As entrance to the religious schools and seminaries are open to the general public, advancement is entirely personal; therefore creation of a hereditary elitism or aristocracy of the incumbents is practically impossible. The slow process of ascension in the system may take up to 40 years. The system of progression is not unlike Catholicism however, the greatest difference is the positive ratio of wealth and glitter to the elevation of status in the Catholic Church compared to the negative one amongst the Shiite clergy. The higher an Ayatollah climbs the more his life style is marked by simplicity and abject frugality, especially amongst the Grand Ayatollahs. Another point of difference is that contrary to the Catholicism or the Anglican Church where there is only one Pope or one Archbishop at any given time, in the Shiite sect there are several contemporary Grand Ayatollahs with competing undesignated spheres of influence each comparable if not equal to the other. The Shiite clerics keep a direct and constant contact with their flock by living amongst them and through their particular life style. Throughout history, they have often championed the cause of the people on their conflicts with the secular powers. However following an age old unwritten mutual contract, the secular powers have spread their influence over the masses through the power of the clergy. On occasions, the clergy have successfully challenged kings and sultans while in case of the reverse, it has invariably ended in the detriment of the secular powers. A good example of all characteristics named above is the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Although, during his own lifetime, he reached the apex of power, toppled one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and replaced a ruler, he wore the simplicity and frugality of his life and later his office as a badge of honor. He is the manifestation of the power of the Shiite clerics and the pivotal role they play in the relationship between the secular powers and the populace.
Financially the clerical organization is a self-sustaining independent system. The faithful provide the cost of the running of the system by taxes regulated by the Koran. These taxes are irrespective of the revenues paid to the State. Theoretically Islamic religious taxes amount to a one time Estate Tax equal to 1/5th of any persons estimated wealth and an annual 1/7th income tax. Revenues are paid to the Imam of the local mosques, which after deduction of the expenses of the local network are sent to the Grand Ayatollah who is the accepted Marja’a (source of emulation) of the area. The Grand Ayatollah then decides on the further distribution of the funds. As the revenues are calculated and paid voluntarily by the individuals personally, the collected revenues are an irrepressible and uncontrollable source of income. In other words, the source, the amount, and the end use of the funds are not controllable by any extent of imagination or any outside authority. Considering the number of the faithful and assuming that only practicing believers abide by these taxation laws, the sums collected are still staggering. It also is representative of the strength of the network and the extent of social influence of the Shiite religious establishment. The only factor that plays the role of the checks and balances and prevents concentration of excessive power in one person, eliminating emergence of personal cults is the plurality of Grand Ayatollahs. Depending on the extent of the sphere of influence, powers of each individual Grand Ayatollah is varied. This constitutes a natural flaw in the system and becomes the source of bitter rivalries and behind the scenes backstabbing.
The long and arduous training period of over 40 years for the top clerics, as well as educating them in the fundamentals of the religion, it also provides them with all the tricks of the trade for diplomacy, clean and dirty politics, conspiracies, and the techniques of infighting and eventually doing away with the rivals. History shows that in conflicts between the clerics themselves, almost no holds are barred. If the use of conspiracies, rumor mongering and other less violent techniques are not sufficient to bring the opponent to his knees, the use of thugs and club wielders and in modern times Kalashnikovs and suicide bombers may enter the arena. Thus, Machiavellian mannerism is an integral part of life of the Shiite clerics. In other words, this long and protracted system of training turns them into extremely competent politicians and adversaries with a thorough knowledge of Real-Politics. These characters become most unassailable if one takes into account, the source of the power they wield; it is not granted by man but ordained by God.
It is through these methods that the present Iranian regime has not only succeeded in strangulation of its secular opponents but also has alienated and disarmed the clerical sources of opposition and objection.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the present Iranian Supreme Leader, the virtual source of power and the man who has a finger on the proverbial button and by many is considered to be a Pragmatist mullah, has been through this educational mill and under his benevolent spiritual surface lies a reactionary hardliner. If in the past, he has ever demonstrated any leniency and relinquished some of the restrictions dictated by the Shiite laws, the compromise has been a temporary measure and has been carried out under duress. Ordinarily the decisions have been made for the preservation and good of the theocratic dominance and maintenance of hold of the clerics to the seat of power.
The theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic although on the surface fragmented and polycentric, is a self-preserving and disciplined organization. The regime and its supporting structures are well aware of their public unpopularity. The system is run in a manner that totally excludes any form of outside control or accountability in a country that is relatively wealthy. The elite manage and distribute the country’s wealth and only a small portion seeps down into the society on an according to the need basis. Naturally this type of governance invites corruption. The true followers are rewarded handsomely and the ultimate qualification for becoming included in the inner circle is absolute loyalty. A significant character of the regime is its nepotism where the ruling elite including those who play the role of the opposition are related to one another by blood or by marriage. Ayatollah Khatami, The former reformist president was a close relative of both Ayatollah Khomeini the founder of the republic and Ali Khamenei the present Supreme Leader. Regime’s response in dealing with unauthorized opposition does not spare anyone including the clergy. Clerics like Grand Ayatollah Shari’atmadaari, and Taleghani were two early victims of the regime while Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, the heir apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini has been in house arrest for over 10 years. To discourage opposition the punishments of the dissidents extends beyond the opponents and include his extended family and friends. The combined character of rewarding the followers handsomely and crushing the opposition ruthlessly has created a suffocating atmosphere of subservience that makes any meaningful and effective opposition impossible. However this Machiavellian system of governance is not unique to the Iranian regime. Writing about the lessons learnt form the Cold War Paul Wolfowitz the Assistant Secretary of Defense (2000=2004) recommends; ”....demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so.”
Financially the clerical organization is a self-sustaining independent system. The faithful provide the cost of the running of the system by taxes regulated by the Koran. These taxes are irrespective of the revenues paid to the State. Theoretically Islamic religious taxes amount to a one time Estate Tax equal to 1/5th of any persons estimated wealth and an annual 1/7th income tax. Revenues are paid to the Imam of the local mosques, which after deduction of the expenses of the local network are sent to the Grand Ayatollah who is the accepted Marja’a (source of emulation) of the area. The Grand Ayatollah then decides on the further distribution of the funds. As the revenues are calculated and paid voluntarily by the individuals personally, the collected revenues are an irrepressible and uncontrollable source of income. In other words, the source, the amount, and the end use of the funds are not controllable by any extent of imagination or any outside authority. Considering the number of the faithful and assuming that only practicing believers abide by these taxation laws, the sums collected are still staggering. It also is representative of the strength of the network and the extent of social influence of the Shiite religious establishment. The only factor that plays the role of the checks and balances and prevents concentration of excessive power in one person, eliminating emergence of personal cults is the plurality of Grand Ayatollahs. Depending on the extent of the sphere of influence, powers of each individual Grand Ayatollah is varied. This constitutes a natural flaw in the system and becomes the source of bitter rivalries and behind the scenes backstabbing.
The long and arduous training period of over 40 years for the top clerics, as well as educating them in the fundamentals of the religion, it also provides them with all the tricks of the trade for diplomacy, clean and dirty politics, conspiracies, and the techniques of infighting and eventually doing away with the rivals. History shows that in conflicts between the clerics themselves, almost no holds are barred. If the use of conspiracies, rumor mongering and other less violent techniques are not sufficient to bring the opponent to his knees, the use of thugs and club wielders and in modern times Kalashnikovs and suicide bombers may enter the arena. Thus, Machiavellian mannerism is an integral part of life of the Shiite clerics. In other words, this long and protracted system of training turns them into extremely competent politicians and adversaries with a thorough knowledge of Real-Politics. These characters become most unassailable if one takes into account, the source of the power they wield; it is not granted by man but ordained by God.
It is through these methods that the present Iranian regime has not only succeeded in strangulation of its secular opponents but also has alienated and disarmed the clerical sources of opposition and objection.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the present Iranian Supreme Leader, the virtual source of power and the man who has a finger on the proverbial button and by many is considered to be a Pragmatist mullah, has been through this educational mill and under his benevolent spiritual surface lies a reactionary hardliner. If in the past, he has ever demonstrated any leniency and relinquished some of the restrictions dictated by the Shiite laws, the compromise has been a temporary measure and has been carried out under duress. Ordinarily the decisions have been made for the preservation and good of the theocratic dominance and maintenance of hold of the clerics to the seat of power.
The theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic although on the surface fragmented and polycentric, is a self-preserving and disciplined organization. The regime and its supporting structures are well aware of their public unpopularity. The system is run in a manner that totally excludes any form of outside control or accountability in a country that is relatively wealthy. The elite manage and distribute the country’s wealth and only a small portion seeps down into the society on an according to the need basis. Naturally this type of governance invites corruption. The true followers are rewarded handsomely and the ultimate qualification for becoming included in the inner circle is absolute loyalty. A significant character of the regime is its nepotism where the ruling elite including those who play the role of the opposition are related to one another by blood or by marriage. Ayatollah Khatami, The former reformist president was a close relative of both Ayatollah Khomeini the founder of the republic and Ali Khamenei the present Supreme Leader. Regime’s response in dealing with unauthorized opposition does not spare anyone including the clergy. Clerics like Grand Ayatollah Shari’atmadaari, and Taleghani were two early victims of the regime while Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, the heir apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini has been in house arrest for over 10 years. To discourage opposition the punishments of the dissidents extends beyond the opponents and include his extended family and friends. The combined character of rewarding the followers handsomely and crushing the opposition ruthlessly has created a suffocating atmosphere of subservience that makes any meaningful and effective opposition impossible. However this Machiavellian system of governance is not unique to the Iranian regime. Writing about the lessons learnt form the Cold War Paul Wolfowitz the Assistant Secretary of Defense (2000=2004) recommends; ”....demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so.”

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