Eye On U.S.A

[Rasputin]

US Vice-President Dick Cheney has held talks with President Pervez Musharraf on a surprise visit to Pakistan.
Mr Cheney urged Pakistan to do more to combat the Taleban near the Afghan border, but also praised its role in the "war on terror", officials said.

Pakistan is a key US ally in the region but Washington has been alarmed by the Taleban's growing strength in its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Mr Cheney spent only a few hours in Islamabad before flying on to Kabul.

His trip follows a report in the New York Times saying that US President George W Bush wants to send a tough message to Pakistan that Washington could cut its aid to the country unless President Musharraf goes after militants more aggressively.

It also coincides with one to Islamabad by UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett.

Taleban threat

The BBC's Barbara Plett in Islamabad says the US and Britain share concerns about an expected increase in Taleban fighting and the support the insurgents get from Pakistani tribes along the border with Afghanistan.


Pakistan has thousands of troops near the border

She says the Americans have made quite pointed statements in recent months about the need for Pakistan to eliminate Taleban safe havens.

There was no publicity around Dick Cheney's visit to the region.

He went straight into talks with President Musharraf on his arrival in Islamabad and made no public comment after his meeting.

Pakistani officials, however, said Mr Cheney had conveyed US "apprehensions" about al-Qaeda regrouping in the tribal areas near Afghanistan.

And he communicated "serious US concerns" about reports that a surge in Taleban attacks against Nato forces in Afghanistan was imminent, the officials said.

But he also praised Pakistan for its "pivotal role" in fighting the militants.

Mrs Beckett also met President Musharraf during her talks in Islamabad.

She briefed him about an expected announcement that more UK troops are being sent to Afghanistan.

She said Britain recognised the steps Pakistan had taken to prevent Taleban infiltration across the border, but that no-one wanted to see terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Pakistani officials said border security was a joint responsibility and that Nato and Afghan forces on the other side must do more.

Tribal deals

Earlier this month, US said it would not neglect Afghanistan and allow extremists to take over the country.

There are 27,000 US troops in Afghanistan, the number highest since the invasion of 2001, to combat an expected spring offensive by the Taleban.

Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,400 mile (2,250km) border.

Many Taleban fighters operate from bases on the Pakistani side of the border and Nato and the Afghan government say Islamabad must do more to curb violence.

Correspondents say that Western officials acknowledge President Musharraf's difficulties, but they are afraid that the Taleban are using Pakistan to prepare for a spring offensive.

President Musharraf's government has also come under fire for pacts with tribal militants in the North and South Waziristan border areas. Critics say the deals give Taleban fighters based there freedom to go where they please.

[Rasputin]

World shares have dropped for a third day on concerns about economic growth and the outlook for corporate profits.
A large slide in Europe and Asia was compounded by a drop on US indexes. The Dow Jones and S&P 500 indexes fell 0.3%, while the Nasdaq lost 0.5%.

London's FTSE 100 index closed 0.9% lower. It has shed 5% in three days, wiping more than £80bn of its value.

The global sell-off was triggered by fears of a new tax in China on Tuesday, and has now spread to wider issues.

Shares fell 9% in Shanghai on Tuesday, their biggest daily reverse in 10 years, and dropped a further 87.99 points on Thursday, closing 2.9% lower.

On Thursday, Germany's Dax and France's Cac both fell 1.1%. Earlier in the day, Japan's Nikkei 225 index had closed 0.9% lower, while Hong Kong's Hang Seng slipped 1.6%.

Spreading out

Since Tuesday and China's tax worries, investors have become more concerned about the state of the US economy and strength of the mortgage market.

On Wednesday, figures from the US Commerce Department showed that the US economy grew at a slower-than-expected pace of 2.2% in the last three months of 2006.

Investors are still wondering if the storm is actually over or not

Masatoshi Sato, Mizuho Investors Securities


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Q&A: World stocks slump

Other figures showed that spending on new home building fell 19.1% during the quarter, the sharpest drop since early 1991, adding to worries over the state of the housing market in the world's largest economy.

"The biggest risk in the next few weeks is likely to come from the US data front and developments in the mortgage and housing markets," said analysts at JP Morgan Chase.

Losses in the US were trimmed slightly thanks to good manufacturing data that helped allay some of investors' fears but it was not enough to turn the market around.

"Right now, everything and anything is viewed in a negative light," said stock analyst Dick Green. "It will take a while for the fears to calm down."

Heady heights

At the same time, investors are questioning whether stock prices have climbed too high, too quickly.



A number of the world's main indexes have broken records recently, and analysts said that corporate earnings may not be good enough to underpin the gains.

It is not unusual for stock markets to have a significant correction, and then go on to even higher levels.

Last May, the UK's FTSE lost more than 9% in three weeks, before recovering and surging to its highest level in more than six years in February, 2007.

"Investors are still wondering if the storm is actually over or not," said Masatoshi Sato, a senior strategist at Mizuho Investors Securities.

"Aftershocks in some markets, where prices are overvalued, may be seen from now on. Volatile and sensitive trading is likely to continue at least until mid-March," he added.

[Rasputin]

VIENNA, Austria - New doubts are arising about the accuracy of U.S. intelligence on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, only a few years after faulty warnings about weapons of mass destruction helped President Bush justify the invasion of Iraq.

North Korea agreed earlier this month to dismantle its plutonium-producing nuclear facilities in exchange for economic aid and security assurances from the United States and four other world or regional powers. The pact successfully put aside for now the possibility of military action.

But the Western standoff with Iran remains tense. The Bush administration says it won't rule out an attack if Tehran refuses to end its nuclear enrichment program.

However, in both cases, U.S. intelligence is backing away from at least some of its once-strident pronouncements raising the tension level with Pyongyang and Tehran — along with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, members of Bush's "axis of evil."

Just weeks after the Feb. 13 six-nation pact with North Korea, new U.S. statements suggest that Washington might have overstated a purported secret North Korean second-track nuclear program. The result was that it derailed what could have been a peaceful resolution to the North Korean issue more than four years ago.

The U.S. alleged then that North Korea had a large-scale gas centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment — the same program Iran now is developing. The Bush administration used that information to scrap a plan developed under the Clinton administration to supply energy to the North in exchange for its pledge to mothball its plutonium program.

Tensions rose and Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003, sparking the process that led to its test of an atomic weapon late last year.

Now, however, Bush administration officials are toning down assertions that such a program had been developed. Intelligence official Joseph DeTrani, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday belief that such a program exists was now "at the mid-confidence level."

The "mid-confidence" terminology means that analysts have differing views or credible information exists but has not been fully corroborated. That's a notable departure from the previous U.S. view of "high confidence" that the North was working on such activities.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said Wednesday that the U.S. knows that North Korea has bought equipment that could be used only for uranium enrichment. But he expressed uncertainty about the program's current state.

"How far they've gotten, whether they've actually been able to produce highly enriched uranium at this time — I mean these are issues that intelligence analysts grapple with," Hill told a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. "But what we know is they have made the purchases, and we need to have complete clarity on this program."

A U.S. government official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the subject's sensitivity, said DeTrani was commenting on acquisitions for the program and not the program itself, and there was no change in the intelligence assessment. Varying degrees of certainty were always reflected in the CIA's judgment, the official said.

The U.S. intelligence community found with "high confidence" in 2002 that North Korea obtained components that could be used to enrich uranium. However, there has always been less confidence in the analysis of what precisely North Korea planned to do with the components, the official said.

It was a worst-case scenario when a CIA paper in 2002 stated that the plant "could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as soon as mid-decade."

The next line of the paper highlighted the uncertainty, reminding readers that North Korea's nuclear program was "a difficult intelligence collection target."

President Bush said at the time that Pyongyang was "enriching uranium, with the desire of developing a weapon."

Chief U.N nuclear inspector Mohamed ElBaradei has been invited to Pyongyang in mid-March for a visit expected to result in the return of his inspectors after a four-year hiatus.

The U.S. intelligence record on Iran's nuclear activities also is being questioned.

Several senior diplomats familiar with work of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which ElBaradei heads, told The Associated Press that while U.S. intelligence helped reveal Iran's secret nuclear program in 2002, none of the information provided the U.N. nuclear watchdog by American spy agencies since then had led to meaningful leads. Still unproven is whether Tehran is using the cover of a nuclear power plant program to try to make atomic weapons.

One of the diplomats — who, like others demanded anonymity because he was discussing confidential information — said that in the case of Iran, lack of good intelligence was due to "no presence on the ground." Intelligence is increasingly scarce because "the Iranians have tightened up on their operations" since the 2002 revelations about their secret uranium enrichment program, he added.

Broad assessments often hinge on detailed information about equipment, which can be difficult to prove.

For North Korea, a key U.S. assertion that Pyongyang was trying to create an industrial-scale uranium enrichment program parallel to its plutonium operations was based on evidence that the North Koreans had purchased or were trying to buy thousands of highly machined aluminum tubes, he said. The CIA cited Iraqi purchases of such tubes to support its assertion about a purported nuclear weapons program under Saddam.

A CIA fact sheet made public four years ago claimed "clear evidence indicating that the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility," and estimated it could produce material for at least two or more nuclear weapons a year by 2005.

Former U.N. nuclear inspector David Albright, who recently visited Pyongyang and held talks on the North's nuclear program, does not question U.S. assertions that the North bought a few dozen centrifuges from the same Pakistani black market network that supplied Iran's program.

"However, a large centrifuge plant likely does not exist; perhaps it never did," says Albright in a report of his Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security that tracks the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs.

The diplomat agreed, noting it made no sense for the energy-starved North — which is to get the equivalent of up to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil under the nuclear disarmament deal — to run such a program consuming record amounts of power at a time it was making good progress on its plutonium-based arms program.

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[Rasputin]

The United States and Iran are closer to war than they have ever been at any time in their tumultuous history. Due to a lethal combination of US policy failures in the Middle East and entrenched political and economic interests at home, the Bush Administration is reportedly preparing to carry out a massive bombing campaign against Iran to set back its nuclear program and degrade its military capabilities.

In a January 10 speech to the nation, Bush defied the elite bi-partisan Iraq Study Group and the American public by putting in place a policy to escalate the war and provoke Iran into a military conflict. The Bush Administration’s military build-up in the region, its refusal to take the military option off the table, and its strong resistance to diplomacy indicate that a conflict is highly likely.

Constitutionally, the President is responsible for foreign policy. As the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the primary authority to wage war, but he shares this power with the legislative branch, which controls the nation’s purse. Right now, little stands in the way of an attack once the current infighting inside the Administration is resolved. That can happen at any time from now until January 2009 when the President leaves office.

The only sure way to prevent a pre-emptive attack on Iran is if Congress passes a legally binding resolution that restricts the President’s ability to use funds for military force against Iran.

Reacting to Bush’s new provocation-escalation policy, members of Congress have introduced several resolutions in the House and Senate that aim to do just that – a reaction to Bush’s provocation-escalation strategy. But only two of these resolutions - H.J. 14, H.R. 770 – are binding, meaning that they invoke the budgetary power of Congress and can actually prohibit the President from using funds to carry out an attack. The rest are non-binding resolutions that express the opinion of Congress, and while important, do not legally bind the President. These include H.Con.Res 33, H.Con.Res. 45, H.Con.Res. 63, S. Con. Res. 13, and S.Res. 39.

There are reports that the American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) – Washington’s virulently anti-Iran lobby – is mobilizing against these resolutions. In the last two weeks, co-sponsorship has lost momentum. Further, the presidential candidates for 2008 - including all of the Democratic candidates - are also under intense pressure by AIPAC to keep the military option on the table. This, in essence, blocks a diplomatic solution and makes war more likely.

Make no mistake about it. Supporting diplomacy does not mean that Iranian Americans are supporting the Iranian government. But not supporting diplomacy amounts to supporting war against the Iranian nation. We are currently functioning in a binary political framework, and it is critical to maintain clarity on the policy options before us.

This is where the Iranian-American community comes in.

It is essential that Iranian Americans directly contact their members of Congress –in both the House and Senate - and ask them to support binding legislation that prohibits a US attack on Iran.

Iranian-American donors to the 2008 presidential and Congressional campaigns must leverage their contributions by supporting candidates incrementally and making them contingent on a constructive policy of diplomacy and an unequivocal opposition to military options with regard to Iran.

The Iranian-American community is at a distinct disadvantage from its adversaries in the United States. Not only does it not have an official lobby to formally push legislation, it also lacks political action committees that provide dollars on issues related to foreign policy. The Iranian American Political Action Committee (IAPAC), our community’s only PAC, has not become involved in U.S.-Iran relations – focusing instead on immigration and civil rights. But there are other effective actors on the scene. The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) has worked furiously for the past five years to educate and advocate on behalf of Iranian Americans. Currently, NIAC is at the forefront of Congressional and grassroots advocacy – working in broad coalitions – toward the goal of reaching a diplomatic solution.

Iranian-American citizens have an extremely important role to play. They must work individually and collectively to fill these institutional gaps. They must stay informed and pressure elected officials and candidates for office to oppose any military option with regard to Iran. Above all, it is their duty to educate their lawmakers on Iran and of the repercussions of a military attack. In every conversation with their representatives, they should specifically reference resolutions prohibiting an attack on Iran, and ask their members to support them. Then, they should follow up to see if they signed on. They should track lawmakers’ positions and statements on Iran, send letters, make office visits and place phone calls. There should be no doubt in members’ minds where Iranian Americans stand on this issue and there should be no doubt that our community’s support is based on their support of a constructive Iran policy.

Specifically, Iranian Americans should ask their representatives in the House to support all four House resolutions on Iran - H.J. Res. 14,HR 770, H.Con.Res. 33, and H.Con.Res. 45. They should ask their Senators to support S.Con.Res. 13 and S.Res. 39. They should further ask their Senators to join their House colleagues in supporting a binding measure to prohibit the use of funds to attack Iran. Remember that emphasis should be put on binding resolutions.

Despite ominous signs, there is still hope that military conflict can be averted. The mood on Capitol Hill is against war and in favor of diplomacy. A new momentum exists on Iran that has not existed in the past ten years. It is our best opportunity to heal the relationship for the sake of peace between the two nations. It is your voice that can make the difference.

[Rasputin]

روزنامه واشنگتن پست تغيير رويکرد دولت بوش در برخورد با مسائل بين المللی و از جمله توافق با گفتگوی مستقيم با ايران و سوريه را چرخش استراتژيک کاخ سفيد دانسته است.
روزنامه واشنگتن پست نوشت : همان رئيس جمهوری که به ايده گفتگو با ايران و سوريه تا دو هفته پيش می خنديد و آن را مسخره می کرد، حال فرستادگانی را به کنفرانس منطقه ای بغداد اعزام می کند تا با ايران و وسوريه گفتگو کنند.

" پيتر بيکر" نويسنده اين تحليل خاطر نشان می کند : برای جرج بوش رئيس جمهوری آمريکا تصميم هفته گذشته آخرين دگرگونی از چندين تغيير انجام شده در مسائلی بود که وی زمانی با آن مخالفت کرده بود.

وی می افزايد : از زمانی که دموکراتها کنترل کنگره را برعهده گرفتند و بوش "دونالد رامسفلد" وزير دفاع سابق را برکنار کرد، اجازه گفتگوهای مستقيم با ايران و سوريه را داد ، نيروهای بيشتری را به عراق اعزام و توافق کرد تا درباره طرح دولت فلسطينی در مذاکرات روند صلح خاور ميانه بحث و گفتگو کند و حتی پيشنهاد افزايش مالياتی را برای ميليونها آمريکايی مطرح کرد و اينها همه از مورادی بودند که وی پيش از اين با آنها مخالفت کرده بود.

" لی هميلتون" رئيس گروه تحقيق عراق گفت :" اين مسئله و تغيير واقعا برای من عجيب نيست. واقعيتهای موقعيت ( کنونی) برای آنها نمايان تر شده است. رئيس جمهور می داند که پيشرفتی در برخی مسائل بين المللی نداشته است."

در ادامه اين تحليل آمده است : برخی تغييرات در دولت بوش مورد استقبال دموکراتها و برخی جمهوريخواهان قرار گرفته هر چند اغلب اوقات از نظر آنها وی به قدر کافی در اين زمينه ها حرکت نکرده است.

واشنگتن پست می افزايد : طی ماههای اخير منتقدان از بوش اين سوال را مطرح کرده اند که چرا از گفتگو با ايران و سوريه خودداری کرده است. بوش ماه گذشته به اين درخواستها برای گفتگو با تهران و دمشق خنديد ، اما دو هفته بعد توافق کرد که همراه با آنها بنشيند و در چارچوب کنفرانس منطقه ای با آنها گفتگو کند.

" مايکل لدين" کارشناس انستيتو امريکن اينترپرايز با رد گفتگوی واشنگتن با تهران و دمشق گفت :" من چنين فرق زياد بين گفته های صريح رئيس جمهور و اقداماتش نديده ام. "

" اسکات ريد" که از فعالان انتخابات رياست جمهوری آمريکا در سال 1996 بود، گفت :" مسئله مهم برای بوش آن است که پيش از آنکه دوره وی پايان يابد، سابقه بد خود را بهتر کند ."

[Rasputin]

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A former key White House official, Lewis Libby, has been found guilty of obstruction of justice and perjury.
Libby, ex-chief of staff to Vice-President Dick Cheney, faces a prison term of up to 25 years. He will be sentenced in June.

He was accused of lying to the FBI and a grand jury over revelations about CIA agent Valerie Plame's identity.

Libby's lawyer said he was "very disappointed" at the verdict, and would ask for a new trial, or would appeal.

In a statement shortly after the verdict was announced, Mr Cheney expressed his deep disappointment, saying he was "saddened" for Libby's family.

Libby, who goes by the nickname "Scooter", was found guilty on four out of five counts. He was acquitted on one count of lying to the FBI.

'Honest lapses'

Critics claimed the White House had deliberately leaked Ms Plame's identity to ruin her career. Her husband, former ambassador Joseph Wilson, had publicly cast doubt on the Bush administration's case for going to war in Iraq.

LIBBY CHARGES AND VERDICT
Two counts of perjury - guilty on both
Two counts of making false statements - guilty on one
One count of obstruction of justice - guilty


White House secrets revealed
Send us your comments

It can be a crime to reveal the identity of an undercover CIA agent.

The alleged cover-up, rather than the leak itself, was the subject of the trial.

Libby told FBI investigators and a grand jury investigating the leak of Ms Plame's name, that he had learned of her identity as a CIA agent from reporters.

However, several people testified that he discussed her identity before the date he said he learned of it.


It was alleged Valerie Plame was targeted because of her husband

"He claims he forgot nine conversations with eight people over a four-week period," prosecution lawyer Peter Zeidenberg said in his closing statement.

The defence maintained that Libby's false statements were the results of honest lapses in memory by a man tasked with extraordinary responsibility.

"He was bombarded with a blizzard of information. Those briefings would make your toes curl," defence lawyer Theodore Wells said.

The defence also argued that Libby was a scapegoat for the misdeeds of other White House players, like President Bush's political strategist Karl Rove.

Bush 'saddened'

After the verdict, and standing beside his client, who remains free until sentencing, Mr Wells said: "We have every confidence that ultimately Mr Libby will be vindicated.

"We believe he is totally innocent, and did not do anything wrong."

Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald said he was "gratified" by the verdict, but that it was "sad" that "we had a high-level official... who obstructed justice and lied under oath".

US President George W Bush "said that he respected the jury's verdict. He said he was saddened for Scooter Libby and his family," said White House spokeswoman Dana Perino.

But Senate majority leader Harry Reid said: "I welcome the jury's verdict. It's about time someone in the Bush administration has been held accountable for the campaign to manipulate intelligence and discredit war critics."

A member of the jury, Denis Collins, said although jurors decided Libby was guilty they also had a "tremendous amount of sympathy" for him, and thought he might just be "the fall guy".

"Where's Rove?" he asked, referring to Mr Bush's top aide.

[Rasputin]

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Iraq: Saddam Hussein and the War
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s personality also drove the conflict. Hussein served as the symbol of Iraqi Ba'thist Pan-Arab ideology. Hussein viewed himself as successor to the great rulers of ancient and medieval Fertile Crescent or Mesopotamian empires comprising Iraq’s geographic and political center. With Mesopotamian Sunni Arab rule, nostalgia for ancient Babylonia and the Abbasid Caliph helped forge an Iraqi nation state identity which was weak ever since Iraq’s post-World War One British colonial founding. Hussein’s rhetoric included historical references to defeating non-Arab enemies, both Jews and Persians. Ba'thist popularity throughout the Arab world seeks Arab unity politically alongside state sponsored socialism without regard to religion. To Hussein the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin served as his authoritarian mentor for assuming Arab world leadership. In running the war Hussein’s pan-Arab Islamic rhetoric scripted himself in the role of past Arab or Moslem heroes who overcame external challenges whether Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd.

Unlike Khomeini's solely theological bent, Hussein's perspective was predominately militaristic. Hussein saw himself as military leader of the Arab world and acknowledged his mentors to be past warriors such as Imam Hussein, the Shiite legend, and Saladin the Great, of Kurdish origin, who captured medieval Jerusalem on Islam’s behalf. Hussein sought to restore the glory of both the Arab Abbasid and Babylonian empires headquartered in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital. Hussein filled the shoes of ancient Babylonia’s Nebuchadnezzar by seeking the end of Biblical Judea’s successor state-Israel. In the 1970s, Hussein inaugurated Iraq's first nuclear reactor with the name "Tammuz 17", the Hebrew date in which Babylonia captured Jerusalem in 589 B.C.E. Iraq's rivalry with Syria inspired Saddam Hussein to allude to the rivalry between the Damascus-based Umayyad Empire and the Iraqi Shiite sovereign Imam Hussein in southern Iraq during Islam’s early days. Hussein saw Iraq's war with Iran as parallel to the medieval Arab Moslem defeat and takeover of Persia.

Saddam Hussein used Arab nationalism of the Ba'th Party as an ideology for making Iraq a great state and leader of the Arab world. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Ba'athist dominated regimes in Iraq declared the Arab inhabited Iranian province of Khuzestan as "occupied Arabistan" and challenged Iran's 1971 Persian Gulf seizure of Arab populated islands in the Strait of Horrmuz. Saddam Hussein, as a Ba'athist leader in the 1970s, pursued Iraq's Arab agenda by crushing a Kurdish insurgency, holding unification talks with Syria, and hosting an Arab League Summit to expel Egypt from the Arab fold upon her alleged treasonous peace with Israel. Following his 1979 seizure of the Iraqi presidency, Hussein sought to achieve Arab unity by replicating the medieval Arab defeat of ancient Persia. He boasted upon attacking Iran that he planned to enter Teheran victorious in four days.

In the Iran-Iraq war Saddam Hussein behaved as a great military strategist, playing on Arab nationalism to justify his actions. With the war’s outbreak Hussein promoted Arab hegemony with Iraqi leadership by strengthening ties to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. He also hoped to cultivate Arab and Moslem unity against Israel's entry to Lebanon even declaring a cease fire in his war with Iran in 1982. Hussein's Arab solidarity appeal forced Iran's Arab allies Syria and Libya to mend ties with Iraq. Hussein’s flamboyancy in portraying himself defender of the Arab nation against Persians attracted weak Arab Sunni regimes in the Gulf, fearful of subversion from their own downtrodden Shiite subjects. Simultaneously, Hussein discouraged renewed Kurdish hostility by emphasizing the Arab nation's Islamic, predominantly Sunni character, with which most Kurds identify. Overall Hussein's motive for engaging Iran in war in 1980 was prompted by his personal desire to glorify himself as successor to the military geniuses of past Arab and Fertile Crescent civilizations.

Domestic Affairs Determined the War
Turning from personalities to domestic affairs and the war, it would be useful to identify the level of stability and instability inside both countries. Iran, plagued by revolutionary instability and the Shah’s departure in 1979 left a vacuum for competing political groups. But stability, however minor, also existed. Iraq appeared more stable compared to Iran yet Iraqi political instability was also present shortly before the war. Since both countries exhibited characteristics of both stability and instability it would be worthwhile to determine which description of each state's internal affairs influenced the war's outbreak.

Iran's instability, a prelude to revolution, concerned the world. President Carter's 1978 Tehran New Year's party toast to the Shah declaring Iran to be, “an island of stability in an unstable region,” was quickly disproved by the year’s events. An Abadan movie house fire allegedly set by the Shah’s secret police, the Savak, resulted in hundreds of casualties.

In the calamity’s aftermath revolution erupted through popular protests forcing the Shah's departure. The Shiite clergy mobilized the unemployed rural born migrants of the cities, dislocated by rapid industrialization, against the Pahlavi regime. Opposition groups of all political stripes rallied behind the Ayatollah Khomeini who returned from France where he resided since his Iraqi expulsion and declared an Islamic Republic.

Between 1978-1980 Iran was plagued by instability economically, politically, militarily and socially. Economically, Iran suffered from an oil strike against the Pahlavi regime in 1978. Shipyard workers also went on strike, upsetting trade. Politically, Iran was divided among Khomeini-led Islamists, the Communist Tudeh Party, Mujahadin and National Front leftists, and remaining Pahlavi monarchists. With the monarchists disgraced, each group, taking advantage of revolutionary turmoil, came out of hiding to loot military arsenals and recruit members. Militarily, Iran was weakened by low morale of the pro-Shah military whose leader abandoned them to revolutionaries. The military was promptly stigmatized as the force behind the Shah’s oppression. Following arrests and executions of the top officers’ corps many military remnants began fleeing the country. Iran, with a weakened military, confronted dismemberment as anti-government rebellions broke out in ethnic enclaves in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Baluchistan. Socially, the new revolutionary leadership was faced by the same social problem of the Shah: a restive wave of unemployed rural migrants descending upon the overpopulated crowded cities.

Externally, Iran was threatened by the Soviet Union, whose domination of neighboring Afghanistan and alliance with Iraq gave the country a feeling of encirclement. Soviet influence in Iran was reactivated by the revolutionary turmoil allowing the oppressed communist Tudeh Party to bid for political support. The U.S. posed yet another threat as the revolutionary leaders, many from the 1953 era, felt another American repeat of the 1953 CIA coup restoring the Shah was imminent. Iraq, Iran's Persian Gulf competitor, underwent a military build-up and expressed concern at Shiite revolution lurking at its backdoor to overthrow the Sunni dominated Ba’thists.

Although the above review of Iran prior to the war indicates instability, some signs of stability should be identified. First, although the Islamic revolution's rulers originally sought the dismantlement of the old regime for achieving their newly declared Islamic Republic, they soon realized that a complete purge of the well entrenched Iranian bureaucracy and military would leave the country vulnerable to internal and external enemies. While most Iranians sympathized with the Islamic revolution, they also had developed cosmopolitan concerns of a modern industrial society under the Shah. The military and bureaucratic elite of the Pahlavi regime had the technological expertise and skills needed to administer the country's daily affairs. Iran's new leaders, after purging token leaders of the Shah's regime, attempted to integrate the former bureaucratic and military apparatus into the Islamic Republic. Savak agents, well versed in leftist activities threatening cleric rule, and a prime source of intelligence, were recruited to serve in Savana, the intelligence agency of the Islamic Republic. Several Iranian generals, colonels and bureaucrats associated with the Shah continued their careers under Khomeini.

Another sign of stability was Khomeini’s use of Islam and hatred toward the Shah to unite the country. Islam reduced ethnic differences among Iranians, with 90% of the populace professing Shiism. The Islamic element sustained the loyalty of Khuzestan’s Shiite Arabs upon Iraq's invasion. Khomeini opened dialogue with rival Sunni ayatollahs in Turkish speaking Azerbaijan. The early Islamic Republic's leadership included secular intellectuals attractive to the Iranian middle class such as President Bani Sadr and Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh.

[Rasputin]

Iraq
Following decades of instability Iraq seemed headed for some stability at the time of the Iran-Iraq war. Like Iran, Iraq was plagued by ethnic and religious rivalries. Unlike Iran, which can be identified as unstable in September 1980, Iraq's level of instability was more ambiguous.

Politically, Iraq lay divided among competing Sunni Arabs of the north who dominated Iraqi state politics. The 1958 Revolution eliminated the British imposed Hashemite monarchy and set the stage for continued political unsettledness throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The country was plagued by squabbles between Ba'athists, Communists, and pro-Nasser military leaders tied to Egypt. The Ba'athist Party consolidated its power in 1969 following a coup against General Aref and installed Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as President and Saddam Hussein his deputy.

The political instability of the 196Os and 1970s allowed for a Kurdish insurrection led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) against the Iraqi military. This insurrection threatened the development of Iraq's oil industry located in the Kurdish north. The rebellion drained the Iraqi military and economy. It also allowed external powers such as Israel, the U.S. and Iran to threaten the state by aiding the Kurds and establish bases in rebel camps. These powers hoped that the intermittent Kurdish rebellions would prevent Iraqi subversive activities in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf. The Kurdish insurgency restricted the ruling Iraqi Ba'ath Party's ability to confront the restive Shiites in the south who gave sanctuary to anti-Shah fundamentalists regularly crossing the Iran-Iraq border on pilgrimage to Shiite shrines. The downtrodden Shiite majority, while playing a subordinate role in the country's Sunni dominated politics, posed yet another threat to the regime.

In 1977, a bloody clash between Shiite pilgrims and the Iraqi Army led to riots at Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Subsequently, at the Shah’s request, Deputy Ba'ath Party Chairman, Saddam Hussein expelled Ayatollah Khomeini to quell growing fundamentalist unrest simmering throughout the region.

Iraq traditionally sought to divert attention from internal troubles through external activities. Following the 1958 Iraqi Revolution attempts were made to unite with Nasser ruled Egypt and Syria under the United Arab Republic to defend against Kurdish insurrection and a Communist takeover. The instability in Iran and Lebanon in 1979 prompted a short lived Syrian-Iraqi honeymoon aimed at unifying both countries governed by rival wings of the Arab Ba'ath Party. Iraq also hosted the 1979 Arab League Summit to protest the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, further offsetting publicity of internal problems. A year before the war, a mysterious change in power occurred quite unexpectedly as it was announced that Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr had resigned his presidency for “health reasons” in favor of the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein. Later reports surfaced that “health reasons” indeed contributed to Bakr's "resignation," as he later died of gunshot wounds traced to Saddam Hussein and/or his supporters. Following Bakr's death, Saddam Hussein had to consolidate his rule quickly to quell challenges questioning his legitimacy. Hussein must have recognized his weak position and the violent succession of past leaders.

In 1980 the Iran-Iraq War broke out. To early observers Iraq appeared the blatant aggressor as its military forces zoomed across the border September 22nd reaching deep into its long claimed “Arabistan” or Khuzestan. Historical revisionists seeking to justify Western sympathies toward Iraq later asserted Iraqi accounts of alleged Iranian border provocations of early September as inciting a pre-empted attack. Despite early successes against Iran, Iraq was pushed back by the Iranian military and Islamic revolutionary guards in 1982. Khomeini defined the war in religious terms, declaring it to be the first step toward liberating Jerusalem and rallying soldiers to the slogan "The road to Jerusalem is through Baghdad!" Ironically, circumstantial evidence points to Iranian military collusion with Israel, as the Israeli campaign against PLO-infested Lebanon coincided with an Iranian counteroffensive against Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s goal of quick Iraqi military victory to uplift his prestige at home and abroad failed, forcing him to sue for peace through international frameworks while utilizing Iraqi air force superiority to pressure Iran’s leadership to end the conflict he began.

Analysis of theories
The theory that holds personality of leaders to be the significant force behind international conflict is well illustrated by the Iran-Iraq War. Khomeini's quest for the downfall of the Ba’thist secular tyrant who expelled him from the holy city of Najaf caused Iran's persistence in the war. Iranians, despite national hardship, placed the fate of the war reluctantly in Khomeini's idealistic hands. To Khomeini, the war was a fight of moral and religious principle against Ba’thist secularism which couldn’t be compromised.

Saddam Hussein's personality, less idealistic, was more prone to compromise. To Hussein the war was a great Arab military campaign which had to be waged and adjusted according to the political and military circumstances of the Arab nation. Iraq failed to win Iran's Khuzestan populace over to unification with the Arab nation. The Iranian Arabs identified as Shiite Moslems tied to the Islamic Republic rather than as Arabs tied to the Arab world. When the Arabs were confronted with Israel's move into Lebanon, Hussein withdrew Iraqi forces from Iran in hopes of ending the war to concentrate on the Zionist enemy to the west. Despite Hussein's failure to annex Iranian Khuzestan or "Arabistan", he succeeded in uniting the majority in the Arab world, wary of Shiite fundamentalism, behind Iraq. Hussein's impulsiveness allowed him to invade Iran, suddenly withdraw and sue for peace. He nevertheless developed a personality cult by depicting himself as successor to the mighty Arab and Fertile Crescent warriors of yesteryear.

Thus the war can be described as a personal feud between two archenemies: Ayatollah Khomeini, the religious zealot and Sadaam Hussein, the Arab military conqueror. Although the war renewed historical Arab-Persian enmity, much of the war can be explained by the personal animosity between the two leaders prior to the conflict. One way to test this theory is to examine whether the war's eruption and pursuit would have existed had these two personalities not been in power. It can be argued that another Arab-Persian conflict was imminent regardless of leadership. If this assumption is true then the war may have looked different without Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein.

Perhaps if the Shah had remained a war between Iran and Iraq would have erupted anyway. The Shah would have sought to mobilize the dislocated masses away from revolution to fight an external enemy in Iraq. The Pahlavi monarchy would have utilized the ideology of Pan-Aryanism to renew Iraqi Kurdish dissent with Shiism being subordinate in defining the war. In such a scenario the war would have been defined in more secular military terms between two nationalities, as Hussein often emphasized. Under these conditions both sides could have ended the war, recognizing the hardship of endless military stalemate. However, casting the war in Shiite religious terms as Khomeini did, especially where martyrdom was glorified, made a conclusion to the war difficult for Iran.

[Rasputin]

Stability versus Instability
What can be said for the theory that views a country's domestic environment as determining war when applied to the Iran-Iraq war? Hoffman asserts that instability tends to be prevalent in heterogeneous societies. Both Iran and Iraq are such societies plagued by ethnic and religious squabbles. Hence this theory can explain that both the instability in Iran and Iraq contributed to war as each actor sought to ward off internal conflict by uniting against an external enemy. Iraq used Pan-Arabism to unite its predominately Arab populace while Iran used Shiism to unite its ethnically divided yet predominately Shiite populace. However, signs of stability can be pointed to in both countries prior to the war. These signs create a counterargument that stability at home made each leader secure for adventure. Iran's stability can be shown through the Islamic Republic's ability to integrate institutions of the old regime into its apparatus after rallying the country against the American backed Shah. The characteristics of Iraqi stability include the collapse of the Kurdish insurrection in 1975 and Saddam Hussein’s ability to secure his rule for a whole year despite his questionable tactics in achieving it.

Let’s force ourselves to identify each country as stable or unstable in determining the reason for the war. Iran's domestic situation must be labeled unstable rather than stable. The Shiite clergy sought to consolidate their power through ongoing crisis to mobilize the peasant Iranian underclass on its behalf. The first crisis, revolution, erupted to depose the Shah. With this achievement the clergy bought time to consolidate their reign against its revolutionary rivals, thus creating another prolonged crisis through the seizure of American Embassy hostages. As this crisis concluded, further entrenching clerical rule, the mullahs still had to grapple with the same overpopulation dilemma. The mass rural influx to the cities contributing to the Shah’s downfall remained, to potentially undo their rule as well. The war with Iraq seemed a convenient way for getting rid of excess population and distracting Iranians in warfare. The war enabled a pro-Shah military to be distracted at the front fighting an external enemy rather than plotting against clerical theocratic rule at home. The war also diminished ethnic rivalries as the country united under the Islamic banner against secular Iraq. Iranian Kurdish grievances softened as their Iraqi Kurdish brethren across the border received the Islamic Republic’s backing for renewed insurrection against Baghdad.

In the case of Iraq both stability and instability explain its behavior in sparking the war. The Iranian-inspired Kurdish insurrection of the past and unrest within the Shiite south remained chief concerns for the Baathist regime. To the Arab Shiites, Saddam Hussein offered both the carrot and stick: Khomeini's expulsion in 1978 alongside investment and development in the Shiite heartland to counter further sedition. Instability was also prevalent within the Sunni dominated Ba'athist government. Hussein's sudden installation as president and immediate purge of top Ba'athist leaders illustrated the shaky position he inherited. Saddam Hussein's insecurity as leader of Iraq's Ba'athist government and fear of Shiite rebellion motivated his decision of getting the country into an external adventure to prove his competency and legitimacy.

In conclusion, both personality and domestic condition theories can be applied to the Iran-Iraq Middle East war. Personality plays a vital role in shaping authoritarian regimes where the leader represents an appealing ideology. Khomeini's thirst for revenge and Hussein's impulsiveness, although influential aspects, by no means fully determined the war's outbreak, progression, or outcome. The hostility between Arabs and Persians was sooner or later to resurface even after the Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) and Arab League encouraged 1975 Algiers border agreement signed by the Shah and Saddam Hussein. In the Iran-Iraq war domestic politics also played a direct role. The instability in Iran following revolution forced the clerics to use war as an outlet to legitimize their rule and allocate the idle dislocated urban masses while short-term Iraqi stability enabled initial military success to consolidate and legitimize Sadaam Hussein’s rule.

[Rasputin]

A predator becomes more dangerous when wounded

In the energy-rich Middle East, only two countries have failed to subordinate themselves to Washington's basic demands: Iran and Syria. Accordingly both are enemies, Iran by far the more important. As was the norm during the cold war, resort to violence is regularly justified as a reaction to the malign influence of the main enemy, often on the flimsiest of pretexts. Unsurprisingly, as Bush sends more troops to Iraq, tales surface of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Iraq - a country otherwise free from any foreign interference - on the tacit assumption that Washington rules the world.

In the cold war-like mentality in Washington, Tehran is portrayed as the pinnacle in the so-called Shia crescent that stretches from Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon, through Shia southern Iraq and Syria. And again unsurprisingly, the "surge" in Iraq and escalation of threats and accusations against Iran is accompanied by grudging willingness to attend a conference of regional powers, with the agenda limited to Iraq.
Presumably this minimal gesture toward diplomacy is intended to allay the growing fears and anger elicited by Washington's heightened aggressiveness. These concerns are given new substance in a detailed study of "the Iraq effect" by terrorism experts Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, revealing that the Iraq war "has increased terrorism sevenfold worldwide". An "Iran effect" could be even more severe.

For the US, the primary issue in the Middle East has been, and remains, effective control of its unparalleled energy resources. Access is a secondary matter. Once the oil is on the seas it goes anywhere. Control is understood to be an instrument of global dominance. Iranian influence in the "crescent" challenges US control. By an accident of geography, the world's major oil resources are in largely Shia areas of the Middle East: southern Iraq, adjacent regions of Saudi Arabia and Iran, with some of the major reserves of natural gas as well. Washington's worst nightmare would be a loose Shia alliance controlling most of the world's oil and independent of the US.

Such a bloc, if it emerges, might even join the Asian Energy Security Grid based in China. Iran could be a lynchpin. If the Bush planners bring that about, they will have seriously undermined the US position of power in the world.

To Washington, Tehran's principal offence has been its defiance, going back to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and the hostage crisis at the US embassy. In retribution, Washington turned to support Saddam Hussein's aggression against Iran, which left hundreds of thousands dead. Then came murderous sanctions and, under Bush, rejection of Iranian diplomatic efforts.

Last July, Israel invaded Lebanon, the fifth invasion since 1978. As before, US support was a critical factor, the pretexts quickly collapse on inspection, and the consequences for the people of Lebanon are severe. Among the reasons for the US-Israel invasion is that Hizbullah's rockets could be a deterrent to a US-Israeli attack on Iran. Despite the sabre-rattling it is, I suspect, unlikely that the Bush administration will attack Iran. Public opinion in the US and around the world is overwhelmingly opposed. It appears that the US military and intelligence community is also opposed. Iran cannot defend itself against US attack, but it can respond in other ways, among them by inciting even more havoc in Iraq. Some issue warnings that are far more grave, among them the British military historian Corelli Barnett, who writes that "an attack on Iran would effectively launch world war three".

Then again, a predator becomes even more dangerous, and less predictable, when wounded. In desperation to salvage something, the administration might risk even greater disasters. The Bush administration has created an unimaginable catastrophe in Iraq. It has been unable to establish a reliable client state within, and cannot withdraw without facing the possible loss of control of the Middle East's energy resources.

Meanwhile Washington may be seeking to destabilise Iran from within. The ethnic mix in Iran is complex; much of the population isn't Persian. There are secessionist tendencies and it is likely that Washington is trying to stir them up - in Khuzestan on the Gulf, for example, where Iran's oil is concentrated, a region that is largely Arab, not Persian.

Threat escalation also serves to pressure others to join US efforts to strangle Iran economically, with predictable success in Europe. Another predictable consequence, presumably intended, is to induce the Iranian leadership to be as repressive as possible, fomenting disorder while undermining reformers.

It is also necessary to demonise the leadership. In the west, any wild statement by President Ahmadinejad is circulated in headlines, dubiously translated. But Ahmadinejad has no control over foreign policy, which is in the hands of his superior, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The US media tend to ignore Khamenei's statements, especially if they are conciliatory. It's widely reported when Ahmadinejad says Israel shouldn't exist - but there is silence when Khamenei says that Iran supports the Arab League position on Israel-Palestine, calling for normalisation of relations with Israel if it accepts the international consensus of a two-state settlement.

The US invasion of Iraq virtually instructed Iran to develop a nuclear deterrent. The message was that the US attacks at will, as long as the target is defenceless. Now Iran is ringed by US forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and the Persian Gulf, and close by are nuclear-armed Pakistan and Israel, the regional superpower, thanks to US support.

In 2003, Iran offered negotiations on all outstanding issues, including nuclear policies and Israel-Palestine relations. Washington's response was to censure the Swiss diplomat who brought the offer. The following year, the EU and Iran reached an agreement that Iran would suspend enriching uranium; in return the EU would provide "firm guarantees on security issues" - code for US-Israeli threats to bomb Iran.

Apparently under US pressure, Europe did not live up to the bargain. Iran then resumed uranium enrichment. A genuine interest in preventing the development of nuclear weapons in Iran would lead Washington to implement the EU bargain, agree to meaningful negotiations and join with others to move toward integrating Iran into the international economic system.

[Rasputin]

A predator becomes more dangerous when wounded

In the energy-rich Middle East, only two countries have failed to subordinate themselves to Washington's basic demands: Iran and Syria. Accordingly both are enemies, Iran by far the more important. As was the norm during the cold war, resort to violence is regularly justified as a reaction to the malign influence of the main enemy, often on the flimsiest of pretexts. Unsurprisingly, as Bush sends more troops to Iraq, tales surface of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Iraq - a country otherwise free from any foreign interference - on the tacit assumption that Washington rules the world.

In the cold war-like mentality in Washington, Tehran is portrayed as the pinnacle in the so-called Shia crescent that stretches from Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon, through Shia southern Iraq and Syria. And again unsurprisingly, the "surge" in Iraq and escalation of threats and accusations against Iran is accompanied by grudging willingness to attend a conference of regional powers, with the agenda limited to Iraq.
Presumably this minimal gesture toward diplomacy is intended to allay the growing fears and anger elicited by Washington's heightened aggressiveness. These concerns are given new substance in a detailed study of "the Iraq effect" by terrorism experts Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, revealing that the Iraq war "has increased terrorism sevenfold worldwide". An "Iran effect" could be even more severe.

For the US, the primary issue in the Middle East has been, and remains, effective control of its unparalleled energy resources. Access is a secondary matter. Once the oil is on the seas it goes anywhere. Control is understood to be an instrument of global dominance. Iranian influence in the "crescent" challenges US control. By an accident of geography, the world's major oil resources are in largely Shia areas of the Middle East: southern Iraq, adjacent regions of Saudi Arabia and Iran, with some of the major reserves of natural gas as well. Washington's worst nightmare would be a loose Shia alliance controlling most of the world's oil and independent of the US.

Such a bloc, if it emerges, might even join the Asian Energy Security Grid based in China. Iran could be a lynchpin. If the Bush planners bring that about, they will have seriously undermined the US position of power in the world.

To Washington, Tehran's principal offence has been its defiance, going back to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and the hostage crisis at the US embassy. In retribution, Washington turned to support Saddam Hussein's aggression against Iran, which left hundreds of thousands dead. Then came murderous sanctions and, under Bush, rejection of Iranian diplomatic efforts.

Last July, Israel invaded Lebanon, the fifth invasion since 1978. As before, US support was a critical factor, the pretexts quickly collapse on inspection, and the consequences for the people of Lebanon are severe. Among the reasons for the US-Israel invasion is that Hizbullah's rockets could be a deterrent to a US-Israeli attack on Iran. Despite the sabre-rattling it is, I suspect, unlikely that the Bush administration will attack Iran. Public opinion in the US and around the world is overwhelmingly opposed. It appears that the US military and intelligence community is also opposed. Iran cannot defend itself against US attack, but it can respond in other ways, among them by inciting even more havoc in Iraq. Some issue warnings that are far more grave, among them the British military historian Corelli Barnett, who writes that "an attack on Iran would effectively launch world war three".

Then again, a predator becomes even more dangerous, and less predictable, when wounded. In desperation to salvage something, the administration might risk even greater disasters. The Bush administration has created an unimaginable catastrophe in Iraq. It has been unable to establish a reliable client state within, and cannot withdraw without facing the possible loss of control of the Middle East's energy resources.

Meanwhile Washington may be seeking to destabilise Iran from within. The ethnic mix in Iran is complex; much of the population isn't Persian. There are secessionist tendencies and it is likely that Washington is trying to stir them up - in Khuzestan on the Gulf, for example, where Iran's oil is concentrated, a region that is largely Arab, not Persian.

Threat escalation also serves to pressure others to join US efforts to strangle Iran economically, with predictable success in Europe. Another predictable consequence, presumably intended, is to induce the Iranian leadership to be as repressive as possible, fomenting disorder while undermining reformers.

It is also necessary to demonise the leadership. In the west, any wild statement by President Ahmadinejad is circulated in headlines, dubiously translated. But Ahmadinejad has no control over foreign policy, which is in the hands of his superior, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The US media tend to ignore Khamenei's statements, especially if they are conciliatory. It's widely reported when Ahmadinejad says Israel shouldn't exist - but there is silence when Khamenei says that Iran supports the Arab League position on Israel-Palestine, calling for normalisation of relations with Israel if it accepts the international consensus of a two-state settlement.

The US invasion of Iraq virtually instructed Iran to develop a nuclear deterrent. The message was that the US attacks at will, as long as the target is defenceless. Now Iran is ringed by US forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and the Persian Gulf, and close by are nuclear-armed Pakistan and Israel, the regional superpower, thanks to US support.

In 2003, Iran offered negotiations on all outstanding issues, including nuclear policies and Israel-Palestine relations. Washington's response was to censure the Swiss diplomat who brought the offer. The following year, the EU and Iran reached an agreement that Iran would suspend enriching uranium; in return the EU would provide "firm guarantees on security issues" - code for US-Israeli threats to bomb Iran.

Apparently under US pressure, Europe did not live up to the bargain. Iran then resumed uranium enrichment. A genuine interest in preventing the development of nuclear weapons in Iran would lead Washington to implement the EU bargain, agree to meaningful negotiations and join with others to move toward integrating Iran into the international economic system.

[Rasputin]

The US army's top doctor, Lt Gen Kevin Kiley, has stepped down in the wake of a scandal at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the flagship US Army hospital.
Gen Kiley becomes the third top-ranking official to lose his job over Walter Reed conditions, which were highlighted last month by the Washington Post.

President Bush has said he is "deeply troubled" after reports of cockroaches and rats in some hospital buildings.

Gen Kiley had filed a "request to retire" on Sunday, the army said.

However, a senior Pentagon official speaking on condition of anonymity said the acting US Army Secretary, Peter Geren, had asked Gen Kiley for his retirement.

The secretary of the army and the head of the medical centre have quit over the reports.

At war

"I submitted my retirement because I think it is in the best interest of the Army," Gen Kiley, who had overseen the army's medical services, said in a statement.

"We are an Army Medical Department at war, supporting an Army at war - it shouldn't be and it isn't about one doctor," the statement said.

The 56-year-old was commander of Washington's Walter Reed Army Medical Center from 2002 to 2004.

Major General Gale Pollock, the Deputy Surgeon General, will replace Gen Kiley until a permanent replacement is found.

"I have confidence she will carry out her responsibilities and lead with skill and distinction," said Peter Geren.

'Huge embarrassment'

Gen Kiley has been accused of playing down the reports by the Washington Post and ignoring earlier warnings about sub-standard care at the hospital.


The scandal over Walter Reed erupted in February
Last week, he told a congressional committee that he was taking responsibility for correcting the problems at America's top army military facility which he admitted had taken him by surprise.

The suspicion will be though that the man who initially played down the reports of cockroaches, mice and mould in the rooms of wounded war veterans, has been pushed, says the BBC's James Coomarasamy in Washington.

This was a scandal which would have been a huge embarrassment at any time, but is particularly bad just as the Bush administration is sending more troops into Iraq, our correspondent says.

The chairman of the House armed services committee said the removal of top Army brass was only a first step towards solving the problems at Walter Reed.

"But this step alone will not fix the problems that our wounded and injured service members experience when they are in recovery," Representative Ike Skelton said in a statement.

"With the installation of new leaders, the real test will be making sure that the work fixing problems actually gets done," he added.

[Rasputin]

وزير دفاع آمريكا تاكيد كرد كشورش با وجود وخامت اوضاع عراق حاضر است براى تامين منافع خود در خاورميانه، دهها سال در منطقه باقى بماند.
به گزارش خبرگزارى آسوشيتدپرس، "رابرت گيتس" روز جمعه در مراسمى به مناسبت انتصاب رسمى آدميرال "ويليام فالون" به سمت فرمانده مركز فرماندهى ارتش آمريكا در منطقه خاورميانه و آسياى مركزى گفت آمريكا تمام تلاش خود را معطوف تقويت تعهدات و دفاع از منافع خود در خاورميانه طى دهه*هاى آينده خواهد كرد و براى دفاع از خود تمام قدرت و توان خود را به كار خواهد بست.
وى كه خطاب به بيش از 600 فرمانده بلندپايه و ميهمان در پايگاه هوايى مك*ديل صحبت مى كرد، تاكيد كرد آمريكا در كنار متحدان خود در خاورميانه باقى خواهد ماند.
ويليام فالون جانشين ژنرال "جان آبيزيد" شد كه از سال 2003 تابحال فرماندهى نيروهاى آمريكا را در خاورميانه عهده دار بود. به اين ترتيب علاوه بر جنگ عراق، جنگ در افغانستان نيز تحت فرماندهى فالون قرار خواهد گرفت.
وى در مراسم شب گذشته گفت اوضاع عراق بحرانى است و زمان مهم ترين عامل است.
اين درحال است كه جنبش وابسته به مقتدا صدر روز گذشته با انتشار بيانيه اى ضمن ابراز مخالفت با حضور نيروهاى اشغالگر آمريكايى در عراق، از هواداران خود خواست فشار را بر آمريكايى ها افزايش دهند.
وزارت دفاع آمريكا هفته گذشته با انتشار گزارش جديدى از وضعيت عراق اعلام كرد كه سه ماه انتهايى سال 2006 خونين ترين دوره در عراق از سال 2003 تاكنون بود.