Eye On Iran

[Rasputin]

Everybody who knows the regime knows that it is impossible for it to reform from within. Remember, the legislators cannot even write laws. They can only propose laws. Ultimately it is [supreme Iranian spiritual leader Ali] Khamenei, who is unelected, who can accept or reject moves proposed by the Iranian parliament.

How badly are the people faring, economically? How angry are they at Ahmadinejad over that?

They are financially pressured. But Iranians are like Easterners; they put up with hardship. And Ahmadinejad is helping to some extent; he is distributing oil revenues, among his supporters. He has been traveling ever since he was elected to every corner of the country. He asked for a discretionary budget, which is against the Iranian constitution. There was a fight for a few weeks in the Iranian parliament but then he got it. When he visits a town he immediately sits down with the elders of the revolutionary structure - not the government agencies - and allocates funds for various projects. The money does not go to the local government, but to the Revolutionary Guards, the mosques, the religious leaders.

Again, then, what is the potential for internal dissent?

It has to be cultivated. But the opposition leaders haven't really stepped up to the plate. Those who truly don't like this regime and really want the regime to go, they don't have a political message beyond that. Hating the regime is not sufficient. You need to have a plan for what happens next. They lack that. And they are so disunited.

The people have given up. If there is a good incentive, they could come into the street again. If they believe something can change. But they say "President Bush told us to come out, so did Reza Pahlavi, so did all the opposition leaders. We came to the streets and nothing happened. Our friends were beaten up. A lot of our friends are in jail. We kept our end of the bargain; nobody else kept theirs."
I'll give you a recent example. In the last few months, the bus drivers have [twice] gone on strike, seeking a legal right to protest and to boost salaries and working conditions. Others might have joined. But the regime suppressed the protests after a few days. It brought in poor people to drive the buses and it beat up the drivers and their families. [Hundreds were arrested.] The leader, Mansour Ossanlu, is still in jail. What did America do? Mr. John Sweeney, the president of the Teamsters Union, wrote two nasty letters to Ahmadinejad. That was it.

The [minor] soccer protests [that broke out whenever Iran played qualifying matches at home ahead of this summer's World Cup] are also an indicator that the people will use any opportunity to show their hatred of the regime, any opportunity for women to take off the veil, for boys and girls to kiss in the street.

In 1999, when the Khatami government shut down a pro-reform newspaper, there were much bigger protests [initiated on the campus of Teheran University]. The first students who came out were beaten up. More students joined them. It continued for seven or eight days until the regime had completely beaten everybody up. Some of them were condemned to death. They were tortured and are still in jail. The torture and suppression was so savage, and the support from outside and from within Iran was so small, that they all got discouraged. We need to keep the fire going.

The message from those outside, particularly America, has to be that they will be with the Iranian people to the end. They must send the right message into Iran. [US-sponsored] Radio Farda and Voice of America are a joke. They don't even have entertainment value. People in Iran need to feel in their bones that America is with them and behind them. The teachers, nurses, health care and students unions are all semi-organized. If the right message is sent, if there is some organization outside, they will regroup.

[Rasputin]

There also has to be moral and financial help for the opposition outside Iran. The regime has millions. The opposition doesn't have any kind of serious money. Here in Washington you have organizations that purport to be genuine American-Iranian student groups but are actually lobbying for the regime, with 10 or 15 staff. Effective. Well-financed. The opposition has no such resources.

How could you keep protest going?

It starts with small groups of students gathering at different strategic locations at the university and all starting to sing the national anthem at the same time. Other students join them. Some guards come and beat them, there's a small fight, and then other students come. If the number rises above 10,000 and the protest lasts more than four hours, then the regime cannot sustain itself.

As few as that?

Yes, because people would quickly join en masse. Everyone is waiting to join something.

After [former Chilean president] Pinochet got arrested in England, when it became certain that nobody could free him, the first Chilean women immediately came out and said they had been raped in Chilean prisons. Quickly, then, a massive wave of the women who were raped under Pinochet's regime came out and talked. People start to come out when they feel they can safely do so. Similarly, once the floodgates are open in Iran, you will see a massive explosion.

You also see the hatred of the regime in the number of people who have run away from the country. I know many, many people who have risked their lives to flee Iran. Some are living illegally in Turkey, Bulgaria. They drown in major rivers trying to cross to Europe. In the first Turkish cities across the Iranian border, there are huge populations of Iranian refugees, who are prepared to live in horrible conditions, just to flee Iran.

What kind of access do Iranians have to the West?

In the 1980s, there was a single opposition newspaper out of London. Then we had the first opposition radio station in Los Angeles, only for the US. Then, about 10 years ago, that radio station was able to broadcast into Teheran for two hours a day, and that created some hope among Iranians that now they were connected. Then the first TV station, broadcasting to the US and Europe, realized by accident that it was being picked up in Iran. Somebody called in to the station, and said he was watching from Iran. The broadcaster said "I don't believe you." He picked up an orange and said, "What am I holding?" The caller said "An orange."

Many more satellite TV stations have followed, 28 all told now, but they don't carry the same hope. At first, everyone was euphoric over the simple fact of communication. But now half the stations are full of sexy video clips and music, for the younger generation. Even the political ones are not really heavy in terms of content.

And the regime has also invested in TV, to muddy the water and create conflicting messages. Like I said, it is sophisticated. It used Khatami's "reformist" presidency, for instance, to create more confusion among already confused opposition forces. Half the opposition supported Khatami at first.

Now the regime is moving to block satellite broadcasts. It is centralizing the Internet in order to block it. Radio? Voice of Israel is actually among the most respected… I should add that many educated Iranians see Israel as the only hope. They know that Israel sold spare parts to the Islamic regime during the Iran-Iraq war. But they understand that the issue then was the territorial integrity of Iran. They respect Israel as having relentlessly and consistently opposed the Iranian regime.

[Rasputin]

As for the phone, well, people can phone in and out. The regime cannot check every telephone line. And even the well-known political figures can use phone cards from restaurants.

How worried should the West be by the nuclear drive and horrible rhetoric?

Extremely worried. They should not be sleeping at night. If they are sleeping at night they are fools. They should take Ahmadinejad at face value. This is no rhetoric for political consumption, or domestic consumption, or international consumption. He means what he says and says what he means. And when I say "he" I mean "they" - the regime.

If they had a nuclear capability would they use it?

I would say so, yes.

Unprovoked?

They would make good use of it, in their aim to defeat the West.

How does Hamas fit into this mind-set?

As an operational arm of the Islamist regime - financially, politically.

Where does this desire to take over the world come from? Retreating from modernity is one thing, but taking over the world? Why the effort to defeat the West? Is this a religious imperative?

Judaism is more conducive to modernity. It does not close the mind. It encourages debate. I am Muslim-born, but Islam is the most rigid faith. Islam paralyzes the brain.

And when the West looks for moderate Islam…?

There is a way. There is no single definition of Islam. Iran, potentially, could reformulate Islam, if the opposition can unite and bring together enough scholars. Iran could bring the entire Islamic world into the modern era.

As things stand, Ahmadinejad and Khamenei have one particular interpretation of Islam, and they find sufficient ideological justification in their interpretation of Islamic texts for their hatred of the West and their desire to destroy it.

This is a war between two opposing ideologies that only one can survive. There can be no coexistence. Therefore the West needs to defeat this ideology completely, and it should do this by supporting the people of Iran to overthrow the Islamic regime, create a democratic definition of Islam, institutionalize that, and then spread it through the other Islamic countries. Otherwise Western civilization is in grave danger.

We should take this regime seriously and try to end it as quickly as possible. We should not only focus on the nuclear program. What about biological weapons, a single bottle poured into a lake? It's a mindset. There are so many ways that they can harm the West.

And you're not advocating a military response?

Definitely not military. It is a conflict for hearts and minds. A war, yes, but an intellectual one. Here's one obvious way to wage it: Members of the regime have changed the face of Toronto. They buy big gigantic houses, cash, and they get Canadian residency permits, hoping that if things change they can come to Canada. Rafsanjani is rumored to own half of Toronto. Perhaps the Treasury should confiscate those assets.

Here's another: Stop the flow of oil into Iran. Iran is a net importer of refined oil products. The transportation system will collapse within a few months and the regime with it.

But Russia and China won't go along with that.

In a worst case scenario where Russia and China help the regime, the most important weapon is again the people. If we can trigger the people of Iran to revolt, Russia and China can't stop that. Everything comes back to triggering the revolt by the people of Iran.

[Rasputin]

Excerpt from MERIA Journal, a project of the GLORIA Center:

External support continues to help advance Iran's space effort. Teheran is advancing its space program to satisfy numerous civil and military objectives, including manufacturing satellites to accurately guide its Shahab ballistic missiles. The United States and Israel remain gravely concerned about Iranian efforts to gain more military power.

The Iranian space endeavor mimics a disturbing pattern other countries use clandestinely to advance their long-range missile programs. Iran might reengineer the Shahab to carry future satellites and try to obtain significant political rewards from future satellite launches. Exploiting this event would unite Iran politically, complicating Washington's regional objective, and further destabilizing the region.

In slightly different ways and to varying degrees of success, China, North Korea, and Pakistan use a civil space program clandestinely to manufacture longer-range missiles to further safeguard national security. Iran seeks to become a space power for similar reasons.

Unlike other Islamic countries with satellites, the Iranian defense ministry plays a prominent role in shaping the space effort with possible contributions from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). This military component manages the Shahab ballistic missile program, which Iran might modify into a space launch vehicle (SLV) with foreign support.

Enhancing the Shahab to become satellite-guided would allow Iran to strike Israel and United States military forces stationed throughout the region precisely. Statements from Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who declared his intention to "wipe Israel off the map" and dismissed the United States as a "hollow superpower," heighten the level of tension.

Iran might seek to develop a space program to improve national pride. Successfully testing a launch vehicle would allow Iran to boast that it is a space power. The propaganda Teheran espouses following this event might unite the country. This would further legitimize Ahmadinejad's policies and rhetoric, and generate greater regional and international fear regarding the regime's intentions.

Iranian efforts to exploit space began under the Shah, who tried to improve his country's scientific standing. In 1959, Teheran became a founding member of the United Nations' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The United Nations' General Assembly requested that UNCOPUOS review international collaborative programs to exploit space for civil purposes, serve as a forum for information exchanges, and encourage the development and facilitate the advancement of national programs to study outer space.

The fact that Iranian efforts to exploit space started over thirty years ago demonstrates that the country put a premium on further understanding this arena. Iran built a facility to obtain photographs soon after the United States launched the first system designed to capture imagery of the Earth. The Iranian Remote Sensing Center (IRSC) is responsible for gathering, processing, and distributing relevant material to users throughout the country for resource planning and management. The IRSC helps officials determine suitable areas to develop, and its personnel maintained operations while the country experienced a revolution and a devastating conflict with neighboring Iraq.

Partly as a response to Iran's eight-year war of attrition against Iraq, Iranians wanted to improve their political, social, and economic standing. As such, the people elected the pragmatist Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and later, the reformist Muhammad Khatami as president. These leaders wanted to further modernize the country partly with more Western financial assistance. To encourage greater Western support, both presidents diminished the fundamentalists' influence. Khatami issued various reforms to modernize the country including reinvigorating efforts for the nation to become more active in space. He helped the country to view becoming a space power as a vehicle for modernity.

[Rasputin]

Possessing images and other types of material from space will assist Teheran in identifying areas suitable for development and those to be avoided because of their susceptibility to earthquakes and floods. Iran attempted partially to do that by manufacturing satellites. On January 5, 2003, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the country's former defense minister, stated that within eighteen months, "Iran will be the first Islamic country to penetrate the stratosphere with its own satellite and with its own launch system."

According to Shamkhani, the satellite launch would be in response to American actions. "The Persian Gulf was once a place from which constant threats against the Islamic Republic emanated. But now, with the resources that we are gaining, this region cannot be used against us by any outside force."

When he made this announcement, Teheran figured it was the next target after coalition forces met their objectives in Iraq. That has yet to occur, but Iran still seeks a space capability partly because of America's growing regional presence. Developing these programs in response to the increased United States presence indicates that Iran feels threatened and partly seeks to exploit space to safeguard its own national security.

Iran apparently attempted to meet some of these goals starting in April 2003. The legislature approved a bill to create the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) to serve as a policy-formulating organization for space initiatives. The ISA performs research on technology such as remote sensing projects, develops national space equipment, and participates in the development of national and international space endeavors. It also coordinates various space-related activities within the country's research institutes, administrative agencies, and universities. These efforts also help the ISA to execute decisions from the Supreme Aerospace Council.

Iran's legislature created this body in December 2003 to approve various space-related programs and to promote partnerships among other organizations. The council functions with input from senior government officials. The ISA's director serves as the council's secretary, and the country's president functions as chairman.

Reorganizing the Iranian aerospace sector can help the country more effectively consolidate resources to advance various space efforts, such as launching satellites aboard indigenously developed SLVs. Nasser Maleki, former deputy director of the Iranian aerospace organization, acknowledged that the same technology used to manufacture missiles could also be used to manufacture SLVs. Building an SLV based on ballistic missile technology has distinct advantages: lower cost, less time needed for training, and less likelihood of international scrutiny because the same technology can apply to manufacturing the SLV. These benefits might explain why Iran seeks to deploy its satellites onboard indigenously-manufactured SLVs.

Teheran will likely do that by modifying its road-mobile, single-stage, liquid propellant Shahab ballistic missile.

On February 7, 1999, Shamkhani, acknowledged his country's plans to construct an SLV, the Shahab-4, indigenously. His statement marked the first time an Iranian government official publicly admitted that the country considered developing an SLV for civil purposes.

The author is a defense contractor in McLean, Virginia.

[Rasputin]

Political System

Iran is a theocratic Islamic republic, based on the 1979 constitution, and it involves several intricately connected governing bodies, most of which are appointed. The post of prime minister was eliminated in 1989 and presidential powers were expanded.

The Supreme Leader is responsible for the definition and supervision of the Iranian government’s general policies. He is commander-in-chief and controls military intelligence and security operations. He has the sole power to declare war. The supreme leader is responsible for appointing the heads of the judiciary, state radio and television networks, as well as police and military commanders and half of the Council of Guardians.

The supreme leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, based on qualifications and popularity. He is appointed for a life term.

The executive branch is led by the president, the second most powerful person in the Iranian government. The president is responsible for the implementation of the constitution and the exercise of executive matters. He appoints and supervises the Council of Ministers, coordinates government decisions, and selects policies to bring before the legislature. There are eight vice presidents and a 21-member cabinet. The executive branch does not control the military.

The parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is made up of 290 members, or majlis. They draft legislation, ratify international treaties and approve the budget.

Iran’s judicial system is led by a Supreme Leader-appointee. That head then chooses a head of the supreme court, and a chief public prosecutor. There are a number of different types of courts, including public courts and revolutionary courts. There is also a Special Clerical Court that handles crimes of clerics. It is accountable only to the supreme leader.

The Assembly of Experts meets for one week each year is made of 86 "virtuous and learned" clerics. They elect the supreme leader and have the authority to remove him at any time.

The Council of Guardians is composed of 12 jurists. They interpret the constitution and can veto parliament.

An Expediency Council has the authority to mediate disputes between the parliament and Council of Guardians, and serves as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader.

Local councils serve, along with the parliament, as Iran’s administrative and decision-making bodies.

[Rasputin]

Americans and Europeans Share the Same Fears

A survey finds they have grown further apart but have common concerns about terrorism, radical Islam and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

By Sebastian Rotella, Times Staff Writer

September 7, 2006


PARIS — Americans and Europeans think their relationship is deteriorating but share growing fears of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and Iran's nuclear ambitions, a survey of public opinion in Europe and the United States shows.

The fifth annual survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, released Wednesday, also found signs of a chill between the West and moderate Muslim-led Turkey.

With the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks approaching, majorities of Americans and Europeans polled see international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as "extremely important" threats. That sentiment has intensified on both sides of the Atlantic. In the last year, it jumped 22% in Britain, the target of suicide bombings on the London transit system in 2005 and a hotbed for fundamentalist ideologues.

More than 50% of Europeans and Americans polled think the values of Islam are incompatible with democracy, though they blame particular Islamic groups and not the religion in general, the survey says.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States is dedicated to promoting dialogue between Europe and the United States.

Pollsters looked at the U.S. and 12 European nations and Turkey, which straddles Europe and Asia and aspires to membership in the European Union.

Despite a widening schism on some key issues, there was a striking uniformity of opinion that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a threat to global stability.

"A nuclear Iran, heightened terrorism fears and the Israel-Lebanon clash show there is no shortage of issues on the transatlantic docket," said Craig Kennedy, president of the organization. "It's clear from our survey that Americans and Europeans continue to feel strongly — and increasingly similarly — about those threats that fundamentally affect our security."

European and U.S. leaders have worked together to try to persuade Iran to halt its uranium enrichment efforts. Many Europeans polled were hawkish about what to do if diplomacy failed. Fifty-four percent of French respondents, compared with 53% of Americans, said they would support military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The survey found that 75% of Americans and 58% of Europeans saw the Iranian nuclear threat as more urgent than instability in Iraq.

But in Europe, the world's only superpower also stirs mistrust and resentment. Majorities in only three countries — Britain, the Netherlands and Romania — expressed positive views of U.S. leadership in world affairs.

"Five years after Sept. 11, 2001, the image of the United States in the world has not recovered from its steep decline after the war in Iraq," the organization said. "Yet at the official level there have been attempts at rapprochement, shifting the transatlantic policy agenda toward the challenges of emerging global threats and concerns."

In contrast to recent years, the number of Americans wanting better relations with Europe dropped to 45%, down by 15%.

Those numbers don't bode well for sustained cooperation in hotspots such as Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.

Moreover, anti-Western feelings are on the rise in Turkey, a key Muslim ally on those fronts. Of those surveyed, Turks were the most anti-American, and they showed declining interest in becoming part of the European Union.

At the same time, Turks feel increasingly receptive toward Iran, the survey found.

[Rasputin]

Tehran's Two Worlds

At the end of a 10-day visit here, I am struggling with a question: Is the Iranian revolution of 27 years ago following the normal arc of history and moving toward a rational and stable society? Or is this country still exploding with radical energy and a desire to export its revolution to other Muslim nations?

The answer, I'm afraid, is that while Iran is maturing as a nation, the heat of the Islamic revolution is still intense -- and dangerous. This should be Iran's moment, in which this big, dynamic country claims its place as the region's dominant power, with commensurate responsibilities. But its leaders seem unable to make the compromises that would lock in Iran's gains. They have an "up" staircase toward confrontation but not a "down" staircase toward agreement.

The standoff over Iran's nuclear program is dangerous in part because the Iranians are counting on the West's prudence to save them from their own actions. You hear over and over again versions of a comment made at a conference here by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh-Attar: "Why won't America attack us? Because we consider that America is not naive enough to do that."

Iran is one of the most surprising and confounding countries I've visited. It's more modern than one expects, more open, more diverse. You hear conflicting opinions on almost every topic -- from different factions within the government, the clergy, the media, the business community. This isn't North Korea or even China, where a ruling party enforces consensus. At the center of the Iranian government is a black hole, a group of senior clerics whose decisions are wrapped in mystery. That's the essence of the problem -- there are so many competing factions, and so many checks built into the system, that sometimes nobody seems to be steering the ship of state.

Which is the real voice of the country -- the fulminating rhetoric of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the measured tones of Iranian parliament member Kazem Jalali, who insists in an interview that Iran is ready for negotiation with the West? Is it the gravelly sermon of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who leads the crowd of worshippers in chants of "death to America" at Friday prayers at Tehran University? Or is it the learned discourse of Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Saanei, who tells me in his seminary at Qom that he favors dialogue with the West and that in today's Iran, "there is talk of human rights everywhere you go."

You sense this split personality in the two worlds of Tehran, north and south. In the apartments of the Iranian elite in North Tehran, the headscarves and matronly manteaux of the women disappear and the conversations are as animated as anything you might hear in Paris or London. This is post-revolutionary Iran.

An example of this progressive Iran is Rajab Ali Mazrooei, who heads the association of Iranian journalists. His own son was arrested for running one of the thousands of Internet blogs here, yet he insists that despite Ahmadinejad's zeal, "the whole society is moving toward freedom and democracy."

But in the sprawling slums of South Tehran, where Ahmadinejad draws his power, the revolution seems very much alive. I visited the famous martyrs' cemetery south of the city and encountered Mohammed Rashidi, 73, standing over the grave of his son Jaafar, who died 20 years ago in the Iraq-Iran war. "We have no problem with another war starting," he says. "Iran is powerful. Martyrdom is its slogan." From the cemetery, the wealthy suburbs of North Tehran are barely visible in the afternoon haze -- distant, another world.

Iran's business leaders know that in a globalized economy, Iran needs foreign investment. "Growth is closely related to cooperation with the international economy," says Ali Naghi Khamoushi, the president of the Iranian chamber of commerce, at a conference for foreign investors here. But after 27 years, Iran is used to going it alone, and business leaders don't seem especially worried about sanctions. Indeed, Iranians see a perverse economic benefit in defying the international community. "If we cooperate, oil is $7 a barrel. If we don't, it is $70," former defense minister Ali Shamkhani observes at the investment conference.

Upon leaving this puzzling country, I ask myself what policy would make sense for America and its allies. The best answer may be the same one George Kennan proposed in 1947 for countering a rising Soviet Union: a policy of containment -- backed by the threat to use military force -- that seeks to limit the damage Iran can do while its revolution runs its course. Kennan's version of containment worked because the Soviets believed America's military threat was real. The Iranians I met seem to doubt it. Oddly, that calm attitude is what worries me most.

[Rasputin]

A Cleric Steeped in Ways of Power

As Iran defies the West over its nuclear program, the public face of the nation has become the outspoken president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But it is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who by most accounts has been the primary architect of Iran’s combative foreign policy, and the force behind the president’s own power.

Cloaked in religious robes, with a black turban signaling that he is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, Ayatollah Khamenei delivers the same blistering anti-American, anti-British, anti-Israeli message as the president.

His political evolution charts his own rise to power. As the Friday Prayer leader nearly two decades ago, he questioned the absolute power of Iran’s supreme leader, saying Islamic law and the Constitution must come first. Today, he has emerged as an aggressive defender of his own right to have the final say in all matters of state and religion — a power he has not been afraid to exercise.

Indeed, political analysts, clerics and former government officials here said they believed that he had pushed for a more confrontational approach with the West because he grew disillusioned with the so-called confidence-building policy pursued by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami.

They said he also sought to consolidate his power by building a political base among Iran’s more fundamentalist circles, which are suspicious of the West. Along the way, he succeeded in sidelining most of those with independent authority, such as the former two-term president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who pushed to select Ayatollah Khamenei as supreme leader.

“He wanted to preserve his power and he has been quite successful,” said Mohsen Kadivar, a senior reformist cleric in Tehran. “His power is stronger today. Everyone who is in power is to obey him, completely. But his authority, which comes from people’s support, has not increased.”

Ayatollah Khamenei’s political evolution from the traditionalist right to the more fundamentalist camp was described in interviews with present and former state officials, clerics who worked with him before and after the revolution, Western diplomats in Tehran and political analysts. Virtually all insisted on anonymity, fearing retribution if they spoke publicly. They all cautioned that they held only pieces of the puzzle.

The supreme leader is such a sensitive subject here that the government press office declined to submit a request to visit his office, or speak with his administrative staff.

When Mr. Ahmadinejad was elected last year, many analysts and present and former officials said he was Ayatollah Khamenei’s candidate. But when the president came out with his aggressive comments — about nuclear energy and Israel in particular — many wondered aloud if the leader’s candidate was speaking without the consent of his prime patron. It is still impossible to know whether, for example, the president asked for permission before sending letters to world leaders, including President Bush.

But Ayatollah Khamenei (pronounced kha-meh-neh-ee) erased some of that confusion late last month, when he made statements siding with the president against the Guardian Council, which oversees all government decisions, and Parliament. In a news conference last month, Mr. Ahmadinejad acknowledged that Ayatollah Khamenei had advised his administration to try to broaden its circle of advisers and reach out to more “intellectuals.”

When Ayatollah Khamenei was chosen 17 years ago to succeed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the father of the Islamic Republic, he was finishing his second term as president, a relatively weak job then because there was also a prime minister.

The ayatollah, a midlevel cleric without a strong political base, was chosen in part because he was not seen as a threat to other powerful clerics or politicians, political analysts in Tehran said. In fact, for his first six years as leader, it was President Rafsanjani who ran the state, according to people who worked with both men.

Over time, Ayatollah Khamenei created a system that many political analysts and Western diplomats here say is less a theocracy and more an autocracy — with loyalty to the leader the prerequisite for influence.

Ayatollah Khamenei has strong ties to the Basij volunteer morality squads and the Revolutionary Guards, and has won the allegiance of some powerful seminaries in the religious center of Qum by giving them state funds. He also has strong allies in the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts, which technically exercises oversight of the leader.

While Iran’s elected officials are subjected to public scrutiny and criticism, the supreme leader is not. He is more than a head of state; he is a symbol of two core elements of the Islamic Republic’s official identity — revolution and religion. As a result, assessing the leader is a red line in Iran, one few people are willing to cross, at least publicly.

[Rasputin]

The Constitution gives the supreme leader near total control of the state, though officials like to emphasize that he is selected by the Assembly of Experts, which is elected by the public. The leader appoints all military and security commanders, he has the power to declare war and must confirm the election of the president. He appoints the head of the judiciary, more than half the members of the Guardian Council and the head of state television.

Still, Iran is not a country ruled by decree. There are multiple power centers and competing agendas, requiring that major decisions be made after consultation and compromise.

As Ayatollah Khamenei has consolidated power, he has defined Iran’s agenda. He supports Iran’s right to pursue nuclear energy, rails against the failure of “liberal democracy” and often talks about the “usurper Zionist regime” — just as President Ahmadinejad does.

Here is what the supreme leader said at a conference in Tehran in April:

“The bitter and venomous taste of Western liberal democracy, which the United States has hypocritically been trying to portray through its propaganda as a healing remedy, has hurt the body and soul of the Islamic Ummah and burned the hearts of Muslims.”

Ayatollah Khamenei appears to have gravitated closer to the fundamentalists. But he has always held conservative values. In a 1996 interview with the hard-line journal Sobh, for example, he wrote that children should not be allowed to play music. “Teaching music is not in accordance with the Islamic establishment, and teaching music to schoolchildren brings corruption,” he said.

In early power struggles over the scope of the supreme leader’s authority, however, he spoke out in support of limits. In the early years of President Khatami’s reformist rule, he tolerated some popular changes relaxing social restrictions and allowing more freedom of the press.

But he appears to have worked steadily to undermine Mr. Khatami, and those efforts accelerated after he sensed that the reform movement was challenging his authority. One former high-ranking reformer who remains friendly with Ayatollah Khamenei said that the biggest mistake the reformers made was to challenge the power of the supreme leader.

The former official, who is still involved in politics and said he meets regularly with Ayatollah Khamenei, said many of the supreme leader’s decisions were based on political calculations aimed at preserving his power. “He reacted to efforts by radicals among the reformers to weaken him,” the former official said.

When Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, the country’s leaders had talked about creating a council to replace him. The logic was twofold: there was a sense that no one could command the same authority and respect as Ayatollah Khomeini, and other officials did not want to cede power to a new leader, people familiar with the decision process said.

Mr. Rafsanjani, then the speaker of Parliament, was one of Iran’s most powerful men. He pressed for a new supreme leader, saying it was essential to have one person in that post — and he pushed through the selection of Ayatollah Khamenei.

“Rafsanjani definitely played a role in making him leader,” said Mahmoud Vaezi, a former deputy foreign minister who now sits on the Expediency Council, which arbitrates disputes between the elected and appointed arms of government.

But in time, the supreme leader figured out how to project his authority. He changed his dress, from elegant clerical robes to the more conservative, simple and traditional religious garb hidden beneath a flowing black cape. He also draped around his neck a kaffiyeh, the checkered scarf that is a symbol of resistance.

“Nobody should forget that as the leader, he is a revolutionary and a religious man,” said Mehdi Karoubi, a cleric and former speaker of Parliament who was among the early followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. “In his public comments he has to reflect those realities.”

[Rasputin]

The leader’s consolidation of power appeared to reach its height on the day of the new president’s inauguration ceremony last year, when Mr. Ahmadinejad made a very public gesture of obedience by gently leaning over to kiss his hand.

Still, Ayatollah Khamenei is known to consult widely before making a final decision. And he has made efforts to appear inclusive, reaching beyond his base. Recently, for example, he created a new strategic foreign policy committee and put a former official from Mr. Khatami’s reform government in charge, although the official is related to the leader.

Many Iranians who know him describe the ayatollah as a man who loves the arts, writes poetry and is a voracious reader. And most confine themselves to safe generalities: “He is a very kind, sincere, joyful person,” said Muhammad Ali Besherati, a former interior minister.

Ayatollah Khamenei was born in 1939 in Mashhad, a holy city in northeastern Iran. His father was a cleric, and according to his own biography, an ascetic who lived a life of few comforts. He was a follower of Ayatollah Khomeini and is said to have been a strong supporter of the students who stormed the United States Embassy in 1979 and held the staff hostage for 444 days. He was first elected president in 1981 and was re-elected to a second term in 1985.

In important early battles over the scope of the supreme leader’s power, Ayatollah Khamenei apparently took a more moderate stance than his predecessor. In December 1987, he first spoke out in favor of limits on that power in a conflict between Parliament and the Guardian Council, which sought to nullify a labor law Ayatollah Khomeini had backed, saying it conflicted with Shariah, or Islamic law.

Mr. Khamenei, speaking at Friday Prayer, suggested that the Constitution had to be observed by everyone and that laws had to respect Shariah. Mr. Khomeini rebuffed him, stating that the supreme leader could overrule even Islamic law.

In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa authorizing the murder of Salman Rushdie for his book “The Satanic Verses.” At the time, Mr. Khamenei was the leader of the Friday Prayer sermon, a post that allowed him to address the nation.

“Islam is the religion of blessing and kindness,” he was quoted as saying in the Feb. 15, 1989, edition of the newspaper Kayhan. “And anyone who repents of what he has done, no matter how serious the sin, he ought to be optimistic of being forgiven by God.”

He was again rebuffed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who issued a scathing public rebuttal.

[Rasputin]

A lot of residential buildings have sprung up in southern Jerusalem over the last few years. There are entire new neighborhoods, such as Har Homa. Kibbutz Ramat Rachel sold off a considerable amount of its agricultural land in the Talpiot area, much of which was swallowed up in medium-sized apartment bloc projects. A series of similar-sized and still taller apartment complexes newly line the main Derech Hebron.

Unsurprisingly, the capital's road system has found itself unable to cope with the extra traffic. As in so many other parts of the city, the country and indeed the world, south Jerusalem, year by year, has found itself ever-more helplessly snarled up as more people, with more cars, hit the streets.

The chaos recedes a little each summer, during the school holidays. But at the start of each new school year, as every irritable car-pooling parent will testify, it resumes at full-force, and just a little bit worse than it was the year before.

The back-to-school south Jerusalem traffic nightmare was exacerbated at the start of the new term this week because of roadworks - commendably designed to ultimately improve traffic flow and add an extra lane - that have reduced Derech Hebron to a single lane for a lengthy stretch where it nears the city center.

The alternative main route into town, Derech Bethlehem, is only a single lane in either direction, and invariably grinds to a halt at key stretches - the consequence of a familiar combination of good shops, selfish parking, local and through traffic, bus routes and more.

Nearer the city center, the Keren Hayesod thoroughfare has been reduced to a single lane in each direction for some time now, with the middle lanes fenced off, again commendably, for public transport. But it doesn't take much to go wrong - too many taxis, for instance, backed up in the narrow entrance road to the Dan Panorama Hotel - for that single lane to jam, frequently prompting shouted arguments between hot, impatient, frustrated drivers, with repercussions all the way back toward those already snarled up on the Hebron and Bethlehem roads.

But this is not a column about a lack of forward planning to grapple with predictable paralysis on the roads, or about the incompetence and selfishness that exacerbates it.

IRAN IS on the point of mastering the technology to produce a nuclear bomb. Some Israeli experts have been saying that Teheran is mere months from clearing the last hurdles, after which it will be able to duplicate its capabilities at innumerable sites and will thus be almost unstoppable. Some of these experts have been saying "months" for months, if you follow.

Israel has long argued that a nuclear Iran is a global problem, and that it must fall to the free world to thwart Teheran's ambitions. Many world leaders have said the same thing; they just haven't done much about it.

Meanwhile not a week goes by without Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly declaring his desire to wipe Israel off the face of the earth.

Sometimes, in the recent past, US President George Bush responded to Ahmadinejad's threats by saying that America would come to Israel's defense if necessary. He's toned that down a little of late; having been held responsible in some quarters for dragging the US into Iraq, the last thing the Jews need, it has been pointed out to him, is to now be perceived as pulling America into confrontation with Iran.

Abraham Foxman, the well-informed director of the Anti-Defamation League who has been visiting Israel this month, believes that Bush will explore "every possible avenue to see if there is a political solution to convince Iran to desist. Nobody will be able to say, 'We didn't try this option.'" His fear, Foxman says, "is that Teheran misunderstands these efforts, and reads them as a sign of weakness."

[Rasputin]

Ultimately, though, Foxman regards Bush firmly as "a man of his word. When the president says, as he has on several occasions, that the world cannot live with, or permit, a nuclear Iran, he means it."

Giora Eiland, until recently Israel's national security adviser, sounded much less certain of this when I spoke with him two weeks ago. As reported in the Post at the time, he set out America's three possible courses of action: One, giving up on stopping Iran and "making the best of it" in isolating the regime, hoping for regime change and trying to head-off a regional rush to nuclear capability. Two, launching a last-ditch bid to diplomatically persuade Teheran to at least suspend its program, since it was inconceivable that non-military methods could convince the mullahs to abandon the nuclear drive altogether. And three, military intervention, which would have to come within months, before the final technological obstacle was cleared.

All three options were bad, Eiland said. But choosing his words with extreme care, he assessed that the difficulties facing the administration over that third course were growing.

An Israeli cabinet minister, in a conversation I had last week, entertained the possibility that Iran might indeed prove unstoppable; I have never previously heard so senior a figure so much as contemplate this notion. He went on to assert, presumably by way of comfort, that a nuclear Iran would not necessarily immediately strike out at Israel.

Perhaps. Perhaps not. It would certainly remake the balance of power at a stroke - in the Middle East and globally.

Israeli experts are divided about the potential viability of an Israeli military option. Few believe that Israel could thoroughly "take out" Iran's nuclear facilities. Some argue that the repercussions of a preemptive strike that is less than completely successful are prohibitive. Others assert that a sustained air attack, over a few days, would cause a massive setback to the Iranian program, that continued oversight could prevent a rebuilding, and that while the US is capable of doing a better job of both of those tasks, Israel dare not fail to act if the US proves unwilling. Another school of thought has it that Israel must build up its second-strike capability - so that it is unmistakable that a non-conventional attack on Israel would lead certainly and absolutely to the destruction of Iran.

There could be no more acute dilemma: a declared enemy on the point of obtaining the most potent weapon of mass destruction, time running short, and innumerable variables to be weighed en route to a decision by the Israeli government.

At the very start of the recent war with Hizbullah, it was argued in some quarters that Iran had deliberately timed the northern border bombardment, incursion and kidnapping that triggered the conflict in order to distract the attention of the world's leading statesmen - to change the focus of a G-8 meeting that had been designed to concentrate on the Teheran nuclear program. That theory was subsequently largely discarded; if anything, the crystal-clear evidence of Iran's management of Hizbullah deepened international recognition of the wide threat posed by Teheran, albeit without prompting a discernible new push for concerted action against it.

But where the second Lebanon war has clearly distracted attention is in Israel. Three-and-a-half weeks after the fighting ended, Israel's political and military leadership is paralyzing itself in an orgy of in-fighting and blame-trading.

[Rasputin]

The coalition is wobbling, the opposition is scenting opportunity, and nobody is paying more than lip service to the notion that Israel, facing the Iran crisis, might actually need an emergency government of the best and brightest in which partisan ambitions are subsumed to the national interest.

Ex-generals are demanding resignations. Serving generals are consulting with their lawyers. The prime minister is attempting to avoid the establishment of the fully independent state commission of inquiry that his own defense minister is backing. Appointees to the alternative inquiry committees he favors are being challenged, as is the very purpose of separate committees that, by definition, cannot identify and rectify the stark failures of coordination between the political and military hierarchies that were apparently at the root of some of what went wrong. Rather than the urgent learning of lessons, delay and obstruction and argument and recrimination are the order of the day.

It's a kind of national political gridlock. The watching ayatollahs must find it tremendously entertaining. Israel needs, urgently, to get moving.

[Rasputin]

Getting into the country is not half the fun



Day 1: For a first-time visitor, there's nothing quite like arriving in the Islamic Republic of Iran. A few minutes before our plane touched down at Tehran's Mehrabad Airport this weekend, all the women aboard started digging in their bags for head scarves and long-sleeved jackets called manteaus to comply with the country's strict Islamic code. Dozens of Iranians who had been happily drinking alcohol and displaying skin-baring tops now covered up faster than you can say "the Great Satan."
Once on the ground, I waited for several minutes in a long line before an immigration officer glanced at my U.S. passport and curtly pointed me to a different queue. There's no sign that tells arriving Americans where to go (tip for future travelers: it's the line on the far right), but it seemed pointless to complain.

The officer in the second booth took my passport and disappeared into a side room. Several minutes passed and soon I was the only one of the several hundred passengers from our plane still waiting in the dilapidated terminal. A parade of uniforms periodically offered reassuring gestures or grunts before going on their way. Meanwhile, I continued to sit.

I've been in plenty of Third World countries, so travel headaches are nothing new. But after about 45 minutes, worried that the driver I'd arranged to meet me would give up and leave, I was struggling not to lose patience. By now, it had been 21 hours since I'd arisen at 4:20 am to catch my first flight at Dulles airport and I was beat.

My thoughts were interrupted by yet another officer. "Mister, mister," he said, indicating I should follow him to a chest-high wooden shelf behind his desk. And it was there that I was slowly, clumsily and quite sloppily fingerprinted. At one point he yanked my thumb so awkwardly I grumbled: "if you bend it any farther than that it breaks." He didn't understand English but I think he caught my drift.

I'd been warned by a colleague to expect this treatment, which is how Iran retaliates for the United States fingerprinting Iranian visitors. But understanding why this pointlessness was occurring didn't make it any more enjoyable.

Suddenly, another officer nudged me with an elbow. Pointing to the man doing the fingerprinting, whose back was to us, the second officer pantomimed smearing my ink-covered hand across the his back. The young Iranian officer's smile was so genuine, and his giggle so infectious, that it was impossible to remain irritated. And just like that, I was glad to be in Iran.