Nuclear Crisis

[iranmedia3]

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[iranmedia3]

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[Rasputin]

U.N. inspectors have discovered new traces of highly-enriched uranium on nuclear equipment in Iran, deepening suspicions Tehran may still be concealing the full extent of its atomic enrichment program, diplomats said.
Several Western diplomats said there were signs Iran continued to pursue uranium enrichment research in secret and fear the goal is to acquire the capability to produce enriched-uranium fuel for weapons -- a charge Iran denies.

In its April report to the U.N. Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it took samples from equipment that had been acquired by a former research center at Lavizan-Shiyan. The center was razed in 2004 before IAEA inspectors could examine it.

The IAEA inspectors took swabs from the machinery earlier this year which were subjected to microscopic particle analysis.

"Preliminary analysis by the IAEA showed traces of highly-enriched uranium in the samples," a Western diplomat accredited to the IAEA told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

He gave no details about the equipment. The former physics center at Lavizan, which advised the defense ministry, acquired some dual-use machinery useable for uranium enrichment.

A diplomat in Vienna, where the IAEA is based, confirmed the new finding but warned against exaggerating its significance: "It's no smoking gun. There could be many explanations. But it increases pressure on Iran to come clean about Lavizan."

Iranian officials declined to comment for this article.

In 2003, the IAEA found traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) at several sites in Iran. Most HEU is now believed to have come from contamination on second-hand Pakistani equipment.

"Even if it is the same contamination, this is a significant finding because it indicates something was going on at Lavizan," said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security think-tank.

SECRET SITES?

He said it raised the question of whether Iran ran a second parallel enrichment program alongside the one it has declared.

The finding will probably also deepen suspicions among Western countries that Iran's military was actively involved in the program for uranium enrichment, a process of purifying uranium for use in nuclear power plants or atomic weapons.

Iran says it only wants to generate electricity, but the West believes the secrecy and military links to its atomic program are clear signs that it is also aimed at making bombs.

The U.N. Security Council has called on Iran to freeze its enrichment program, but Tehran refuses.

Iran has already succeeded in purifying uranium to low-grade levels needed for power plants. Western diplomats say the sophistication of Iranian nuclear scientists is surprising.

They say that during a 2-1/2 year suspension of its enrichment program, Iranian scientists have significantly improved their mastery of centrifuges, which purify gas of a uranium compound by spinning at supersonic speeds.

"Our (intelligence) assessment is that you cannot explain Iran's progress without secret (enrichment) sites being involved," said a diplomat from a country critical of Iran.

Others say Iran could have made such progress through simulation work.

Another diplomat from the same country said he suspected small amounts of processed uranium gas were being diverted from Isfahan, possibly to undisclosed enrichment sites in Iran. An EU diplomat said the IAEA had such suspicions too but no proof.

Albright said there was no proof of any "secret site" in Iran.

[Rasputin]

The European Union will insist on Monday that Iran must suspend all uranium enrichment despite Tehran's demand that some be allowed for research goals, according to a draft declaration obtained by Reuters on Friday.

"It (the EU Council) calls on the Iranian authorities to cooperate fully with the IAEA, suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development," according to a declaration drafted for EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on Monday.

Tehran said on Thursday that a new proposal been drawn up by European states on its nuclear program must allow Iran to enrich uranium for atomic research and development purposes.

[Rasputin]

More Uranium Reportedly Found in Iran

The U.N. atomic agency found traces of highly enriched uranium at an Iranian site linked to the country's defense ministry, diplomats said Friday, adding to concerns that Tehran was hiding activities aimed at making nuclear arms.
The diplomats, who demanded anonymity in exchange for revealing the confidential information, said the findings were preliminary and still had to be confirmed through other lab tests. But they said the density of enrichment appeared to be close to or above the level used to make nuclear warheads.

Still, they said, further analysis could show that the traces match others established to have come from abroad. The International Atomic Energy Agency determined earlier traces of weapons-grade uranium were imported on equipment from Pakistan that Iran bought on the black market during nearly two decades of clandestine activity discovered just over three years ago.

Uranium enriched to between 3.5 percent and 5 percent is used to make fuel for reactors to generate electricity. It becomes suitable for use in nuclear weapons when enriched to more than 90 percent.

Iran's refusal to give up enrichment ambitions has led to involvement by the U.N. Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions but remains split on how firmly to pressure Tehran.

Key U.N. Security Council members agreed Tuesday to postpone a resolution that would have delivered an ultimatum to Tehran, giving Iran another two weeks to re-evaluate its insistence on developing its uranium enrichment capabilities.

Iran's hard-line president said Friday that his country was not afraid of possible U.S. military action over its enrichment program, but added that he thought any such strikes were very unlikely. Washington has said it favors a diplomatic end to the dispute, but it hasn't ruled out military force.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also told a local TV station that Iran would cooperate with the Security Council if it makes a decision on the escalating standoff as long as the world body acts "in line with international rules."

The Islamic republic denies accusations it wants to make nuclear arms and says it is only interested in uranium to generate power.

To argue that it never enriched uranium domestically to weapons grade, it cites the IAEA's tentative conclusion last year that weapons-grade traces collected from other sites within the country with no suspected ties to that military came in on equipment from Pakistan.

The origin of the samples now under perusal created some concern in that regard.

One of the diplomats told The Associated Press that the samples came from equipment that can be used in uranium-enriching centrifuges at a former research center at Lavizan-Shian. The center is believed to have been the repository of equipment bought by the Iranian military that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.

The United States alleges Iran had conducted high-explosive tests that could have a bearing on developing nuclear weapons at the site.

The State Department said in 2004 that Lavizan's buildings had been dismantled and topsoil had been removed in attempts to hide nuclear weapons-related experiments. The agency subsequently confirmed that the site had been razed.

In an April 28 report to the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors, agency head Mohamed ElBaradei said the agency took samples from some of the equipment of the former Physics Research Center at Lavizan-Shian. The diplomat said the evaluation of those samples revealed the traces in question.

Ahmadinejad's remarks on possible U.S. military action were made in Jakarta during a discussion with Indonesian Islamic leaders.

Asked whether his country was prepared to face an attack by the United States, he said "that is very unlikely because they know the Islamic Republic of Iran is a strong country."

"They are trying to frighten our country by waging a propaganda campaign using strong words. The people of Iran and the country are not afraid of them," he said to applause from the audience.

The Chinese and Russians have balked at British, French and U.S. efforts to put the resolution under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Such a move would declare Iran a threat to international peace and security and set the stage for further measures if Tehran refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment operations. Those measures could range from breaking diplomatic relations to economic sanctions and military action.

[Rasputin]

This is an ad from the 1970s purchased by a number of U.S. power companies using the Shah's nuclear power program to convince Americans of the necessity and safety of nuclear energy. How times change.

[Rasputin]

EU to barter for civilian Iran nuclear programme

The European Union will propose a "bold package" of incentives to Iran, including possible security guarantees, if Tehran can ensure that its nuclear programme is not used to produce weapons, the EU foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana, said today.
"We have said over and over again that we think a diplomatic solution is a good way, and we are going to continue on that line and ... we are going to prepare a very serious package that will make it difficult for them to say no," Mr Solana said ahead of a meeting of EU foreign ministers.

The proposals will be put together despite an announcement last night by Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that any economic and political incentive package would be rejected if it required Tehran to stop enriching uranium. Uranium enrichment can be a first step towards a nuclear weapons programme.
Insisting that only Iran has the authority to make decisions about its nuclear program, Mr Ahmadinejad said "they want to offer us things they call incentives in return for renouncing our rights".

However, Mr Solana did not appear unduly worried by the Iranian president's announcement. "It will be a generous package, a bold package, that will contain issues related to nuclear, and atomic matters and maybe necessary security matters," he told reporters. "We ... have nothing against Iran having nuclear capabilities, if it's strictly devoted to the production of energy, [and] we have said that we would even be ready to cooperate with that."

"What we think is not appropriate, not acceptable, is to take the other route which is not to produce energy, but to produce arms or weapons."

The British foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, said there would be "real advantages" for Iran if it complied with the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Tehran has repeatedly asserted that its nuclear program, which includes uranium enrichment, is purely civilian in character and aimed only at generating power. But the United States, Israel and the EU fear the research programme is in fact a cover for the development of nuclear weapons.

Iran rejected a package of economic and political incentives offered by the EU last August in return for a permanent end to uranium enrichment, but EU governments have continued to offer sweeteners, as well as pushing at the United Nations for measures that could lead to sanctions if it refuses.

Meanwhile, the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, today called for urgent action on the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Mr Annan met the South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon, with whom he also discussed the North Korean nuclear standoff.

"The international community has to take very urgent steps to deal with these issues before we have a cascade of a proliferation of nuclear weapons," Mr Annan said.

[Rasputin]

A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy

By Henry A. Kissinger
Tuesday, May 16, 2006; Page A17

The recent letter from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to President Bush needs to be considered on several levels. It can be treated as a ploy to obstruct U.N. Security Council deliberations on Iran's disregard of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This consideration, and the demagogic tone of the letter, merited its rejection by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. But the first direct approach by an Iranian leader to a U.S. president in more than 25 years may also have intentions beyond the tactical and propagandistic, and its demagoguery may be a way to get the radical part of the Iranian public used to dialogue with the United States. America's challenge is to define its own strategy and purposes regarding the most fateful issue confronting us today.

The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and wind up in terrorist hands. The negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed. A failed diplomacy would leave us with a choice between the use of force or a world where restraint has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of countries that have the most to lose to restrain defiant fanatics. One need only imagine what would have happened had any of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Istanbul or Bali involved even the crudest nuclear weapon.
Of the two negotiations, the one on Korea -- a six-party forum of Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and North Korea -- seems more advanced than the four-party talk on Iran (among France, Germany, Britain and Iran). Last September an apparent agreement in principle was reached in Beijing that North Korea will give up its nuclear program if the other parties provide adequate assurances of security, economic help in the post-nuclear period and a substitute for the power generation allegedly lost by abandoning the nuclear program. But each side has demanded that the other fulfill all its obligations before it undertakes its own; a serious effort to discuss a concurrent schedule has been prevented by North Korea's tactic of stringing out the period between each session, perhaps to gain time for strengthening its nuclear arsenal.

With respect to Iran, there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is. Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program, in the absence of which no control over a weapons program is meaningful.

The public debate often focuses on whether the United States is prepared to engage in bilateral discussions with North Korea or Iran. With respect to Korea, that is a subsidiary issue. The six-power talks provide adequate opportunity for a bilateral exchange of views. What Pyongyang is attempting to achieve -- and what the Bush administration has rightly resisted -- is a separate negotiation with Washington outside the six-party framework, which would prevent other parties in the Beijing process from undertaking joint responsibilities. If bilateral talks replaced the six-party forum, some of America's present partners might choose to place the onus for breaking every deadlock on Washington, in effect isolating the United States.

The same considerations apply even more strongly to bilateral negotiations with Iran at this stage. Until now formal negotiations have been prevented by the memory of the hostage crisis, Iranian support of terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president. Nor does the Iranian president's letter remove these inhibitions. Nevertheless, on a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate -- especially in light of what is at stake.

An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a de facto acquiescence by the international community in letting new entrants into the nuclear club. In Asia, it would spell the near-certain addition of South Korea and Japan; in the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia could enter the field. In such a world, all significant industrial countries would consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol. Radical elements throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere would gain strength from the successful defiance of the major nuclear powers.

[Rasputin]

The management of a nuclear-armed world would be infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various nuclear countries would not only have to maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process that would not necessarily follow the principles and practices evolved over decades among the existing nuclear states. They would also have the ability and incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in general confrontations. Especially Iran, and eventually other countries of similar orientation, would be able to use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities around the world.

There is an argument on behalf of acquiescing in proliferation which holds that new nuclear countries have proved responsible in the past. But this is not endorsed by experience. Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project; North Korea has been an active proliferator. In addition, the safeguarding of nuclear material on the territories of emerging nuclear countries is bound to be more porous and less sophisticated.

Diplomacy needs a new impetus. As a first step, the United States and its negotiating partners need to agree on how much time is available for negotiations. There seems to be general agreement that Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year; there is some disagreement about progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing. Estimates on how close Tehran is to producing its first nuclear weapon range from two to 10 years. Given the risks and stakes, this gap needs to be narrowed. Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of the fact that in 2008 governments in both Russia and the United States will change; this will impose a hiatus on diplomacy while the governments are preoccupied with transition and, in America, restaffing the executive branch.

The next step is to recognize the difference between multiparty negotiations and a preferred strategy of regime change. There are no governments in the world whose replacement by responsible regimes would contribute more to international peace and security than those governing Pyongyang and Tehran. But none of the participants in the existing or foreseeable forums will support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change. Inevitably, a negotiation on nuclear disarmament will involve compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities and is, in that sense, incompatible with regime change.

Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue. The United States should oppose nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran regardless of the government that builds them.

The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War: no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union as the evil empire.

On Korea, progress requires agreement regarding the political evolution of the Korean Peninsula and of Northeast Asia. The expectation that China is so reluctant to see nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula -- and therefore ultimately in Japan -- that it will sooner or later bring the needed pressure on North Korea has so far been disappointed. This is because China has not only military concerns but also strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula. It will try to avoid an outcome in Korea that leads to the sudden collapse of an ally, producing a flood of Korean refugees into China as well as turmoil on its borders. For these reasons, a strategic dialogue with Beijing must be an important component of a negotiating strategy that also addresses Pyongyang's desire for security.

Though America is represented in the six-party forum by an exceptional diplomat in Christopher Hill, periodic engagement at a higher level is needed to give the necessary direction to his efforts. The objective should be an understanding regarding security and political evolution in Northeast Asia that requires no changes in sovereignty as part of the process of denuclearization but leaves open the prospect of Korean unification through negotiations or internal evolution.

Parallel considerations apply to the case of Iran. The current negotiating forum is highly dysfunctional. Three European countries in close coordination with the United States are acting partly as America's surrogate. China and Russia do not participate in the negotiations but are involved when their consequences go before the U.N. Security Council -- a procedure enabling Iran to play off the nuclear powers against each other.

A more coherent forum for negotiation would combine the three European nations with the United States, China and Russia as the countries most directly affected and in the best position to act jointly in the Security Council. This could be set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution now under discussion. It would permit elaboration of the one hopeful scheme that has emerged in Iranian diplomacy. Put forward by Russia, it is to move certain enrichment operations out of Iran into Russia, thereby preventing clandestine weaponization. The new, broader forum could be used to establish an international enrichment program applicable to future nuclear technologies to curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation.

Obviously, nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented simply by multiplying negotiating forums. The experience with existing conferences demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation. To be effective, diplomacy must involve a willingness to provide clear penalties for obstruction.

Only after we have created the requisite negotiating framework and explored all aspects of diplomacy should the issue of military measures be addressed. But neither should force be rejected in principle and for all time before we know the circumstances in which this last resort should be considered.

The issue before the nations involved is similar to what the world faced in 1938 and at the beginning of the Cold War: whether to overcome fears and hesitancy about undertaking the difficult path demanded by necessity. The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war; the ability to master it in the immediate aftermath of World War II led to victory without war.

The debates surrounding these issues will be conducted in the waning years of an American adm1inistration. On the surface, this may seem to guarantee partisanship. But thoughtful observers in both parties will know that the consequences of the decisions before us will have to be managed in a new administration. The nuclear issue, capable of destroying mankind, may thus, one hopes, bring us together in the end.

[Rasputin]

Doubts have been raised about how technically advanced Iran's nuclear programme is, after it emerged Tehran may have used material from China.
Western diplomatic sources told the BBC the material used in Iran's recent uranium enrichment experiments probably came from materials supplied in 1991.

That was before China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and before it was bound by its export controls.

Iran recently announced it had been able to produce enriched uranium.

This was despite calls from Western powers to suspend the programme because of fears it could lead to the production of a nuclear weapon.

Iran may have used stocks of high-quality uranium gas - or uranium hexafluoride gas - from China to speed up a breakthrough in enrichment, diplomats say.

This allowed them to proclaim Iran's enrichment programme was under way.

'Impure' material

Nuclear experts say Iran has had some problems with impurities in its own production of the material.

So it would be logical to use the good quality Chinese material to test out its enrichment machinery, says the BBC's Jonathan Marcus.

The Iranian move had great propaganda value, but it may also have had a clear political purpose: to demonstrate that the Iranian enrichment programme was a reality, our correspondent says.

It may also have put down a marker that in the event of any future deal, Iran's right to conduct at least some enrichment activity would have to be acknowledged, he adds.