Iran-U.S.A

[Rasputin]

Military Surplus Parts Illegally Find Their Way to Iran, U.S. Officials Say

Fighter-jet parts and other sensitive U.S. military gear seized from front companies for Iran and brokers for China have been traced in criminal cases to a surprising source: the Pentagon.

In one case, federal investigators said, contraband purchased in Defense Department surplus auctions was delivered to Iran, a country President Bush has branded part of an "axis of evil."

In that instance, a Pakistani arms broker convicted of exporting U.S. missile parts to Iran resumed business after his release from prison. He purchased Chinook helicopter engine parts for Iran from a U.S. company that had bought them in a Pentagon surplus sale. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents say those parts reached Iran.

Sensitive military surplus items are supposed to be demilitarized or "de-milled" -- rendered useless for military purposes -- or, if auctioned, sold only to buyers who promise to obey U.S. arms embargoes, export controls and other laws.

Yet the surplus sales can operate like a supermarket for arms dealers.

"Right Item, Right Time, Right Place, Right Price, Every Time. Best Value Solutions for America's Warfighters," the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service says on its Web site, calling itself "the place to obtain original U.S. Government surplus property."

Federal investigators are increasingly anxious that a top priority on Iran's shopping list is within its easy reach: parts for the precious fleet of F-14 Tomcat fighter jets the United States allowed Iran to buy in the 1970s when it was an ally.

In one case, convicted middlemen for Iran bought Tomcat parts from the Defense Department's surplus division. Customs agents confiscated them and returned them to the Pentagon, which sold them again -- customs evidence tags still attached -- to another buyer, a suspected broker for Iran.

"That would be evidence of a significant breakdown, in my view, in controls and processes," said Greg Kutz, the Government Accountability Office's head of special investigations. "It shouldn't happen the first time, let alone the second time."

A Defense Department official, Frederick N. Baillie, said his Pentagon unit followed procedures.

"The fact that those individuals chose to violate the law and the fact that the customs people caught them really indicates that the process is working," said Baillie, the Defense Logistics Agency's executive director of distribution and revitalization policy. "Customs is supposed to check all exports to make sure that all the appropriate certifications and licenses had been granted."

[donsaeid]

ناو هواپيمابر آيزنهاور آمريكا خليج فارس را ترك كرد


ناو هواپيمابر آيزنهاور در حالي منطقه خليج فارس را ترك كرده است كه تحليل ها و شايعات گسترده*اي مبني بر حمله قريب الوقوع امريكابه ايران، توسط برخي رسانه*ها در حال انتشار است.


يك مقام مطلع در نيروهاي مسلح كشورمان در اين باره گفت: به رغم جنگ رواني اخير آمريكا مبني بر افزايش فشارها بر ايران از طريق اضافه شدن نيروهاي نظامي آمريكا در منطقه، ناو هواپيمابر آيزنهاور آمريكا چند روزي است كه از خليج فارس خارج و اكنون در شرق كشور عمان مستقر شده است.

وي با اشاره به احتمال جايگزين شدن ناو هواپيمابر جان استينز با آيزنهاور تاكيد كرد: برخي سعي دارند اينگونه نشان دهند كه نيروهاي نظامي آمريكا در حالت آماده باش براي حمله به ايران قرار دارند، در حالي كه اين مسئله به هيچ وجه نمود واقعي ندارد و خروج اين ناو هواپيمابر نيز گواهي بر اين مسئله است.

اين مقام آگاه خاطرنشان كرد: اشراف كامل نيروهاي دريايي كشورمان بر تردد نيروهاي فرامنطقه*اي كه نمونه*اي از آن در ناگفته*هاي برخورد زيردريايي اتمي آمريكا با نفتكش ژاپني از زبان فرمانده نيروي دريايي ارتش بيان شد، هرگونه گمانه زني ناآگاهانه را غيرموجه، نادرست و موجب تشويش اذهان عمومي مي سازد.

[donsaeid]

[donsaeid]

محسن رضايي:

آمريكا ادبيات جديدي را با ايران به كار گيرد


دبير مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام تاكيد كرد: امريكا بايد در عصر جديد با ادبيات و زبان جديدي با جهان به ويژه جمهوري اسلامي ايران صحبت كند.



به نقل از دفتر دبير مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام، محسن رضايي امروز سه شنبه در ديدار گريگوري موريارتي سفير استراليا در ايران با استقبال از توسعه همكاري*هاي ميان دو كشور اظهار داشت: ايران و استراليا داراي امكانات خوبي هستند كه مي*تواند در برگيرنده مسايل اقتصادي، سياسي، اجتماعي و فرهنگي و دفاعي باشد.

وي با توجه به روابط مناسب استراليا با كشورهاي اروپايي به ويژه آلمان و انگليس و همچنين آمريكا گفت:استراليا مي*تواند نقش مهمي در ارتقاء آگاهي غرب نسبت به مواضع اصولي و به حق جمهوري اسلامي ايران داشته باشد.

رضايي تاكيد كرد: عصر زورگويي نه تنها در ايران بلكه در جهان خاتمه يافته است و آمريكا بايد در عصر جديد با ادبيات و زبان جديدي با جهان به ويژه جمهوري اسلامي ايران صحبت كند.

دبير مجمع تشخيص مصلحت نظام با اشاره به اين كه آمريكا بعد از ماجراي 11 سپتامبر تمام برنامه*هاي خود را بر تهديد 5 كشور لبنان، سوريه، عراق، افغانستان و ايران متمركز كرده است، از اين كشورها به عنوان كمربند طلايي نام برد كه محوريت آن ايران است.

محسن رضايي هر يك از كشورهاي ياد شده را فلسطين جديدي براي آمريكايي*ها دانست و گفت: تنها راه منطقي براي آمريكايي*ها راه*حل ديپلماسي و تغيير در رفتار سياسي آن است.

وي مسير پيش روي آمريكايي*ها مبني بر اعمال فشار را اشتباه خواند و گفت:عقلاي دنيا مي*توانند در تغيير اين نگرش نقش موثر و سازنده*اي داشته باشند.

گريگوري موريارتي نيز در اين ديدار با انتقال تقاضاي دولت متبوعش مبني بر افزايش همكاري*هاي دفاعي با جمهوري اسلامي ايران، از كشورمان به عنوان يك كشور مهم راهبردي در منطقه نام برد.

وي همچنين گزارش مبسوطي از مسايل منطقه*اي و بين*المللي به ويژه عراق و افغانستان و مسايل هسته*اي ارايه داد.

سفير استراليا در ايران افزود: نمي*توان ايران را در معادلات منطقه*اي و حتي بين*المللي ناديده گرفت، چون فرهنگ و تمدن با سابقه و امتياز ژئوپوليتيكي آن بر هيچ كس پوشيده نيست.

[donsaeid]

[Rasputin]

معاون وزير امور خارجه آمريكا اعزام دومين ناو هواپيمابر آمريكا به خاورميانه را روش واشنگتن براى هشدار به ايران ذكر كرد.

خبرگزارى آسوشيتدپرس گزارش داد كه نيكلاس برنز در مركز تحقيقات خليج*فارس در دوبى گفت:"آشتى ميان ايران و آمريكا امكان*پذير نيست، مگر اينكه ايران غني*سازى اورانيوم را تعليق كند."
برنز تاكيد كرد: خاورميانه منطقه*اى نيست كه ايران برآن تسلط يابد و خليج فارس منطقه آبى نيست كه ايران آن را كنترل كند، به همين دليل است كه شاهد دو ناو هواپيمابر آمريكا در منطقه هستيم.

وى هشدار داد كه ايران بايد درك كند در صورت تلاش براى رويارويى با ما، آمريكا از منافع خود دفاع مي*كند.

روزنامه عرب* تايمز نيز به نقل از برنز نوشت: آمريكا به دنبال راه حل ديپلماتيك است اما ايران برآورد غلطى از سناريو دارد. آمريكا هميشه ثبات اين منطقه استراتژيك را در ذهن دارد اما ايران مي*كوشد با تسلط بر اين منطقه، اوضاع را تغيير دهد اما واشنگتن اجازه نمي*دهد چنين حادثه*اى رخ دهد، زيرا مايل نيستيم ايران بر منطقه تسلط يابد. بنابراين زمانى كه به چالش كشيده شويم از طريق اقتصادي، مالى و سياسى و نه لزوما اقدام نظامي، به آن پاسخ مي*دهيم.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

It is commonly said that the United States has no Middle East strategy. That may not be true much longer. The United States has begun to establish the framework of a new coalition strategy in the Middle East that could rebuild tattered alliances, shift attention away from the Iraqi catastrophe, and provide a touchstone for policymaking that could appeal across party lines.

The organizing principle of the new strategy is confrontation with and containment of Shia influence -- and specifically Iranian influence -- wherever it appears in the region. US allies in this endeavor are Israel and the traditional (and authoritarian) governments of predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. One unique feature of this otherwise unremarkable set of long-standing friendly governments is the possibility that the Arab states may subordinate their hostility to Israel at least temporarily out of their even greater fear of Iranian/Shia dominance of the region.

One of the products of the U.S. armed intervention in the Middle East since 9/11 has been a shift in the fundamental balance of power. In the name of fighting terrorism, the United States empowered Iran. By removing the Taliban, Iran's greatest threat to the east, and then removing the government of Saddam Hussein, its deadly enemy to the west, and finally installing an Iran-friendly Shia government in Baghdad for the first time in history, the U.S. virtually assured that Iran -- essentially without raising a finger -- would emerge as a power center rivaled only by Israel. It is one of the great ironies that U.S. policy would inadvertently make it possible for these two non-Arab states on the eastern and western flank of the Arab Middle East to dominate the traditional Arab heartland. The process was further accelerated by U.S. democratization policies that put its traditional Arab allies on the defensive.

Although these were unintended consequences of U.S. policy, the effects dismayed friends and foes alike. From Iran's perspective, it was a strategic gift of unparalleled proportions, tarnished only by the fact that its two major enemies had been replaced by a pugnacious U.S. military giant looking for new worlds to conquer. That tarnish was gradually removed as the United States found itself increasingly bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire, with a public fast growing disillusioned with the ugly realities of empire building in a hostile and unforgiving environment. Erstwhile U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere privately viewed U.S. actions as a failure at best and a betrayal at worst. They were ripe for a change.

The origins of the new cooperative undertaking are murky, but they appear to have been galvanized by the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon the summer of 2006. This event was perceived by Israel, the United States and the Sunni Arab governments in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan as an Iranian attempt to extend its power into the Levant by challenging both Israel and the Sunni Arab leadership. Whether Iran in fact had any direct control over the decision by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, to kidnap Israeli soldiers is far from clear; however, the perception of growing Iranian strength and reach -- a fundamental shift in the Middle East balance of power -- was unquestioned and hugely menacing to the traditional power brokers of the region. Initially they had to swallow their words of discontent as Hezbollah acquitted itself very creditably and entranced the Arab "street." But once the war was over and Hezbollah began challenging the predominantly Sunni and Christian Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora, initial misgivings reemerged.

In the following months we have seen a number of indicators of a new coordinated policy approach. Senior Saudi officials met privately with equally senior Israeli officials, which was itself a remarkable new development. The content of the discussions has not been revealed, but one of the participants was rumored to be Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the former Saudi Ambassador to Washington and presently Secretary-General of the Saudi National Security Council, one of the architects of the U.S.-Saudi collaboration against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and a wheeler-dealer of legendary reputation. During the same time period, Bandar began a series of private visits to Washington, meeting with U.S. officials at the highest level. Apparently these meetings occurred without the knowledge of the present Saudi ambassador who abruptly resigned after the information became public.

The United States successfully shepherded a resolution through the United Nations Security Council denouncing Iran's nuclear program and imposing limited sanctions. It was adopted unanimously, and it gives Iran 60 days to change its policies or the issue will be revisited. In the speech by President Bush announcing a troop increase in Iraq, he focused a surprising amount of attention on Iran. The announced increase of U.S. naval presence in the Gulf region together with the supply of Patriot anti-missile batteries to the Gulf were widely interpreted as warning signals to Iran. The United States is taking an expansive view of the UNSC sanctions by prohibiting a major Iranian bank from operating in the U.S. and leading a campaign to persuade others to do the same. In the meantime, Israel has maintained a drumfire of criticism of Iran's nuclear program, including suggestions that if no one else is willing to act, Israel may be called upon to launch a strike against Iran on is own.

Some of these developments were spelled by Deborah Amos of NPR in a special report on January 17.

There have not been (and probably will not be) any formal announcements, but the accumulating evidence suggests that a major new strategy is being pursued. What are its moving parts? It is still early days, but here is my own interpretation of the division of labor that seems to be emerging:

United States:
-- Drop any further talk about democratization in the Middle East;
-- Use its influence in the United Nations Security Council to keep the pressure on Iran (and to a lesser extent Syria) with sanctions and coordinated international disapproval;
-- Provide military cover for the Arab Gulf states as they take a more confrontational position vis a vis Iran (Patriot missiles, additional naval aircraft, etc.);
-- Undertake a more vigorous diplomatic effort to find a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, recognizing that even limited visible progress will provide diplomatic cover for the Arab states if they are to cooperate more closely with Israel;
-- In Lebanon, provide covert support for efforts to support the Siniora government and to thwart Hezbollah, probably in close cooperation with Israeli intelligence;
-- Organize dissident movements in Iran, primarily among ethnic groups along the periphery or other targets of opportunity, to distract and potentially even destabilize the Tehran government;
-- In Iraq: (1) keep attention focused on Iran, including raids and general harassment of its representatives; (2) keep U.S. forces in country to prevent the situation from descending into full scale civil war or a breakup of the country (or, as Henry Kissinger presents it in a recent article, combining both points: "They [U.S. troops] are there as an expression of the American national interest to prevent the Iranian combination of imperialism and fundamentalist ideology from dominating a region on which the energy supplies of the industrial democracies depend"); and (3) consider engineering a more Sunni-friendly government, especially if Prime Minister Maliki is unwilling or unable to control the Shia militias;

[Rasputin]

Israel:
-- Provide intelligence support to U.S. (and potentially Arab) anti-Hezbollah efforts in Lebanon;
-- Keep international attention focused on the Iranian threat as a uniquely dangerous situation that may even demand Israeli military intervention;
-- Use long-standing Israeli contacts, especially with the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, to foment opposition to the Tehran government;
-- Be prepared to make sufficient concessions on the Palestinian issue and the Golan to provide at least the perception of significant forward motion toward a comprehensive settlement.

A tripartite strategy of this sort has a number of appealing qualities. By keeping attention focused as fully as possible on Iran as the true threat in the region, it tends to change the subject and distract public attention from the Iraqi disaster. It provides something of real value to each of the participants, but most of the distasteful parts of the plan are plausibly deniable so they will not have to be explained or justified in great detail to skeptical observers in any of the countries involved. In the United States, the antipathy to Iran as a result of the hostage crisis in 1979-81, inter alia, is so strong that such a strategy is likely to have widespread appeal to Democrats and Republicans alike, with enthusiastic endorsement from pro-Israel lobbying groups.

Perhaps most important of all, it provides a single, agreed enemy that can serve as the organizing point of reference for policies throughout the region. Like the cold war, this can be used to explain and rationalize a wide range of policies that otherwise might be quite unpopular. The Holy Grail of U.S. Middle East policy has always been the hope of persuading both Arab and Israeli allies to agree on a common enemy and thereby relegate their mutual hostilities to a subordinate role. Trying to get the Arabs to conclude that the Soviet Union was a more immediate threat than Israel was always a losing proposition, though it did not prevent several U.S. administrations from trying. But Iran, as a large, neighboring, non-Arab, radical Shia state, may fulfill that role more convincingly.

The advent of Mr Ahmadinejad in Iran, with his extravagant rhetoric and populist posturing, makes that a much easier sell than it was under President Khatami. More than anyone else, Ahmadinejad is responsible for the appeal of this strategy. He has done immense -- and perhaps irreparable -- damage to Iran's image in the world and its genuine foreign policy objectives. The fact that Iranian parliamentarians are banding together in opposition to him and his policies is evidence that this has not gone unobserved in Tehran, but it may be too late.

Will the strategy work? Well, it does NOT necessarily mean an immediate recourse to military conflict, as some are predicting. The underlying fundamentals have not changed: none of the tripartite protagonists stand to gain by an actual war. Especially after the Iraqi experience, it is widely understood in Washington that a war with a country as large and as nationalistic as Iran would be immensely costly and almost certainly futile. Moreover, there is no halfway house. You can't do a quick air strike and realistically expect it to end there. The situation would inevitably escalate and ultimately require boots on the ground. That is a bridge too far for the United States at this juncture. However, the strategy is deliberately provocative and risks prompting a belligerent Iranian response (or perhaps it is deliberately looking for a belligerent response} that could quickly escalate into an armed exchange. So the threat of military action is not insignificant.

Will the new policy persuade Iran to change its policies? Probably not, although knowledgeable Iranian political observers say Iran is actually ripe for a deal that would deal with both the nuclear and the Iraqi issues. Iran will have a celebration in a few weeks about its initial success in running a linked series of centrifuge cascades. That would be the moment when they could accept at least a temporary suspension of enrichment activities without renouncing their national "right to enrich." If the Europeans (and Americans) are interested in moving to a settlement of the nuclear issue, that would be the moment to revisit and/or creatively reformulate the array of proposals -- Iranian and European -- that are already on the table.

The new tripartite strategy, however, is not really about Iran but about the three protagonists. It brings them together, gives them a common purpose, offers an alternative to the current misery of reporting about Iraq, and provides a focus for future planning that might gain a wide measure of support. Unfortunately, that suggests that actually finding a negotiated solution with Iran is very much a secondary priority.

[Rasputin]

Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq

The Bush administration has authorized the U.S. military to kill or capture Iranian operatives inside Iraq as part of an aggressive new strategy to weaken Tehran's influence across the Middle East and compel it to give up its nuclear program, according to government and counterterrorism officials with direct knowledge of the effort.

For more than a year, U.S. forces in Iraq have secretly detained dozens of suspected Iranian agents, holding them for three to four days at a time. The "catch and release" policy was designed to avoid escalating tensions with Iran and yet intimidate its emissaries. U.S. forces collected DNA samples from some of the Iranians without their knowledge, subjected others to retina scans, and fingerprinted and photographed all of them before letting them go.

Last summer, however, senior administration officials decided that a more confrontational approach was necessary, as Iran's regional influence grew and U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran appeared to be failing. The country's nuclear work was advancing, U.S. allies were resisting robust sanctions against the Tehran government, and Iran was aggravating sectarian violence in Iraq.

"There were no costs for the Iranians," said one senior administration official. "They are hurting our mission in Iraq, and we were bending over backwards not to fight back."

Three officials said that about 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command, are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time. There is no evidence the Iranians have directly attacked U.S. troops in Iraq, intelligence officials said.

But, for three years, the Iranians have operated an embedding program there, offering operational training, intelligence and weaponry to several Shiite militias connected to the Iraqi government, to the insurgency and to the violence against Sunni factions. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the CIA, told the Senate recently that the amount of Iranian-supplied materiel used against U.S. troops in Iraq "has been quite striking."

"Iran seems to be conducting a foreign policy with a sense of dangerous triumphalism," Hayden said.

The new "kill or capture" program was authorized by President Bush in a meeting of his most senior advisers last fall, along with other measures meant to curtail Iranian influence from Kabul to Beirut and, ultimately, to shake Iran's commitment to its nuclear efforts. Tehran insists that its nuclear program is peaceful, but the United States and other nations say it is aimed at developing weapons.

The administration's plans contain five "theaters of interest," as one senior official put it, with military, intelligence, political and diplomatic strategies designed to target Iranian interests across the Middle East.

The White House has authorized a widening of what is known inside the intelligence community as the "Blue Game Matrix" -- a list of approved operations that can be carried out against the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon. And U.S. officials are preparing international sanctions against Tehran for holding several dozen al-Qaeda fighters who fled across the Afghan border in late 2001. They plan more aggressive moves to disrupt Tehran's funding of the radical Palestinian group Hamas and to undermine Iranian interests among Shiites in western Afghanistan.

In Iraq, U.S. troops now have the authority to target any member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, as well as officers of its intelligence services believed to be working with Iraqi militias. The policy does not extend to Iranian civilians or diplomats. Though U.S. forces are not known to have used lethal force against any Iranian to date, Bush administration officials have been urging top military commanders to exercise the authority.

The wide-ranging plan has several influential skeptics in the intelligence community, at the State Department and at the Defense Department who said that they worry it could push the growing conflict between Tehran and Washington into the center of a chaotic Iraq war.
Senior administration officials said the policy is based on the theory that Tehran will back down from its nuclear ambitions if the United States hits it hard in Iraq and elsewhere, creating a sense of vulnerability among Iranian leaders. But if Iran responds with escalation, it has the means to put U.S. citizens and national interests at greater risk in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Officials said Hayden counseled the president and his advisers to consider a list of potential consequences, including the possibility that the Iranians might seek to retaliate by kidnapping or killing U.S. personnel in Iraq.

Two officials said that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, though a supporter of the strategy, is concerned about the potential for errors, as well as the ramifications of a military confrontation between U.S. and Iranian troops on the Iraqi battlefield.

In meetings with Bush's other senior advisers, officials said, Rice insisted that the defense secretary appoint a senior official to personally oversee the program to prevent it from expanding into a full-scale conflict. Rice got the oversight guarantees she sought, though it remains unclear whether senior Pentagon officials must approve targets on a case-by-case basis or whether the oversight is more general.

The departments of Defense and State referred all requests for comment on the Iran strategy to the National Security Council, which declined to address specific elements of the plan and would not comment on some intelligence matters.

But in response to questions about the "kill or capture" authorization, Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the NSC, said: "The president has made clear for some time that we will take the steps necessary to protect Americans on the ground in Iraq and disrupt activity that could lead to their harm. Our forces have standing authority, consistent with the mandate of the U.N. Security Council."

Officials said U.S. and British special forces in Iraq, which will work together in some operations, are developing the program's rules of engagement to define the exact circumstances for using force. In his last few weeks as the top commander in Iraq, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr. sought to help coordinate the program on the ground. One official said Casey had planned to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard as a "hostile entity," a distinction within the military that would permit offensive action.

Casey's designated successor, Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, told Congress in writing this week that a top priority will be "countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, and the continued mission of dismantling terrorist networks and killing or capturing those who refuse to support a unified, stable Iraq."

Advocates of the new policy -- some of whom are in the NSC, the vice president's office, the Pentagon and the State Department -- said that only direct and aggressive efforts can shatter Iran's growing influence. A less confident Iran, with fewer cards, may be more willing to cut the kind of deal the Bush administration is hoping for on its nuclear program. "The Iranians respond to the international community only when they are under pressure, not when they are feeling strong," one official said.

With aspects of the plan also targeting Iran's influence in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories, the policy goes beyond the threats Bush issued earlier this month to "interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria" into Iraq. It also marks a departure from years past when diplomacy appeared to be the sole method of pressuring Iran to reverse course on its nuclear program.

R. Nicholas Burns, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, said in an interview in late October that the United States knows that Iran "is providing support to Hezbollah and Hamas and supporting insurgent groups in Iraq that have posed a problem for our military forces." He added: "In addition to the nuclear issue, Iran's support for terrorism is high up on our agenda."

Burns, the top Foreign Service officer in the State Department, has been leading diplomatic efforts to increase international pressure on the Iranians. Over several months, the administration made available five political appointees for interviews, to discuss limited aspects of the policy, on the condition that they not be identified.

[Rasputin]

The other night, over dinner in a cozy little tavern, I was engaged in a maddening discussion with my colleague from Norway on a recent Time magazine cover headlined "What war with Iran would look like." Even with the recent Democratic Party victory sweeping the nation, I argued there is still talk that Bush may have time to get his invasion plans for Iran in before his presidential timeline expires. If this proves true, then for this hyphenated-American, it's a hard thing to stomach. I will admit that I am frightened to think of the consequences. If we all buy into Seymour Hersh's concepts of Iran as the next Iraq, then what about my aunts and cousins who still live in Tehran and can't get out in time?

For many months now, Mr Hersh has filed ongoing reports on the Bush Administration's purported plans for an air strike within Iran. The Bush administration repudiated and cited Hersh's reportage as "wild speculation". But the potency of this argument has lingered around like a wet, stench odor.

It now seems fairly plausible -- this once wildly speculated plan. A travesty to those of us who symbolize a harmonious partnership between the US and Iran. Not all of us are automatically drawn to the side of Ahmadinejad.

Having grown up in the United States, I want just as much a bite off that all American burger as any other American. And my father prefers to barbecue hot dogs to kabobs on any given Sunday. San Francisco Forty Niners cap and barbecue pit in tow.

One autumn Sunday after the September 11th attacks, my father barbecued us up a whole mess of hamburgers and hot dogs and we ate a big American feast. We were sitting outside as the late afternoon California sunshine warmed our faces. My brother's friend, another hyphenated American, but this time German, kept frowning at my father. He finally spoke up, juicy half-bitten chunks of hamburger still in his mouth,

"Its interesting your wearing a NYFD (New York Fire Department) t-shirt at a time like this. Considering what just happened."

My father just looked up at him a smiled and swallowed and then picked up a glass of water to drink.

"Oh, yes," he chuckled in a deep Iranian accent. "We do not all support terrorists. But it seems most Americans now think that because we are from the Middle East, this reason alone automatically associates us as being radical."

Whether we believe in what we read in the news or the multiple videos chronicling conspiracy theories, they all follow along the same yellow brick road. Yes Dorothy, that man (Ahmadenijad) behind the big scary façade is just a tiny mortal just like the rest of us.

My cousin, for example, is a firm believer in conspiracy theories. Speaking with a deep California surfer boy accent, he often outlines the Loose Changian philosophies that oppose what the media may be telling us at the time. Prior to September 11, my cousin preferred to discuss the technological wonders of Nintendo over the military blunders of NATO, but now all of his talks center on some kind of secret puppet master controlling the joystick of foreign policy.

"That's how they do it" he tells me.

"Do what?" I ask.

"Trick us into believing that Muslims are the ones responsible for all of the disasters."

A soft man, now in his mid twenties, my cousin, a US Citizen having grown up in California, never fails to get stopped at airports. After all, he fits the US Homeland Security profile of the physicality of a terrorist. Young, male and Muslim.

It may be easier for my cousin and for many Muslim American men to believe there is a master plan. As they get swiped down and their luggage torn open, they may find it an easier place to rest in their minds if they think that someone must be behind the game panel. That this Guantanamo ridiculousness has to be some kind of funny game. Maybe this is easier to stomach than to actually believe that there is no higher force in control.

If we truly want to open up the dialogue then we have to come to the common understanding that Ahmadenijad and Bush are opposite sides of the same coin. They are both preaching a maniacal religious agenda and nationalist revolution. As Negar Azimi writes in What's Left of Reform (The Nation, November 2006), "Perhaps the only government they (Iranian civil society) dislike more than their own is an American one they associate with double standards and overzealous meddling that goes back more than a century, reaching deep into their psyches."

One can't dispute that the Iranian Revolution pioneered other nationalist Islamic revolutions. Its consequences, were nevertheless brutal to average Iranians just trying to get through the day. I remember hearing stories from my cousins during the mid-eighties -the height of the revolution and fighting with Iraq. I was a young teen at the time and my cousin Behnaz used to tell us how the Kommittee (a sect of the Iranian revolutionary guards) used to break into house parties where teenagers from both sexes gathered.

Having grown up in a deeply segregated Iran, buses where men sat in the front and women in the back, Behnaz was ready for the break-in and search and complete degradation of females by the guards. She told me stories of how underneath the chador, women and girls wore minis***ts and tank tops and if there was a Kommittee raid, they had pants ready in their purses to slip on quickly as they made a mad dash for the door, hoping on one leg while slipping into their conservative surrogate outfits. During these raids, teens would jump out of windows, climb rooftops and stumble down stairs upon hearing the words "Kommittee!" Her brother Nader, was caught once. He has whipped a dozen times on the back side with a belt. His friend Shahram, then fifteen, was jailed for four months for talking back during the beating.

Another not so fortunate nine year old girl went swimming that same week one scorching afternoon in her own swimming pool. A noisy neighbor reported her to the Kommittee and a guard came to the house and shot her dead in her own pool. The blood draining from her body, her father came home and attacked the guards. He was taken to prison and his wife, left alone. She was chastised by the rest of the community for allowing her daughter to be so "loose" as to swim in a bathing suit in broad daylight.

During the over eight year bombing raids, "Tavajoh, Tavajoh (attention, attention)" became common language and these words swept through the city, as families dived for basement shelters to escape death and destruction by Iraqi soldiers. With her nights spent hiding out in the shelter, it was during the days on her way to school that Behnaz and the other young girls were followed on the street by the Kommittee. "Pull your chador up more" they'd shout at her. "Take off that make-up!" Older pious women would stand in the streets with dirty dish rags and wipe make-up off the faces of women and girls. Telephones would be wired, as oddly enough, they are in America today. The experience she'd tell me years later, all too humiliating to comprehend.

[Rasputin]

I remember hearing these tales from the cozy nook of my living room high up in the sunny hills of California. My sister and I would sit, wide-eyed and amazed at the thought of being forced to grow up in such a draconian society. We felt so sorry for Behnaz and her friends.

These events underscore that clearly not all Iranians are eager to have the Islamic revolution continue. Indeed many Americans might be surprised to discover that the 70% of Iran's under 30 population is opposed to the Islamic party gaining more power. I believe the most effective strategy must be rooted in organized movement from Iranian civil society and youth groups. Although Iranian bloggers have been harassed and jailed in recent years, their messages do still get out to expatriate Iranian communities in Europe and the US. These voices need to be lent a larger stage in more American and European press.

Iranian civil society has to be the key to Iran slowly building itself up an autonomous social framework to reach out to the remaining liberalized Iranian leaders. It is only then the Iranian community as a whole can work together to create a plan to boost investments and resources, create jobs to defeat the current staggering unemployment rate and advocate on behalf of women and youth. Iran's Statistic Center and the Central Bank both reported last year that the rate was over 12 percent and some reports sited a rate as high as 20 percent. According to official estimates, nearly 3.5 million working age Iranians are currently unemployed. The jobless rate is particularly high among women and youth of the Islamic Republic. Iranian authorities have called unemployment a national threat and one of the country's most pressing priorities.

What many western governments have failed to understand is that radicalization and Islamic fervor breed with unemployment, lack of liberties for women and youth disenfranchisement. Rather than fielding threats and sanctions, why doesn't the US Administration look to an economic solution rather than a foreign political solution? Better job opportunities for Iranians brings social prosperity and sanctions all but even further distance Iranians from understanding the American democratic ideal. After all, if an Iranian male in his early twenties can't get a job and a piece of bread to eat because of US lobbied sanctions, then why would he want to buy into the sanctimonious spell of democracy? He would rather buy into straying from radicalization if perhaps, food was on the table and a proper job through solid US investments made him better recognize the value of a democratic society free from Ahmadenijad's isolated notions of a Muslim republic.

The US Administration must also restructure its policy actions to include Iran in the process. As Walter Isaacson states: "Talks with Iran should begin, without preconditions, by discussing such a framework while getting Iran involved in keeping the chaos in Iraq apart from ripping apart the region, {and} in the process, Iranians will see more clearly the benefits of being treated as a responsible global player." But the Bush Administration has been relentless in even further sheltering Americana from the world's understanding. German author Robert von Rimscha has stated repeatedly, that Europe's young people "are not simply saying We do not need the US any longer. But we do not want the US any longer." And in his article entitled The Imperial City, broadcaster and editor Kurt Andersen writes that the recent US attacks on the middle east have confused the region's civil society to an end where there may be no clear understanding on their side that there is a way to go back to life as it once was.

Engaging in diplomacy with Iran will affect its internal politics, in a way that the current US Administration has failed to understand. I am a hyphenated-American willing to listen to reason and I believe my brothers and sisters in Iran are also on stand by for a more integrated approach that doesn't focus on attacks but rather promotes economic and social investment. As former President Khatami stated in a speech on the dialogue among civilizations," When superficial issues masquerade as real, urgent and essential, and where no agreement, or at least mutual understanding, obtains among parties to dialogue concerning what is truly fundamental, in all likelihood misunderstanding and confusion will proliferate instead of any sense of empathy and compassion."

So, let's break out the mini-sandwiches and bottled water and really talk to each other.

[Rasputin]

جورج بوش، رییس جمهوری آمریکا، ضمن هشدار عليه آنچه که دخالت ايران در عراق خواند، ادامه برنامه های هسته ای جمهوری اسلامی را به زيان مردم ايران توصيف کرد.
رييس جمهوری آمريکا در مصاحبه با رادیو ملی آمریکا (NPR ) ديدگاه های خود را در مورد روابط آمريکا و ايران در مورد عراق و همچنين برنامه های هسته ای جمهوری اسلامی تشريح کرد.

وی به ايران هشدارداد که اگر فعاليت نظامی خود در عراق را به زيان نيروهای آمريکايی و "مردم بی گناه عراق" شدت بخشد، با پاسخ قاطعانه ايالات متحده روبرو خواهد شد.

در پاسخ به اين سئوال که آيا برای اقدام عليه ايران، خواستار مصوبه کنگره هم می شود، آقای بوش گفت که در نظر ندارد ايران را اشغال کند ولی افزود که "البته از نيروهای خود در عراق محافظت خواهيم کرد."

رييس جمهوری آمريکا جنگ با ايران را رد کرد و گفت "نمی دانم چه طور کسی می تواند بگويد که اين جمله که ما از نيروهای خود حفاظت خواهيم کرد به معنی اشغال خاک ايران است؟"

از آقای بوش در مورد ساير مسايل مورد اختلاف ايران و ايالات متحده سئوال شد.

وی گفت که در مورد روابط آمريکا و ايران موضوع های متعددی مطرح است و نبايد اين موضوعات را با يکديگر مخلوط کرد.

آقای بوش گفت که يکی از اين جنبه ها، مداخله ايران در امور عراق و جنبه ديگر، برنامه تسليحات هسته ای ايران است.

برنامه 'تسليحات اتمی' ايران

رييس جمهوری آمريکا در مورد آنچه که برنامه تسليحات اتمی ايران می خواند گفت که ايالات متحده با اين مساله برخوردی ديپلماتيک دارد و به نظر وی، می توان اين مساله را از راه های ديپلماتيک حل کرد.


شما فرصتی داريد تا به عنوان يک سنت بزرگ مجددا شکوفا شويد اما اگر دولت شما بر برنامه تسليحات اتمی اصرار ورزد، اين به منزله از دست رفتن فرصت ها برای مردم ايران است که نخواهند توانست قابليت های خود را به طور کامل تحقق بخشند


جورج بوش

وی گفت که پيامی که ايالات متحده می خواهد برای رژيم ايران و مردم ايران ارسال دارد اين است که اگر به برنامه تسليحات اتمی ادامه دهند، بيش از پيش منزوی خواهند شد.

آقای بوش افزود "پيام من به مردم ايران اين است که دولت شما باعث محروميت شما خواهد شد."

وی خطاب به مردم ايران گفت "شما فرصتی داريد تا به عنوان يک سنت بزرگ مجددا شکوفا شويد اما اگر دولت شما بر برنامه تسليحات اتمی اصرار ورزد، اين به منزله از دست رفتن فرصت ها برای مردم ايران است که نخواهند توانست قابليت های خود را به طور کامل تحقق بخشند."

اظهارات آقای بوش پس از آن پخش می شود که سفير ايران در عراق در گفتگو با روزنامه نیویورک تایمز از عزم کشورش برای گسترش روابط و تقويت حضور اقتصادی در عراق خبر داده بود.

مقام های آمريکايی نسبت به اين اظهارات ابراز ترديد کرده و گفته اند عملکرد جمهوری اسلامی تا کنون "چيزی خلاف اين را نشان می دهد."

گوردون جاندرو، سخنگوی شورای امنيت ملی آمريکا نیز اعلام کرده که واشنگتن از هر تصميم ايران برای بر عهده گرفتن نقشی سازنده در عراق استقبال می کند اما افزوده که "تا کنون شاهدی بر اين مدعا ديده نشده و هر چه بوده خلاف اين بوده است."

دولت آمريکا ايران را متهم می کند که با برخی گروه های شورشی در عراق مرتبط است و از اين طريق در کشته شدن سربازان آمريکايی نقش دارد. مقام های ايرانی همواره اين اتهام را رد کرده و حضور نيروهای ائتلاف در عراق را عامل نا امنی و خشونت های فرقه ای دانسته است.

[Rasputin]

[Rasputin]

سناتورهای جمهوری*خواه و دموکرات، روز سه*شنبه نسبت به وجود گرایشی در دولت بوش برای حمله به ایران هشدار دادند و از دولت جورج بوش به سبب از دست دادن فرصت گفتگوی بالقوه سازنده با ایران بر سر عراق انتقاد کردند.
به گزارش خبرگزاری آسوشیتد پرس، سناتور دموکرات، باراک اوباما، خطاب به جان نگروپونته، نامزد معاونت وزارت امورخارجه آمریکا، اظهار داشت: " گمان می*کنم نگرانی بسیاری از ما از این بابت است که عملا ناگهان وارد جنگ با ایران بشویم بدون اینکه جسورانه رویکردهای دیپلماتیک را در پیش گرفته باشیم، و بدون اینکه مردم آمریکا دقیقا بدانند چه اتفاقی در حال وقوع است".
باراک اوباما، کاندیدای ریاست*جمهوری سال 2008 آمریکا، در کمیته روابط خارجی سنا اظهار داشت که هر دو حزب جمهوری*خواه و دموکرات خواستار "روشنی و شفافیت در سیاست ایالات متحده هستند، بطوریکه ما برخی اشتباهاتمان را که در گذشته مرتکب شده*ایم تکرار نکنیم".
سناتور جمهوری*خواه، چاک هاگل، از جان نگروپونته، پرسید که آیا به نظر وی ایالات متحده در آستانه یک برخورد با تهران است؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش سناتور جان نگروپونته با اشاره به تاکید*های بوش گفت که دیپلماسی اولویت دارد. با این حال نگروپونته خاطرنشان کرد که "ما دیگر گزینه*ها را کنار نمی*گذاریم".
بوش روز سه شنبه گفت اگر ایران تحرک نظامی در خاک عراق را افزایش دهد و نیروهای آمریکایی را با خطر مواجه سازد، ایالات متحده "با آن برخورد خواهد کرد". با این حال بوش در گفتگو با شبکه ای.بی سی گفت که این اظهارات حاکی از هیچگونه قصد حمله به ایران نیست.
روز دوشنبه رییس*جمهوری آمریکا، درباره گزارش*های اطلاعاتی ابراز تردید کرد. بوش با اشاره به اینکه واشنگتن درباره اتهام وجود سلاح*های کشتار جمعی در عراق دچار اشتباه بود اظهار داشت "من هم مانند بسیاری از آمریکایی*ها هستم که می*گویند خوب، اگر گزارش*های عراق اشتباه بود، از کجا می*دانید که درباره ایران درست باشد".
واشنگتن، تهران را متهم می*کند که افراطیون شیعه درعراق را آموزش داده و آنها را تجهیز می*کند. واشنگتن در واکنش، دیپلمات*های ایرانی در عراق را بازداشت کرد و کاخ سفید اعلام کرد بوش مجوز دستگیری یا کشتن ایرانی*های مشکوک در عراق را صادر کرده است.
به نظر می**رسد شماری از سناتورهای آمریکایی و از جمله هاگل، جورج ویونویچو جوزف بایدن، از تصمیم دولت بوش برای عدم تعامل با تهران سرخورده شده*اند.
جان نگروپونته در کمیته روابط خارجی سنا اظهار داشت که سوریه اجازه می*دهد که ماهانه 40 تا 70 جنگجوی خارجی از مرزهایش به داخل عراق بیایند و ایران هم دربرابر نیروهای آمریکایی به شورشیان کمک می*کند. نگروپونته گفت ایران و سوریه به برقراری ثبات در عراق کمک نمی*کنند.
اگر کمیته روابط خارجی سنا نگروپونته را به تایید کند وی در وزارت امورخارجه آمریکا سیاست**های واشنگتن در عراق را پیش خواهد برد.
نگروپونته، چهل سال پیشینه دیپلماتیک دارد و نخستین سفیر آمریکا پس از حمله عراق بود. نگروپونته همچنین در آمریکای لاتین و و در سیاست آمریکا در زمینه کره شمالی درای تجربه است.