Eye On Iran

[Rasputin]

Eye of the Storm: Security Council to Iran: Go for it

Last week the United States ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton had a message for Teheran: Take note of the Security Council's resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea.

Bolton had reason to be proud. He had piloted the passage of the resolution in record time. Nevertheless, his advice to Teheran will fall on deaf ears - and for a reason.

The resolution on North Korea was not placed under the famous Chapter Seven of the UN Charter that allows the use of military force. Worse still, the resolution forbids military action against Pyongyang, pending the passage of a second, and highly improbable, resolution. Even then, the resolution has been further weakened because China announced it opposed the provision under which North Korean ships could be searched for dual-use materiel.

The resolution on North Korea belongs to a new set of UN decisions that diplomats refer to as "half-pregnant." These, though impressive on paper, are subject to "ifs and buts" that render them useless in practice.

THE PROBLEM as always is that the five permanent members of the Security Council do not agree on the nature of the problem. China, and to some extent Russia, see North Korea as a misbehaving juvenile to be calmed down with a mixture of advice and threat. The United States, and to some extent Britain, see the North Korean regime as a dangerous and unpredictable criminal who, unless restrained by forceful action, could do a great deal of harm all around. (France, as always, tries to cultivate its exception by adopting a median position.)

To complicate matters further, Russia, China and France, are convinced that if North Korea ever tried to do really big mischief, the United States would always be on hand to deal with it. There is, therefore, no reason for Russia, China and France to appear as parties to an American "plot" to change the regime in Pyongyang. And, why should Russia, China and France help install a pro-American regime in North Korea?

With all that in mind, Bolton's advice to Iran, as already noted, is misplaced. When the text of the North Korean resolution was published, Teheran's reaction was a sigh of relief. Their response went something like this: if this is all the UN can do against a regime that admits having tested a nuclear device, there is little that it can do against the Iranian regime that swears it does not want the bomb.

Teheran is certain that China and Russia will prevent the adoption of even a "half-pregnant" resolution.

Here too, Russia and China are convinced that if the Islamic Republic did try big mischief the US would deal with it, and that, in the meantime, there is no reason why they should help install a pro-American regime in Teheran.

MANY IN Washington regard the Russian and Chinese attitudes as merely mercenary. But that is a partial reading of a complex reality.

China is trying to emerge as a major power while Russia is dreaming of a comeback. Both see the power game as played with no sentimental considerations. Russian and Chinese decision-makers are not hounded by lobbyists and opinion-makers with particular agendas and ideological preferences. They don't care if the North Korean or for that matter the Iranian regime are tough on their own folk.

They believe they have no business preaching human rights and multi-party elections to either the North Korean Stalinists or the Khomeinists. The Russian and Chinese approach to big power politics is a new version of what the British, in their heyday of empire, called benign neglect. Put simply, this means: We don't give a damn what the natives do among themselves or to each other as long as they do not threaten our interests.

And, as far as the Islamic Republic is concerned, both China and Russia have immense interests in the perpetuation of the Khomeinist regime. The duo are among Iran's top four business partners and account for almost 80 percent of the Islamic Republic's imports of military hardware. Without the Iranian market, some production lines in the Russian and Chinese hardware industries could become too costly to continue.

Separately, Iran has signed contracts with Russia and China to develop a range of missiles, armored vehicles and tactical aircraft. Russia is also committed to helping the Islamic Republic build 22 nuclear power plants by 2020, something that has given the moribund Russian nuclear industry a second life.

The Islamic Republic has signed contracts with China and Russia to the total value of $70 billion each.

With US and European universities closed to students from the Islamic Republic, China and Russia are becoming popular destinations for young Iranian scholars. In 1979 there were just 30 Iranians studying in China. This year they number 7,800. Almost twice as many are in Russia.

That China and Russia regard the Islamic Republic as a strategic partner was highlighted earlier this year when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to attend the summit of the Shanghai Group, whose principal task is fighting terrorism!

IN THE longer-term, China's relations with the Islamic Republic are more important than Teheran's ties to Moscow. There are several reasons for this. Iran harbors bitter memories of Russia as an enemy with which it fought at least four major wars, ending in huge losses of territory by the Iranians. Iran and Russia are also rivals for influence in Trans-Caucasia, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. As an oil and gas producer, Russia has no need of Iran whereas China, ever thirstier for energy, looks to the Islamic Republic as a long-term source of supply.

According to some estimates, China imports 19% of its oil from Iran. Preliminary talks have also taken place for building a gas pipeline linking Iranian fields in the Persian Gulf to China via Pakistan. An old plan, drafted under the Shah in the 1970s and envisaging a massive Iranian presence in downstream activities in China, is being revived. The centerpiece of the plan is the creation of a strategic reserve of Iranian crude oil on Chinese soil. This is advantageous to both sides. The Chinese will have an emergency source of supply in case the US tries to cut their oil in a conflict over Taiwan. The Iranians would benefit by being able to produce more than their OPEC quota, and being able to supply their customers outside China in case the US tries to stop Iranian exports from the Strait of Hormuz.

So the truth is that any "half-pregnant" UN resolution aimed at Iran would only encourage Teheran in its defiance. Teheran would factor the whole thing in its overall strategy and, supported by China, Russia, and to some extent the European Union, might even intensify whatever it is doing.

In a sense, having no resolution is better than ending up with a "half pregnant" one. The absence of a resolution would have at least one advantage: it would keep Teheran guessing what might hit it next.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

In fact, Ahmadinejad, and every other Iranian politician and official who speaks on the subject, takes elaborate, even ritual, care to reiterate Iran's longstanding claim that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons, and that the program is exclusively peaceful. The US national intelligence director, John Negroponte, has predicted that Iran "might be in a position to have a nuclear weapon" at some time between 2010 and 2015.

2.
The verbal attacks of Iran's leaders, Ahmadinejad in particular, on Israel and America have rightly received much attention and criticism. Equally, some Western analysts have noticed a tendency on the part of the US government and its allies to misrepresent Iran in order to generate support for tough action against the Islamic Republic. In the "ritual condemnation of Iran," laments Ali Ansari, the author of a new book on Iran's troubled relations with the US, "no rhetorical flourish, no level of hyperbole, seems excessive." Iran is "not just a member of the Axis of Evil, but the founding member, the chief sponsor of state terrorism, or to use a more recent characterization, the central banker for terrorism." Ansari is a British academic of Iranian birth who is often invited by the press to comment on contemporary Iranian affairs. He is no friend of the Islamic Republic, but he regards many of these epithets as exaggerated or undeserved.

The Iranian leaders that Ansari describes in Confronting Iran are more predictable than the Islamic zealots often portrayed by neoconservatives. As much as its Islamist ideology, Ansari finds, collective memories of hurt and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, nationalist sentiments, and the instinct of Iranian leaders for self-preservation shape the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. As a fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a prestigious British institution with close relations to the Foreign Office, Ansari was privy to sensitive information when Britain, France, and Germany tried, from 2003 onward, to dissuade Iran from carrying through its plans to produce nuclear fuel, while the US skeptically stood aside. In Ansari's account, these efforts failed both because of opposition in Iran and the US's failure to support negotiations when they had a chance of succeeding. When the US finally threw its weight behind the talks, Ansari writes, it offered Iran no more than "technological scraps," for example, access to commercial aircraft parts.

"After all," Ansari writes, "Iran, unlike Iraq, had not invaded anyone, nor had it been defeated in war." Many in the West saw Iran's refusal to continue to allow intensive spot inspections as evidence that the Iranians were hiding a nuclear weapons program; Ansari understands it primarily as part of Iran's struggle to evade Western dominance, a struggle it has been waging since the end of the nineteenth century. Ansari does not ascribe Iran's opposition to the now-defunct Middle East peace process solely to ideology; "an underlying motive for Iran's...obstructionism," he writes, "was the fact that it had not been invited to the table."

In Ansari's analysis, Iran's pugnacious behavior is partly designed to underscore its claims to be a regional power that could, if treated respectfully, use its influence benignly. For example, in diplomatic meetings with the Europeans and others, Iranian officials have repeatedly suggested that they could use their influence over Hezbollah to secure peace between Palestinians and Israel. Iran has reportedly offered to help arrange prisoner swaps between Hezbollah and Israel.[6]

Ansari's belief that Iran's behavior can be understood by studying national ambition and self-interest, rather than the ideological proclamations of Ahmadinejad, is shared by another expert on Iran, Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in Washington, D.C. In his new book, Hidden Iran, Takeyh writes that three elements, "Islamic ideology, national interests and factional politics," contribute to Iran's national policies; but even now, in the Ahmadinejad era, he believes that calculation and self-interest are more important than the religious fervor that was a driving force for Iran during its war with Iraq in the 1980s. As an example of Iranian pragmatism, he cites Iran's silence in the face of Russian atrocities against Chechen Muslims. In return for this surprisingly accommodating Iranian attitude, and for Iran's acquiescence in Russia's dominance over much of Central Asia, the Russians provide the Islamic Republic with diplomatic support, conventional arms, and nuclear know-how. (Russia has built Iran's sole, and still unused, nuclear reactor at Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf coast.)

As for Iran's nuclear program, which he believes is designed to produce weapons, Takeyh writes:

The Islamic Republic is not an irrational rogue state seeking such weaponry as an instrument of an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy designed to project its power abroad...for Iran this is a weapon of deterrence, and the relevant question is whether its possession will serve its practical interests.
According to Takeyh, "the unpredictable nature of developments in Iraq has intensified Iran's anxieties and further enhanced the utility of the nuclear option." Looking east, he says, Iran sees "a nuclear-armed Pakistan with its own strain of anti-Shiism." Most important of all, in my opinion, Iran, he says, may be able to "play the nuclear card to renegotiate a more rational relationship" with the United States.

[Rasputin]

Underlying both authors' analyses of Iran's internal politics, and their relatively calm appraisals of its regional ambitions and abilities, is their sense of Iran's complicated power structure and Ahmadinejad's place in it. Some American commentators refer to Ahmadinejad as if he were synonymous with the Islamic Republic and its policies. In the US, where the president can veto laws and order invasions, that would be natural enough; in Iran, where he can be challenged and overruled by elected institutions such as the parliament as well as by unelected officials gathered around the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it is misleading. As head of the government, Ahmadinejad has broad control of the country's finances and many domestic policies. His influence can be seen, for instance, in the government's decision to set up a large fund to help needy Iranians, and in continuing the gradual purge of secular-minded professors from the nation's universities —itself a disturbing development.

In matters of internal security and public order, however, Ahmadinejad's authority is restricted by several supervisory bodies, the most important of which are dominated by representatives of the supreme leader. There is also the unofficial veto power of the senior clergy, theologically conservative grand ayatollahs who do not hold political office. They recently forced Ahmadinejad to back down on his pledge to allow women to attend soccer matches. Ahmadinejad officially presides over the powerful Supreme National Security Council; but here again Khamenei's word is final.

On major decisions concerning foreign and military policy, we can assume that Ahmadinejad's views are no more than advisory. He does not set the Islamic Republic's policy toward Israel any more than he would decide whether to use nuclear weapons should Iran eventually acquire them. Strategic and important tactical decisions are taken by the supreme leader and his advisers, who include Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, and senior officers in the Revolutionary Guard.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Ahmadinejad's threatening anti-Israeli rhetoric, Iran's role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has long been defined by what Takeyh calls its "unwillingness to commit forces to the actual struggle against the Jewish state." That has not changed. Before the recent conflict in south Lebanon, Iran supplied rockets and other weapons to Hezbollah; but the Iranians conspicuously failed to dispatch to the front the "suicide battalions" that they had organized, with much fanfare, earlier this year. The batallions come under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, and were officially established for "defense"—a defense that one volunteer told me could mean the defense of Islam—i.e., Palestine or Lebanon if need be. The battalions were much covered in the Iranian press, but are generally regarded as an empty gesture —fat boys giggling for the cameras.

Khamenei is an inscrutable politician; his rhetoric can be extreme, but Iran has greatly moderated its foreign policy since he succeeded Khomeini in 1989. Iran's policies toward Israel remain opaque, somewhere, perhaps, between Ahmadinejad's most venomous anti-Israel comments and his assurance on August 27 that "Iran is not a threat to anybody, not even to the Zionist regime."

The deterioration of the US position in Iraq, and Hezbollah's ability to withstand Israel, have done much to free Iran's leaders from their old fear of Bush. They have also encouraged Ahmadinejad to develop his quixotic, pseudophilosophical worldview. Ahmadinejad is opinionated but not intellectually inquisitive, quite unlike his predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, whose presidency was symbolized by his call for a "dialogue among civilizations," and by his winning, gallant manners. Ahmadinejad has an ideologue's disdain for competing or alternative views. He defines his job in language that refers to the divine and the revelatory. On his provincial tours he touches sick children with a rapt look that is reminiscent of a religious healer. He sends discursive letters to the leaders of other countries on what is wrong with the world. These seem expressions of his belief in his own destiny and divine mission. He does not see himself as an ordinary president, and he is determined that his presidency should not be judged by mundane standards.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the revealing long letter that he sent to Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, in July, Ahmadinejad suggests that the Germans, a proud people who have contributed much to"knowledge, philosophy, literature, art and politics," are being prevented from achieving their potential by efforts on the part of countries that defeated them in World War II to keep "a black cloud of humiliation and shame" hanging over their heads, and to ascribe to them responsibility for the "sins of their forefathers." In this letter, Ahmadinejad avoids questioning whether the Holocaust happened, but he positions Germany today in opposition to the powers that defeated it in the war, and to Israel, "the greatest enemy of humanity."

From here, Ahmadinejad leaps—as he has done in speeches in the past—to question the conditions in which Israel was established, and to ask why Britain and other supporters of Zionism, "if they felt responsibility towards the survivors of the Holocaust, did not give sanctuary to them in their own countries." He criticizes the control that the US and the UK, along with the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, continue to exercise over the affairs of the world. This, he says, has contributed to the spread of oppression, injustice, and weapons of mass destruction. Ahmadinejad goes on to propose a partnership between Iran and Germany, founded on shared "exalted visions" and aimed at instituting divinely sanctioned justice and ending "the distortions that are present in the world."

[Rasputin]

In directly addressing Western leaders and asking them to change their ways, Ahmadinejad is following a familiar Islamic path. In his letter to Merkel, and an earlier (also unanswered) letter to Bush, in which he berated the American president for his policies and for betraying the principles of Jesus Christ, Iranians are reminded of Ayatollah Khomeini's famous invitation to Mikhail Gorbachev to study Islam, itself an echo of the letters that the Prophet Muhammad during his mission in the seventh century sent to three contemporary rulers, urging them to become Muslims.

If we assume that the Iranian president knows very little about Europe and the West, he must nonetheless have been advised that his letter, and its confiding, complicit tone, would shock the representative of a people that is, more than sixty years after the event, still trying to come to terms with the Holocaust. For more than a month after it was sent, Ahmadinejad's letter to Merkel was not made public in either country. The President's decision to release it, at the end of August, suggests that he was addressing it not only to Merkel but also to Iranian citizens. The day after the letter appeared in the Iranian press, Ahmadinejad announced that he was inviting George Bush to debate with him the best way to run the world. "The time has come," he told journalists, "for us to respect the intelligence and opinions of the peoples of the world."

There is little in Ahmadinejad's letter to Merkel to suggest that his political positions are based on his millenarian beliefs; rather, his attention seems fixed on changes that he believes should be made to the existing world order. Ahmadinejad does not seem to have a clear or coherent idea of what these changes should be, or how they might be brought about. Even if he did, the Islamic Republic has not given him the means to attempt the transformation that he proposes so vaguely. This explains why Ahmadinejad's pronouncements often have an illusionary, theatrical quality, and why most of them pass unnoticed in the West.

Ahmadinejad has been described to me by an experienced observer of Iranian politics as a man who "thrives in a crisis," often of his own making. Although many Iranians sympathize broadly with his anti-Israel feeling and his defense of the nuclear program, they are increasingly unhappy that, so far, they have received little of the oil revenues that he promised to distribute to them. Meanwhile, he seems to derive pleasure from the appalled bewilderment he elicits in the West. In a recent interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel, he reiterated at length his doubts about the Holocaust. In the words of Hubert Kleinert, a German political scientist and former member of the Bundestag, whose comment accompanied the interview, this conversation was "without precedent: a living Iranian president—not some neo-Nazi or obscure fringe theorist—expounding in a lengthy interview about the alleged uncertainty of the Holocaust.... It's as if Mr. Ahmadinejad wants to position himself as a worldwide symbol of the neo-Nazi movement."[7]

It is likely that Ahmadinejad has different aspirations. He seems to covet a position of leadership among Islamists everywhere and, to achieve this, he is prepared to say what few other Muslim leaders, especially those who have relations with the US, dare to say. For Ahmadinejad, saying outrageous things wins him the admiration of Israel-haters everywhere, while concealing the fact that little of his fuzzy program of "upliftment," for Iran and the world, can be realized.

4.
A recent opinion poll found that Ahmadinejad is the third-most-admired politician among Egyptians, after Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah and Hamas's leader, Khaled Meshaal. Among Lebanon's Shias, the prestige of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose photograph is often displayed in Hezbollah-dominated areas, is higher than ever. This has led some commentators, including Vali Nasr, in his new book, The Shia Revival,[8] to observe that Iran's leaders seek "great-power status."

If they achieved that, it would upset the conventional view that Iran, as a Shia country dominated by ethnic Persians, cannot realistically aspire to lead a region that is, on the whole, run by Sunni Arabs. That seemed to be a lesson from the 1980s, when Khomeini's revolutionary government failed in its repeated attempts to foment revolutions elsewhere. But among the Shias of Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's influence is strong and seems bound to grow. Many ordinary Sunnis, especially those living under pro-American governments, admire Iran for standing up to the common enemy. By supporting the beleaguered Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority, the Iranians have won thanks from the Sunni Palestinians who voted for it.

Iran's ability to retain the goodwill it has gained rests on its staying above the sectarian violence that is tearing Iraq apart. Shia groups supported and perhaps armed by Iran, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), are thought to be behind many sectarian killings. But Iran has not been directly implicated; and it has given no sign that it approves these murders. Iran's press, both government-run and independent, avoids inciting anti-Sunni feeling whenever there is a massacre of Shias in Iraq; it dwells instead on American neglect or perfidy. Iran may be reluctant to be perceived as being involved in Iraqi sectarian strife because of the effect that it might have on some of its own troubled peripheral provinces, some of which have large Sunni populations.

Even if Iran manages to avoid sectarian conflict, it is unlikely to become a "great power," for the same reasons that have prevented it from doing so in the past. If tensions between Israel and the Palestinians eventually diminish, and more voices are heard in favor of resuming the peace process, regional support for Iran's hard-line position will drop; and traditional divisions—between Persians and Arabs, and between Shias and Sunnis—will start to seem more important.

Right now, though, the Iranian government feels more confident than at any time since it was placed in the "axis of evil." The Iranian leaders calculate that Hezbollah's success in resisting Israel's attacks, assuming that it continues to be in a position to threaten Israel, may diminish the likelihood that America or Israel will attack Iran's nuclear facilities, as some commentators have suggested they intend to.[9] Iranian officials have made it clear that if there are strikes, they will respond by attacking American interests in the region. American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are obvious targets, though Iranian civilian and military leaders have also threatened to disrupt world oil supplies passing through the Straits of Hormuz.

By engaging itself militarily, politically, and morally across the Middle East, George Bush's America has become vulnerable. In the face of an overstretched competitor, Iran is less likely than ever to relinquish its nuclear program unless it gets something it wants in return. It is still far from clear that America's weakness will force it to accept Iran's demands, particularly the demand that the US relax its sanctions and end its efforts to destabilize the Islamic Republic. If the US does not, it is hard to imagine today's Iran suspending its enrichment program for very long.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

Regime change policy change

In recent months, Ms. Condoleeza Rice has emphasized the importance of using multilateral diplomatic channels in dealing with Iran. This change in policy stance toward Iran should be viewed with some caution given the preference of this administration for the use of force in the region. The change in the U.S. approach to Iran, however, may be seen more as a preparatory step in softening opposition to another limited military adventure.

One unfortunate ramification of the regime-change policy in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the relative paralysis in delivering the next stages of the transition to a more inclusive and participative model of governance and reconstruction. To avoid a further deepening and spread of the present crises, it is necessary to move away from the present state of militarized management of the conflict to developing democratic governance in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The body of evidence available to us so far suggests that existing policies are more likely to exacerbate the crisis in these countries rather than helping their governments to de-radicalize the segments of the population that have been passive supporters of the insurgents.

There is an increasing realisation in the rest of the world that the strategy of bomb-first, talk-last has not been capable of achieving its objectives of nation-building. There has been a failure to plan for the post-military stages of the conflicts and to devise strategies which respond quickly to the immediate needs of the indigenous populations and genuinely engages them in the reconstruction of their own villages, towns and countries.

Furthermore, the unwillingness of the Americans and the British to involve other members of G8 and/or regional players as partners has weakened the spirit of multilateralism and international cooperation and discredited the United Nations.

Despite these issues, the American and British policy makers seem to be even more determined to prepare the groundwork for a military strike against Iran as their last legacy in their now-defunct policy of nation-building. Recent visits by top policy-makers in the last few months to Washington and London seem to have been mostly about how to appear sufficiently engaged in the diplomatic aspects of resolving the situation.

At the same time, politician in Washington and London have been trying to apply maximum pressure to France and Germany to ensure their support for a policy that is almost certain to lead to a military attack on Iran. This attack is likely to take the form of surgical air strikes combined with a sea embargo that is supposed to expedite the demise of the regime in Tehran.

In Iran, Mr Ahmadinejad, through making inflammatory statements, seems to be a willing partner in providing the justification for the U.S. in its effort to move policy toward a military attack on Iran. For their part, American foreign policy-makers, through repeated threats of military action against Iran if it countinues with its nuclear research, have once again have provided the oppressive regime of Iran with an excuse, in the guise of "national security," to silence discontent.

The question that must be asked is one about the real beneficiaries of the policies pursued by the U.S. and Britain. Have these policies weakened the hardline mullahs in Iran and/or the jihadist Sunnis in Iraq and Afghanistan? Can we say that progressive journalists and politicians seeking a secular form of governance in the Islamic countries have benefited from regime-change policies?

Or have these policies led to the marginalization and imprisonment of those who might lead their countries in the Islamic world towards a more open, accountable, and socially inclusive society? Do we live in a safer world or are we, in the world community, more divided and suspicious of each other and less willing to talk with those who differ from us? We seem to be heading quietly but surely towards the next military engagement.

It is time to change policy and talk, yes, talk with whoever is prepared to engage in conflict resolution. Once the threat of war, surgical air strikes, and nuclear weapons recedes, we will see a re-emergence of those young Iranian women and men who will once again challenge the dogmatic policies of religious fanatics and fight to push back the reign of terror that has been ruling Iran.

Regime change is most effective and stable when it is instigated by internal forces who seek an open and free Iran, and who, unilaterally, will disengage from developing nuclear armaments. Iran has a generation of young, capable and highly educated women and men who have demonstrated their determination and willingness to fight for their rights and challenge the violent rule of the Ayatollahs and their theocratic allies. Their opposition to the regime should not be undermined by the launch of another military-cum-regime change debacle that could spread throughout the whole region, and very possibly further, for many years to come.

Instead, the focus of policy must be on exposing the abuses of human rights and the misdirection of oil revenues by the Iranian regime, as well as demonstrating the corruption that has become the way of governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As the first practical step, Western governments should provide and publish a list of assets, particularly bank accounts, of the leaders of the regime in Iran, and their business partners in Europe and in the United States. This can give a tremendous impetus to the opposition groups in Iran to mobilize the urban population and seek fundamental changes.

Few Westerners can appreciate the far-reaching effects of this action and the divisions that it will create even within the ranks of the regime. There is no single solution to the problems that beset Iran. However, eroding the revolutionary credentials of the ayatollahs and their allies may be one of most effective means of loosening and eventually severing their grip over Iran and its people.

[Rasputin]

The National Iranian American Council has a great review of the current draft Security Council resolution on Iran which states, in part:

... all States shall prohibit specialised teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs...

NIAC currently summarizes:

If the draft resolution's academic sanctions provisions are approved, they could apply added pressure to all countries to follow a similar model, affecting certain Iranian youths wishing to attend foreign universities. What is more, depending on the interpretation of the resolution's language, all Iranian students (not just engineers or physicists) are likely to experience added scrutiny and suspicion as a result.

Obviously students studying nuclear science would be affected. But what about those studying material science, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, or even biology? Clearly all of these studies are essential to a nuclear or ballistic weapons program? What about Iranian students who have dual citizenship and study in these area? How would they be affected? Let me summarize the wide effect of this resolution:

1. For students who have Iranian nationality, but no nationality in the country in which they study, and are studying a field which could contribute to nuclear or ballistic weapons, the country is obligated and required to deny you such education.

2. For students who have Iranian nationality and nationality in the country in which they study, and are studyign a field which could contribute to nuclear or ballistic weapons, the country has the right, but is not obligated, to deny you such education.

The expansive and broad language of the resolution and the potential impact it may have on innocent students and families are breathtaking. This is nothing short of a resolution designed not only to cripple Iran's nuclear program, but Iranians altogether, regardless of their association with the current government. During the recent Iranian Presidential elections, President Bush stated:

And to the Iranian people, I say: As you stand for your own liberty, the people of America stand with you. And to the Iranian people, I say: As you stand for your own liberty, the people of America stand with you.

If this was true, why is the administration pushing a resolution that would take away the very liberty it seeks to invest and support in Iranians? In both the short-term and long-run, this will do more to sustain this regime, then destroy it.

[Rasputin]

What Makes Tehran Tick? The Sources of Iranian Conduct

Can Republicans and Democrats find common ground on Iran? In his savvy and accessible Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (Times, $25), Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that administrations from both parties have already managed to unite around something rather basic about one of America's main foreign policy challenges: They all get Iran wrong.

That consistent misreading of the country's behavior arises, Takeyh argues, because a broad spectrum of U.S. leaders, from Jimmy Carter to Dick Cheney, has seen Islamist Iran as a grim totalitarian state with an arid political life akin to North Korea's. But Iran's domestic politics are in a state of constant churn, helping produce what Hidden Iran describes as a reasonably pragmatic foreign policy prone to spasms of baffling dogmatism and raving rhetoric. Tehran's national security apparatus, Takeyh writes, is riven by feuds that make the current U.S. splits between State Department and Pentagon officials look mild; in Iran, the disputes are driven by "three competing elements -- Islamic ideology, national interests, and factional politics -- all constantly at battle."

In the 1990s, an odd array of reformist clerics and cranky hard-liners -- with the blessings of the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- coalesced reluctantly "around the notion that Iran cannot remain isolated from the global order" and began reaching out to China, Russia and other major powers. But that overture is now under threat from a new generation of ascetic, doctrinaire mullahs who feel that the revolution has grown calcified and corrupt -- a cohort exemplified by the current rightist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who seems equally passionate about Islamist puritanism, economic populism and Holocaust-denying anti-Semitism.

Takeyh has written a shrewd, timely guide to Iran's schisms, interests and ambitions, as well as offering a bracing and often nicely acerbic look at U.S.-Iranian relations -- from the 1953 CIA-backed coup that overthrew Iran's popular, nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, to the politics of the Persian Gulf in the post-9/11, post-Saddam Hussein era.

So how can America get Iran right? Takeyh urges U.S. policymakers to "to set aside the chimera of regime change," acknowledge the durability of the theocratic republic, resign themselves to a mature U.S.-Iranian relationship that combines competition and cooperation, and start direct talks on such crucial issues as Iran's nuclear program, its sponsorship of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, its reported willingness to harbor al-Qaeda fugitives and its drive for greater influence over the Shiite majority of neighboring Iraq. Takeyh sees Iran as "a problem to be managed," not solved. But, he warns, Washington doesn't have much margin of error left.

[Rasputin]

France, the United States and Japan slip further Mauritania and Haiti gain much ground

North Korea, Turkmenistan, Eritrea: The worst violators of press freedom


New countries have moved ahead of some Western democracies in the fifth annual Reporters Without Borders Worldwide Press Freedom Index, issued today, while the most repressive countries are still the same ones.

“Unfortunately nothing has changed in the countries that are the worst predators of press freedom,” the organisation said, “and journalists in North Korea, Eritrea, Turkmenistan, Cuba, Burma and China are still risking their life or imprisonment for trying to keep us informed. These situations are extremely serious and it is urgent that leaders of these countries accept criticism and stop routinely cracking down on the media so harshly.

"Each year new countries in less-developed parts of the world move up the Index to positions above some European countries or the United States. This is good news and shows once again that, even though very poor, countries can be very observant of freedom of expression. Meanwhile the steady erosion of press freedom in the United States, France and Japan is extremely alarming,” Reporters Without Borders said.

The three worst violators of free expression - North Korea, bottom of the Index at 168th place, Turkmenistan (167th) and Eritrea (166th) - have clamped down further. The torture death of Turkmenistan journalist Ogulsapar Muradova shows that the country’s leader, “President-for-Life” Separmurad Nyazov, is willing to use extreme violence against those who dare to criticise him. Reporters Without Borders is also extremely concerned about a number of Eritrean journalists who have been imprisoned in secret for more than five years. The all-powerful North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, also continues to totally control the media.

Northern European countries once again come top of the Index, with no recorded censorship, threats, intimidation or physical reprisals in Finland, Ireland, Iceland and the Netherlands, which all share first place.

Deterioration in the United States and Japan, with France also slipping

The United States (53rd) has fallen nine places since last year, after being in 17th position in the first year of the Index, in 2002. Relations between the media and the Bush administration sharply deteriorated after the president used the pretext of “national security” to regard as suspicious any journalist who questioned his “war on terrorism.” The zeal of federal courts which, unlike those in 33 US states, refuse to recognise the media’s right not to reveal its sources, even threatens journalists whose investigations have no connection at all with terrorism.

Freelance journalist and blogger Josh Wolf was imprisoned when he refused to hand over his video archives. Sudanese cameraman Sami al-Haj, who works for the pan-Arab broadcaster Al-Jazeera, has been held without trial since June 2002 at the US military base at Guantanamo, and Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein has been held by US authorities in Iraq since April this year.

France (35th) slipped five places during the past year, to make a loss of 24 places in five years. The increase in searches of media offices and journalists’ homes is very worrying for media organisations and trade unions. Autumn 2005 was an especially bad time for French journalists, several of whom were physically attacked or threatened during a trade union dispute involving privatisation of the Corsican firm SNCM and during violent demonstrations in French city suburbs in November.

Rising nationalism and the system of exclusive press clubs (kishas) threatened democratic gains in Japan, which fell 14 places to 51st. The newspaper Nihon Keizai was firebombed and several journalists physically attacked by far-right activists (uyoku).

Fallout from the row over the "Mohammed cartoons”

Denmark (19th) dropped from joint first place because of serious threats against the authors of the Mohammed cartoons published there in autumn 2005. For the first time in recent years in a country that is very observant of civil liberties, journalists had to have police protection due to threats against them because of their work.

Yemen (149th) slipped four places, mainly because of the arrest of several journalists and closure of newspapers that reprinted the cartoons. Journalists were harassed for the same reason in Algeria (126th), Jordan (109th), Indonesia (103rd) and India (105th).

But except for Yemen and Saudi Arabia (161st), all the Arab peninsula countries considerably improved their rank. Kuwait (73rd) kept its place at the top of the group, just ahead of the United Arab Emirates (77th) and Qatar (80th).

Newcomers to the top ranks

Two countries moved into the Index’s top 20 for the first time. Bolivia (16th) was best-placed among less-developed countries and during the year its journalists enjoyed the same level of freedom as colleagues in Canada or Austria. But the growing polarisation between state-run and privately-owned media and between supporters and opponents of President Evo Morales could complicate the situation.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (19th) continued its gradual rise up the Index since the end of the war in ex-Yugoslavia and is now placed above its European Union member-state neighbours Greece (32nd) and Italy (40th).

Panama (39th) is enjoying political peace which has helped the growth of a free and vigorous media and the country moved up 27 places over the year.

War, the destroyer of press freedom

Lebanon has fallen from 56th to 107th place in five years, as the country’s media continues to suffer from the region’s poisonous political atmosphere, with a series of bomb attacks in 2005 and Israeli military attacks this year. The Lebanese media - some of the freest and most experienced in the Arab world - desperately need peace and guarantees of security. The inability of the Palestinian Authority (134th) to maintain stability in its territories and the behaviour of Israel (135th) outside its borders seriously threaten freedom of expression in the Middle East.

Things are much the same in Sri Lanka, which ranked 51st in 2002, when there was peace, but has now sunk to 141st because fighting between government and rebel forces has resumed in earnest. Dozens of Tamil journalists have been physically attacked after being accused by one side or the other of being biased against them.

Press freedom in Nepal (159th) has shifted according to the state of the fighting that has disrupted the country for several years. The “democatic revolution” and the revolt against the monarchy in April this year led immediately to more basic freedoms and the country should gain a lot of ground in next year’s Index.

Disparities in the Americas

Three journalists were killed in each of Colombia (131st) and Mexico (132th). A Mexican reporter also disappeared along the US border, where drug-traffickers threaten the media. Cuba (165th) remains the world’s second biggest prison for journalists, with 24 in jail, and still does not allow an independent media.

The other surprise, along with Bolivia’s good position, was the slipping of Brazil (to 75th place) and Argentina (to 76th). One journalist was killed in Brazil over the past year and physical attacks on local media are still numerous. Relations between Argentina’s national media and the presidency are still very bad and cutting off state subsidies is no longer the only way used to cow media outlets. Suspensions and dismissal of journalists are sometimes the result of direct pressure by politicians. The atmosphere is still tense in Peru (113th) and in Venezuela (115th), where the consequences of the “media war” between supporters of opponents of President Hugo Chávez persist.

Changes of ruler are sometimes good for press freeedom, as in the case of Haiti, which has risen from 125th to 87th place in two years after the flight into exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in early 2004. Several murders of journalists remain unpunished but violence against the media has abated.

Except for Guatemala (90th), Central America as a whole has good rankings despite the gap between countries such as Costa Rica (29th), Panama (39th) and El Salvador (41st), and Honduras (64th) and Nicaragua (69th). The few physical attacks on journalists also shows that self-censorship is at work.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

Almost twenty eight years have passed from the establishment of theocratic regime in Iran which has been responsible for many calamities imposed on our nation during this period. Apart from deprivation of our people from peace and prosperity which they enjoyed prior to cleric rulers of Iran, most of Islamic regime's authorities from top to bottom have been involved in many serious crimes against Iranians. Widespread looting of national resources and corruption at different levels of government along with use of extremely suppressive forces against people has left no choice for most Iranians to either leave the country if they can or settle with the misery that is forced upon them.

During the past 27 years, double digit unemployment and struggle with poverty has driven the nation to a depression and change of fundamental moral values in a society which has a long history with dignity and honor. More than 40 percent of Iranians live below poverty line even based on Islamic regime's standards and they have hard time in every minute of their daily lives in order to make the ends meet!

It is under such dreadful conditions which Islamic rulers have decided one more time to drag our nation into a crisis and conflict to satisfy the system which is founded on deception and lies with its divine mission to impose rules of Allah on earth! Islamic regime of Iran that has failed to accomplish anything positive for any Iranian other than those who are affiliated with ruling clerics and their families, has made freedom of Palestinian lands and destruction of Israel their number one priority!

In early 1980's, leaders of Islamic regime in Iran welcomed the attack of Iraqi army to our country as a gift from god which would help them to silence and destroy any voice of opposition that had already started to gather momentum since the first few weeks from Islamic revolution in February of 1979. Similar to those days, leaders of Islamic regime today declare the imposition of international sanctions against our nation as a cause for celebration and in this way, they are ready to turn Iran into another North Korea in which laughter is a rare commodity and some people are dying on the streets from disastrous living condition under dictatorship of Kim Jong-il.

One day, war became a gift from god and another day Islamic rulers celebrate international sanctions on Iran to show their disregard for any humane values and our people's rights. It is obvious that with this mentality and with war mongering policies of Islamic regime's rulers as representatives of Allah on earth, we will soon be witnessing another gift package from god in which for Iranians there will be more misery, more corruptions and more humiliations. There is no need to be an expert in any field in order to see the coming storm that will destroy anything on its path. What else do Iranians need to see in order to get their act together and do something for the sake of saving themselves from disaster rather than waiting to see what others will do?

Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly shows it will be very hard to reach stability for any government after invasion and attack by foreign forces. Moreover, Iran is a totally different territory and conditions are much different. Islamic rulers have kept the nation in deep misery and corruption so they can buy their way out using the enormous wealth at their exposal whenever they need. There are still some people whose sincere religious beliefs could be manipulated and taken advantage of by ruling clerics to make everything difficult for others. And of course there are those who care for nothing other than their own petty interests which they believe could be achieved through association or dealing with rich mullahs.

There is ample amount of reasons to justify prompt action in direction of removal of clerical tyranny in our country. Military intervention by foreign nations will do no service to the interests of Iranian nation and will push Iran back into dark ages while Islamic rulers can survive such attack without much trouble. For years, Iranian opposition groups and individuals residing outside the country have been neutralized by manipulative propagandas of Islamic regime in promotion of this unrealistic notion that no one from outside the country can "prescribe" any action and have serious effect inside!

Unfortunately, many of Iranians inside and outside the country have simplistically fallen for this nonsense which has disabled a good portion of opposition forces to consider more active approach to the question of regime change in Iran. It is a patriotic duty of any Iranian who loves his/her country to speak up and participate in any action that could contribute to the liberty of our nation and no one is exempted! In the absence of democratic options to bring possible changes in politics of our nation, every Iranian, specially political groups and activists have the right to "prescribe" what they believe is beneficial in direction of removing Islamic tyranny from our nation and creating a democratic establishment that serves the national interests rather than an ideology. It is better to speak up now and avoid future regrets.

The constitution of Islamic republic regime in Iran is nothing but a cycle of doom which starts from "velayat faghih" (absolute rule of mullah) and ends with "velayat faghih". More than 9 years ago Iranian people elected a president whom they thought would be helpful in bringing the much needed change in the country. This was the ultimate show of democracy, Islamic republic style, in which Iranians went against the wishes of "vali faghih" by electing a clergyman from whom they heard what they wished for in his political campaign. People participated in that game to try the last possible resort in order to bring the peaceful changes they wished for but soon enough they had to deal with broken promises, outburst of chain killings and increasing stoning and other inhumane punishments to remember one more time that by whom they are ruled!

All attempts in the past 27 years to bring slightest political change in Iran have been brutally confronted and suppressed by clerical rulers and every door has been slammed in the face of Iranian people. It is under such condition and in the absence of a competent opposition inside and outside that many Iranians are desperately waiting for a savior from the western world to make things right in Iran! Iranian opposition groups have no choice but to stand up and provide Iranians with clear directions and guidance with no ambiguity on how to react.

It's time for Iranian opposition groups and leaders to show their sincerity rather than hanging to cliché and political correctness without fear of being labeled. It is only in critical times when a leadership can establish its legitimacy by showing courage and wisdom. It is time to call upon the nation to act on their own behalf without being afraid of old and obsolete "prescription" propaganda! It's time for strike rather than wait and regret the inaction later! Iranian people welcomed the call by foreign based opposition groups about two years ago with widespread boycott of presidential election. It's time to step up the action through a laud and clear call for a general strike against policies of tyrannical regime by every single opposition group or leader. It is time to be specific and to the point!

[Rasputin]

U.S. intelligence on Iran

The man who ran the CIA`s covert activities in Europe during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq says U.S. intelligence needs to be better insulated from political influence if the nation is to avoid another disaster in Iran.

'I can see the same thing happening with (intelligence on) Iran,' Tyler Drumheller told United Press International in an interview about his just-published book, 'On the Brink.'

He said there was 'a core of intelligence professionals who can do the job if they`re allowed to.' But there was a real risk of repeating what he said was the two-pronged failure on Iraq: policy-makers brought their preconceptions to the table and senior intelligence officials failed to confront them with uncomfortable truths.

Policy-makers, he said, had to learn that, 'When someone doesn`t agree with your preconceptions, you can`t interpret that as disloyalty or stupidity.' But they must also be able to 'rely on intelligence officials to tell them things they don`t want to hear.'

He said that recent reforms of the structure of U.S. intelligence, including the appointment of Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, were 'an impediment, not an improvement.'

'On the Brink,' offers a few fresh details about several episodes of the now familiar tale of how U.S. officials ended up making a case for war based on inaccurate statements about Iraq`s weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

'The White House took our work and twisted it for its own ends,' he writes, accusing then-CIA Director George Tenet of having 'set a tone whereby people knew what he and the White House wanted to hear. The bureaucratic imperative was to prove one`s worth by supporting the president`s case for war.'

CIA Spokesman Mark Mansfield declined to comment on the book beyond saying that Drumheller no longer worked for the agency and was 'expressing his own opinion.'

Colleagues have defended Tenet from similar charges in the past, pointing out that the published reports of two inquiries into the matter have concluded that there was no politicization of the CIA`s analysis on his watch, but rather a failure of analytic creativity, and the predominance of so-called 'groupthink.'

Drumheller`s book also echoes the conclusions of the special presidential commission that probed pre-war intelligence failures on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, in placing much of the blame for the errors on the CIA`s Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control center, known as WINPAC.

'The truth is (Tenet) over-empowered WINPAC,' he writes.

The presidential commission last year recommended a fundamental overhaul of the center. 'We didn`t quite say, `Bulldoze it,` but we came close,' a commission official told UPI at the time.

Mansfield praised the center`s analysts as 'smart, extraordinarily dedicated officers' and said changes had been made there.

'We have improved our analytical tradecraft and our intelligence-sharing (with people working the issue at different agencies),' he said, adding that the center was doing more analysis focused on the research U.S. adversaries are doing on weapons development.

He said a so-called Red Cell, or alternative analysis team, had been put in place at the center. 'We are including alternative analysis in many more of our products, and are bolstering (intelligence) efforts to improve interdiction capabilities.'

He said WINPAC analysts had predicted both North Korea`s missile test in July and its recent effort to detonate a nuclear bomb.

'We have taken the lessons learned from the Iraq episode,' he said, 'and are applying them every day.'

One congressional staffer with access to intelligence products agreed. 'I have seen no evidence that the intelligence community is being pushed or is shaping their analysis' on Iran, the staffer told UPI.

'They have in fact learned fairly well the lessons of Iraq,' the staffer went on. 'They are much clearer about the degree of confidence they have in their judgments, much readier to acknowledge uncertainty, much better at laying out what they don`t know.'

But Drumheller is not alone in his concerns. Many critics of the administration have discerned a similar tunnel vision on the part of senior officials as was evident in the run up to war with Iraq.

Negroponte has said it is the consensus assessment of U.S. intelligence that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, and is five to 10 years away from developing one.

In August, the GOP Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, released titled, ' Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States.'

'We lack critical information needed for analysts to make many of their judgments with confidence about Iran, and we don`t know nearly enough about Iran`s nuclear weapons program,' read the report.

'I would suspect we do know quite a bit about what`s going on in Iran, but it`s not what they want to hear, so they say, `We`re blind,`' Drumheller said.

The report was slammed by critics, including the International Atomic Energy Authority, as presenting an overblown and exaggerated picture of the threat.

The authority`s former head, Hans Blix recently gave evidence to a congressional panel, and told them that Iran was 'not a threat today. It could become (one) later on.'

He said U.S. intelligence analysts looking before the war at Iraq`s weapons programs had 'chose(n) to replace question marks by exclamation marks,' and urged against repeating that error on Iran.

He said it was not certain that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon. 'I think there have been some indications pointing in that direction, but I don`t think it is conclusive. And I think that after the experience we have had in Iraq, one should be a little careful to jump to conclusions.'

[Rasputin]