Nuclear Crisis

[siamak]

Bushehr plant test
Iranians start reactor test run

BBC: Iranian and Russian nuclear officials have begun a test run of Iran's first nuclear power plant. The test involves dummy rods that imitate the enriched uranium needed to run the Russian-built plant at Bushehr. The test is likely to fuel fears in the West about Iran's nuclear ambitions, though Tehran says they are peaceful. An Iranian official told journalists at Bushehr that Iran had increased the number of its centrifuges enriching uranium at another site to 6,000 ...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XysRQQQzF-o

[Rasputin]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/03/090310_op_dennis_blair_iran_uranium.shtml

[Rasputin]

William Schneider
The international community's prolonged hesitance to intervene has allowed Iran to acquire the industrial capability to enrich uranium. Iran has sufficient yellow cake -- uranium that has been milled, the first step toward enrichment -- to produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel fifty nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iran's path toward nuclear weapons capability is facilitated by its access to Pakistan's nuclear know-how.

The unpopularity of the Iranian regime affords the United States a renewed opportunity to exercise leadership. Washington must promote stiffer economic and financial sanctions, including those that jeopardize Iran's ability to export oil and import refined petroleum products. In addition, the global recession and the oil market meltdown offer some unique short-term opportunities to implement crippling sanctions on Iran's ability to sustain its nuclear program.

Iran's nuclear progress has assumed great urgency in Israel, which perceives the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat. Whatever the U.S. view may be, Israel currently thinks that it has a military option to slow down Iran's nuclear quest, despite the recognition that military means alone cannot permanently stop the program. Israel may be driven to exercise that option sooner than it otherwise would because of concern over improved Iranian air defenses. The crucial issue is the potential Russian sale of the S-300 air defense system. The transfer of the S-300 system to Iran would likely trigger unilateral Israeli action, which would be detrimental to U.S. regional interests. This possibility raises the importance of American engagement with Russia to defer or prevent the transfer of the air defense equipment to Iran until the nuclear issue is resolved.

The U.S. strategic position vis-a-vis Iran affords Washington far greater diplomatic leverage than it has employed in the past. The large U.S. military presence in the region, for example, can be utilized at the diplomatic level to great advantage. The period following the election of President Obama and before the Iranian election in June may provide a particularly good opportunity to strengthen this engagement. Exploitation of carrots (integration into the international community and ending multilateral sanctions) as well as sticks (more severe sanctions) -- could positively affect the preelection environment in Iran.

Eugene Habiger
Deterrence is not just a Cold War concept; it is a viable strategy today. The question is how to use deterrence to prevent a cascade of instability stemming from Iranian nuclear progress. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the United States would deter nuclear threats not only to itself and its formal allies, but also to its "friends," which is a new dimension that could include countries such as Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. On the campaign trail in 2008, Hillary Clinton offered a similar proposition.

Deterrence is the product of military capability and political will. If either is lacking, deterrence will not work. The United States has the military capability to deter Iran's nuclear progress, but it remains to be seen whether it has the political will. As it stands today, some in the Middle East have little confidence in the United States to execute its deterrent capability. The current administration must take quick and aggressive action to regain credibility on this issue.

Discussions of U.S. nuclear deterrence often center on extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to the region. Washington does not necessarily have to deploy nuclear weapons to this area to maintain an umbrella: although the United States has nuclear weapons embedded in some NATO-allied countries, its nuclear umbrella extends to Japan, South Korea, and Australia without deploying nuclear weapons in those regions.

Nancy Soderberg
The United States has lost the ability to intimidate its adversaries in the Middle East. Unless Washington regains that capacity, the region runs the risk of cascading instability in the face of Iranian nuclear progress. Some regional countries fear that the United States lacks the stamina and clout to resolve this pressing issue and are unconvinced that it will follow through on defense commitments. There is, however, a hunger in the region for U.S. reengagement both on the Iranian front and in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

For Israel, the most clear and immediate threat is a potential Iranian nuclear weapon, particularly if Iran installs an adequate air defense system or takes further steps to hide its capabilities. These scenarios would significantly advance Israel's timetable for action. The United States should consider providing Israel with a stronger strike capability to ease the pressure on Israel to strike Iran preemptive of its acquisition of an advanced air defense system from Russia. More importantly, the United States must reengage Russia and seek cooperation on this matter. For Israel, the freedom to act on its own timetable and develop its own military options are paramount; Israel is not interested in an American nuclear umbrella to deter an attack by a nuclear Iran.

Concerns about Iran in the Persian Gulf extend beyond the nuclear issue to the larger issue of Persian regional hegemony. Arab countries see the centuries-old struggle for regional supremacy shifting in Iran's favor. Arab states are worried that Iran will use proxies to dominate the region and are therefore urging the United States to engage Syria in order to block Iran's doorway into the Levant.

On a positive note, the threat of a nuclear Iran is promoting cooperation among the GCC countries, which is something Washington should continue to encourage. One repeatedly voiced fear in the GCC, however, is that the United States will sacrifice its interests in exchange for a U.S.-Iranian detente or, in a less extreme version, that U.S. concern about their interests will wane as Washington deals with a new partner in Tehran. GCC countries want to be treated as full partners, and the onus is on the United States to seize this opportunity for partnership and cooperation.

The urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat requires U.S. engagement with Tehran. The outcome of Iran's presidential elections later this year will affect the policy on some level: if President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad is voted out of office, a more moderate figure could take his place, altering the dynamic between the two countries.

Although an increased Iranian threat is a major problem, it provides an ideal opportunity to work with Arab states on a range of mutual issues, from counterterrorism and piracy to Persian Gulf security and Iraq. The United States must shore up cooperation among the Gulf countries and reiterate U.S. defense commitments in the Middle East -- all of which will help deal with a problematic Iran while reinforcing other U.S. regional interests. Open discussion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has left Middle East leaders eager for protection assurances from Washington. The Middle East is hungry for strong U.S. leadership and is looking to the new administration to help solve the problems that plague the region today.

[Rasputin]

Halliburton "sold nuclear technology to Iran"

Senate hearing on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies dealing with Iran

Halliburton, the notorious U.S. energy company, sold key nuclear-reactor components to a private Iranian oil company called Oriental Oil Kish as recently as 2005, using offshore subsidiaries to circumvent U.S. sanctions. This clip shows Democratic Senators Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) grilling Sherry Williams, V.P. and Corporate Secretary for Halliburton about the company's deplorable ethics and questionable practices.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0giXvhEWMo

[Rasputin]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123845791330271707.html

[Rasputin]

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/87571cc6-206b-11de-b930-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F87571cc6-206b-11de-b930-00144feabdc0.html%3Fnclick_check%3D1&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fbalatarin.com%2Flinks%2Fpopular%2Frecent%2Fall%2Fall%2F3&nclick_check=1

[Rasputin]

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5380VF20090409?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&rpc=69

[Rasputin]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090417/wl_canada_afp/canadausenergynuclearcrimepoliceiran_20090417200423

[Rasputin]

As Mohamed ElBaradei's term as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) draws to a close, the organization is struggling to choose a new leader. After deadlocking on an initial vote in March, a new round of nominations closed on April 27, with the next vote scheduled in the coming months. While the IAEA sorts out changes at the top, the United States should try to expand the agency's mandate and responsibilities. One such change would be the establishment of a full-fledged intelligence office, which would dramatically improve the agency's ability to identify and deter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).


Post-September 11 Urgency
After the September 11 attacks, the CIA faced the daunting prospect of al-Qaeda seeking a nuclear bomb and collaborating with Pakistani nuclear scientists in an effort to build one. A mood of grim determination gripped the U.S. intelligence establishment, a sentiment highlighted by CIA Director George Tenet when he stated that "We are behind the eight ball" in tracking al-Qaeda's efforts to obtain WMDs.

This threat galvanized an unprecedented response, which stimulated a degree of risk taking, experimentation, and creativity that would have been impossible under normal circumstances. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies abandoned traditional methods of conducting business and worked together in unprecedented ways to defuse the threat. Government agencies agreed to colocate officers and work together as an integrated team, drawing from a well of capabilities that included everything at the U.S. government's disposal. The United States also shared raw leads and information with dozens of countries in the war on terrorism, most notably with our new Russian partners. Washington went to extreme lengths to ensure information was passed to anyone who might have answers, including Syria, Sudan, and Iran. Conventional rules limiting the sharing of information were suspended in favor of sharing everything with everyone. In all, the CIA passed WMD-related leads and analysis to over two dozen countries. In fact, in the process of averting a WMD-enabled al-Qaeda, the United States and its allies were able to thwart attacks in the formative stages in several countries.

The Price of Success
Over time, the shared feeling of imminent threat began to dissipate, and as it did, U.S. interagency cooperation and international outreach reverted to more traditional, limited form. Cooperation once again became more formal, rigid, and slower. Unfortunately, the threat of an al-Qaeda-linked nuclear attack has not diminished, even as memories of its aborted attempts fade.

Nuclear threats are growing, and nuclear terrorism is among the greatest challenges facing the world in the age of globalization. Terrorist groups are attempting to procure WMDs in order to achieve global objectives. For terrorists, possessing even a single nuclear weapon would place them at the pinnacle of power, knowing that detonating a bomb in any city offers an opportunity to change history. Although it would not be easy for any state or terrorist group to pull off such an attack, even the minute chance that terrorists might have that ability changes the equation dramatically, given that the Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction is no longer applicable.

The Armageddon Test
What makes the situation more dangerous is the availability of weapons-usable material on the black market -- material that is often not reported as missing from or unaccounted for at the facility of origin. Seizures have typically been samples of larger quantities that remain missing. Furthermore, the record indicates that nuclear material seizures have been serendipitous, and not the result of proactive intelligence and law enforcement action. Past smuggling incidents have fostered deep suspicion and mistrust among states, including charges and countercharges over sting operations.

Intelligence and law enforcement organizations have not taken ownership of loose nuclear material. This should come as no surprise given the reluctance of nuclear states to acknowledge that material is missing or that they have secretly provided it to other governments or nonstate actors. States are loath to claim missing material when it is seized and much less ready to accept the possibility that more may be missing and for sale to the highest bidder. To make matters worse, nothing is more sensitive to governments than sharing information about nuclear secrets, weapons, and materiel, and there is a natural aversion to working with rival countries. As such, national interests trump the collective security imperative of closing down the nuclear black market.

An IAEA with Teeth
The overall U.S. effort to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack depends heavily on the ability of intelligence to perform its mission. Broadening the mandate and intelligence capability of the IAEA -- a multilateral institution created specifically to respond to nuclear threats -- would be one way to improve international intelligence capability in this area. IAEA intelligence would not require an army, only a small core of true professionals. To build such an effort, intelligence officers could be seconded to the IAEA. A small operational team, following carefully conceived ground rules, could penetrate and study the black market, and devise a plan to eliminate it. To demonstrate the gravity of the problem, the group could be tasked to obtain sufficient nuclear material for a bomb. The successful completion of such a task might help highlight the dangers and galvanize the international community to act.

Nothing is substantively complicated about arming the IAEA with intelligence capacity. Considering the nuclear mission of the agency and its status as an established international body, it is only logical to do so. The IAEA needs all three parts of the intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, and analysis -- in order to effectively carry out its mission. Applying the discipline and rigor of intelligence collection and analytical tradecraft in tracking nuclear materials, analyzing smuggling networks, and identifying clandestine nuclear activity would only enhance the IAEA's capacity to serve the common interests of all member states.

A Preventable Catastrophe
Objections to creating an IAEA intelligence capability will center around international politics and the bureaucratic realities of multilateralism, rather than on the substance of the matter. Some may argue that based on its track record, the IAEA is not worthy of such trust and responsibility. Others will express reluctance to infuse intelligence into the agency's sensitive safeguard mission. Certain intelligence officials will express concern about protection of sources and methods in sharing more information with the IAEA. Under the current system, IAEA employees, for example, cannot be prosecuted for leaking sensitive intelligence information. While these reservations have some merit, they should not be barriers to multilateralism, but rather serve as a basis for formulating a realistic plan for cooperation. The truth is that states cannot succeed on their own; global intelligence is the only hope for confronting nuclear terrorism and other threats to collective security.

The biggest obstacle to multilateral intelligence cooperation is leadership and finding the courage to work together. Group think and risk aversion must be overcome in the name of urgency. The IAEA must garner the support of member states, their resources, methodologies, and most of all, their information. An aggressive international intelligence presence on the black market would help deter smugglers and terrorists. It would help prove that the international community, by working together, can eliminate the nuclear black market, deter nuclear smuggling, and expose clandestine nuclear activity before it reaches fruition. If the international community stays on the current course, however, it is only a matter of time before the world experiences the catastrophe of a nuclear terrorist attack.

[Rasputin]

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE55457H20090605?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&rpc=69