.


In Iran, on the other hand, church and state are inextricably entwined. This is the definition of a theocracy - the church is the state. In Iran, the Supreme Leader must be an expert in Islamic jurisprudence and the “Assembly of Experts,” the elected body that chooses the Supreme Leader, is comprised completely of Mujtahids, or Islamic scholars (Dilip 61). Iran’s constitution even states that all laws are to be based on Islamic criteria (Maggi 129). If there exists a complete opposite to the American model with regards to the relationship between church and state, it exists in Iran.

Another right that has existed in American society ever since the ratification of the Bill of Rights is the freedom of speech - certainly one of American’s most guarded personal liberties. Again, in the very first amendment, Congress is forbidden from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” (Taylor 230). These rights are a staple of American society, in which the press is free to criticize the government to their heart’s content (and they do – just turn on the radio and listen to Rush Limbaugh!). The government does not control newspapers or censor material, protestors are allowed to assemble peacefully, and most everyone can say whatever they want to say, provided they don’t incite violence.

An entirely opposite system operates in Iran. In fact, Iran has its own ministry, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, to decide what Iranian citizens are allowed to read and watch, banning books such as “The Da Vinci Code” and many Western websites, even NYTimes.com (Tait 1). As seen in the BBC documentary “Rageh Inside Iran”, all newspapers and magazines must have their articles approved before publication. There is no private television, only state-controlled television that consists of seven channels, and ownership of satellite dishes is illegal (Samii 1). With total power, the Iranian government is able to completely control the media in a manner that would make most Americans cringe. But it doesn’t stop there; even dress codes are enforced. Iran detained 150,000 people in its annual sweep against non-Islamic clothing in 2007 (MacFarquhar 1). Bloggers face threats and jail time for publishing ideas or images seen as threatening to the Islamic regime. Journalists could even face death, as in the case of Zahra Kazemi, a Candian-Iranian woman who was detained after attempting to take pictures of a controversial Iranian prison and died in prison of a head wound after reportedly being raped (CBC News 1). This clear absence of the freedom of speech is a direct result of a theocracy intent on keeping an iron grip on control. Naturally, the theocracy uses religion to justify its actions. Shaikh Fazlallah, one of the most influential clerics to oppose the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, took issue with the call for liberty during the early 20th century, especially the freedom of the press, arguing that it caused “sedition and permitted the spreading of calumny” (Martin 186). The current leaders of Iran use his example, and today he is celebrated in Iran as a martyr for defending Islam against democracy. In other words, thanks to government promotion of the choice interpretation of the Qur’an by certain conservative influential clerics like Fazlallah, there is no freedom of speech in Iran – Iranian citizens see what their government allows them to see. Regardless of the root of this reality, freedom of expression in Iran stands in stark contrast to the situation in the US.

Equality for all is an American value embedded in arguably one of the best-known phrases of any American political document: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal…” (Jefferson 43). Penned in 1776 by Thomas Jefferson as the first line of the Declaration of Independence, this simple truth has been repeated throughout American history, by Abraham Lincoln in his famous Gettysburg Address and by Martin Luther King, Jr. in his equally famous “I Have a Dream” speech. Granted, American society hasn’t always allowed equality for all races and all genders, but in comparison to most other countries we are relatively egalitarian.

In contrast, the Iranian theocracy allows for major inequality between men and women and between Muslims and non-Muslims. Women especially face blatant discrimination under the law. In Iran, by law women inherit half of what men do from their parents, by law women do not have the right to seek divorce, and by law women need a male guardian’s permission to marry (Peters 72). Women who have been raped run the risk of being charged with adultery if they speak out but can’t prove it (Iran Focus). Perhaps most shocking is that the current minimum marriage age for girls under Iranian law is age 13 (an improvement, believe it or not, from age 9 in 1979), occasionally resulting in the marriages of extremely young girls to men much older (Keddie 116). Time Magazine reported in 2001 that the minimum marriage age has occasionally been exploited by child predators who marry poor young girls from rural areas, use them, and then abandon them (Spencer 187). Even still, this law has been strongly supported from the highest levels of Iranian leadership. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution and a true icon in Iran, once intimated that a girl should have her first menstrual period in her husband’s house, not her father’s (Peters 72). Perhaps Khomeini had personal experience – he, at the age of twenty-eight, married a ten year old, and described marriage to a prepubescent girl as “a divine blessing” (Spencer 187). It is absolutely unfathomable to imagine Americans supporting such a leader. Clearly American views of women’s rights differ greatly from those propagated by the Islamic regime in Iran.

[Rasputin]

Additionally, under the Iranian theocracy there is inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims. Shaykh Fazlollah, the aforementioned admired conservative cleric, was completely against the notion of “equality of all subjects, regardless of their creed,” noting that such a law would allow the Zoroastrians to freely propagate their faith (Martin 186). Fazlollah preferred a system of law based on the “Divine Will, in which believers have a privileged position distinct from that of unbelievers,” based in his interpretation of Islamic law (Martin 186). Today, true to Fazlollah’s word, the Iranian government actively persecutes members of the Baha’i faith. Seven leading members of the Baha’i community in Iran were arrested last year and will soon stand trial under charges of spying for Israel, desecrating Islam, and campaigning against an Islamic Republic, although it seems clear that no real crime was committed (Moss 1). The persecution of peaceful followers of a minority religion is an act few Americans look positively upon considering our nation’s history.

Clearly the policies instituted by Iran’s Islamic theocracy stand against many American values we hold dear, from simple equality among citizens to freedom of speech and the separation of church and state. Additionally, considering that Iran seems to be pursuing nuclear technology, publicly supports Hezbollah, an internationally recognized terrorist organization, and that the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, periodically calls for “Israel to be wiped off the map,” it is no wonder that the US and Iran are constantly butting heads – we simply do not have compatible political ideologies (BBC News 1). Just as American democracy is incompatible with communism, it is similarly incompatible with the current Islamic theocracy in Iran. Without a similar base of state values, it is unlikely that the development of mutual respect necessary to improve US-Iranian relations will occur anytime in the near future.

Works Cited


Da Vinci Code book banned in Iran, BBC, 26 July 2006. BBC News. 3 Mar. 2009.

Floyd, Charlene. Christian Voices: Journeys through Faith and Politics in Contemporary American Protestantism. New York: Praeger, 2007.

Hiro, Dilip. The Essential Middle East: A Comprehensive Guide. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003.

Iran leader's comments attacked, BBC, 27 Oct. 2005. 3 Mar. 2009.

"Iran's Changing Story." CBC News 27 Nov. 2007. 3 Mar. 2009.

Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: 1776-1781. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.

Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East Past and Present. New York: Princeton UP, 2006.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Iran Cracks Down on Dissent." The New York Times 24 June 2007. 3 Mar. 2009.

Maggi, Michael. Review Of The Convention On Contracts For The International Sale Of Goods Cisg 2002-2003. New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004.

Mahbubani, Kishore. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008.

Moss, Meredith. "Baha'i plan prayer gathering for 7 members jailed in Iran." Dayton Daily News 21 Feb. 2009. 3 Mar. 2009.

Peters, Julie Stone. Women's Rights, Human Rights International Feminist Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Samii, Bill. "Iran: State Media Control Extends To Provinces, Airwaves." Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2 Oct. 2006. 3 Mar. 2009.

Spencer, Robert. Religion of peace? why Christianity is and Islam isn't. Washington, D.C: Regnery Pub., 2007.

Tait, Robert. Censorship fears rise as Iran blocks access to top websites 4 Dec. 2006. The Guardian. 3 Mar. 2009.

Taylor, Hannis. The Origin and Growth of the American Constitution. Houghton Mifflin company, 1911.

"UN women's rights official raps Iran over abuses." Iran Focus 6 Feb. 2005. 3 Mar. 2009.

Wise, John S. A Treatise on American Citizenship. Edward Thompson Co., 1906.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

تماس مستقيم ايران و آمريكا در لاهه

وزير امور خارجه آمريكا مي گويد فرستاده ايران در اجلاس لاهه با نماينده ويژه باراك اوباما دست داده و آمريكايي ها نامه اي به هيأت ايراني داده اند كه در آن درخواست هايي درباره "سه شهروند آمريكايي كه نمي توانند از ايران بازگردند" مطرح شده است.

به گزارش كسري ناجي، خبرنگار اعزامي بي بي سي فارسي به لاهه، هيلاري كلينتون در يك نشست خبري اعلام كرد كه ريچارد هولبروك، نماينده ويژه رئيس جمهوري آمريكا در امور افغانستان و پاكستان ملاقاتي مختصر با محمدمهدي آخوندزاده، معاون وزير امور خارجه ايران داشته و آن دو در فضايي صميمي با هم دست داده اند.

به گفته خانم كلينتون، آقاي هالبروك و آقاي آخوندزاده قول داده اند كه در آينده تماس خود را حفظ كنند.

پس از سال ها، اين نخستين بار است كه ملاقاتي ميان مقامات ايران و آمريكا در اين سطح صورت مي گيرد.

خانم كلينتون در نشست خبري خود همچنين اعلام كرد كه آمريكا نامه اي به نمايندگان ايران تحويل داده و در آن در مورد "سه شهروند آمريكايي كه نمي توانند از ايران خارج شوند"، از مقامات ايران كمك خواسته است.

يكي از اين سه تن رابرت لوينسون، افسر سابق پليس فدرال آمريكا (اف بي آي) است كه حدود دو سال پيش در كيش ناپديد شد و اينك دولت آمريكا از مقامات ايران خواسته است كه به روشن شدن سرنوشت او كمك كنند.

در نامه آمريكا به مقامات ايران همچنين در خواست آزادي ركسانا صابري (خبرنگار ايراني - آمريكايي) و رفع محدوديت از عشا مومني (عضو كمپين يك ميليون امضاء براي حقوق زنان) مطرح شده است.

ركسانا صابري كه پدري ايراني و مادري ژاپني دارد، در آمريكا متولد و همانجا بزرگ شده است.

او از حدود شش سال پيش به ايران رفت و به عنوان خبرنگار براي رسانه هايي چون "راديوي عمومي آمريكا"، بي بي سي، اي بي سي نيوز و چند رسانه ديگر كار كرد.

او در بهمن ماه سال 1387 بازداشت و بعدا به زندان اوين منتقل شد. گفته مي شود بازداشت او به دليل ادامه دادن به ارسال پاره اي گزارش هاي خبري به رغم عدم تمديد مجوز كارش بوده است.

پدر خانم صابري مدتي پيش در نامه اي سرگشاده به رهبر ايران از آيت الله خامنه اي خواست دستور آزادي دخترش را صادر كند.

آقاي صابري و همسرش كه نگران حال دخترشان هستند، گفته اند براي ملاقات با او به ايران سفر خواهند كرد.

عشا مومني هم عضو كمپين يك ميليون امضا براي رفع تبعيض قانوني عليه زنان است كه مهرماه 1387 بازداشت و به تبليغ عليه نظام جمهوري اسلامي متهم شد.

خانم مومني چندي بعد با سپردن وثيقه از زندان آزاد شد، اما مقامات او را ممنوع الخروج كردند.

[Rasputin]

It is customary in an Iranian wedding ceremony, when asked, "Do you take this man?", for the bride to not answer "Yes!" the first time the question is posed. By tradition, the bride, but not the groom, is asked the signifying question three times. To show her proper upbringing, she must wait until the third time before answering 'Yes!' Otherwise, she may come off seeming too eager, not ladylike, not coy enough, aggressive or too enthusiastic (implying further bad things), way too much in a hurry, not able or patient enough to observe the proper decorum. Not good.

The Obama administration's recent overtures for a reconciliation with Iran have come in the form of sweet talk of opening up of fisted hands, accompanied with a quotation from the wily and clever Sa'di, one of our more popular poets (1184-1283?). The initial Iranian responses to these Obama overtures are starting to resemble the coy Iranian bride's ladylike silence upon first being asked if she would take the man.

Initial reactions from the Iranian government were predictable rebukes and denunciations to the effect that nothing has changed in reality, that the Americans should draw some lessons from their past and present behavior if they really want better relations with Iran. Yet, the Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, left open the possibility that the Americans can and may change their attitude, in which case the Iranians likewise will change theirs; which is to say, "Keep talking! I'm listening."

Of course, the Iranian government would like nothing better than to have full and complete recognition from the global bully, a recognition that comes with a guarantee of unfettered turf and a ticket to actual and concrete cooperative joint projects with the global bully in regional matters, such as in 'stabilizing' Iraq and Afghanistan, where the Iranians can play a substantial role in furthering the agenda set out by the global bully. But, of course, the Iranians cannot come out and just say it like that. They have to play coy, or actually, even pissed off a bit initially, demanding the unfreezing of assets, the stopping of economic embargo and the hostile language; basically, demanding the stoppage of all abusive behavior, and a show of some real sweetness before this principled and pious bride is convinced that she can live comfortably within the coming union of objectives.

One of the signs of attitude change the Iranian side expects to see, one of the most obvious, is the un-freezing of the their assets held in American banks. This can easily be arranged without any loss of face on the part of the Americans, since not a really big deal, yet can be used in Iran as the proof that the Americans are starting to step on the righteous path and yielding to the Iranian people's demands. This in turn will lead to more open Iranian cooperation with, say, the NATO, providing them whatever help they can in the war against Afghanistan. In time, further concrete measures will be taken to bring the two states closer.

But, the 'bringing closer' of the two states will only work as long as the union is beneficial to the imperialists. As long as the major interests of the imperialists are reinforced and fortified, they will have no problem throwing around some crumbs.

Signs of relational improvements between the two sides have already manifested themselves. "[A] meeting took place on March 9 between NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Martin Erdmann and Iran's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, Ali-Asghar Khaji," (see: "NATO confirms first high-level meeting with Iran on Afghanistan"). There is also the invitation offered to Iran (and Iran's acceptance) to participate in a NATO-organized international conference, held on March 31, to deal with the war in Afghanistan.

And, as pertains to some of the things the Iranian government would like to see done by the American side, we have seen the throwing to the wolves of about 3,500 members of an Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahedin (or Mojaheddin-e Khalq-e), camped for the past twenty years in a military compound north of Baghdad, some 50 miles from the Iranian border. This organization has been a major irritant to the Iranian regime ever since 1980. The Mojahedin in Iraq have been told their camp will be moved to a location far removed from the border and much more remote, and that they will have to leave Iraq. Their presence in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussain had been tolerated by the invaders and, presumably, held as a card to be used in any potential negotiations with the Iranian government. It seems that card is now in play.

* * *

The support base of the current Iranian state -- this particular form of government, a post-modern capitalist theocracy -- comprises a host of actors with a variety of socio-political backgrounds.

Internally and on the far right, there are obviously the obsessive, clerical advocates and functionaries of this despotic, religiously based state apparatus, and they have their own ideologically correct armies in the Basiji Forces and the Revolutionary Guards (which are separate from the regular armed forces), as well as in loose networks of religious vigilantes. They also have allies across the higher academia and the larger educational system, in the judiciary, in the majlis (parliament), and they control a substantial amount of print and electronic media (and theirs never get shut down by the government).

But not all theocrats are extremist zealots dependent on a cocktail of one part ideology mixed with three parts bullying. Khatami, to name an internationally known 'moderate', is a representative of another strand of theocrats, those with a gentler face (and their 'reformist' newspapers regularly get shut down; theocrats can't even fully tolerate their own!). As the reader may well know, the moderates have been more vocal, and for a longer time, about finding it reasonable to have relations with the Great Satan as long as those relations are based on respect. Khatami famously advocated a 'Conversation between civilizations'. But, 'hardliners' too welcome better relations and even cooperation with the Great Satan. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly said that relations with the U.S. are welcome as long as some face saving issues are addressed. And the most recent contacts between Western and Iranian diplomats, lest we forget, did occur under his presidency. Of course, Iran observers and Iranian people know that the Supreme Leader has the final say on all matters and the thumbs-up to diplomatic contacts must have come from him. But, he too is considered a 'hard-liner'.

The theocratic state apparatuses have their backs watched by ideological armed forces of their own but, more significantly, they make great use of the state run foundations that form an echelon-specific welfare state, making sure that the relative well being of millions of lower-working class and poor people is directly dependent on the survival of this particular form of government. Additionally, the state can count on the support of the bazaari merchant classes, though merchants may not be the most reliable of the state's allies since, from time immemorial, they have had their own independent social interests, regardless of who wields the state power. But, it must be said that this particular state has been a particularly good friend of the merchant classes.

Internationally, the Islamic Republic has also built strong alliances. They have very cooperative relations with major western European powers, including France, Germany, and Italy; they have economic and trade ties with the U.K.; their strategy of building trade and bilateral economic alliances with Russia and China, as well as with Japan, South Korea and others, has extended their independence from purely western connections. They have also made sure to create key political alliances with Latin American leftist leaders in countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, which furthers their standing among the left-leaning elements of societies in those countries as well as internationally.

Finally, they have developed a network of international lobbyists cleaning up the Iranian state's image abroad, trying to win it business as well as parliamentary and congressional allies in Europe and the U.S. In the case of the U.S., beside seeking and securing key business and some Congressional allies, we have seen a particular effort by the Iranian state's lobbyists since 2004-2005 to neutralize any radical left objections to the Iranian state's violations of basic human rights, and to preempt any objections to the fact of it being a theocracy; inherently anti-democratic, an abhorrent phenomenon for any Westerner, the inheritors of the Enlightenment project advocating the separation of state and religion.

[Rasputin]

II

This is not an insignificant move. Iranian state functionaries have basically clipped the wings of any American leftist critique of the normalization of relations between the U.S. and a theocratic state -- a normalization that will most definitely include Iran's active and direct participation in the American war against the people of Afghanistan, a war opposed by most Americans and anybody who thinks of themselves as being on the left.

So, all in all, one can say the Iranian mullahs have covered most of their bases pretty well. And if their calculations are correct, they are about to load all the bases and hit a home run.

And what calculations are those? They are derived simply from basic facts of human history: as omnipotent as imperialists would like to make themselves look, their powers are not infinite, meaning they are not god, and their wishes are not the only determinants in the calculus of international power relations.

Just like everybody living in the world outside the gated U.S.A, Iranians have eyes and can see that this particularly American global bully -- with all the mountains of resources, the trillions of dollars of expenditure on hi-tech armory, 'intelligence' and know-how, with a military budgetary might that equals the combined military expenditures of all the rest of the world -- cannot successfully pacify an infinitely poor and most devastated country like Afghanistan. Further, the American imperialists have not been able to pacify the people of Iraq; not with mass slaughter nor with creating mini-civil wars and proliferation of death squads, not with incineration of entire cities and neighborhoods, not with open bribery, not even while a great portion of the majority Shiite population of the country is either with them (since the imperialists put their representatives in power) or passively hoping and wishing to hell that they wouldn't have to take up arms against the imperialists.

Further, in both cases, the U.S. attacked countries that had already been devastated by over a decade of warfare (in the case of Afghanistan, over two decades): of bombings, of economic strangulation, and the destruction of infrastructure.

Iran's case, in contrast, is greatly different. An attack on Iran would be countered by two sets of armies (the regular, traditional army and the ideological one created after the revolution), a well-fortified military infrastructure totally intact, and by an army of civilian support that will easily swell in ranks to millions in short order (who knows how many thousands or more of even expats and exiles would rush back home to fight the imperialists?).

So, a war against Iran is not in the imperialists' short to mid-term interests, nor is it their real wish. Not at this point. To use a very crude analogy (with all its pitfalls), when building a tunnel, after you've dug for a while, with the completion of each section and before going farther, you need to reinforce each bit of the tunnel just dug. If you don't, many a dead miners would tell you, you get buried alive when the tunnel collapses.

The permanent foothold into the Middle East and the West- and Central-Asia that the American imperialists have been constructing needs to be reinforced at this point. By recklessly expanding the war further, as some neocon crazies have been espousing, imperialists run the highly explosive risk of having everything blow up in their faces and lose all they have achieved so far, particularly in Iraq.

For those who believe that the Iraq war has been a fiasco, it is worth reviewing the American achievements in their war against the people of Iraq. Those achievements are: destruction of Iraqi society's structural protections that previously limited and shaped western multinationals' access to Iraq's natural and social resources and markets; destruction of Iraq's taxation regime, and its replacement with one far friendlier to foreign capital investments; destruction of some of the most fundamental rights of Iraqi women, thereby lowering the floor for expected, overall social misery; structural integration of parts of the leadership of the Iraqi society into the American imperial machinery; under the cloak of war, the Iraqi organized labor has been driven further into the ground, to assure it would not pose any serious strategic challenge to the imperialist designs for Iraq; tribalization, or Balkanization, of a unified Iraqi society into religious and ethnic based identities (Shiite's, Sunni's, and Kurds); and most importantly, the establishment of an Iraqi government absolutely dependent on the American military and political backing for its survival. For imperialists, these are tangible strategic achievements, not the stuff of 'utter disaster', which is how the liberals like to portray the results of the neocons' policies in Iraq.

But, again, for these achievements to last and become part of the 'permanent', long-term and structural setup in the Middle East, they need to be reinforced.

Enter Iran. In the contextual scenario of a global bully wanting more than its might allows, the differences between the Iranian state acting as an outright enemy (which it would have to, the minute an attack against it is launched) and a friendly and cooperative Iran are not small. In fact, the differences are huge, and can make the difference between utter disaster and the possibility of some salvation. Especially at this historical junction, when it comes to the available tools at the disposal of the American imperialists. The crazies may well yell and scream bloody murder, or, "Bomb, bomb Iran," all they want, but such chest thumping is more like the overjoyed outbursts of a crotchety old, impotent yet macho man momentarily caught up in the euphoric delusion of real potency induced by Viagra.

Social reality has its own dynamics and those dynamics invariably slap all power-wielding idiots in the face equally dispassionately. The Iranian government's bet has been that at some point the tunnels being burrowed by the Americans into the social life of the region will need their Iranian, able hands in constructing the needed reinforcements.

Of course, more than anybody, the Iranians know that once the reinforcements are built, they themselves may come under a real attack. But, that is always the rub when dealing with imperialists: there are no guarantees. Look at Pakistan and how miserably enslaved she is in the American imperialists' bear hug.

So, there may be grumblings by the Iranians about the release of their bank assets and the need for a lifting of trade sanctions, as there will surely be demands by the U.S. for Iran to reject 'terrorism' (coming from the U.S., that's balls!) and suspend their 'nuclear activities', or to stop their support for 'terror groups' such as Hamas and Hezbollah, but by the end of this dance, the bride will say 'Yes!' and the gathered celebrators of normalization will happily cheer the newly reconciled into the dark chambers, where big deals shall be made.

But, do not be fooled by either side. Normalization of relations between the U.S. and Iran will have nothing to do with reaching a civilized agreement, in which the U.S. agrees not to interfere in the affairs of the Iranian society and Iran agrees to be nice. Quite the contrary, the normalization will have to be about integrating more methodically the Iranian government's resources into the ongoing American imperial projects for the region, and this by nature will have to lead to increased U.S. interference in how things are run in Iran.

[Rasputin]

III

When social and natural resources of the Iranian society are put into creating a 'corridor' for the NATO to transport its supplies to Afghanistan, that must be called what it is in plain language: aiding and abetting the imperialists in their war of aggression in Afghanistan.

Socialists must ask, Why should any amount of the Iranian social wealth be integrated into some sub-section of a NATO planner's schemes? Gradually and by extension, are we to become a cog in the American imperial military machinery? That cannot be considered progress for the Iranian people. It would be more like the Pakistanization of Iran.

From the standpoint of the Iranian socialists, the best form of relations with the imperialists is no relation at all. That means both no negative or adverse relations (no embargoes, no economic harassment, no military bullying, no diplomatic bullying, no covert interferences, no destruction of any of our resources, human or otherwise), and no so-called positive relations, either (no U.S. corporations in Iran to steal our natural and social resources, no one-sided trade agreements, no shared production agreements in oil industry, ditto for gas resources or any metals and minerals in Iran).

Imperialists do not enter any relations based on equality or respect or any such irrelevant principles. They enter relations of dominance. Only. To not do so is fundamentally against their nature. It should be enough to observe how the Yankee imperialists approach their European allies; not based on equality. So, for the Iranian theocratic state to seriously expect to be treated as an equal by the American imperialists ... well, as politically (not to forget romantically) correct as that may be for some, such notions will simply not become operational in the really existing world capitalist system of today. Not by a long shot.

But, a marriage does not have to be one between equals, as most marriages rarely are. Just as in actual marriages anywhere in the world, and especially as is the case with marriages of convenience (which the Iran-U.S. rapprochement will surely be), both sides will continue to pretend that all is worth the sacrifices made internally and externally, both will do their best to keep up the pretenses, no matter how awkward it may become at times to keep appearances and hold things together. But, hold things together they will, because bigger objectives are at stake.

For the U.S., the bigger objectives at stake include the continuation of its project of tunnel building into the deep structures of social life in the Middle East as well as West- and Central-Asia. For the Iranian theocrats, the larger goals include a much awaited sigh of relief, a reprieve for sure, and the golden opportunity to bring water for the global bully in a fashion that saves face and assures the expansion of Iran's own regional power plays.

Alas, happy together and happily ever after they shall not live. This one will be a messy marriage, filled with sour bickering about past affairs, past abuses and aggressions, past failings of character and failures to allow for possibilities of better lives; there shall be arguments over current flaws, current neglects and continued abuses. There will, for sure, be some trouble over wife number one, Israel, that the U.S. keeps in the same neighborhood. Expect major catfights.

So, all in all, this Iran-U.S. rapprochement dance will make for a very entertaining but overall abusive relationship to be worked out, as well as observed and chronicled. Brace yourselves and try not to be too taken by the bickering coming down the line. It's all about uniting over a miserable cause anyway.

[Rasputin]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090417/ts_nm/us_iran_usa_mottaki_3

[Rasputin]

On March 31, Washington took its first step toward engagement with Tehran through a diplomatic encounter with the Iranian government at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague. Even though the initial contact was awkward, it was clearly a step forward for the Obama administration, and both countries agreed that the opium/heroin trade was a destructive force in both the region and the world. As such, the United States should consider using collaboration on counternarcotics as an effective means to jump-start diplomacy with Iran. Although such an approach would be difficult, it could succeed if both sides focused solely on law enforcement, without the intrusion of politicians, intelligence operatives, and diplomats.

Background
Afghanistan produces roughly 90 percent of the world's opiates -- principally opium and heroin -- and the resulting drug trade fuels the Taliban's war effort. The Taliban is becoming increasingly reliant on this illicit multibillion-dollar industry to fund its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is evidence of growing al-Qaeda involvement.

The UN's 2008 World Drug Report states that more than half of the world's opiate users -- over 9.3 million people -- reside in Asia and are found mostly along the major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. More than 2.3 million of the users live in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, many in Afghanistan and Iran.

Estimates for the number of Iranian users vary widely. Iranian government sources report that between 1.2 million and 2 million Iranians are addicted to opiates, while other estimates are generally higher, especially when frequent users are added to the figures. In other words, at least 2.5 percent of the adult population is addicted, and since 90 percent of Iranian users are male, 5 to 8 percent of adult men in Iran are using opiates regularly.

Opiates are the traditional intoxicant of choice in Iran, with opium use well established in tradition, in contrast to the negative social image of alcohol consumption. Opium was a significant problem in Iran before World War II, when it was the drug's leading international producer. In the decades before the revolution, much progress was made in addressing drug addiction, but the problem roared back after 1979.

Part of the problem was government attitude, since not all clerics disapproved of opium. The problem is compounded by geography, since Iran has served for many years as a major transshipment route for opium and heroin to Turkey, Europe, and other international destinations. As in many other countries, outside traffickers, in this case Afghans, work with Iranian organized crime to create the infrastructure necessary within Iran to support the transshipment of Afghan opiates to Western markets. The Afghan traffickers pay their Iranian partners with product rather than cash, thus contributing to the development of markets and increased demand inside Iran.

Not only is the Iranian addiction rate extremely high, a number of Iranian military personnel have been killed in the line of duty as a result of drug-related violence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose al-Quds Force is the country's primary support organization for regional terrorists, is at the same time a main actor in the fight against drug trafficking. A number of IRGC units appear to be involved in both tasks, which poses a significant problem for U.S.-Iranian counternarcotics cooperation.

Another potential obstacle for a collaborative effort is the perception that Washington supports at least one of the major organizations smuggling opiates into Iran, Jundallah, an ethnically Baluch "political" group also known as Iranian People's Resistance Movement. This organization has engaged in acts of terrorism against the Iranian government, and its leader has spoken on Voice of America.

The Way Forward
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be allowed to establish direct communication and cooperation with its Iranian law enforcement counterparts. Iranian officials have sought this kind of arrangement in the past, and some senior U.S. State Department leaders have even lobbied for it; however, previous administrations have prohibited the DEA from moving forward.

This year the DEA is cohosting -- with its Mexican counterparts -- its twenty-seventh annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Cancun, Mexico. The IDEC has grown from a five-country, Western-hemisphere-centric endeavor, to a global effort involving approximately one hundred nations. Ninety-one countries participated in the 2008 event in Istanbul, Turkey. The IDEC venue could provide an ideal opportunity to open relations between the DEA and Iranian law enforcement, as well as other law enforcement agencies from around the globe, ultimately paving the way for a new era of cooperation between the United States and Iran.

After initial exchanges, the next step is to share intelligence and evidence, ideally though the establishment of a DEA office in Tehran. The DEA has the largest U.S. law enforcement presence abroad (eighty-six offices in sixty-seven countries), made possible only by the acceptance of DEA agents as federal narcotics officers, not spies. Gaining that acceptance in Iran will be a great challenge, and it certainly would not happen overnight. But it is important to set long-term goals. Although no foreign government has succeeded in working with Iran in this manner -- and the recent conviction of a foreign journalist as a spy is alarming -- the DEA has been extraordinarily effective in sharing related leads and sensitive drug intelligence with their counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries throughout the region and the world.

The Challenge
Policing is a science, and complex counternarcotics policing is even more challenging. Senior politicians from both countries becoming involved in police business could be disastrous. Since the problem will be compounded by the role of the IRGC, a reflexively anti-American force, the challenge will be to find a way for cooperation among senior law enforcement leaders, working at a "cop-to-cop" level.

From there, law enforcement officials could conduct collaborative work on efforts to address drug demand reduction and treatment, with professionals from those disciplines taking the lead. In this context, it is discouraging that Iran arrested two brothers, Arash and Kamiar Alaei, as they were heading to the 2008 international AIDS conference where they were due to be awarded a prize for their work with mostly drug-addicted AIDS victims. The brothers were convicted as spies on the charge that their foreign collaboration was promoting the "soft overthrow" of the Islamic Republic -- a preoccupation of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who sees cooperation with foreigners as potentially dangerous to his regime.

To succeed, any U.S. effort to cooperate with Iran on counternarcotics efforts must draw upon the DEA's successful and decades-long experience with law enforcement partners from around the globe. Although Iran does not subscribe to U.S. terrorist designations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is nonetheless in Iran's interest to work aggressively with the United States to target the drug-trafficking activities of these groups, which destabilize Iran and the region.

[Rasputin]

A familiar specter is haunting foreign policy circles, hovering in particular over liberal experts and intellectuals, compelling them to re-examine their views on two former ideological adversaries, namely Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. In an exceptional turn of events, the two ex-presidents are being unanimously hailed as a pair of foreign policy visionaries--Nixon for going to China, and Reagan for embracing Mikhail Gorbachev. The specter, of course, is Henry Kissinger.

Nowhere is this transformation better evident than in the debate about Iran. These days, the new conventional wisdom in Washington advocates the pursuit of a diplomatic solution with Tehran. The only existing disagreement is not over whether to negotiate but when to negotiate. Some believe that Washington must wait to reach out to Tehran after Iran's presidential elections in June. Others contend that waiting is unnecessary since the key figure to reach out to, the Supreme Leader, will remain the same.

In their book Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President, Richard N. Haass and Martin S. Indyk tackle the subject of Iran from multiple angles to arrive at a Kissingerian solution. Though the book covers a gamut of pressing issues in the region--from Iraq policy, to Arab-Israeli peace, to nuclear proliferation--Iran is the major common theme throughout much of their discussion. Its authors present as new an approach that is reminiscent of the old dual containment policy of carrots and sticks, except that the carrots are far from tangible and the sticks hardly defined. They acknowledge Iran as a tough challenge but, they argue, diplomacy can work because the regime does ultimately care about its immediate interests.

However, the question that goes unanswered is this: What reward could the U.S. possibly offer Tehran that could not only trump the allure of nuclear hubris but also substitute for the regime's anti-American fabric, of which its very identity is made?

Even if such a carrot were to magically sprout, the delivery of it to so fractured a regime would be a monumental feat. The Islamic facade of Iran's regime keeps us, in the West, so focused on our ideological divisions that we fail to see the commonalities in what plagues our politics. Much of Iran's economy and political infrastructure is in the firm grip of a handful of mafias. If there were to be a negotiation with Iran, the task of finding a reliable partner among the bosses would be daunting.

The fate of Iran's leaders in the past 30 years best demonstrates the impermanence of power among them. Ever since 1979, the vast majority of the country's leading figures have either fallen from grace--like former President Abolhassan Banisadre who defected to France, or Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who was executed, or Ambassador Mohammad Hossein Moussavian who was imprisoned--or they have lost momentum and popularity, like former President Mohammed Khatami. Iran's leadership landscape is quicksand.

But let us suppose that the miracle carrot was on hand and a single leader existed in Iran. Still, a major shift would first have to occur for the carrot-and-stick approach to succeed. At the heart of the proposal by doctors Haass and Indyk is a recommendation for political surgery to incise a "realistic and legitimate Iran" from its conjoined evil twin, "revolutionary Iran," which is driven by the zeal and impulses that defined Ayatollah Khomeini's rule.

It is here, in the strategy of separating a revolutionary state from its revolutionary moment, that a familiar vision and voice from the past reverberates. This view gives no heed to the ideals that spark revolutions in the first place. It cloaks its disregard for the subject of revolution in "pragmatism." Its foremost architect, Henry Kissinger, remains the perennial muse of the imagination of American foreign policymakers.

Nearly four decades ago, Kissinger introduced his policy to deal with communism, which in essence moved the U.S. to recognize the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the 1949 Chinese revolution. His doctrine accorded legitimacy to an established revolutionary state in the hopes of isolating it from the revolutionary movements and moderating its international behavior.

The revolutionary governments were served judicious helpings of carrots and sticks--the heartiest carrot being the accord of legitimacy itself, and the lesser being an array of trade and economic deals. The stick was America's massive military superiority, and her network of "regional gendarmes," such as Iran and South Vietnam at the time, who were to maintain U.S. influence in strategic areas of the world without overt presence. Kissinger argued that, after Vietnam, military intervention was not a viable policy for the United States.

Today, Kissinger claims that the demise of America's totalitarian rivals did not come as a result of the triumph of American democratic ideals. Rather, it came through the triumph of his policy toward the Soviets, which led to confrontational Reaganite tactics and the subsequent end of the Cold War. This point especially matters to Haass and Indyk in making their Iran proposal. That the authors agree that it was, indeed, the Kissinger Doctrine that broke the Bolsheviks' backs and pushed China toward more openness can be deduced from the model they propose for Iran.

However, there is a glaring distinction not simply between Iran and the former Soviet Union, but also between the Henry Kissinger of the late 1960s and his American counterparts in the new century. Whether it was the kidnapping and assassination of the Chilean General Rene Schneider, or supervision of extensive bombing raids into Laos and Cambodia, Kissinger's political calculus could never be called humanitarian. Yet he was always deeply engaged with the details of the internal politics of the country of his focus.

Haass and Indyk, on the other hand, while maintaining the same pragmatist disregard for the plight of Iranians, admit to a broad and general lack of understanding of critical details related to Iran: "Previous U.S. attempts to play on internal political dynamics in Iran have all proved counterproductive; the United States simply lacks the knowledge and the guile to do so effectively." Beneath all carefully crafted proposals of carrots and sticks for Iran, there is a clear message for the region, that once again American interests, not American ideals, will drive the U.S. foreign policy.

And there lies the glaring omission. The revolutionary movement that Indyk and Haass propose we excise is only a hollow posture when it comes to Iran's regime. But for the nation--for the young women who have spurred the grassroots One-Million-Signature campaign for equal rights, for the bus drivers who want their own union, for the scores of journalists and bloggers who languish in prisons, that movement is everything.

What if the U.S. were to turn its back on the plight of Iran's nation to embrace its government? If so, America is not about to blaze a new path. Rather, once again, as in the time of the Shah, the U.S. will align itself with those whom the nation regard as oppressors. It was precisely such an alliance that sparked the anti-imperialist fury among ordinary Iranians, which Ayatollah Khomeini exploited. That fury became the bonfire we now call the Iranian revolution of 1979.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]