Hezbollah Is A Terrorist Group

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On September 20, 2001, in a historic speech to a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush famously declared, "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." Few terrorist organizations meet this standard, but Hezbollah is definitely one of them. The Lebanon-based group has cells on every continent, and its highly skilled operatives have committed horrifying attacks as far away as Argentina. Before September 11, 2001, it was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. Hassan Nasrallah, the group's secretary-general, recently proclaimed, "Death to America was, is, and will stay our slogan." Since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000, Hezbollah has armed and trained Palestinian terrorists, further fraying the already tattered peace process. Hezbollah operatives have reportedly traveled to postwar Iraq to rekindle historic ties with Iraqi Shi'ites.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many in the United States have argued that Hezbollah should be the next target in the war on terror. Shortly after September 11, a group of leading scholars, pundits, and former government officials, including William Kristol and Richard Perle, declared in an open letter to President Bush that "any war on terrorism must target Hezbollah" and urged that military action be considered against the movement's state sponsors, Syria and Iran. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has warned of Hezbollah's lethality, noting that "Hezbollah may be the A team of terrorists," while "al Qaeda is actually the B team."

Given the organization's record of bloodshed and hostility, the question is not whether Hezbollah should be stopped; it is how. A campaign against it similar to the U.S. effort against al Qaeda -- killing the group's leaders and ending its haven in Lebanon -- would probably fail and might even backfire. Syria and Iran openly support it, and much of the Arab world regards it as heroic, for its successful resistance against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (the only time that Arab arms have forced Israel to surrender territory), and legitimate, because of its participation in Lebanese parliamentary politics. Even officials in France, Canada, and other Western nations have acknowledged the value of its social and political projects.

To have any chance of success, a U.S. military operation would have to involve a sustained counterinsurgency campaign -- something that Israel tried for 20 years, only to find that its efforts strengthened Hezbollah's resolve and increased its local and regional appeal. In response to a U.S. attack, Hezbollah might activate its cells in Asia, Europe, and Latin America -- and possibly in the United States itself. The United States, furthermore, is today in a far worse position militarily and diplomatically than it was before the war in Iraq. Occupying Iraq is tough enough; a fight in the Bekaa Valley, a Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon, would only make things worse.

The upshot is that although Washington should indeed confront Hezbollah, it should do so indirectly. However morally justified an all-out attack would be, reducing Hezbollah's terrorist activity requires avoiding the temptation to overreach. Instead, Washington must apply pressure through Syria and Iran. Only Damascus has the necessary intelligence assets and force on the ground in Lebanon to shut down Hezbollah's militant activities. The right combination of carrots and sticks would lead Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to crack down on his erstwhile proxy. Pressure on Iran, meanwhile, would help cut off Hezbollah's global network and might persuade it to focus on Lebanese politics rather than anti-American violence. Although convincing a hissing Damascus and a fractured Tehran to cooperate will be difficult, such a strategy is more prudent than launching a doomed direct confrontation that would further inflame anti-Americanism. With skill, Washington can transform Hezbollah into just one more Lebanese political faction -- one that continues to be hostile but no longer poses a major threat to the United States and its interests.


THE HEZBOLLAH MODEL

In the U.S. demonology of terrorism, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda are relative newcomers. For most of the past two decades, Hezbollah has claimed pride of place as the top concern of U.S. counterterrorism officials. It was Hezbollah that pioneered the use of suicide bombing, and its record of attacks on the United States and its allies would make even bin Laden proud: the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. embassy there in 1983 and 1984; the hijacking of twa flight 847 and murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem in 1985; a series of lethal attacks on Israeli targets in Lebanon; the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992 and of a Buenos Aires Jewish community center in 1994. More recently, Hezbollah operatives have plotted to blow up the Israeli embassy in Thailand, and a Lebanese member of Hezbollah was indicted for helping to design the truck bomb that flattened the Khobar Towers U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia in 1996. As CIA director George Tenet testified earlier this year, "Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [al Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable organization. I actually think they're a notch above in many respects."

In the course of its 20-year history, Hezbollah has amply demonstrated its hostility, its lethality, and its skill. However, to focus exclusively on this record is to miss how much it has evolved over the past two decades -- an evolution that has altered both the nature of the threat and the best means of confronting it.

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Hezbollah today is dramatically different from the ragtag collection of Shi'ite fighters that first emerged in the early 1980s. In 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to expel Palestinian guerrillas there. The Shi'ites, traditionally underrepresented in Lebanese politics, welcomed the Israelis, whom they saw as protection against the Palestinian militias that dominated much of southern Lebanon. Israel overstayed its welcome, however, and the Shi'ite community soon turned against it. As the situation unraveled, the United States deployed peacekeepers to Beirut and worked to form a new government. Although the Amal movement, until that time the leading voice of the Shi'ite community, embraced the U.S.- and Israeli-backed regime, much of its constituency rejected this cooperation and denounced the government as a puppet of Israel. Syria and Iran encouraged such dissent; Iran hoped to export its Islamic revolution to Lebanon, and both Syria and Iran sought to use the Shi'ites as a proxy force against Israel. With support from Damascus, Tehran helped organize, arm, train, inspire, and unite various Shi'ite groups into the movement that became known as Hezbollah -- "party of God."

The organization literally exploded into the world's consciousness with devastating suicide attacks on the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Beirut, causing over 250 American casualties. As a result, Washington concluded that there was little peace to keep in Lebanon and withdrew its forces in 1984. Israel suffered similar blows, fighting a long, bitter struggle against relatively autonomous fighters who became more and more effective over time. Faced with ferocious Hezbollah resistance, Israel withdrew to a "security zone" in southern Lebanon in 1985 and, 15 years later, left Lebanon altogether.

In Hezbollah's struggle to expel Israel from Lebanon in the 1990s, much of its activity vis-à-vis Israel was best characterized as guerrilla warfare rather than terrorism. The vast majority of Hezbollah's actions were focused on Israeli military personnel on Lebanese soil and intended to drive Israel out of the country. At times, however, Hezbollah did target civilians, through operations such as Katyusha rocket attacks on Israeli settlements near the border and the attacks in Argentina. Hezbollah's supporters argue that such strikes occurred only after Israel violated "red lines" or escalated tensions by assassinating Hezbollah leaders.

Both Hezbollah's terrorist actions and its guerrilla warfare are facilitated by the group's extensive international network. Hezbollah operatives have been found in France, Spain, Cyprus, Singapore, the "triborder" region of South America, and the Philippines, as well as in more familiar operational theaters in Europe and the Middle East. The movement draws on these cells to raise money, prepare the logistic infrastructure for attacks, disseminate propaganda, and otherwise ensure that the organization remains robust and ready to strike. In 2001, U.S. federal investigators discovered a Hezbollah fundraising cell in North Carolina.

Hezbollah's founding document calls for Islamic rule in Lebanon, an end to Western imperialism, and the destruction of the state of Israel. But the group has now abandoned these founding principles, at least in practice. Hezbollah leaders participate in Lebanon's political system, and some have rejected the forceful imposition of Islam. Hezbollah still denounces the United States, but it has become much more cautious in its opposition. It has not been involved in an attack on a U.S. target since the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, when it assisted others rather than using its own capability.

Direct attacks on Israel have also become rare since the withdrawal from southern Lebanon. This decrease, however, is not a sign that the movement has accepted Israel's existence. Rather, Hezbollah has shifted to helping Palestinian terrorist groups become more lethal -- exporting what journalist James Kitfield has labeled "the Hezbollah model" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hezbollah has proved the single most effective adversary Israel has ever faced. Its fighters and leaders have demonstrated exceptional dedication and an ability to learn from mistakes and innovate quickly. Palestinians regularly cite Hezbollah's combination of skilled operations, willing sacrifice, and emphasis on long-term struggle as a guide to their own efforts. And even militias affiliated with Yasir Arafat's secular Palestinian faction Fatah have followed Hezbollah's example, resorting to the sort of suicide terror that had heretofore been the province of Palestinian Islamists. Since the outbreak of the al Aqsa intifada in October 2000, Hezbollah has provided guerrilla training, bomb-building expertise, propaganda, and tactical tips to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other anti-Israeli groups. There are also reports that Hezbollah is trying to establish its own Palestinian proxy, the Return Brigades. Such support for Palestinian terrorists has helped disrupt the peace process at little cost to Hezbollah itself.

Exporting its model of conflict while limiting actual attacks allows the movement to continue its fight without alienating its Lebanese constituents (many of whom fear an Israeli backlash) or its backers in Tehran and Damascus (who fear U.S. retaliation). Ominously, Iraq may become the site of Hezbollah's newest proxy war. In May, Nasrallah called for supporting "the oppressed" when they are "occupied," an attempt to equate the U.S. presence in Iraq with Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. He has thus far avoided openly urging foreign volunteers to enter Iraq, but the postwar chaos has clearly provided fertile ground for Hezbollah's expansion. Many of the movement's founders studied in seminaries in Iraq, and Lebanese Shi'ites maintain ties with their Iraqi brethren. The relative disorganization of Iraqi Shi'ites provides an opportunity for Hezbollah to gain a foothold there, and much of the Arab world would support Hezbollah action against "the American invader." For the United States, active Hezbollah support of Iraqi insurgents would have disastrous consequences.


LEGITIMACY AND POWER

Addressing Hezbollah's involvement with terror is complicated by the support it enjoys in the region and the legitimacy it enjoys in Lebanon. At home, Hezbollah is as much a social and political organization as it is a terrorist or guerrilla movement; abroad, its violence serves the interests of Tehran and Damascus, both of which helped create it and still actively back it. It is embedded in Lebanese politics and society and, unlike al Qaeda, is a stakeholder in the existing regional order, not a force bent on destroying it. This position has made Hezbollah stronger but has also forced it to become more cautious, cunning, and subtle.

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Like many other radical Islamist groups, Hezbollah builds both bombs and schools. It is popular among Lebanon's Shi'ite plurality and respected by many non-Shi'ite Lebanese, and its political wing holds 12 seats in parliament. In marked contrast to the Lebanese government, it offers relatively efficient public services and runs effective schools and hospitals. Although such social and political involvement does not indicate a fundamental reversal in the movement, as some apologists suggest, it does reflect a broadening of Hezbollah's functions beyond political violence. In southern Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and in several poor Shi'ite suburbs of Beirut -- an area analyst Gal Luft has dubbed "Hezbollahland" -- it exercises almost exclusive control and maintains a dense social network that provides food, medicine, education, and basic services.

For Syria and Iran, using Hezbollah as a proxy enables them to strike at Israel and other targets without the risks of direct confrontation. Damascus provides Hezbollah with weapons and logistic support while squashing rival movements and allowing it a haven in Lebanon. This relationship is intensely practical: the Syrian government has avoided direct involvement in international terrorism since 1986 but still puts pressure on Israel and other opponents through Hezbollah. Syria's ties to Hezbollah are essentially meant to remind Israel that it cannot end terrorism without accommodating Damascus. President Assad recently confessed this open secret, noting that the terrorist group is a necessary "buffer" against Israel. Although Hezbollah exercises considerable independence, it has consistently demonstrated that it will bend to Syria's will. Damascus can prompt violence by militants, as it did by making the disputed Shebaa Farms territory a Hezbollah concern, and can get those same militants to lie low when it wants to avoid a confrontation.

Tehran provided the initial inspiration for Hezbollah and continues to offer organizational aid and ideological guidance. Indeed, Iran's sponsorship of the movement consistently puts the country at the top of the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Hezbollah adheres to Iran's ideology of the velayat-e faqih (rule by the Islamic jurist), and Tehran provides approximately $100 million to the group every year. Hezbollah's senior terrorist, Imad Mugniyah, is reportedly an Iranian citizen and regularly travels there. Other top operatives maintain close ties to Iranian intelligence and to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is directly connected to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hezbollah's leaders proclaim their loyalty to Khamenei, and he reportedly acts as an arbiter in their decisions. Tehran exercises particular influence over Hezbollah's overseas activities. For example, Hezbollah cells in Europe ended attacks after Iran decided to halt violent activity there. In exchange for its support of the group, Iran gets a valuable weapon against Israel and influence far beyond its borders. In some cases, Tehran has also used Hezbollah to kill dissidents and strike at U.S. targets.

Although foreign support is a source of Hezbollah's strength, it is just as often a brake on its activities. Iran and Syria use Hezbollah operations to further their foreign policy objectives, but their close ties to the group make them responsible for its trespasses. When Tehran and Damascus feel threatened by the possibility of retaliation, they do not hesitate to rein Hezbollah in. When then Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad met with President Bill Clinton in 1994, for example, Hezbollah halted attacks; it did the same in the face of increased U.S. pressure on its patron before and after the war in Iraq.


THE PITFALLS OF DIRECT ATTACK

Any campaign against Hezbollah must take into account the group's standing in Lebanese politics and society and the nature of its international support. Four possible courses of action are open to Washington: confronting Hezbollah directly through military action; coercing the Lebanese government to take action against the group; working through Iran; or cracking down on Syria. Each carries considerable risks -- and the possibility of outright failure.

The object of a U.S. military strike would be to eliminate Hezbollah's leadership, disarm its militias, and disrupt its infrastructure in Lebanon. As it did against al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States could invade, deploy thousands of troops, and work with Hezbollah's local adversaries in an effort to eradicate the movement completely. Or it could launch smaller-scale missile strikes against key leaders and infrastructure, similar to the attacks on al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in 1998.

Any kind of direct attack, however, would face unfavorable odds. Hezbollah's members are tough and highly skilled and, unlike al Qaeda radicals in Afghanistan, do not stand out from the rest of the supportive Lebanese population. In response to years of Israeli air attacks, Hezbollah has dispersed its membership and its weaponry among Lebanese civilians, making it almost impossible to strike at the group without killing many innocents.

A U.S. invasion would be unpopular in Lebanon even outside Hezbollah strongholds, moreover. U.S. forces would have a difficult time finding local allies, apart from a small group of Maronite Christians, and would have to remain in Lebanon for years -- a daunting task in ordinary times, an impossible one given other U.S. commitments today.

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Limited strikes would be similarly unlikely to succeed. After all, Hezbollah fought a successful guerrilla war against Israel for 15 years. Israeli forces killed or kidnapped large numbers of commanders and combatants, but Hezbollah was able to regenerate its leadership and find new recruits. And any strike against Hezbollah would likely increase its popularity. The pre-September 11 campaigns against al Qaeda are instructive: the 1998 U.S. bombings in Afghanistan and Sudan not only failed to kill al Qaeda leaders, but also lionized the movement in the eyes of the local population and the Arab world.

Nonetheless, Hezbollah too has good reason to want to avoid such a conflict. Although the movement gained popularity for its successful resistance -- and remains fundamentally a militant movement -- any further confrontation with the United States or Israel that subjected southern Lebanon once again to the ravages of war would be highly unpopular even among Hezbollah's supporters. However, in the event of a direct U.S. attack, the group's gloves would come off. Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, often referred to as Hezbollah's spiritual leader, has told his followers to confront "American interests everywhere" if the United States cracks down.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between the struggle against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and a potential war on Hezbollah is that the United States' current position in the world -- militarily and diplomatically -- is far less favorable than it was at the start of the war on terror. The U.S. military was overstretched even before September 11; now, there are almost 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and smaller forces deployed in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Yemen, Djibouti, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Hopes for a quick withdrawal from Iraq are no longer feasible, and U.S. special operations forces -- critical in counterterrorism operations -- are particularly strained.

The United States would have a difficult time finding allies for a strike on Hezbollah. Al Qaeda declared war on everyone: secular Western regimes, Arab autocracies, and a range of governments in between. Such undiscriminating zealotry made international cooperation against al Qaeda relatively easy to obtain. In contrast, Hezbollah is widely viewed as a legitimate, and even admirable, resistance movement fighting an oppressive regional hegemon. Many regimes in the region see the group as a cause deserving support, not a threat to their rule. Even some government officials in Europe and Asia see Hezbollah as more of a social movement than a terrorist organization. In October 2002, Hezbollah operatives participated in a Francophone summit in Beirut with implicit French endorsement.

The war in Iraq has exposed the United States to charges of arrogance from its friends and imperialism from its enemies. The failure to uncover a robust weapons of mass destruction program has hurt U.S. credibility, making it difficult to justify another war. A new military struggle would confirm perceptions of the United States as a trigger-happy cowboy.


CONFRONTATION BY PROXY

The best strategy against Hezbollah is to confront it indirectly: by putting pressure on Iran and, more important, on Syria. Secretary of State Colin Powell has tried a similar tactic with the Lebanese government, but Beirut is essentially Damascus' puppet and will take no independent action. In the past, Israel has tried military action to force Lebanon to act, but the result has been destruction and a refugee crisis with no change in the government's stance. Moreover, it is unlikely that Beirut could confront Hezbollah even if it wanted to. Although approximately 7,000 Lebanese government troops are stationed along the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hezbollah forces could easily defeat them.

Constant diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran and Damascus, on the other hand, coupled with the implicit threat of military action, can successfully rein in Hezbollah. Demanding that its backers abandon it outright would fail, but a more limited approach focused on putting a stop to violent activity would have a good chance of success. The United States should repeatedly emphasize that Syria and Iran will be held responsible for Hezbollah's actions.

Although Iran exercises tremendous influence over Hezbollah, it lacks the means to force a significant change in the movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon, and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements, simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership. Indeed, Iran may find that it has been too successful in imparting its ideology: Hezbollah is more loyal to the legacy of the Islamic revolution than are most Iranians. The United States could, however, convince Tehran to end its support of Hezbollah's violence without walking away from the movement altogether. Iranian President Muhammad Khatami recently told a crowd in Beirut that Hezbollah should act cautiously, and experts have argued that the U.S. victory in Iraq and domestic strife in Iran will compel Iranian leaders to seek better relations with Washington. For the right price -- or from fear of a very harsh response -- Tehran might begin to emphasize Hezbollah's humanitarian and political projects over its guerrilla and terrorist

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Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said today that in the 1990s Hezbollah was complicit in bombing Buenos Aires and planning attacks in places like Bangkok.
"And the advice that we had is the external security organisation of Hezbollah is still capable of, and planning, terrorist attacks in support of its broader objectives in the Middle East," he told ABC TV.

Mr Ruddock said the government did monitor the situation, "but I've received no advice that Hezbollah as an external security situation has changed its objectives".

Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard said there was "no chance, full stop" of changing Hezbollah's classification as a terrorist organisation.

The Muslim Community Reference Group, set up by the government following last year's London terrorist bombings, met Mr Howard last week but had no luck in changing the government's view that the militant wing of Hezbollah was anything other than a terrorist organisation.

Later, the government warned that Australians who donated to any wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement risked breaking the law.

Questions were raised in Australia's Lebanese community this week whether it was illegal to donate to the party as a whole, or just its militant wing.

Many Australian Lebanese want to send funds to charities in Lebanon to help kin displaced by the ongoing conflict.

But a statement from Mr Ruddock cautioned today that all wings of Hezbollah were outlawed by the international community, and Australians could be breaking the law if they donated to any part of it.

"It's quite clear, if they send (money) to Hezbollah, the provision of 1373 of the United Nations' Security Council resolution apply, and they would be committing an offence," Mr Ruddock said today.

"People who want to assist in relation to Lebanon should do so through established organisation. There are many working there in the area."

But he said people should make inquiries before donating funds so they didn't inadvertently send money to an organisation run by Hezbollah.

"You are likely to be committing an offence if you are reckless in the way you deal with these issues," he said.

He said the burden of responsibility in this case was no stronger than in many types of criminal law, which outlaw reckless behaviour.

In Australia, only Hezbollah's External Security Organisation (ESO) is listed as a terrorist organisation. Its political wing is not.

Other countries, such as Canada and the US, have listed Hezbollah in its entirety.

Mr Ruddock said he would not discuss whether the government was monitoring Australians returning from southern Lebanon.

An Australian's mere presence in that region was not enough to arouse suspicion they were involved with Hezbollah, he said.

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Hezbollah fired more than 250 rockets into Israel on Sunday, the fiercest attack against northern Israel since the fighting began more than a month ago, the Israeli army reported. One Israeli man was killed.
After a stormy debate Sunday, Israel's Cabinet approved a Mideast cease-fire, agreeing to silence the army's guns in less than 24 hours. The Israeli military and Hezbollah both embarked on a last-minute barrage, trying to inflict as much damage as possible before the cease-fire began.

Israeli warplanes ranged across south Lebanon, rocketing south Beirut and other areas with 23 missiles that killed at least 15 people.

The 24-0 Israeli Cabinet vote, with one abstention, came a day after the Lebanese government approved the agreement and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave his grudging consent. The truce was to take effect Monday morning.

But questions as to the truce's durability quickly arose Sunday, when the Lebanese Cabinet canceled a critical meeting that was supposed to discuss the deployment of 15,000 troops to southern Lebanon, a key part of the cease-fire deal. Published reports said the Cabinet had been sharply divided over demands that Hezbollah surrender its weapons.

A heated debate erupted during Israel's Cabinet session, with minister Ofir Pines-Paz criticizing the government's decision to order an expanded ground offensive in the days before the cease-fire is to take effect.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the cease-fire agreement would ensure that "Hezbollah won't continue to exist as a state within a state."

"The Lebanese government is our address for every problem or violation of the agreement," Army Radio quoted him as saying.

The Israeli Cabinet session came as some 30,000 Israeli troops fought heavy battles with Hezbollah a day after 24 soldiers were killed in the highest Israeli toll of the monthlong war.

As the vote took place, Israeli shells slammed into the hard-hit Dahiyeh suburb, a Hezbollah stronghold just south of Beirut. Lebanese television reports said the strike destroyed a complex of eight residential buildings. TV footage panned across massive damage that appeared to stretch for several hundred yards in all directions.

An Associated Press photographer saw the body of one child being removed from the wreckage.

As explosions reverberated across the Lebanese capital, and there were reports of other strikes south of the city on the Christian town of Damour and a nearby village, dl-Naameh.

Earlier Sunday, Israeli warplanes fired missiles into gasoline stations in the southern port city of Tyre. Huge fires could be seen near the al-Bass Palestinian refugee camp north of Tyre and near the Najem hospital in the city. Israeli planes also attacked villages near Nabatiyeh north of the Litani River, killing three men.

The cease-fire was to go into effect at 8 a.m Monday. After a halt in fighting, some 15,000 Lebanese troops and an equal number of U.N. forces were to be deployed in south Lebanon and create a Hezbollah-free zone, from the Israel-Lebanon border to Lebanon's Litani River, 18 miles away.

Israel said it hopes Lebanese troops will start deploying quickly, within a week or two.

"When the Lebanese and multinational force enters, Israel will withdraw and not before," Israeli Cabinet minister Yaacov Edri said after the Cabinet vote.

Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz abstained in the vote, said a senior government official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Lebanese government approved the deal Saturday, and Nasrallah signaled grudging acceptance, but also warned that "the war has not ended."

In the Cabinet meeting, Olmert praised the cease-fire agreement approved by the U.N. Security Council, saying it will prevent a return to the status quo in which Hezbollah ran a state-within-a-state in south Lebanon, participants said.

The deal was seen at best as a draw with Hezbollah, and some felt Israel — unable to subdue a guerrillas force — had lost.

Neither the Lebanese army nor U.N. forces can be counted on to challenge Hezbollah and prevent the Iran-supplied guerrillas from rearming, military experts and commentators said.

The deal buys a period of calm, at best, and sets the region up for the next war with Tehran's proxy army, critics said. The truce will be "a time-out until the next confrontation, and maybe not even this," commentator Nahum Barnea wrote in Israel's Yediot Ahronot daily.

The Cabinet session was overshadowed by rising Israeli casualties. Twenty-four soldiers were killed Saturday and at least 73 wounded.

Hezbollah appeared to be fighting as fiercely as ever. The guerrillas shot down an Israeli helicopter, a first in the war, and killed five crewmembers. Other troops were killed by Hezbollah anti-tank missiles. The army said it killed more than 50 Hezbollah fighters. The guerrillas reported three deaths but gave no date.

The violence has claimed more than 900 lives: at least 763 in Lebanon — mostly civilians— and 147 Israelis, including 109 soldiers. On Saturday, 19 Lebanese civilians were killed in Israeli air raids.

President Bush had an 8-minute phone call Saturday with Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora to discuss the truce. The White House said it is determined to vanquish the hold of Hezbollah — and that of its Syrian and Iranian benefactors — on the south.

"These steps are designed to stop Hezbollah from acting as a state within a state, and put an end to Iran and Syria's efforts to hold the Lebanese people hostage to their own extremist agenda," Bush said.

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Hezbollah monitors Israeli and international television news footage of scenes from rocket landings inside Israel and has used the broadcasts the past few weeks to more accurately target installations in the Jewish state, a senior terror leader told WorldNetDaily.

Israeli television and international news outlets such as Fox News, BBC, CNN and SkyNews have been regularly broadcasting, many times live, from the aftermath of Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel.

"Of course the constant stream of television news is helpful for Hezbollah to know whether they hit targets and the location of strategic facilities. A whole department of Hezbollah [in part] monitors this footage," said Abu Oudai, who is a chief of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades terror group's rocket infrastructure in the West Bank.

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Hezbollah - or Party of God - emerged in Lebanon in the early 1980s and became the region's leading radical Islamic movement, determined to drive Israeli troops from Lebanon.

In May 2000 - due partly to the success of the party's military arm - one of its main aims was achieved. Israel's battered and bruised army was forced to end its two-decade occupation of the south.

Hezbollah now serves as an inspiration to Palestinian factions fighting to liberate occupied territory.


Hezbollah has embraced the Palestinian cause
The party, in turn, has embraced the Palestinian cause and has said publicly that it is ready to open a second front against Israel in support of the intifada.

Hezbollah was conceived in 1982 by a group of clerics after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was formed primarily to offer resistance to the Israeli occupation.

Inspired by the success of the Iranian Revolution, the party also dreamt of transforming Lebanon's multi-confessional state into an Iranian-style Islamic state. Although this idea was abandoned and the party today is a well-structured political organisation with members of parliament.

Terror

Hezbollah's political rhetoric has centred on calls for the destruction of the state of Israel. Its definition of Israeli occupation has also encompassed the idea that the whole of Palestine is occupied Muslim land and it has argued that Israel has no right to exist.


Hezbollah's spiritual head Sheikh Fadlallah is close to Iran

The party was long supported by Iran, which provided it with arms and money.

In its early days, Hezbollah was close to a contingent of some 2000 Iranian Revolutionary guards, based in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, which had been sent to Lebanon in 1982 to aid the resistance against Israel.

As Hezbollah escalated its guerrilla attacks on Israeli targets in southern Lebanon, its military aid from Iran increased.

The movement also adopted the tactic of taking Western hostages, through a number of freelance hostage taking cells: The Revolutionary Justice Organisation and the Organisation of the Oppressed Earth, which seized Terry Waite.

For many years, Hezbollah was synonymous with terror, suicide bombings and kidnappings. In 1983, militants who went on to join Hezbollah ranks carried out a suicide bombing attack that killed 241 US marines in Beirut.

Passionate and demanding

The party has operated with neighbouring Syria's blessing - with the guerrilla war against being a card for Damascus to play in its own confrontation with Israel over the occupation of the Golan Heights.

Over the two decades, Hezbollah evolved into a movement with thousands of trained guerrillas, members of parliament and a dynamic welfare programme benefiting thousands of Lebanese.


Hezbollah proved to be a formidable fighting force
It was passionate, demanding of its members and devoted to furthering an Islamic way of life.

In the early days, its leaders imposed strict codes of Islamic behaviour on towns and villages in the south - a move that was not universally popular with the region's citizens.

But, despite the early history of coercion, the party emphasises that its Islamic vision should not be interpreted as an intention to impose an Islamic society on the Lebanese.

Political moves

In recent years, Hezbollah has won considerable backing within Lebanon. Its social services programme was popular with the Shia community.

The group's successful hit-and-run guerrilla war on Israel's much-vaunted army assured it some support and a lot or respect from other religious communities.

While, the US listed the group as a terrorist organisation, the government in Beirut declared it a national resistance movement.

Its popularity with the Shia community - which makes up almost 40% of Lebanon's three million people - was confirmed in the 1992 parliamentary elections when Hezbollah led a successful campaign and won eight seats in parliament.

But it is not popular with all of Lebanon's different communities - the Christians, for example, have accuse it of trying to destabilise the country.

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In the wake of the stunning American victory over Al-Qa'ida forces in Afghanistan, the Bush administration has increasingly focused its attention on the Lebanese Shi'ite Islamist group Hezbollah. The movement's continuing, if sporadic, attacks across the UN-demarcated "Blue Line" against Israeli forces stationed in the Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights and its provision of weapons and training to Palestinian extremist groups are increasingly seen in Washington as a direct threat to US interests in the region.

Although the Bush administration has put unprecedented diplomatic and economic pressure on the Lebanese government to counteract Hezbollah [see Has American Pressure Sidelined Hezbollah?, December 2001], US officials have long recognized that Lebanon is powerless to act without approval from Syria, which maintains an estimated 20,000-25,000 troops in the country and tightly controls its foreign policy and security decisions.

However, successive American administrations have been reluctant to openly push for an end to Syrian protection of Hezbollah. In fact, the United States has been unwilling even to publicly request that the Syrians end this protection. While this stems in part from the long-standing American policy of avoiding public statements which mention or suggest that Syria controls Lebanese policy decisions, it may also reflect a tendency to underestimate the degree of control that Damascus has established over Hezbollah, which is usually regarded as an Iranian proxy.

While Iran undoubtedly remains the group's supreme ideological mentor and an important source of funding, it is evident that Syria has increasingly established control over virtually every aspect of Hezbollah activities in Lebanon, ranging from its choice of political allies in the electoral process to the timing of its periodic attacks against Israeli forces.

The Origins of Hezbollah

The origins of Hezbollah date back to June 1982, when Syria decided to permit the Shi'ite Islamist revolutionary government in Iran to dispatch around 1,000 Pasdaran (members of the Revolutionary Guards) to the Beqaa Valley of eastern Lebanon, an area occupied by Syrian forces. Syria had previously refused to permit the clerical regime in Tehran to directly involve itself in Lebanese affairs, but the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier that month and the cordial reception accorded to the Israelis by Shi'ites in the South convinced Syrian leaders that Iranian involvement could serve to block Israeli influence in the country. An added factor was Iran's supply of oil to the Syrians at greatly reduced prices.

The Iranian delegation, consisting of both military and religious instructors, recruited a number of young, militant Lebanese clerics affiliated with the Lebanese branch of Al-Da'wa, a radical Iraqi Shi'ite fundamentalist group, and Islamic Amal, a breakaway faction of the Amal movement, which had become more secularized under the leadership of Nabih Berri. Most of the radical clerics who formed the nucleus of Hezbollah's leadership had been educated in the Shi'ite seminaries of southern Iraq, particularly Najaf, where Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and other ideologues in Iran spent many years in exile. As a result of these ties, they embraced Khomeini's concept of the just jurisconsult (al-wali al-faqih), the ideological basis for clerical rule, enshrined in Iran's 1979 constitution. In a 1985 manifesto, the leadership of Hezbollah pledged loyalty to Khomeini and to the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon.1

Iranian funds and training led to the rapid growth of Hezbollah's military wing, which devoted itself primarily to the expulsion of the American and European multi-national force (MNF) in Beirut and the defeat of occupying Israeli forces - objectives which corresponded with both Iranian and Syrian interests. After a series of deadly Hezbollah operations against MNF forces, most notably the October 1983 twin suicide bombings which killed around 300 American and French servicemen, MNF forces withdrew in 1984. Israel, facing pressure from Hezbollah and other groups in Lebanon, withdrew from central Lebanon in 1985.

The End of the Honeymoon

Relations between Damascus and Hezbollah began to deteriorate after the MNF and Israeli withdrawals, which greatly strengthened Syria's position in Lebanon. Lebanese President Amine Gemayel abandoned the May 1983 non-belligerancy agreement with Israel, stopped pressing for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and committed himself to negotiating with Damascus and its militia allies. Since Syria was now capable of dealing with challenges to its authority either directly or through its leftist militia proxies, the presence of a revolutionary religious movement on Lebanese soil, pledging allegiance to another government and advocating the overthrow of the entire Lebanese political system, was increasingly seen as a potential threat.

While Syria was more than happy to see Hezbollah attack Israeli forces in south Lebanon, the group's campaign of kidnappings against Westerners in Lebanon served the aims of Iran, which used the hostages to negotiate concessions from their respective governments, not Syria, which now wished to demonstrate to the West that it could tame the Lebanese jungle. Although Hezbollah's abduction of foreigners was advantageous to Damascus insofar as it fueled the Western need for its services in Lebanon, the Syrians no longer wished to give the group carte blanche to act independently. Shi'ite fundamentalists were beginning to attack non-Western leftist institutions, such as the offices of the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and even went so far as to briefly kidnap four Soviet diplomats.

Moreover, by the mid-1980s, Hezbollah's military and socio-economic presence had begun to expand from the Beqaa to areas of south Lebanon and the Shi'ite southern suburbs of Beirut - directly threatening the rival Shi'ite Amal militia, Syria's closest and strongest proxy. Hezbollah's Iranian financing allowed it to pay its fighters much more than the going "militia wages" and offer much-needed social services to the local population. Amal, on the other hand, had no significant source of external financing and therefore had to raise taxes from the population in areas it controlled. As rank and file Shi'ites gravitated toward what Amal leaders dubbed the "Petro party," a growing number of the group's military commanders did the same.

A third factor fueling tensions with Hezbollah following the MNF and Israeli withdrawals was Syria's drive to defeat its principle remaining enemy in Lebanon - the PLO - during the mid-1980s. In May 1985, Syria's closest and strongest militia proxy, Amal, attacked the Shatilla refugee camp in Beirut, sparking the so-called "war of the camps" that lasted from 1985-1987 and claimed an estimated 2,500 lives. Although Amal had its own reasons for the attack (the camp stood in the way of its domination of West Beirut), the assault was widely seen as a move by Damascus "intended to prevent the re-emergence of the Palestinians as an independent force in Lebanon."2 Hezbollah, which advocated the liquidation of Israel and the "liberation" of Jerusalem, condemned Amal's assault on the Palestinians as an "international conspiracy." The group not only provided humanitarian support to the camps, but even intervened on the Palestinian side at times. Syria's move to liquidate Sunni Islamist groups in Tripoli also exacerbated tensions with Hezbollah, as both Iran and Hezbollah had developed ties with them.

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Political Constraints

The Syrians also established clear constraints on Hezbollah's political influence. The group's representation in parliament is explicitly set by Damascus, roughly on par with Amal, but hardly commensurate with its support among Lebanese Shi'ites. This discrepancy has been a source of considerable tension between Syria and Hezbollah.

Prior to the 1992 parliamentary "elections" in Lebanon, Hezbollah joined a Syrian-brokered electoral coalition with Amal in which it was allotted eight Shi'ite seats (four in the district of Baalbeck-Hermel, two in south Lebanon, one in Beirut and one in Baabda) and four seats held by non-Shi'ites selected by the Hezbollah leadership. In the aftermath of Israel's Grapes of Wrath campaign in April 1996, however, public support for Hezbollah was at an all-time high. During the run-up to parliamentary elections that fall, the group conducted surveys in the South and concluded that it could significantly expand its parliamentary representation without forming an electoral coalition with Berri's Amal movement.

Hezbollah officials informed the Syrians that they would not coordinate with Amal unless they were awarded six seats in Baalbeck-Hermel and six seats of the thirteen Shi'ite seats in the South, allowed to maintain their two seats in Beirut and Baabda, and have a say in the choice of Christian legislators in the South. Syrian officials, reportedly under pressure from the United States to reduce the number of Islamist deputies in the Lebanese parliament,7 refused and offered Hezbollah only six seats. When Hezbollah officials angrily rejected the offer and began openly denouncing Amal, the Syrians hastily arranged electoral coalitions against the group. Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, whose supporters opposed Hezbollah candidates in Beirut, called the elections a "battle between moderation and extremism." For good measure, Damascus informed Hezbollah that it was not permitted to form coalitions with traditional Shi'ite politicians opposed to the Syrian occupation, such as former Parliament Speaker Kamel al-Asaad, the Communist Party, or with Southern MP Habib Sadek, who was attempting to forge a coalition against Berri.

Hamstrung by these restrictions and unwilling to cross Syrian red lines, Hezbollah suffered defeat in the first two rounds of the elections, losing its seats in Baabda and Beirut, where afterwards Hezbollah's candidate held a press conference displaying fake ballots and other evidence of electoral fraud allegedly designed to ensure his defeat. At the last minute, Hezbollah conceded to Syria and joined an electoral alliance with Amal prior to the round of elections in south Lebanon, emerging from the 1996 elections with a net loss of only two seats.

Significantly, the 1998 municipal elections in the Shi'ite suburbs of Beirut witnessed unmediated electoral competition between the two rivals and resulted in a landslide Hezbollah victory. Afterwards, the Beirut weekly Monday Morning crowned Hezbollah "the spokesman of the majority of Lebanon's Shi'ite community."8 Nevertheless, Hezbollah conceded to a Syrian-brokered alliance with Amal in the 2000 parliamentary elections and was rewarded by gaining two additional seats in the legislature.

That many rank and file members of Hezbollah resent the political parity with Amal is evident from the frequency of clashes between partisans of the two groups (most recently, a fight erupted on February 1 between Amal and Hezbollah members who had arrived to use a soccer field at the same time - four of the participants and five Lebanese soldiers who intervened were injured in the confrontation).

It is not difficult to fathom why Damascus imposed such strict limits on Hezbollah's political representation. Syrian control over Lebanon is rooted in the pervasive corruption that infects Lebanese politics at all levels, and Hezbollah has been the most vocal critic of this corruption. Moreover, the readily observable asceticism of its leaders and efficiency of its social-welfare network contrast sharply with the pervasive corruption and ineptitude that has infected the Second Republic. Even Hezbollah's soccer team, Al-Ahd, has managed to maintain an impeccable image in a country where the sport is not associated with good sportsmanship. Astonishingly, during the 1997 season, the team did not receive a single red or yellow penalty card.

Hezbollah's stance on corruption is particularly resonant among Lebanese Shi'ites because the Amal movement arose in the 1970s primarily to challenge the corrupt patronage networks of the traditional feudal lords (zu'ama) who reigned supreme within the community. After the death of the movement's founder, Musa al-Sadr, however, Amal soon adopted the same practices as the zu'ama it sought to supplant. In the post-Ta'if era, Berri has rivaled Rafiq Hariri as the most skilled and corrupt of Lebanon's neo-zu'ama, and the Council of the South, a government institution controlled by Berri, is perhaps more ridden with patronage than any agency that existed in the First Republic. As a result, many among the Shi'ite professional middle class - once the core base of Amal's support - have deserted the group and now support Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose austerity and dedication to the fight against Israel (his own son was sent into battle and died) contrast sharply with Berri's corruption and cowardice (during the civil war he fled Lebanon and spent the better part of a year in Damascus because he feared for his life).

Interestingly, Hezbollah's domestic political agenda has led many of the movement's activists to coordinate at the grassroots level with members of the anti-Syrian Free National Current (FNC) in opposing corruption and political patronage. For instance, when the Lebanese doctors' association held elections in March 2001 for a new chairman, Hezbollah and the FNC joined together in backing the losing candidate, Dr. Saad Bizri, over Dr. Mahmoud Shuqair, who enjoyed the firm backing of such political heavyweights as Hariri and Berri.

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As with other Syrian-backed groups in Lebanon, Damascus has sought to maintain control over the mainstream Hezbollah leadership by protecting and supporting a dissident faction headed by former secretary-general Sobhi Tufaili, known as the "movement of the hungry." Interestingly, Tufaili left the movement in 1992 in protest over its participation in the parliamentary elections and adamantly opposed Nasrallah's "moderation" toward the Lebanese state, which he believed had continued to mistreat the Shi'ite population. His fortunes plummeted in January 1998, when an attempt by his militia to occupy a Hezbollah religious school touched off a violent confrontation with the Lebanese army. The Lebanese authorities issued a warrant for Tufaili's arrest, while Lebanese army units conducted a massive sweep of the Beqaa. To the surprise and chagrin of most Lebanese, however, the head of Syrian military intelligence in Baalbeck, Col. Ali Safi, stepped in and forced advancing Lebanese army units to permit Tufaili and around 100 of his fighters to escape to his hometown of Britel,9 where he has remained under Syrian protection to this day.

Tufaili's militia, swelled by the influx of disaffected Hezbollah militiamen, established control of a number of strategic positions in the Bekaa. In April 1999, Tufaili's forces overran a Hezbollah arms depot in the village of Nabichit, near Baalbeck, seizing large numbers of machine-guns, rocket-launchers and other military equipment. Tufaili now openly hosts gatherings at his residence in Douris near Baalbeck without fear of arrest. Early reports that Tufaili's supporters would run against Hezbollah in the 2000 elections were apparently intended to pressure Hezbollah into an electoral coalition with Amal.10

The Syrianization of Hezbollah?

After the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon in May 2000, many observers expected Hezbollah to end its war against Israel and focus its energies on much-needed economic reconstruction in the South. However, after an initial lull of nearly five months, the group launched a new war, this time against Israeli soldiers stationed in the Shebaa Farms area of the Golan Heights, an area that Syrian and Lebanese officials claim is Lebanese. Meanwhile, Syria prevented the Lebanese government from sending troops to south Lebanon (although the Lebanese army maintains two token garrisons in the towns of Marjayoun and Bint Jabeil, it has made no attempt to approach the border).

While Hezbollah attacks against Israeli forces (and vice versa) have been far less frequent than during the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, the resumption of hostilities has perpetuated the economic deprivation of both the South and the country as a whole by scaring away investors. As a result, Hezbollah's new war has not been popular in Lebanon, even within the Shi'ite community.

While Hezbollah may have been motivated to renew hostilities by the Palestinian revolt against Israel, the decision was clearly related to the growth of Lebanese opposition to the Syrian occupation throughout the Fall of 2000, beginning with the release of a September 20 statement by the Council of Maronite Archbishops calling upon Syria to "completely withdraw" its military forces from Lebanon.

After Syria's initial attempts to contain the spread of calls for a withdrawal failed, in early October Hezbollah guerrillas infiltrated the Shebaa Farms area and abducted three Israeli soldiers. In addition to momentarily distracting public attention away from Syria, the operation was widely regarded as having bolstered Syria's clout internationally. Shortly afterwards, the Lebanese daily Al-Diyar wrote that Hezbollah had succeeded in returning Syria to the "world equation" after it had become marginilazed following the Israeli withdrawal, noting that Damascus had become a "pilgrimage" for international envoys seeking their release.11

Subsequent Hezbollah operations over the next six months closely followed major outbursts of Lebanese opposition to the Syrian occupation:


November 16, 2000: A roadside bomb attack on November 16 occurred five days after supporters of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt gathered in the thousands to protest Syrian threats against him. Even the relatively docile English-language Daily Star suggested in an editorial that the operation "could have been triggered mainly by a desire to shift attention from the issue of Syria's presence [in Lebanon]."12


November 26, 2000: A Hezbollah attack killed an Israeli soldier, four days after the FNC staged massive anti-Syrian demonstrations to commemorate Lebanon's Independence Day.


December 2000 - January 2001: The absence of Hezbollah attacks against Israeli forces corresponds with a lull in protests against the Syrian occupation (due in part to rumors that a partial withdrawal would soon take place).


February 16, 2001: Hezbollah resumes operations against the IDF, killing an Israeli soldier, just four days after a Lebanese television station conducted a live interview with Aoun and broadcast the results of a viewer poll showing that over 90% of Lebanese agreed with him.


April 14, 2001: Hezbollah launches its first major attack in two months, just days after the Lebanese nationalist movement was forced to call off demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the Lebanese civil war amid a campaign of violent intimidation by pro-Syrian groups [see Syria's Campaign to Silence Lebanese Muslims, April 2001].

By early 2001, the attacks had begun to severely alienate Prime Minister Hariri. Just one day before the February 16 attack, he had confidently informed a group of investors in France that there was "a clear agreement with our Syrian brothers" to end Hezbollah provocations in the security zone.13 However, after arriving in Damascus to complain that Hezbollah's war was obstructing his efforts to secure international aid and investment, Hariri was reportedly told by Assad that Hezbollah would be permitted to continue the attacks until Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon fell from power.

After the next attack, on April 14, Hariri's newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal, openly questioned whether Lebanon can "bear the consequences of such an operation and its political, economic and social impacts."14 Syrian President Bashar Assad was so outraged by the editorial that he canceled a scheduled meeting with the Lebanese premier in Damascus and refused to receive him for over a month (while openly welcoming his rival, former Prime Minister Omar Karami, to the Syrian capital).

Syria's role in determining the timing of Hezbollah attacks and strong-arming Lebanese politicians into accepting the new war had become so blatant that, following the April 14 operation, Israel abandoned its moratorium on retaliation against Syrian forces in Lebanon. On April 16, the Israeli air force bombed a Syrian radar station in the Dahr al-Baidar region [See Sharon Ends Moratorium on Striking Syrian Forces in Lebanon, April 2001]. On July 1, Israel launched a second air strike against a Syrian radar position in Lebanon, wounding two Syrian soldiers, two days after a Hezbollah missile attack injured an Israeli soldier.

Hezbollah's willingness to relegate virtually complete authority over its military operations to Damascus over the last year has coincided with an unprecedented degree of political backing for the Syrian occupation. Until recently, Hezbollah officials had not distinguished themselves as enthusiastic spokesmen for the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

This changed in March 2001, after Maronite Christian Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir returned from a trip abroad to rally diplomatic support for a Syrian pullout and received a tumultuous reception from tens of thousands of supporters. Anxious to organize a counter-demonstration in favor of the Syrian presence, the Syrians persuaded Nasrallah to speak out during an April 4 rally before 300,000 followers. The presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon is "a regional and internal necessity for Lebanon" and a "national obligation for Syria," declared Nasrallah. "Should the Syrian leadership take its army out of Lebanon, we as Lebanese will stand up and tell them they are wrong and are doing something which is not in Lebanon's interest."

Over the last year, Hezbollah's unqualified support for the Syrian occupation - at a time when opposition to Damascus has been growing among all sectarian communities in Lebanon - has elicited an unprecedented degree of support for the movement from President Assad, who is said to fawn over Nasrallah during his visits to the Syrian capital like a starstruck teenager. To the astonishment of many observers, Assad has even permitted Hezbollah to stage a paramilitary parade in his home province of Latakia.

Conclusion

Bashar's love affair with Hezbollah is attributed by some observers to naivete. "A Syria that can be manipulated by Hezbollah, which acts, in turn, under Iranian guidance, could well miss the crucial moment when Iran and Hezbollah attempt to spark a huge conflagration . . . on Israel's northern border," says Israeli commentator Ehud Ya'ari. "A weak and naive Syria acts as an accelerator for Hezbollah, not a brake."

Such interpretations are founded on the conventional wisdom that Hezbollah remains first and foremost an Iranian proxy. However, Iranian funding for Hezbollah was long ago surpassed both by contributions from expatriate Lebanese Shi'ites and by revenue from the movement's array of commercial businesses in Lebanon. Since Syria and its Lebanese satellite are capable of impeding these money transfers, Hezbollah's financial situation is ultimately more dependent on its relations with Damascus than with Tehran.

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Hezbollah does, in fact, appear to be gearing up for a major conflagration with Israel. According to Israeli intelligence reports, Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah have accelerated, and the group now has an estimated 7,000 Katyusha rockets capable of hitting Israeli territory throughout the Galilee and up to the outs***ts of Haifa. Hezbollah is also nearing completion of an extensive defense line deep in the heart of south Lebanon, designed to obstruct the advance of invading Israeli tanks.

It is likely, though, that if Hezbollah is planning a dramatic escalation of hostilities with Israel, it will come at a time of Syria's choosing.

[Sepideh_UK]

Well Well Well!!!
Felan ke atash bas shode bebinim badesh chi mishio ki zudtar attack mikone.

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President Bush, just hours after a cease-fire took hold Monday, said Hezbollah guerillas had suffered a sound defeat at the hands of Israel in their monthlong Mideast war.
There's going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon," Bush said, referring to plans for the Lebanese government, backed by an international force, to reassert control in the area that has been dominated by Hezbollah fighters.

The president also said the war was part of a broader struggle between freedom and terror, and he blamed Iran and Syria for fomenting the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

"We can only imagine how much more dangerous this conflict would be if Iran had the nuclear weapon it seeks," the president said.

Bush said Iran and Syria were the primary sponsors of Hezbollah guerrillas who captured two Israeli soldiers, igniting the battle with Israel. More than 900 people were killed in the fighting, and there was massive destruction in southern Lebanon.

Bush said the "responsibility for this suffering lies with Hezbollah."

The president spoke at the State Department after conferring with his national security team, first at the Pentagon and then at State. He was flanked by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Bush said the U.N. cease-fire resolution was "an important step forward that will help bring an end to the violence."

"We certainly hope the cease-fire holds," he said. "Lebanon can't be a strong democracy when there is a state within a state and that's Hezbollah."

"Hezbollah attacked Israel, Hezbollah started the crisis, and Hezbollah suffered a defeat in this crisis," the president said. "The reason why is, this is because there's going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon, and that's going to be a Lebanese force with a robust international force to help them seize control of the country."

"It will take time for people to see the truth, that Hezbollah hides behind innocent civilians," Bush said.

In the Mideast, there were competing claims about who came out on top in the war.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the war had shifted the strategic balance in the region and eliminated the "state within a state" run by Hezbollah, restoring Lebanon's sovereignty in the south.

But Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah said his guerrillas achieved a "strategic, historic victory" against Israel.

Bush, taking questions from reporters on a variety of topics, said the United States still believes that al-Qaeda was behind last week's disrupted plot to blow up U.S.-bound airliners from Britain.

"It sure looks like it. ... It looks like the kind of thing al-Qaeda would do," he said. But he said the United States has not made a definite conclusion about the sponsorship of the plan.

Asked if there might be any U.S.-based participants, Bush said, "Any time we get a hint that there might be a terror cell in the United States, we move on it."

While Bush praised the Mideast cease-fire, he said Israel would have the right to defend itself if it were attacked by Hezbollah.

"We don't advise Israel on its military options," the president said. "As far as I'm concerned, if somebody shoots at an Israeli soldier ... Israel has a right to defend herself. They have the right to suppress that kind of fire."

Bush rejected criticism that the United States was slow to support a cease-fire and allowed the violence to continue.

"You know it's going to be a painful process," the president said. "Diplomacy can be a painful process."

He said that if a resolution had been reached quickly without addressing the root causes, then "everybody would have felt better for a quick period of time. Then the violence would have erupted again."