Iran-U.S.A

[Rasputin]

كاخ سفيد ادعاى دخالت ايران در حمله به نظاميان آمريكايى در عراق را در حد يك پيشگويى خواند.

به گزارش فارس به نقل از خبرگزارى فرانسه، كاخ سفيد امروز درباره ادعاى دخالت ايران در حمله به يك پايگاه آمريكا در كربلا، موضعى محتاطانه اتخاذ كرد.
اين حمله كه در بيستم ژانويه گذشته در كربلا روى داد، به كشته شدن 5 نظامى اين كشور منجر شد.
تونى اسنو سخنگوى كاخ سفيد در هواپيماى حامل جرج بوش رئيس جمهور امريكا به نيويورك گفت:, من نمى خواهم وارد اين نوع پيشگوئي*ها شوم.,
وى گفت: ,پنتاگون مرجع ذى صلاح در واكنش به اين موضوع است.,
اسنو در عين حال تاكيد كرد، آمريكايي*ها هر آنچه را كه لازم باشد براى دفاع از نيروهاى خود در مقابل تحركات احتمالى ايراني*ها در عراق به كار خواهند گرفت.
سخنگوى كاخ سفيد افزود: ما به نحو مناسب و به شدت در برابر كسانى كه سعى مي*كنند با بى ثبات كردن دمكراسى در عراق نيروهاى ما را بكشند، واكنش نشان خواهيم داد.
شبكه تلويزيونى سي*ان*ان آمريكا در تلاش براى توجيه ناكامي*هاى آمريكا در عراق مدعى شد: مقامات واشنگتن گمان مي*كنند تهران بطور مستقيم در حمله به نظاميان آمريكا در كربلا دست داشته است.
سي*ان*ان به نقل از مقامات دولت آمريكا كه نامشان را فاش نكرد، گزارش داد: ,وزارت دفاع آمريكا مشغول تحقيقات لازم درباره اين امر است كه آيا اين حملات توسط ايراني*ها و يا مبارزانى صورت گرفته است كه از سوى ايران آموزش ديده*اند يا خير.,
در حمله*اى كه در 20 ژانويه در كربلا صورت گرفت عده*اى از افراد مسلح با پوشيدن يونيفورم نظامى ارتش آمريكا و با كاروانى مجهز وارد مجتمع اين ارتش در كربلا شدند و پنج سرباز را ربوده و سپس از پاى درآوردند.
يكى از اين مقامات كه نامش فاش نشده، در مصاحبه با اين شبكه خبرى مدعى شد:* ,ما اعتقاد داريم عاملان اين حمله، ايراني*ها و يا كسانى بودند كه از سوى ايران آموزش ديده*اند. اين اقدام بسيار بالاتر از آن چه بود كه از شبه *نظاميان و يا مبارزان خارجى در عراق شاهد بوده**ايم.,

[Rasputin]

کريستين امانپور خبرنگار شبکه "سی.*ان.ان" با حضور در بيت آيت* الله صانعی در قم با وی در خصوص مسائل مربوط به ظهور امام مهدی(ع) گفتگو کرد .

به گزارش مهر، امانپور صبح امروز به همراه گروه فيلمبرداري*اش در مؤسسه آينده روشن که اختصاصا به مسائل مربوط به مهدويت مي*پردازد، حضور يافت و با برخی مسئولان و کارکنان اين مؤسسه به گفتگو پرداخت.

وی در ادامه سفر خود به همراه يک طلبه آمريکايی الاصل ساکن در قم که مشغول فراگيری علوم حوزوی است در صحن*های حرم مطهر حضرت معصومه به گفتگو پرداخت و فيلمبرداران وی نيز اقدام به ضبط اين گفتگو که بيشتر در رابطه با علت اسلام آوردن اين فرد* آمريکايی بود، پرداختند.

امانپور همچنين در پايان سفر يک روزه خود با حضور در بيت آيت* الله صانعی با وی در خصوص مسائل داخلي، آينده کشور در جامعه بين الملل و مسائل مربوط به ظهور امام مهدی(ع) به گفتگو پرداخت.

اين خبرنگار شبکه* سي*ان ان قرار است عصر فردا برای حضور در مسجد مقدس جمکران بار ديگر به قم سفر کند.

[Rasputin]

برايتان يک آزمون کوچک درباره سياست خارجی دارم: دو کشور را - که کشور الف و کشور ب می نامم - برايتان وصف کنم و شما بگوييد کدام يک متحد آمريکا هست و کدام يک نيست.

اجازه دهيد شروع کنم: کشور الف فعالانه به آمريکا کمک کرد طالبان را در افغانستان شکست دهد و به جای آن يک دولت منتخب متشکل از مسلمانان ميانه رو که حامی آمريکاست بنشاند. زنان کشور الف رای می دهند، در سمت های دولتی خدمت می کنند، اکثريت دانشجويان کشورشان را تشکيل می دهند و به طور کامل در نيروی کار جذب شده اند.

روز يازدهم سپتامبر، شهروندان کشور الف از جمله معدود کسانی در جهان اسلام بودند که به گونه ای خودجوش تجمعی در حمايت از آمريکا برگزار کردند. رئيس جمهور راديکال کشور الف اخيرا برای افزايش محبوبيت خود کنفرانسی درباره اينکه چرا هولوکاست هرگز اتفاق نيافتاده برگزار کرد. يک ماه بعد، کشور الف انتخابات سراسری شوراهای محلی را برگزار کرد و همان رئيس جمهور شاهد بود که رای دهندگان نامزدهای دلخواه او را به نفع محافظه کاران معتدلتر کنار گذاشتند. کشور الف برای منافع استراتژيک خود می خواهد شاهد موفقيت دولت تحت هدايت شيعيان عراق که طرفدار آمريکاست باشد. هر چند اين کشور يک کشور مسلمان درست در مجاورت عراق است اما هرگز بمبگذار انتحاری به عراق نفرستاده و از ديرباز از جوامع يهودی و مسيحی خود حفاظت کرده است. کشور الف به طور سرانه بيش از هر کشور ديگری در خاور ميانه اسلامی، وبلاگ نويس دارد.

آن شاخه از اسلام که اکثريت مردم کشور الف پيرو آن هستند به زنان احترام می گذارد، در پرتو مدرنيت درهايش به روی قرائت های تازه باز است و پوچ گرايی از نوع القاعده را رد می کند.

اکنون کشور ب: 15 تن از 19 هواپيماربای 11 سپتامبر از اين کشور آمدند. کشور ب به زنانش اجازه نمی دهد رانندگی کنند، رای بدهند يا نامزد انتخابات شوند. در کشور ب ساختن کليسا، کنيسه يا معبد هندو قدغن است. کشور ب مسئول حمايت مالی از طالبان بود.

موسسات خيريه کشور ب به بقای القاعده کمک می کنند. مردان جوان در مساجد کشور ب مرتبا اجير می شوند تا در عراق بمبگذاری انتحاری انجام دهند. مساجد و موسسات خيريه کشور ب پول جمع می کنند تا به شورشگری در عراق کمک کنند. کشور ب نمی خواهد که دولت منتخب تحت هدايت شيعيان در عراق موفق شود. درحالی که رهبران کشور ب طرفدار آمريکا هستند، نظرسنجی ها نشان می دهد که بسياری از مردم آن با آمريکا خصومت می ورزند -- برخی از آنها 11 سپتامبر را جشن گرفتند. شاخه ای از اسلام که در کشور ب بيشترين پيروان را دارد، به مساجد سراسر جهان صادر می شود و بيشترين ضديت را با مدرنيته و ساير اديان دارد.

سوال: به نظر شما کدام کشور متحد طبيعی آمريکاست: الف يا ب؟

البته که الف. کشور الف ايران است و کشور ب عربستان سعودی.

عجله نکنيد. می دانم که ايران هم درگير تروريسم عليه آمريکا شده و اينکه سعودی ها در مواقع حساس در برخی زمينه ها از آمريکا حمايت کرده اند. با اين حال نکته ای که می خواهم به کرسی بنشانم اين است که خصومتی که از زمان سقوط شاه در سال 1979 ميان ايران و آمريکا وجود داشته خصومتی طبيعی نيست.

به اقتضای فرهنگ، تاريخ و جغرافيا ما عملا منافع مشترک خيلی بيشتری با مردم ايران داريم. و من تنها کسی نيستم که متوجه اين مساله شده ام.

محمد حسين عادلی، سفير سابق ايران در لندن، در مجمع داووس به من گفت از آنجا که آمريکا دو عدد از بزرگترين دشمنان ايران - طالبان و صدام - را نابود کرده "بحثی در ايران درگرفته که می گويد آيا واقعا ما همچنان بايد با اين شدت مقابل آمريکا عمل کنيم... اکنون آمادگی بيشتری برای ديالوگ با آمريکا وجود دارد."

مهمتر اينکه وقتی مردم می گويند "مهمترين کاری که آمريکا امروز می تواند برای ايجاد ثبات در خاور ميانه انجام دهد حل مناقشه اسرائيل-فلسطين است"، آنها اشتباه می کنند، اين دومين کار مهم است. مهمترين کار اين است که مناقشه ايران و آمريکا حل شود.

اين کار کل خاور ميانه را عوض خواهد کرد و راه را برای حل مناقشه اسرائيل و فلسطين می گشايد، زيرا ايران حامی کليدی حماس، جهاد اسلامی، حزب الله و سوريه است. کمک های فعال ايران همچنين می تواند برای ثبات عراق اهميت حياتی داشته باشد.

برای همين است که با جنگ با ايران مخالفم. من از مذاکره طرفداری می کنم. منزوی کردن ايران مانند حکومت کاسترو در کوبا تنها به توليد همان چيزی که در کوبا شاهد بوده ايم منجر می شود: تقويت کاستروهای ايران. اما برای آنکه گفتگو با ايران مثمر ثمر باشد، بايد از اهرم ها استفاده کنيم.

می پرسيد چه اهرم های موثری وجود دارد؟ ابهامی نگذاريد که ايران نمی تواند کاری کند که ما را از نظر نظامی از خليج (فارس) بيرون براند؛ قيمت نفت را که در خودبزرگ بينی رهبران تندروی ايران نقش کليدی دارد پايين بياوريد. از نظر مالی تندروها را زير فشار بگذاريد. اما همه اين ها بايد با اعلام آشکار اين موضوع همراه باشد که آمريکا قصد تغيير رژيم در ايران را ندارد، بلکه خواستار تغيير رفتار ايران است. همچنين روشن کنيد که آمريکا می خواهد فورا سفارت خود در تهران را بگشايد و اينکه اولين کاری که خواهد کرد دادن 50 هزار ويزای دانشجويی به ايرانی ها برای درس خواندن در دانشگاه های آمريکاست.

فقط همين کار را بکنيد - و بعد عقب بنشينيد و شاهد باشيد که چه بحث خارق العاده ای در ايران درخواهد گرفت. می توانيد خانه تان را روی آن شرط ببنديد.

[Rasputin]

The shadowy outlines of a new US strategy towards Iran are exercising diplomats and experts around the Middle East and in the west. The US says Iranian personnel are training and arming anti-US forces inside Iraq, and it will not hesitate to kill them. It is sending a second aircraft carrier to the Gulf, doubling its force projection there. It is calling on Europeans to tighten sanctions on Iran until Tehran suspends its uranium enrichment programme.

Is the US rattling the sabre in advance of an attack on Iran? Or is it merely rattling its cage, as it pretends still to be a power in the region in spite of being locked into an unwinnable war in Iraq? The only certainty is that Bush's strategy of calling for democratisation in the Middle East is over. Washington has had to abandon the neocon dream of turning Iraq into a beacon of secular liberal democracy. It is no longer pressing for reform in other Arab states.
On her recent trip to Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf, Condoleezza Rice said little about democracy. Her pitch was old-fashioned realpolitik as she tried to create a regional counterweight to Iran's influence. Gary Sick, a former National Security Council expert, argues that Washington's return to balance-of-power considerations is designed to create an informal anti-Iranian alliance of the US, Israel and the Sunni Arab states. The aim is partly to divert attention from the catastrophe of Iraq. It also reduces Israel's isolation by suggesting Sunni Arab states have a common interest in confronting Iran, whatever their disagreements over Palestine.

Other American experts argue that Iranian influence should not be confused with Shia influence. The US blunder in invading Iraq and opening the way for Shia Islamists to control its government created an unexpected opportunity for Iran. But it does not follow that Shia movements in other Arab states have grown stronger or that the arc of Shia radicalism that King Abdullah of Jordan has talked of is anything more than a figment of his imagination. The Shia minorities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are showing no signs of revolt. On the contrary, Saudi Shias are reported to be fearful of a backlash from the Sunni majority if sectarian threat-mongering continues. Highlighting sectarian identities has turned into a galloping cancer in Iraq, and it would be a disaster if the US seeks to export these tensions into the wider Middle East.

Even in Iraq there are limits to Iran's role. The eight-year war between the two countries in the 1980s showed that Iraqi Shias put their Arab and Iraqi identity above the religious rituals they share with Iranians. Moqtada al-Sadr, the cleric who commands one of the main Iraqi militias, frequently boasts of his Iraqi nationalism and the fact that his father, a distinguished ayatollah, remained in opposition in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein years rather than fleeing, as other Iraqi Shia clerics did, to the protection of Tehran or London.

The US claims Iran has increased its subversion in Iraq in recent months. The US has a record of self-serving and false intelligence on Iraq but, even if true, Iran's actions cannot make much difference to the problems the US is facing. The sectarian violence is perpetrated largely by Iraqis on Iraqis. If outsiders provoke it, they are mainly Sunni jihadis loyal to al-Qaida. As for attacks on US forces, these come primarily in Sunni areas or the mixed province of Diyala. Some US officials now hint that Iranians may be involved in these areas too. Links between Iran and Iraq's Sunni insurgents would be new, but marginal.

The real purpose of Washington's heightened talk of Iranian subversion seems to be twofold. The administration is playing the blame game. When the "who lost Iraq?" debate develops in earnest as the presidential election contest hots up, Bush's people will name its fall guys. Number one will be the Democrats, for failing to fund the war adequately and allowing the "enemy" to take comfort from the sapping of American will. Number two will be Iran for its alleged arming of militias and insurgents. Number three will be Syria for allowing suicide bombers through Damascus airport and into Iraq.

The second purpose of Washington's anti-Iranian claims, as the former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently suggested, is to prepare a case for a US military strike on Iran. It will be described as defensive, just as the first attacks on North Vietnam two generations ago were falsely said to be an answer to the other side's aggression.

There could be a third aim: a desire to influence the internal Iranian debate. A senior US official stated in London this week that the Iranian government was a monolith and "we try to discern differences within the Iranian regime at our peril". That may not be the majority view within the administration. Ratcheting up accusations against Iran's revolutionary guards who are close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be a device to make a case for moderates like the former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. He appears to favour a deal with Washington rather than confrontation.

The safest conclusion is that Washington remains confused about what Iran is doing, and frustrated by its own inability to find allies to support a response. All options are being prepared, along with their "justifications". The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual survey rightly pointed out this week that US power is fading. It can shape an agenda but not implement it globally.

Two stark new events prove that. One was the meeting between the Saudi and Iranian security chiefs to try to stop Lebanon sliding back into civil war. This showed Iran can be a force for regional stability, and that Saudi Arabia is resisting US efforts to isolate Tehran. The other was President Jacques Chirac's comment that it would not matter if Iran developed a nuclear bomb or two as they could not be used productively. Described as a gaffe since it broke ranks with Washington, it expressed the views of many Europeans (as well as the contradiction inherent in the French and British nuclear arsenals), since the French president added that the bigger problem was the push for other nations to follow suit.

As Washington's neocons go into eclipse and the realpolitikers dither, Britain and other European governments need to be far clearer in public than they have so far been. They should point out that the dispute with Iran is not as monumental as Washington claims. Fomenting new divisions in the Middle East or resorting to force are cures far worse than the disease.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

آنکه زد و آنکه خورد

معنای خبرهای دیروز

روی خروجی ایران و امریکا


مجموعه خبرهای دیروز که در ارتباط با ایران روی خروجی خبرگزاری های داخلی و خبرگزاری جهانی قرار گرفت وقتی درکنار هم قرار داده می شد تصویر جالبی بدست می آمد:

در ایران از رئیس جمهور تا سرمقاله نویس کیهان تهران که حسین شریعتمداری باشد چنان سخن گفتند و نوشتند که منتظر یک تخلف کوچک امریکا هستند تا به حساب این ابرقدرت برسند و خود جای آن بنشینند! حسین شریعتمداری که یک نوک انگشت به ماشه موشک اتمی فاصله داشت و رئیس جمهور هم که ترک اسب سفید امام زمان منتظر ظهور و تاخ جهانی بود. البته وزیر خارجه هم کوتاه نیآمد، همانگونه که حسن و حسین و ناصر و تقی و.... که این روزها بنام سخنگویان شورای امنیت ملی و یا فلان نهاد و بنیاد سخن می گویند کوتاه نیآمدند و خیلی هشدار دهنده با جهان و بویژه امریکا سخن گفتند. چوب را چنان بلند کردند که اسرائیل هم حساب کار خودش را بکند! مصاحبه احمدی نژاد و سرمقاله کیهان دیروز را بخوانید تا ببینید دیروز چه قدرت نمائی در تهران کردند.

اما درخارج از ایران و بویژه در امریکا، بر خلاف همه روزها و هفته های گذشته و حتی برخلاف 48 ساعت قبل، مقامات یکی پس از دیگری سخنرانی و مصاحبه کرده و منکر هر نوع طرح و یا قصد حمله به ایران شدند. در مورد افزایش نیروها در عراق و پرسه زدن در مرزهای ایران و عراق هم گفتند: چیزی نیست، مرزها را کنترل می کنند!



اما ضلع سوم خروجی خبرها: دیروز هم دستگیری های امنیتی در عراق ادامه یافت و از تهران بی سرو صدا به مقتدا صدر گفتند سرداران جیش المهدی بهتر است به ایران بازگردند. در فلسطین هم نیروهای فتح ریختند به دانشگاه اسلامی غزه که ستاد نظامی حماس است و در آنجا 7 ایرانی را دستگیر کردند که بی شک سرنخشان به سپاه قدس و سپاه پاسداران وصل است. چرا ریختند آنجا؟ از کجا می دانستند ایرانی ها آنجا هستند؟ دستگیر شدگان را کجابردند؟ و سئوالات دیگر بی پاسخ است، اما این نکته قطعی است که خیلی از خانه های تیمی وسوراخ سنبه ها کشف شده و به نوبت دست می کنند در آن ها. ابتدا در بغداد، سپس در اربیل، نوبت بعدی رسید به نجف و حالا به غزه. با هر دستگیری اطلاعات تازه ای بدست می آید و روزنه های جدید باز می شود.

بدینگونه گذشت 24 ساعت گذشته: درایران شاخ و شانه کشیدند و امریکا را تهدید کردند. در امریکا جا خالی کردند و گفتند ما اهلش نیستیم. در عمل امریکائی ها ضربه زدند و ایرانی ها ضربه خوردند. فعلا جنگ در حاشیه سنگر اصلی جریان دارد اما با دو ادعا. آنکه می زند و پیش می آید می گوید قصد حمله به ایران را ندارد و آنکه پیاپی خورد ادعای جنگ و پیروزی دارد!

ببینیم امروز چه می شود.

[Rasputin]

مصاحبه تلويزيونی جلال طالبانی
ايران و امريکا
مسائل بين خودشان را
خارج از عراق حل کنند




جلال طالبانی رئيس جمهور عراق و رهبر جبهه ميهنی کردستان عراق با شبكه تلويزيونی عراقی «الحرية» مصاحبه کرده و در آن فاش ساخت:

اخيرا با منوچهر متكی، وزير امور خارجه جمهوری اسلامی ملاقات داشتم. او دراين ديدار به من گفت: «به دوستت، زلمای خليل*زاد(سفير ويژه امريکا درعراق واکنون نماينده جديد امريکا در سازمان ملل) بگو ما در همه مسائل سرنگونی صدام، دقيقاً همان مواضعی را اتخاذ كرديم كه آمريكا در عراق اتخاذ كرد؛ پس آنها چه چيزی بيشتر از اين از ما می*خواهند؟»

هنگامی كه اين پيغام را به خليل*زاد منتقل كردم، او گفت: «درست است؛ آنها در كنار ما ايستادند، اما از آنها می*خواهيم كه در مورد استقرار امنيت و ثبات در عراق هم در كنار ما باشند.» طالبانی دربخش ديگری از مصاحبه خود، با اشاره به اتهاماتی که اکنون متوجه دخالت های جمهوری اسلامی در امور عراق وارد شده گفت:

"آرزوی ما در عراق اينست که اختلافات ايران با امريکا و انگليس در جائی دور از عراق حل وفصل شود، تا مشكلات موجود بين ما و آنها هم از طريق گفت*وگو و راهكارهای سياسی رفع گردد. طالبانی که زبان فارسی را بخوبی صحبت می کند، در بخش ديگری از همين مصاحبه و در پاسخ به اين سئوال که کتاب های فارسی را مطالعه می کند يا خير گفت:

"بله می خوانم. مثلا در حال حاضر مشغول مطالعه سلسله *كتاب*هايی هستم كه به*تازگی در تهران با عنوان «نگاهی به جنبش چپ از درون» منتشر شده است؛* پيش از اين كتاب نيز «خاطرات كيانوری" را مطالعه كردم و اكنون روی كتاب «حزب رنجبران ايران» متمركز شده*ام.

[Rasputin]

سخنگوى وزارت خارجه آمريكا به ايران، نسبت به اعمال تحريم*هاى شديدتر هشدار داد. خبرگزارى آسوشيتدپرس گزارش داد كه شان مك كورمك گفت: اگر ايران درخواست شوراى امنيت براى تعليق برنامه غني*سازى اورانيوم را ناديده بگيرد، آمريكا براى تحريم*هاى بيشتر شوراى امنيت عليه تهران اعمال فشار مي*كند.
مك كورمك افزود: ظاهرا ايران با اطلاعيه*هاى اخير درباره شروع نصب سانتريفوژها در مسير انزوا پيشروى مي*كند.
وى تصريح كرد: اگر بن بست ادامه يابد، آمريكا تحريم*هاى فزاينده در سازمان ملل متحد را دنبال مي*كند.
شوراى امنيت سازمان ملل متحد بيست و سوم دسامبر قطعنامه تحريم عليه ايران را تصويب كرد و ضرب الاجل شصت روزه اى براى پايبندى ايران به آن تعيين كرد.
براساس اين گزارش، ايران اخيرا 164 دستگاه سانتريفوژ را در تاسيسات نطنز نصب كرده است.

[Rasputin]

US DEFENSE Secretary Robert Gates recently had this to say about America's negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran: "Frankly, right at this moment there's really nothing the Iranians want from us, and so in any negotiation right now we would be the supplicant." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also dismissed talking to Iran about Iraq: "The only reason to talk to us would be to extract a price, and that's not diplomacy, that's extortion."

But haven't US leaders in the past been in much less advantageous negotiating positions with adversaries, yet through tactical negotiations been able to advance national objectives? What about SALT I and II, and START, when Soviet adversaries had certain defensive and offensive capabilities equivalent or even greater than America's? If carefully executed, why can't discussions with Iran provide positive results?

Last April, President George W. Bush announced his willingness to reengage with Iran to discuss regional challenges. Since then action has stalled, even though the Baker-Hamilton Report recommends engagement with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, as a way of stabilizing Iraq. But for engagement to be constructive it must address mutual self-interest.

The book "Getting to Yes" by Roger Fisher and William Ury identifies simple but powerful ideas on the fundamentals of negotiation. How do some of the rules of the book apply to US challenges in Iran?

The negotiating power of parties depends primarily on how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement. While there are people in the Bush administration who do not wish for any negotiated solution, our strategic goal is to prevent expanding the zone of conflict and ultimately to separate Iranian nationalism from religious fundamentalism. Despite its frequent revolutionary slogans, Iran's foreign policy is largely predicated on nationalistic impulses. The traditional Persian drive to assert influence over the Gulf and the larger Middle East are problems familiar to the United States and can be dealt with in the context of dialogue and compromise. In assessing Iran's international relations, it's best to focus more on actual conduct then incendiary rhetoric.

Separate people from the problem. Fisher and Ury note that in negotiation, you deal not with abstract representatives of the other side, but with human beings with deeply held values and different backgrounds and viewpoints. A working relationship of trust, respect, and understanding can make a negotiation smooth and efficient. Figuratively if not literally, participants should come to see themselves as working side by side, attacking the problem not each other. In no set of negotiations are such sensitivities more relevant then in the case of Iran. For the last three decades, convoluted historical grievances, emotional barriers, and frequent and mutual misunderstandings have obstructed a rational relationship between two states that often share many interests in common. In one of the paradoxes of the Middle East, the theocratic states' position today is closer to the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton report then is the Bush administration. If we are able to separate people from the problem, we will achieve a more stable relationship with a long-term adversary.

Focus on interests, not positions. Sometimes a stated negotiating position obscures what you really want. A basic problem in negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, and fears. Today, the official US position that it is willing to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue should it suspend its enrichment activities reflects a fundamental misconception, as such discussions would focus on exclusively American concerns. In contrast, the Islamic Republic prefers comprehensive talks instead of limiting them to a single issue. In its response to the US negotiating offer, Tehran has stressed that "to resolve the [nuclear] issue in sustainable manner, there would be no alternative except to recognize and remove the underlying roots and causes that have led the two sides to the current complicated position."

Insist that the result be based on some objective standard. Because trying to settle differences on the basis of will has such high costs, the solution is to negotiate on some basis independent of the will of either side -- that is, on the basis of objective criteria. A negotiating platform that encompasses American concerns over the nuclear issue, terrorism and Iraq, and Iran's interest in sanctions relief and security assurances can best normalize a relationship long mired in acrimony and suspicion.

Today, the focus on the repugnant comments of Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, conceals that a subtle power struggle is underway between pragmatists and hard-liners. In contrast to the militants, the more pragmatic elements led by the secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security, Ali Larijani, have been pressing for a less contentious relationship with the United States. A US offer of resumed diplomatic and economic relations would do much to help them marginalize the hard-liners and tip the balance of power in their favor.

[Rasputin]

BAGHDAD, Tuesday, Feb. 6 — An Iranian diplomat was abducted Sunday evening when his convoy was stopped by men with official Defense Ministry identification in the Karrada neighborhood here, senior Iraqi and American officials said Monday.

Iraqi security forces captured several suspects after pursuing their vehicles through the streets of Baghdad, two of the Iraqi officials said.

The vehicle with the diplomat was not caught, though.

Bombings killed at least 29 people and wounded 90 more in Baghdad as preparations for the latest attempt to secure the city were under way. Those preparations are part of the American-led troop buildup that some American and Iraqi officials view as a last-ditch effort to keep violence in the capital from degenerating into an all-out sectarian war between Shiite and Sunni Arabs.

The abduction of the Iranian took place in a largely Shiite section of the city not far from where a truck bomb killed at least 135 people on Saturday and where residents have complained that the slow pace of the increase in American troops has left them open to attacks.

The men captured in the chase by Iraqi forces on Sunday were Iraqis with Defense Ministry identification, Iraqi and American officials said, raising serious questions about whether government forces themselves were involved in the abduction.

A senior Iraqi official said that the credentials initially appeared to be genuine but that investigators later received conflicting information about whether the men had been dismissed from the ministry but somehow kept their identification.

When asked about indications that an Iranian diplomat had been abducted in Baghdad, Mohammad alHosseini, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman in Tehran, said: “We need to investigate, because we have been receiving a lot of news like that these days. I cannot confirm it yet.”

If the kidnappers’ credentials turn out to be genuine, there will be enormous pressure on the Iraqi government to recover the diplomat and capture all of those involved. The Iraqi government has been critical of recent raids by American forces in which Iranians working with diplomatic offices in Iraq have been detained.

The Americans have accused some of those Iranians of supporting illicit armed groups in Iraq, but the raids have been embarrassing to the Iraqi government, which has been encouraging foreign diplomatic missions — in particular Iran’s — to increase their presence here. Iraqi officials have distanced themselves from the American raids, while Iran has simply termed those operations kidnappings.

In fact, the American position on those raids was weakened after American forces in Baghdad first announced that they would formally present evidence on illicit Iranian activity in Iraq, then pulled back amid indications that officials in Washington were not persuaded that the case was strong enough.

Tensions between the United States and Iran have recently soared over the issues of Iran’s nuclear program and statements by its ambassador to Iraq that his country planned to increase its economic and military ties with Iraq substantially.

The Iranian Embassy has not publicly acknowledged the kidnapping. But in an indication of how high tensions between Iran and the United States have risen over the American raids, the embassy privately voiced suspicions that the kidnapping of its diplomat might have been done at the behest of American forces in Baghdad, an Iraqi official said.

American Embassy and military spokesmen did not immediately respond to requests for comment that were made after midnight on Monday in Baghdad.

Beyond the unsubstantiated suspicions about the involvement of the United States in the kidnapping, there were no clear indications of whether the Iranian diplomat might have been taken by insurgents seeking to cast doubt on the stability of Iraq’s government, or simply for ransom.

But in videos, Sunni insurgents claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Arab embassies in Baghdad in 2005, when the top diplomats from Egypt and Algeria were kidnapped and killed.

Also on Monday, the United States military reported that two American soldiers had been killed the day before.

One soldier from Task Force Lightning was shot by insurgents during combat in Diyala Province. Another soldier, assigned to the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), was killed by a roadside bomb during a patrol north of Baghdad.

A British soldier was killed Monday by a roadside bomb in Basra, the 100th British military combat death in Iraq, according to British news reports.

Another 31 members of the British military have died in Iraq from accidents or other causes.

[Rasputin]

An Iranian diplomat has been kidnapped by gunmen in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, Tehran has confirmed.
Jalal Sharafi, the embassy's second secretary, was abducted from his car on Sunday in central Karrada district by men wearing Iraqi army uniforms.

Iran condemned the kidnapping and said it held the US responsible for his life. A US military spokesman said no US or Iraqi troops had been involved.

The news comes amid US-Iranian tension over Iranian activities in Iraq.

Last month in a dramatic pre-dawn helicopter raid, the Americans detained five Iranians in northern Iraq, prompting Iran to issue a formal protest to the US.

The US has denied any involvement in the latest incident, but recently has been expressing increasing concern about alleged Iranian support for militant activity in Iraq.

Correspondents say the stand-off over Iran's nuclear programme is adding to the tension.

On Tuesday, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair accused Iran of "a strategy to create maximum trouble" in the Middle East.

Identification puzzle

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini told the Isna news agency that Mr Sharafi had been kidnapped by a group linked to Iraq's defence ministry "which works under the supervision of American forces".

We've checked with our units and it was not a [multinational forces - Iraq] unit that participated in that event

Lt Col Christopher Garver,
US military spokesman

"The Islamic Republic of Iran holds the American forces in Iraq responsible for the life and safety of the Iranian diplomat," he said.

Iraqi officials earlier said the gunmen were wearing uniforms of the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion - a special Iraqi unit under US direction.

US military spokesman in Baghdad, Lt Col Christopher Garver, could not confirm the diplomat's abduction.

However, he said: "We've checked with our units and it was not a [multinational forces - Iraq] unit that participated in that event."

Mr Sharafi was reportedly kidnapped outside the Baghdad branch of the Iranian state-owned Bank Melli.

But the details of the abduction are still confused.

Kidnapping 'common'

An Iraqi government official told Associated Press news agency there had been a gun battle and a chase after the kidnapping but the car carrying the diplomat escaped.

RISING US-IRAN TENSION
Dec 2006: US forces detain several Iranians in Iraq suspected of planning attacks. Iran says two are diplomats, who are later freed
10 Jan: US President Bush says in a major speech he will take a tough stance on Iran, whom he accuses of destabilising Iraq
11 Jan: US troops in Irbil raid a building Iran says was consulate, arresting five men
18 Jan: Iran demands the release of the five "diplomats". The US says they are Revolutionary Guard arming Shia fighters


Blair: No Iran attack planned

Some men were captured but the New York Times quoted Iraqi officials as saying they had legitimate defence ministry identification.

An official told the paper the men may have kept the identification after being dismissed. It is not thought they are still being held.

The BBC's Mike Wooldridge, in Baghdad, says the fact that the kidnappers were wearing uniforms can mean anything in Baghdad.

Kidnapping is common - often criminal rather than political - and frequently carried out by people in some kind of official uniform, he says.

But against the background of the ongoing disagreements between the US and Iran, this is quickly becoming another source of diplomatic tension, our correspondent adds.

Speaking to a committee of MPs in London, Prime Minister Tony Blair accused Iran of "a strategy to create maximum trouble" in the Middle East.

Mr Blair said Tehran was trying to prevent reconciliation in Iraq.

"People are alarmed at the strategy they are pursuing," he said.

[Rasputin]

From the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism, from human rights to democratization, the Islamic Republic of Iran cuts across a wide range of American concerns. The American leaders routinely characterize Iran’s meddling in Iraq and its nuclear ambitions as a grave threat, while often musing about the eventual necessity of using military force against the recalcitrant theocracy. To properly contemplate the Iranian challenge, I shall focus on two areas of contention: Iran’s Iraq policy and its ambitious nuclear program. Through a better understanding of Iran’s motivations, one can best assess how to address its essential goals and objectives on these two critical issues.

Revolution versus Stability: Iran in Iraq
On July 7, 2005, a momentous event took place in Tehran. Saadun al-Dulaimi, Iraq’s then-defense minister, arrived in Iran and formally declared, “I have come to Iran to ask forgiveness for what Saddam Hussein has done.” The atmospherics of the trip reflected the changed relationship, as Iranian and Iraqi officials easily intermingled, signing various cooperative and trade agreements and pledging a new dawn in their relations. In yet another paradox of the Middle East, it took a hawkish American government with its well-honed antagonism toward the Islamic Republic to finally alleviate one of Iran’s most pressing strategic quandaries.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Bush administration has periodically complained about Iran’s mischievousness and intervention in Iraq’s politics. The question then becomes, what are Iran’s priorities and objectives in Iraq? Does Iran seek to export its revolution next door and create another Islamic Republic? Is it in Iran’s interest to intensify the prevailing insurgency and further entangle America in its bloody quagmire? Do Iran and the United States have common interests in the troubled state of Iraq?

As Iraq settles into its disturbing pattern of violence and disorder, the Islamic Republic has contending and at times conflicting objectives next door. The overarching priority for Tehran is to prevent Iraq from once more emerging as a military and ideological threat. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war an uneasy consensus has evolved among Iran’s officials that the cause of Iraq’s aggressive behavior was the Sunni domination of its politics. Thus, the empowerment of a more friendly Shiite regime is an essential objective of Iran’s strategy. However, given the fears of a spillover from a potential civil war and the fragmentation of the country, Iran’s leaders also seek to maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity. Finally, there is the menacing U.S. military presence in Iraq. Contrary to the notion that Iran seeks to fuel the insurgency as a means of deterring the United States from attacking its suspected nuclear facilities, Tehran appreciates that a stable Iraq is the best means of ending the American occupation. These competing aims have yielded alternative tactics, as Iran has been active in subsidizing its Shiite allies, dispatching arms to friendly militias, and agitating against the American presence.

Although Iraq’s Shiite political society is hardly homogeneous, the two parties that have emerged as the best organized and most competitive in the electoral process are the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Dawa Party. Both parties have intimate relations with Tehran and allied themselves with the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq war. SCIRI was essentially created by Iran, and its militia, the Badr Brigade, was trained and equipped by the Revolutionary Guards. For its part, Dawa is Iraq’s longest surviving Shiite political party, with a courageous record of resisting Saddam’s repression. Under tremendous pressure, Dawa did take refuge in Iran, but it also established a presence in Syria, Lebanon and eventually Britain. However, despite their long-lasting ties with the Islamic Republic, both parties appreciate that in order to remain influential actors in the post-Saddam Iraq they must place some distance between themselves and Tehran. The members of SCIRI and Dawa insist that they have no interest in emulating Iran’s theocratic model, and that Iraq’s divisions and fragmentations mandate a different governing structure. Their persistent electoral triumphs reflect not just superior organization, but a successful assertion of their own identity. Still, Dawa and SCIRI do retain close bonds with Iran, and have defended the Islamic Republic against American charges of interference and infiltration. In the end, although both parties have no inclination to act as Iran’s surrogates, they are likely to provide Tehran with a sympathetic audience, and even an alliance that, like all such arrangements, will not be free of tension and difficulty.

Although less well-publicized by Tehran, it does appear that Iran has established tacit ties with Moqtada al-Sadr and has even supplied his Mahdi army. In a sense, unlike their relations with SCIRI and Dawa, Iran’s ties to Sadr are more opportunistic, as they find his sporadic Arab nationalist rhetoric and erratic behavior problematic. Nonetheless, given his emerging power-base, strident opposition to the American occupation and his well-organized militia group, Tehran has found it advantageous to at least maintain some links with Sadr. Among the characteristic of Iran’s foreign policy is to leave as many options open as possible. At a time when Sadr is being granted an audience by the Arab leaders and dignitaries across the region, it would be astonishing if Iran did not seek some kind of a relationship with the Shiite firebrand.

Finally, there is Iran’s relation with Iraq’s most esteemed and influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Grand Ayatollah stands with traditional Shiite mullahs in rejecting Khomeini’s notion that proper Islamic governance mandates direct clerical assumption of power. As we have noted, Khomeini’s innovation contravened normative Shiite political traditions, making its export problematic, if not impossible. Thus far, both parties have been courteous and deferential to one another, with Sistani refusing to criticize Iran, while Tehran has been generous with crediting him for the Shiite populace’s increasing empowerment. Rafsanjani made a point of emphasizing Sistani’s role after the elections of the interim government, noting, “The fact that the people of Iraq have gone to the ballet box to decide their own fate is the result of efforts by the Iraqi clergy and sources of emulation, led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.”

For his part, Sistani maintains close ties to Iran’s clerical community and routinely meets with visiting Iranian officials -- a privilege not yet granted to U.S. representatives. Moreover, even though Sistani has not pressed for a theocracy, he still insists that religion must inform political and social arrangements.

The professions of the region’s Sunni elite notwithstanding, as clerical regime plots its strategy toward Iraq, it does not seem inordinately interested in exporting its failed governing model to an unwilling Shiite population. As an influential Iranian politician, Muhammad Javad Larijani, plainly noted, “Iran’s experience is not possible to be duplicated in Iraq.” As such, Tehran’s promotion of its Shiite allies is a way of ensuring that a future Iraqi government features voices who are willing to engage with Iran. The clerical rulers have no delusions about the Iraqi Shiite community subordinating its communal interests to Iran’s prerogatives; they merely hope that promotion of Shiite parties will provide them with a suitable interlocutor. It is important to note that Iran’s policy toward Iraq, as elsewhere in the Gulf, is predicated on carefully calibrated calculations of national interest, as opposed to a messianic mission of advancing the revolution.

Today, the essential estrangement of the Iraqi Shiites from the larger Arab world, and the Sunni dynasties unease with their empowerment makes the community more attractive to Iran. The ascendance of the Shiites maybe acceptable to the Bush administration with its democratic imperatives, but the Sunni monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the presidential dictatorships of Egypt and Syria are extremely anxious about the emergence of a new “arch of Shiism.” At a time when the leading pan-Arab newspapers routinely decry the invasion of Iraq as an U.S.-Iranian plot to undermine the cohesion of the Sunni bloc, the prospects of an elected Shiite government in Iraq being warmly embraced by the Arab world seems remote. Iraq’s new Shiite parties, conservative or moderate, are drawn to Iran, as they look for natural allies. It is unlikely that this will change, as the political alignments of the Middle East are increasingly being defined by sectarian identities.

[Rasputin]

The Nuclear Conundrum
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a regime continuously divided against itself. Even in the era of conservative political hegemony, there are factions, as on issues of economic reforms, regional priorities and even relations with America, conservative frequently find themselves at odds with one another. However, today, a unique consensus has evolved within the regime on the nuclear issue. Iran’s cantankerous conservatives seem united on the notion that the Islamic Republic should have an advanced nuclear infrastructure that will offer it an opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold at some point. Whether Iran will take that step or will remain satisfied with a presumed capability just short of an actual breakout, as India did prior to 1997, will depend on a range of domestic and international developments.

From the outset it must be emphasized that for all the factions involved in this debate, the core issue is how to safeguard Iran’s national interests. The Islamic Republic is not an irrational rogue state seeking such weaponry as an instrument of an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy. This is not an “Islamic bomb” to be handed over to terrorist organizations or exploded in the streets of New York or Washington. The fact is that Iran has long possessed chemical weapons, and has yet to transfer such arms to its terrorist allies. Iran’s cautious leaders are most interested in remaining in power and fully appreciate that transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists could lead to the type of retaliation from the United States or Israel that would eliminate their regime altogether. For Iran this is a weapon of deterrence and power projection.

The primary supporters of the nuclear program are now officials in command of key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Guardian Council. A fundamental tenet of the hardliners’ ideology is the notion that the Islamic Republic is in constant danger from predatory external forces, necessitating military self-reliance. This perception was initially molded by a revolution that sought not just to defy international norms but also to refashion them. The passage of time and the failure of that mission have not necessarily diminished the hardliners’ suspicions of the international order and its primary guardian, the United States. Jumhuri-ye Islami, the conservative newspaper and the mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sounded this theme by stressing,

The core problem is the fact that our officials’ outlook on the nuclear dossier of Iran is faulty and they are on the wrong track. It seems they have failed to appreciate that America is after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for them.

In a similar vein, Resalat, another influential conservative paper, sounded out the themes of deterrence and national interest by claiming, “In the present situation of international order whose main characteristics are injustice and the weakening of the rights of others, the Islamic Republic has no alternative but intelligent resistance while paying the least cost.” Given its paranoia and suspicions, the Iranian right does not necessarily object to international isolation and confrontation with the West. Indeed, for many within this camp, such a conflict would be an effective means of rekindling popular support for the revolution’s fading élan.

Iran’s nuclear calculations have been further hardened by the rise of war veterans, such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to positions of power. Although the Iran-Iraq war ended nearly twenty years ago, for many within the Islamic Republic it was a defining experience that altered their strategic assumptions. Even a cursory examination of Ahmadinejad’s speeches reveals that for him the war is far from a faded memory. In his defiant speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2005, Iran’s president pointedly admonished the assembled dignitaries for their failings:

For eight years, Saddam’s regime imposed a massive war of aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then?

The international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s lack of an effective response has led Iran’s war-veteran president to perceive that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties.

The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran’s nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated. Iraq’s employment of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and combatants has permanently scarred Iran’s national psyche. Whatever their tactical military utility, in Saddam’s hands, chemical weapons were tools of terror, as he hoped that through their indiscriminate use he could frighten and demoralize the Iranian populace. To a large extend, this strategy did succeed, as Iraqi attacks did much to undermine the national support for the continuation of the war.

Beyond the human toll, the war also changed Iran’s strategic doctrine. During the war, Iran persisted with the notion that technological superiority cannot overcome revolutionary zeal and a willingness to offer martyrs. To compensate for its lack of weaponry, Iran launched human wave assaults and used its young population as a tool of an offensive military strategy. The devastation of the war and the loss of an appetite for “martyrdom” among Iran’s youth has invalidated that theory. As Rafsanjani acknowledged, “With regards to chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, it was made clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. We should fully equip ourselves in both offensive and defensive use of these weapons.” Moreover, the indifference of the international community to Saddam’s crimes also left its mark, leading Iran to reject the notion that international agreements can ensure its security. As Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, said in 2004, “We cannot, generally speaking, argue that our country will derive any benefit from accepting international treaties.” Deterrence could no longer be predicated on revolutionary commitment and international opinion, as Iran required a more credible military response.

The legacy of the war only reinforces a nationalistic narrative that sees America’s demands for Iran to relinquish its fuel cycle rights under the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as inherently unjust. As a country that has historically been the subject of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately sensitive of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The rulers of Iran perceive that they are being challenged not because of their provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran’s national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hardliners. To stand against America on this issue is to validate one’s revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Ali Husseini Tash, the Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stressed this point, saying, “A nation that does not engage in risks and difficult challenges, and a nation which does not stand up for itself can never be a proud nation.” Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran’s aggrieved nationalists.

Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the theocratic hardliners are eternal optimists when it comes to their assessment of how the international community will respond to Iran’s nuclear breakout. Many influential conservative voices insist that Iran would follow the model of India and Pakistan, with the initial international outcry soon followed by an acceptance of Iran’s new status. Thus, Tehran would regain its commercial contracts and keep its nuclear weapons. The former Iranian foreign minister Akbar Velayati noted this theme when stressing, “Whenever we stand firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely, they are forced to retreat and have no alternatives.” The right thus rejects the notion that Iran’s mischievous past and its tense relations with the United States would militate against the international community’s accepting Iran’s nuclear status.

However, should their anticipations prove misguided, and Iran becomes the subject of sanctions, it is a price that the hardliners are willing to pay for an important national prerogative. Ahmadinejad has pointedly noted that even sanctions were to be imposed, “the Iranian nation would still have its rights.” In a similar vein, Ayatollah Jannati has noted, “We do not welcome sanctions, but if we are threatened by sanctions, we will not give in.” The notion of the need to sacrifice and struggle on behalf of the revolution and resist imperious international demands is an essential tent of the hardliners’ ideological perspective.

For the foreseeable future, the United States confronts an Iranian state whose strategic vulnerabilities, regional ambitions and internal political alignments press it in the direction of nuclear capability. Moreover Iran’s nuclear empowerment comes at a time when it is bound to be the leading state in the strategically critical Persian Gulf region. These trends can neither be easily reversed through a policy of coercion or pressure, as in the end, a diplomatic engagement between the United States and Iran maybe the only manner of tempering the theocracy’s more troublesome designs.

[Rasputin]

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice faced a blistering challenge in Congress over the administration's failure to provide evidence to back up allegations Iran is building nuclear weapons and fueling attacks on US forces in Iraq.


"Unproven charges against Iran's nuclear intentions are eerily reminiscent of the false charges made against Iraq before we invaded that country," said Ron Paul (news, bio, voting record), a lawmaker from President George W. Bush's own Republican Party, during an appearance by Rice before a congressional panel.

He said "unproven accusations of Iranian support for the Iraqi insurgency" were also serving as a pretext for "escalating our sharp rhetoric toward Iran."

"Pressed for proof of dramatic claims of Iranian involvement in Iraq, the administration keeps promising that they are compiling it," he said.

"This sounds like Iraq, where accusations came first and proof was supposed to come later -- only that proof never came because the accusations turned out to be false," he said, referring to now discredited allegations that Saddam Hussein's regime was building weapons of mass destruction.

US officials have been promising for weeks to make public what State Department spokesman Sean McCormack described as a "mountain of evidence" to back up US allegations about Iranian involvement in attacks on US and allied forces in Iraq.

But the proof has yet to be forthcoming.

Rice rejected suggestions the administration was exaggerating its case against Iran to pave the way for military action.

"We are not planning or intending an attack on Iran," she said.

"What we are doing is that we are responding to a number of Iranian policies both in Iran and around the world that are actually quite dangerous for our national security," she said.

Rice asserted that Iranian support for terrorism was "well known and well-understood" and included providing arms and training to the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon and backing sectarian death squads in Iraq.

She said British forces in Iraq had also linked Iran to attacks on allied forces in the country, notably with sophisticated bombs able to penetrate armored vehicles.

"I don't think any government in the world would stand by and not react to that," she said.

McCormack meanwhile rejected suggestions the administration had yet to reveal its proof of Iranian involvement in Iraq because the evidence was not strong enough to sway skeptics.

"We're going to do this on our own timeline," he said, arguing that it took time to vet the "rich fact base" pointing to Iran's guilt so as not to compromise US intelligence sources.

"There are always going to be doubters, critics, skeptics, that's fine, we accept that," he said.

"It's not going to influence us into hurrying through something that we don't think is ready or appropriate."

[Rasputin]

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran's top authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on Thursday the Islamic Republic would target U.S. interests around the world if it came under attack, state television reported.

Iran and the United States are locked in a dispute over Tehran's nuclear program, which Washington says is being used to build atomic bombs. U.S. officials say they want diplomacy to end the standoff but have not ruled out force if that fails.

"The enemies know well that any aggression will lead to a reaction from all sides in the Iranian nation on the aggressors and their interests around the world," Khamenei was quoted as saying by state television.

"We believe that no one will make such an unwise and wrong move (to attack Iran) that would endanger their country and interests. Some say that the U.S. president is not the type who acts based on calculations or thinks about the consequences of his action. But even these people can be brought to their senses," he said.

U.S. President George Bush has said he has no intention of invading Iran, though he has pledged to step up pressure on the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program and what Washington calls Iran's meddling in Iraq.

Tehran insists its nuclear program is purely civilian and says it is not backing militants in Iraq.